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YOUTH	 IN 	AGR IBUS INESS 	 IN 	UGANDA	
AN 	ETHNOGRAPHY 	OF 	A 	DEVELOPMENT 	
TREND	
	
Okonkwo	was	clearly	cut	out	for	great	things.	He	was	still	young	but	he	had	won	fame	as	the	
greatest	wrestler	in	the	nine	villages.	He	was	a	wealthy	farmer	and	had	two	barns	full	of	
yams,	and	had	just	married	his	third	wife.	To	crown	it	all	he	had	taken	two	titles	and	had	
shown	incredible	prowess	in	two	inter-tribal	wars.	And	so	although	Okonkwo	was	still	young,	
he	was	already	one	of	the	greatest	men	of	his	time.	Age	was	respected	among	his	people,	but	
achievement	was	revered.	As	the	elders	said,	if	a	child	washed	his	hands	he	could	eat	with	
kings.	Okonkwo	had	clearly	washed	his	hands	and	so	he	ate	with	kings	and	elders.	(Achebe,	
2001,	p.	6-7)	
	
	“Above	all,	one	should	not	wish	to	divest	existence	of	its	rich	ambiguity”	(Nietzsche,	1974,	p.	
335)	
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ABSTRACT	
In	the	history	of	development	policy	making	for	Africa	there	have	been	many	major	changes	
between	 the	 themes	 and	 issues	 that	 have	 received	 the	 attention	 and	 budgets	 of	
governments	 and	 donors.	 Different	 approaches	 to	 development,	 swinging	 from	 structural	
adjustments	 to	market	 liberalisations,	 have	 focused,	 sequentially,	 on	environmental	 issues,	
democratisation,	 health	 (HIV/AIDS),	 and	 gender	 issues.	 Consecutively,	 new	 demographic,	
economic	 and	 political	 bottlenecks	 have	 been	 identified,	 giving	 rise	 to	 new	 trends	 in	
development	policy	making	and	budgeting	–	what	I	will	refer	to	in	this	thesis	as	‘development	
trends’.	
Recently,	the	demographic	boom	on	the	African	continent,	and	the	consequent	challenge	of	
unemployment,	 has	 fuelled	 a	 focus	 on	 ‘youth’.	 Given	 that	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 African	
population	resides	in	rural	areas,	the	emphasis	of	development	policies	for	youth	has	focused	
on	their	employability	 in	the	agricultural	sector.	While	the	commercialisation	of	agriculture,	
as	 a	 development	 theme,	 has	 alternated	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 food	 security	 for	 decades,	 the	
emphasis	 on	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 has	 come	 to	 dominate	 development	 policy	making	 and	
budgeting	in	the	past	five	years	(with	country-specific	variations).	Yet,	the	‘youthfulness’	and	
booming	demography	on	the	African	continent	have	not	come	as	a	surprise.	The	mean	age	of	
the	African	population	has	been	oscillating	between	17	and	19	years	since	the	‘1950s1,	while	
the	 sheer	 size	of	 the	population	has	 steadily	grown	at	a	2.0-2.8%	 rate	 in	 the	 same	period.	
This	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 understand	 how	 these	 demographics	 have	 turned	 into	 a	 trend	 only	
recently	despite	the	lingering	youth	problematique.		
The	main	research	question	of	this	dissertation	is:	How	has	the	social	category	of	youth	been	
driving	a	new	trend	in	development	around	agribusiness,	and	what	has	been	its	impact	so	far?	
This	 study	 attempts	 to	 answer	 this	 question	 for	 the	 case	 of	 Uganda.	 Reflecting	 the	
demographic	trends	on	the	African	continent,	Uganda	has	an	exceptionally	young	population,	
which	is	mostly	employed	in	agriculture.	Like	in	other	countries	throughout	Africa,	over	the	
past	 few	 years,	 increasing	 attention	 and	 budgets	 have	 been	 placed	 on	 engaging	 youths	 in	
																																																						
1	Statistics	 accessed	 on	 9/09/2018:	 http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-
population/	
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agribusiness.	 Moreover,	 Uganda’s	 relation	 with	 the	 (international)	 community	 has	 also	
followed	rather	average	patterns.	Thus,	while	unique	in	many	ways,	Uganda	is	a	‘typical	case	
study’	 both	 as	 an	 aid	 recipient	 and	 as	 a	 participant	 in	 the	 development	 trend	 focusing	 on	
youth	in	agribusiness.		
I	studied	the	emergence	of	the	development	trend	on	youth	in	agribusiness	from	two	angles:	
conducting	ethnographic	research	with	both	development	practitioners	engaged	in	the	field	
of	 agribusiness,	 and	 youths	 working	 both	 inside	 and	 outside	 of	 development	 schemes.	 In	
total,	I	interviewed	24	representatives	of	development	agencies	and	110	youths	living	in	four	
regions	 of	 the	 country.	 I	 also	 engaged	 in	 participant	 observation,	 joining	 development	
practitioners	for	field	visits,	sitting	in	high-level	meetings,	and	interacting	with	youths	during	
their	 agribusiness	 activities	 at	 the	 markets,	 in	 the	 agricultural	 fields	 and	 visiting	 their	
households.		
From	my	research,	it	became	apparent	that	development	partners	have	a	range	of	‘theories	
of	change’	regarding	youths	in	agribusiness.	In	particular,	while	some	development	agencies	
took	 a	 public-sector	 approach,	 others	 took	 a	 private-sector	 driven	 approach.	
Correspondingly,	 the	 implementation	 and	 impact	 of	 these	 programmes	 was	 very	 diverse	
across	 the	 country	 and	 depended	 mainly	 on	 the	 geographical	 location	 and	 the	 approach	
adopted.	From	my	interviews	with	youths,	I	also	found	that	this	socially	constructed	category	
was	very	heterogeneous.	The	diversity	that	characterises	this	group	has	strong	impact	on	the	
implementation	of	the	programmes.	The	most	successful	programmes	were	those	that	took	
into	account	youths’	heterogeneity	and	geographical	specificities.		
Altogether,	I	find	that	the	social	category	of	youth	is	too	vaguely	defined	to	effectively	guide	
development	 programmes.	 Development	 programmes	 considerably	 changed,	 from	 the	
elaboration	 of	 theories	 of	 change	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 programmes,	 and	 the	
political	 agendas	 and	 incentives	 of	 the	 development	 organisations	 required	 strenuous	
negotiations	and	adaptations.	In	other	words,	besides	the	gap	in	development	narratives	and	
actual	practices	on	 the	ground,	 there	are	gaps	between	 and	also	within	 the	narratives	and	
practices	 of	 both	 groups	 of	 development	 actors	 (practitioners	 and	 youths).	 There	 is	
contestation	at	all	levels,	which	has	consistent	impact	on	the	outcomes	of	the	programmes.	
Theoretically,	 my	 research	 suggests	 that	 development,	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	
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development	 trend	 like	 youth	 in	 agribusiness,	 should	 be	 understood	 and	 studied	 as	 a	
complex	 process	 in	 which	 social	 actors	 enforce	 power	 mechanisms,	 rather	 than	 as	 the	
enactment	of	policies	into	practices.			 	
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1.1	INTRODUCTION		
	“‘Youth	 is	 just	 a	 word”,	 wrote	 Bourdieu	 (1993),	 referring	 to	 the	 arbitrary	 and	 contextual	
definitions	of	this	social	category.	As	a	phase	between	childhood	and	adulthood,	‘youth’	is	a	
condition	 of	 liminality,2	marginal	 and	 transient	 in	 nature.	 However,	 despite	 the	 apparent	
marginality	of	this	social	category,	the	concept	of	‘youth’	has	recently	assumed	a	prominent	
role	in	public	debates	about	development	in	Africa.	With	a	median	age	that	is	half	that	of	the	
European	population,	 the	African	population	 is	expected	 to	double	by	20503	-	generating	a	
‘youth	bulge’.	With	the	majority	of	the	population	engaged	in	subsistence	agriculture,	youth	
unemployment	 has	 become	 a	major	 concern	 across	 the	 continent.	 In	 the	 past	 few	 years,	
development	 agencies	 have	 brought	 African	 youths	 under	 the	 spotlight.	 Despite	 the	
uncertainty	 and	 fuzziness	 that	 characterises	 its	 definitions	 (Sommers,	 2015),	 ‘youth’	 has	
become	 the	 object	 of	 multi-million	 development	 programmes.	 Such	 demographic	 and	
economic	concerns	have	fuelled	a	relatively	new	trend	in	development	policy	making,	which	
aims	 at	 engaging	 youth	 in	 agribusiness.	 This	 study	 explores	 the	 unfolding	 of	 such	 trend	 in	
development,	and	its	rationale	and	impact.			
How	 has	 the	 social	 category	 of	 youth	 been	 driving	 a	 new	 trend	 in	 development	 around	
agribusiness,	and	what	has	been	its	impact	so	far?		
This	study	focuses	on	the	case	of	Uganda,	one	of	the	world’s	47	least-developed	countries4,	
and	the	country	with	the	second	youngest	population	on	the	continent	(in	terms	of	median	
age).	 I	 have	 chosen	 the	Ugandan	context	 as	 a	 ‘typical	 case	 study’	 (Gerring,	2008).	As	 I	will	
show	below	(sections	1.2.3	and	1.3),	the	political-economic	history	of	the	country,	together	
																																																						
2	‘Liminality’	is	a	fundamental	concept	in	anthropological	research	that	refers	to	a	phase	‘in	between’	
rites	of	passage,	life	stages,	or	anyway	uncertainty	and	ambiguity	of	the	social	status	of	human	beings	
in	this	stage.	The	main	academic	work	on	this	theme	is	to	be	attributed	to	Arnold	van	Gennep,	who,	in	
1909,	published	the	founding	manuscript	‘Rites	of	Passage’(van	Gennep,	2006)	
3	Data	accessed	on	2/10/2018	on:	http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-
population/	
4	As	of	December	2018,	according	to	UN’s	Committee	for	Development	Policy,	accessed	on	
30/01/2018:	https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-
content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf	
	 11	
with	 its	experience	as	a	donor	darling,	make	 it	 a	 representative	 case	of	how	such	 trend	 in	
development	is	adopted	in	similar	African	contexts.		
Since	 about	2015,	with	 the	 second	National	Development	Plan,	 ‘youth	 in	 agribusiness’	 has	
entered	the	scene	of	development	policy	making	in	Uganda	as	a	major	subject.		An	increasing	
number	 of	 programmes	 and	 growing	 budgets	 by	 multilateral,	 bilateral	 and	 Ugandan	
governmental	institutions	have	been	targeting	youths.	‘Youth	in	agribusiness’	has	become	a	
multi-million	business:	a	new	development	trend.		
However,	 little	 is	known	as	 to	what	defines	 ‘youth’	 in	Uganda,	and	what	youths’	capacities	
and	 constraints	 are	 for	 agribusiness.	 With	 78%	 of	 the	 population	 under	 30	 years	 of	 age,	
defining	this	social	category	is	as	arduous	as	necessary.	Due	to	the	heterogeneity	that	can	be	
expected	of	a	majoritarian	social	group,	it	remains	unclear:	1)	how	have	the	Ugandan	youths	
been	targeted	by	development	agencies?	2)	who	are	the	Ugandan	youths	and	what	do	they	
think	 of	 these	 programmes?	 3)	 and	 what	 has	 been	 the	 socio-economic	 impact	 of	 the	
programmes?	These	three	questions	will	be	the	main	focus	of	the	three	empirical	chapters	
that	follow.			
This	chapter	 is	 structured	as	 follows.	 In	 the	 following	section	 (1.2)	 I	 introduce	the	research	
problem	 that	 I	 am	 going	 to	 address	 with	 this	 study	 –	 namely	 the	 rationale	 of	 addressing	
youth	in	agribusiness	with	development	programmes.	First	(sub-section	1.2.1),	I	problematize	
‘youth’	as	a	contested	social	category.	Second	(sub-section	1.2.2),	I	contextualise	the	choice	
of	engaging	youth	in	agribusiness.	Third	(sub-section	1.2.3)	I	 justify	the	choice	of	Uganda	as	
case	study	for	my	research.	In	the	following	section	(1.3),	I	give	the	reader	and	overview	of	
the	political-economic	context	of	the	study,	by	contextualising	the	history	of	development	in	
Uganda	and	explaining	the	recent	trend	in	development	which	targets	youth	in	agribusiness	
(sub-section	1.3.1).	Within	the	frame	of	the	contextualisation	of	this	study,	I	dedicate	section	
1.3.2	 to	 a	 brief	 political-economic	 history	 of	 Uganda	 since	 independence,	 with	 particular	
attention	 to	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 (sub-section	 1.3.2a).	 In	 the	 following	 section	 (1.4),	 I	
introduce	 the	 theoretical	 approach	 I	 have	 adopted	 to	 carry	 out	 this	 study,	 within	 the	
framework	 of	 Foucauldian	 development	 studies.	 In	 section	 1.5	 I	 make	 an	 overview	 and	
justification	of	the	methodological	approach	I	adopted,	combining	anthropological	methods	
to	a	Foucauldian	approach.	Subsequently	(section	1.6),	I	briefly	outline	my	findings	and	their	
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scientific	 (1.6.2)	and	societal	 (1.6.3)	relevance.	 I	conclude	this	chapter	 (section	1.7)	with	an	
overview	of	the	structure	of	the	manuscript.		
	
1.2	RESEARCH	PROBLEM:	WHY	YOUTH	IN	AGRIBUSINESS?	
The	 demographic	 and	 economic	 changes	 on	 the	 African	 continent	 over	 the	 past	 decades	
amount	to	a	historical	conjunction	where	the	‘youth’	are	about	to	become	a	major	social	and	
economic	share	of	the	population.	Increasingly,	political	and	development	initiatives	focus	on	
those	 between	 ages	 18	 and	 35	 for	 programmes	 that	 aim	 at	 reducing	 unemployment	 and	
boosting	 economic	 growth.	 From	 being	 a	marginal	 category	 of	 passage	 from	 childhood	 to	
adulthood,	 ‘youth’	 has	 become	 the	 prominent	 subject	 (or	 object)	 of	 development	 policy	
making.	 In	 the	 past	 decades,	 youth	 have	 been	 the	 target	 of	 development	 programmes	
concerned	 with	 education	 and	 health.	 Only	 recently,	 development	 programmes	 for	 youth	
have	 focused	on	 their	 engagement	 in	 commercial	 agriculture	 (in	opposition	 to	 subsistence	
agriculture)	 –	 or	what	 is	 now	 called	 agribusiness.	 Programmes	 for	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 in	
Africa	are	not	new	in	development	policy	making,	but	have	become,	 in	the	past	 five	to	ten	
years,	a	multi-million	business.	Uganda,	 the	nation	with	youngest	population	 in	East	Africa,	
and	one	of	the	youngest	on	the	continent	–	has	followed	this	trend.	As	I	will	explain	in	more	
detail	below	(1.2.3),	the	history	of	Uganda’s	relation	with	development	aid	make	it	a	typical	
case	study.		
Considering	that	the	majority	–	78%	(UBOS,	2017)	–	of	the	Ugandan	population	is	under	30	
years	 of	 age,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 give	 an	 all-encompassing	 definition	 of	 youth,	 beyond	 an	 age	
bracket.	 The	 arbitrary	 choice	 of	 an	 age	 range	 defines	 the	 boundaries	 of	 a	 social	 category,	
while	 such	 category	 has	 little	 explanatory	 power	 of	 who	 the	 youths	 actually	 are.	 In	 the	
section	 (1.2.1)	 below,	 I	 problematize	 this	 definitional	 problem.	 Moreover,	 I	 question	 the	
choice	of	development	organisations	to	seek	employment	for	the	Ugandan	youth	within	the	
agribusiness	 sector	 (sub-section	 1.2.2).	 	 I	 conclude	 this	 section	with	 an	 explanation	 of	my	
choice	of	Uganda	as	case	study	for	my	research	on	the	adoption	and	implementation	of	this	
new	trend	in	development	policy	making.		
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1.2.1	YOUTH	–	A	CONTESTED	SOCIAL	CATEGORY		
There	 is	not	a	 fixed	moment	 in	our	 lives	when	we	stop	being	children	 to	enter	adulthood.	
Rather,	this	transition	is	determined	culturally	within	our	specific	social	environments	(Aime	
&	Pietropolli	Charmet,	2014,	p.	11-20).	Calculating	age	can	be	an	arithmetical,	quantitative	
given	–	 yet,	 it	 is	 the	qualitative	 value	 that	we	 culturally	 attribute	 to	 it	 that	 is	 functional	 to	
social	status	(ibid:	18-19).	Africa	 is	the	continent	with	the	youngest	population:	the	median	
age	 is	 half	 that	 of	 the	 European	 continent.	 Like	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world	 stages	 in	 life	 are	
defined	 as	 social	 categories	 –	 childhood’,	 ‘youth’	 and	 ‘adulthood’	 –	within	 specific	 cultural	
environments.	 Yet,	 these	 categories	 are	 not	 static,	 but	 continuously	 adapt	 and	 transform	
depending	on	changes	in	society,	politics	and	economics.	In	Europe,	the	conceptualisation	of	
‘childhood’	 dates	 back	 to	 the	 19th	 and	 20th	 centuries	 and	 goes	 hand	 in	 hand	 with	 the	
industrialisation,	the	high	demand	for	child	 labour,	and	the	rise	of	the	bourgeoisie	(Aime	&	
Pietropolli	 Charmet,	 2014,	 p.	 12-13).	 With	 the	 schooling	 (of	 the	 bourgeois)	 and	 the	
exploitation	(of	the	working	class)	of	the	young,	new	ideas	and	rituals	were	created	around	
passages	between	age-related	social	categories	–	for	example	the	celebration	of	birthdays.	
When	I	travelled	to	Uganda	for	the	first	time	I	was	27,	young,	and	thus	belonged	to	a	minor	
segment	 of	 the	 aging	 European	 population.	 I	 was	 beginning	 an	 extended	 ethnographic	
research	 on	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 in	 Uganda,	 a	 country	 where	 the	 wide	 majority	 of	 the	
population	 is	younger	 than	me.	 In	my	home	country,	 Italy,	 the	mean	age	was	almost	46	 in	
2015.	 Meanwhile	 in	 Uganda	 the	 mean	 age	 was	 almost	 16.5	The	 same	 social	 category	 of	
youth,	 between	 18	 and	 356,	 must	 mean	 different	 things	 in	 such	 extremely	 different	
demographic	 contexts	 –	 let	 alone	 the	 socio-cultural	 and	 economic	 differences	 that	
distinguished	my	experience	of	being	young	from	that	of	my	Ugandan	peers.	 	 I	was	to	 find	
out	that	indeed	being	young	meant	different	things	throughout	the	country,	and	that	indeed	
because	of	the	heterogeneity	it	brought	along,	it	was	a	social	category	with	little	explanatory	
																																																						
5Statistics	accessed	on	8/09/2018:	https://www.statista.com/statistics/447643/average-age-of-the-
population-in-uganda/		
6	This	age	bracket	is	the	broadest	possible	bracket,	accommodating	the	definitions	of	all	development	
organisations	I	worked	with.	
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power.	 Yet,	 the	 same	 category	was	 the	 target	 of	multi-millions	 development	programmes.	
‘Youth’	is	a	double,	ambiguous,	social	category:	on	the	one	hand,	it	has	elusive	socio-cultural	
meaning,	on	the	other	hand	it	is	the	object	of	much	development	attention	and	resources.	
In	fact,	being	young	also	refers	to	the	effort	towards	adulthood	and	planning	for	a	future	of	
stability:	 youths	 in	 Europe	 study	 longer,	 enter	 the	 job	market	 later,	 and	marry	 even	 later.	
However,	there	are	great	differences	in	the	socio-economic	conditions	of	youths	in	Europe	–	
which	 are	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	 cultural	 conceptualisation	 of	 this	 social	 category	 (Aime	 &	
Pietropolli	 Charmet,	 2014,	 p.	 60-63).	 Cultural	 and	 socio-economic	 heterogeneity	 in	 the	
understanding	 of	 youth	 vary	 greatly	 also	 within	 one	 country.	 The	 use	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
‘youth’	needs	to	be	contextualised	(in	Europe	as	much	as	in	Africa),	and	cannot	be	projected	
on	 diverse	 socio-cultural	 environments	 without	 problematization.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	
definition	of	youth	that	is	used	by	development	programmes,	is	often	limited	to	an	age-range	
(Sommers,	2015).	
In	Uganda,	 ‘youth’	 indicates	the	 interval	between	childhood	and	adulthood.	Like	 in	Europe,	
there	are	countless	reasons	to	imagine	a	heterogeneous	group	of	people	responding	to	the	
age	range	between	18	and	35.	43	languages	are	spoken7	across	the	country,	which	has	strong	
regional	 disparities.	 In	 such	 diverse	 socio-cultural	 environment,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 imagine	 that	
youth	has	one	meaning.	As	Christiansen	et	al.	(2006,	p.	10)		explain:	
Though	 all	 too	 many	 anthropological,	 sociological	 and	 psychological	 studies	 have	
granted	the	concept	of	youth	and	a	priori	meaning,	seeing	 it	as	a	developmental	or	
life	stage,	the	transition	from	childhood	to	adulthood	should	not	be	considered	fixed	
and	stable.	Generational	categories	will	for	most	of	us	–	layman	and	researcher	alike	
–	 seem	 self-evident,	 but	 rather	 than	 being	 given	 naturally	 their	 meaning	 and	
manifestations	 arise	 in	 relation	 to	 specific	 social	 processes,	 cultural	 understandings	
and	 historical	 influences	 (cf.	Mannheim	 1952).	 Youth	 is	 differently	 constituted	 and	
configured	in	different	times	and	places.	It	may	be	an	influential	social	category	in	one	
context,	a	marginal	one	in	another	and	obsolete	in	a	third.	
																																																						
7	Ethnologue,	visited	on	3/08/2018	on:		https://www.ethnologue.com/country/UG	
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During	 my	 time	 in	 Uganda,	 I	 found	 that	 in	 the	 northern	 and	 the	 south-western	 regions	
entering	 and	 leaving	 the	 category	of	 ‘youth’	 is	 a	 generational	 process:	 youth	 is	 the	 liminal	
phase,	which	ideally	is	rather	short,	 in	which	socio-economic	status	is	accumulated	in	order	
to	access	adulthood	–	generally	through	marriage.	On	the	other	hand,	in	the	eastern	region,	
the	social	 category	of	youth	does	not	even	have	a	 term	 in	 the	 local	 language	–	one	would	
suspect	that	‘youth’	does	not	exist.	A	direct	passage	from	childhood	to	adulthood	is	marked	
by	the	initiation	rites	of	passage	of	circumcision	(for	males),	and	with	marriage	(for	females).	
As	I	was	told	(among	others)	by	Alex8,	a	“young	but	adult”	male	from	Mbale,	in	his	twenties:	
Me:		 When	 someone,	 before	 someone	 is	 circumcised,	 do	 you	 call	 that	 person	 a	
different	name? 
Alex:			Of	course!	For	me	as	I	told	you	now,	for	me	no	one	in	our	family	can	call	me	a	
“ka-boy”	
Me:				a	Ka-boy?	
Interpreter:				It	means	“small	boy”	
Me:				Ooh,	small	boy?	
Alex:				Yeah,	they	cannot	call	me	that,	now.	They	give	me	respect	as	a	mature	man.	
Me:				Ok.	Because	you	were	standing	still	while	being	circumcised?	
Alex:	Yeah.	As	a	mature	man	and	I’m	circumcised,	I	put	my	heart	there	to	circumcise	
me	[i.e.	he	showed	he	was	brave	and	faced	the	pain	of	circumcision].	
Interpreter:			And	you	didn’t	blink	[i.e.	didn’t	show	he	was	in	pain]?	
Alex:		 Yeah.	Now,	 they	 give	me	 respect,	 I	 am	a	man	and	 they	 see	me	as	 a	mature,	
yeah…and	I	can	talk	in	front	of	the	elderly.	
	
Between	being	 considered	a	 ka-boy	and	being	a	 respected,	mature	man,	 the	 young	boy	 is	
tested	on	his	achievements,	economic	status,	and	future	planning.	This	phase	of	liminality,	an	
in-between	phase,	does	not	even	deserve	a	proper	terminology	and	is	shun	away.	Due	to	the	
lack	of	 terminology	 in	the	 local	 language	–	 ‘lugisu’	–	 in	the	eastern	region	the	English	term	
‘youth’	 is	used,	when	referring	to	this	 liminal	phase.	 ‘Youth’	 is	associated	with	poverty,	and	
the	 related	 precarious	 condition	 of	 being	 unable	 to	 plan	 for	 the	 future.	 So	 I	 was	 told	 by	
																																																						
8	This	conversation	took	place	in	Kampala	on	5/05/2017	
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Richard9,	 a	 33	 years	 old	 agricultural	 entrepreneur	 –	 or	 ‘agripreneur’,	 i.e.	 someone	 who	
moved	 from	subsistence	 farming	 to	commercial	agribusiness.	 “The	youths	plan	 for	 today	–	
you	know?	The	majority,	they…	they	don’t	know	how	tomorrow	will	end.	What	I’m	seeing	is	
that	poverty	 is	 very	hard,	 to	 fight	poverty	 is	hard	but	we	are	 trying”	–	as	Richard	 told	me,	
youths	 are	 struggling	 with	 poverty	 and	 therefore	 are	 unable	 to	 settle	 and	 plan	 for	 their	
future,	which	is	his	definition	of	adulthood.		
As	 figure	1	demonstrates,	 the	population	of	Uganda	has	been	growing	 steadily	 in	 the	past	
two	decades,	at	a	percent	rate	of	3.2	annum	(UBOS,	2017).	Currently,	78%	of	the	population	
is	 under	 30	 years	 of	 age.	 Approaching	 40	million,	 the	 Ugandan	 population	 faces	 a	 ‘youth	
bulge’	–	with	nearly	50%	of	the	population	under	15	years	of	age.			
	
FIGURE	1.	CENSUS	POPULATION	1969-2014	SOURCE:	(UBOS,	2017,	P.	13)	
The	major	concern	regarding	this	rapid	(and	foreseen)	population	growth	is	unemployment.	
As	Datzberger	(2018,	p.	132)	argues,	this	condition	is	not	unique	to	Uganda	–	as	much	as	the	
very	definition	of	the	issue	of	youth	unemployment	remains	elusive:	“As	in	many	low-income	
countries,	youth	unemployment	is	pervasive,	though	no	accurate	figures	are	available	on	the	
exact	percentage	of	how	many	youths	are	without	a	stable	job.	Depending	on	the	definition	
of	 ‘unemployment’	and	what	counts	as	 ‘youth’	estimates	on	Uganda’s	youth	unemployment	
																																																						
9	Richard,	Mbale,	15/06/2017	
9.5
12.7
16.7
24.2
34.6
36.6 37.7
1969 1980 1991 2002 2014 2016 2017
Census	Population
Millions	(1969	- 2017)	
	 17	
rates	vary	 tremendously	by	source.”	Defining	unemployment	as	“individuals	not	working	at	
all,	 actively	 looking	 for	 work	 and	 are	 available	 for	 work”,	 the	 Uganda	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	
records	a	4.9%	of	youth	unemployment	rate	for	2017	(2017,	p.	33).	On	the	other	hand,	the	
World	Bank10,	who	focus	on	formal	youth	unemployment,	declared	a	youth	unemployment	
rate	 of	 63%	 in	 2012	 (down	 from	 83%	 in	 2009)	 (Datzberger,	 2018,	 p.	 132).	 Despite	 the	
fuzziness	 of	 definitions	 and	 statistics,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 youths	 are	 competing	 for	 little	
employment	opportunities.	Reflecting	 the	public	discourse,	 the	media	have	been	 talking	of	
Ugandan	 youth	 (especially	 youth	male	unemployment,	 though	 young	women	are	 suffering	
from	 even	 higher	 unemployment	 rates)	 as	 a	 “ticking	 time	 bomb”11,	 threatening	 national	
security	and	political	stability.	
As	a	consequence,	the	social	category	of	youth	is	extending	because	of	the	inability	of	men	to	
achieve	 the	 socio-economic	 status	 required	 to	 be	 considered	 an	 adult	 (Aime	&	 Pietropolli	
Charmet,	 2014)	 (Sommers,	 2015).	 The	 transition	 from	 one	 phase	 to	 another	 becomes	
diluted,	 while	 the	 rites	 that	 culturally	 demarcated	 the	 passage	 to	 adulthood	 lose	 their	
meaning	(Aime	&	Pietropolli	Charmet,	2014).	Eriasa12,	a	33	years-old	agripreneur	from	Mount	
Elgon	in	the	east,	stressed	for	instance,	how	the	ritual	of	circumcision	has	lost	its	meaning	in	
recent	 years.	With	disappointment,	he	 told	me,	 “Now	even	 if	 a	 child	 is	 ten	 years	 they	 can	
circumcise	and	that	does	not	mean	the	child	has	grown	[into	an	adult].	In	the	past	they	used	
to	 circumcise	 at	 20	 years,	 then	 later	 it	 was	 18	 but	 at	 the	 moment	 they	 even	 circumcise	
children.	But	it	is	our	ritual	although	it	doesn’t	define	adulthood	anymore.”	
It	seems	that	the	category	of	youth	is	a	consequence	of	modernity,	as	the	number	of	young	
people	 grow	 competing	 for	 limited	 resources.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 despite	 being	 a	 growing	
majority	 of	 the	 population,	 youth	 are	 a	 marginalized	 group	 in	 socio-economic	 terms.	 For	
these	 reasons	 Sommers	 (2015,	 p.	 13)	 refers	 to	 youth	 in	 contexts	 of	 poverty,	 as	 ‘failed	
adulthood’.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 “	 “structural	 marginalisation”,	 which	 (…)	 has	 cultural,	
political,	 and	 economic	 roots:	 rigid	 cultural	 criteria	 that	 stipulate	 the	 constituents	 of	
adulthood,	a	state	that	provides	less	and	less	to	its	citizens,	and	a	weak	economy”	(Sommers,	
																																																						
10	World	bank	survey	2008/2009,	p.	5,	accessed	on	15/09/2018:	
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSTATINAFR/Resources/ADI-200809-essay-EN.pdf	
11	Ugandan	Monitor,	article	from	7/04/2012:		http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/688342-
1381200-ara4ho/index.html	
12	Eriasa,	Mbale,	14/06/2017	
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2015,	 p.	 13).	And	 therefore,	while	having	outgrown	 the	age	of	 youth,	 they	 socially	 remain	
‘youthmen’	(ibid).	As	described	by	Sommers,	youth	is	a	category	of	transition	where	there	is	
little	pride	in	being	considered	‘young’,	and	access	to	adulthood	is	frustrated	by	competition	
for	scarce	resources,	among	a	growing	number	of	youths.	
	
1.2.2	YOUTH	IN	AGRIBUSINESS		
The	 most	 accessible	 way	 of	 providing	 income	 for	 youths,	 as	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 Ugandan	
population,	is	agriculture.	Agriculture	is	the	backbone	of	the	Ugandan	economy	and	the	main	
source	of	 (informal)	 employment.	 In	 fact,	 according	 to	 the	World	Bank	 (2013),	 60%	of	 the	
population	is	engaged	in	agriculture	and	68%	of	the	working	population	are	youths	between	
15-34	years	old.	However,	the	career	perspectives	of	youths	in	agriculture	are	dependent	on	
the	elderly,	who	own	most	of	the	land.		
During	my	 fieldwork,	 I	 have	often	been	overwhelmed	by	 the	 fact	 that	while	 young	people	
constituted	 the	 majority	 in	 most	 social	 contexts,	 their	 attitude	 towards	 elderly	 was	
reverential.	More	 than	 a	 gerontocracy,13	elderly	 in	 all	 regions	 of	Uganda	 hold	 a	 normative	
power	 that	 is	 seldom	 questioned.	 They	 (mostly	 the	 eldest	 man	 in	 the	 family)	 decide	 on	
matters	 of	marriage,	 education	 and	 inheritance.	 Therefore,	 they	 hold	 a	 crucial	 position	 of	
power	in	youths’	access	to	land,	and	ultimately	their	entrance	into	adulthood.	
Despite	 the	 rapid	 urbanisation,	 which	 has	 resulted	 in	 a	 three-fold	 growth	 in	 the	 Ugandan	
population	 from	2002	 to	2014	 (UBOS,	 2017,	 p.	 14),	 the	majority	of	 the	population	 lives	 in	
rural	 areas	 (Fan	 &	 Zhang,	 2012).	 For	 these	 reasons,	 development	 programmes	 targeting	
youths	focus	on	their	engagement	in	agriculture	as	a	business	–	agribusiness	–	or	commercial	
agriculture.	Moreover,	 agribusiness	 is	 also	 seen	as	 a	way	of	 slowing	 rural-urban	migration.	
Development	 cooperation	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 following	 major	 issues:	 yields	 productivity,	
commercialization	 of	 agriculture,	 and	 infrastructures	 and	 transport	 for	 the	 accessibility	 to	
agri-food	markets.	 The	 general	 trend	 for	 rural	 development	 has	 been	 that	 of	 a	 neoliberal	
																																																						
13	The	youngest	populations	seem	to	be	led	by	the	eldest	leaders,	particularly	in	Africa	–	the	youngest	
continent.	Uganda	follows	this	trend:	https://qz.com/africa/1162490/the-youngest-continent-keeps-
on-being-run-by-the-oldest-leaders/	
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approach	 to	 agricultural	 industrialization,	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 moving	 away	 from	 subsistence	
agriculture.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 latter	 remains	 the	 most	 dominant	 form	 of	 agricultural	
engagement	(Gollin	&	Rogerson,	2010).	
	
1.2.3	COUNTRY	SELECTION:	WHY	UGANDA?	
The	 trend	 in	 development	 supporting	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 is	 widespread	 on	 the	 African	
continent.	The	investments	in	this	sector	have	been	driven	by	policies	from	major	multilateral	
and	bilateral	donors.	One	of	 the	main	multilateral	programmes	 for	youth	 in	agribusiness	 is	
promoted	by	the	African	Development	Bank	(AfDB),	the	ENABLE	Youth	programme14;	while	
one	of	the	main	bilateral	organisations	 in	this	sector	 is	USAID.	Several	African	governments	
have	 taken	 up	 on	 the	 this	 trend,	 prioritising	 programmes	 for	 youth	 employment	 in	
agribusiness	–	Uganda	being	one	of	them.	The	trend	in	development	that	prioritises	youth’s	
engagement	in	agribusiness	is	widespread	across	the	continent,	with	homogeneous	solutions	
for	the	various	countries.		
One	of	the	top-10	recipients	of	international	development	aid15,	Uganda	is	a	representative	
case	of	how	aid	is	absorbed	and	spent	(Aiyar,	Berg,	&	Hussain,	2005).	As	I	will	show	in	more	
detail	in	the	next	section	(1.3),	Uganda	has	entertained	an	intense	and	rather	stable	relation	
with	 donors	 since	 the	 1980s.	 Uganda	 has	 been	 considered	 ‘development	 poster	 boy’	 for	
development	 programmes	 (Cheeseman,	 2015,	 p.	 132).	 Like	 other	 developing	 countries	 in	
Africa,	 Uganda	 has	 undergone	 shifts	 in	 international	 development	 strategies	 –	 from	
structural	 adjustment	 to	 the	 post-Washington	 consensus	 liberalisation.	 In	 Uganda,	 the	
implementation	of	 the	development	 trends	 that	 followed	one	another	 in	 the	past	decades	
was	quite	typical	in	comparison	to	other	countries	(as	I	argue	in	chapter	3).		
																																																						
14Enable	Youth	programme,	info	accessed	on	16/09/2018	on:	https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-
events/afdb-and-iita-invite-africa-to-think-big-for-youth-and-agriculture-in-two-day-design-workshop-
on-enable-youth-program-15587/	
15	OECD	data	accessed	on	16/09/2018	on:	
https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/2%20Africa%20-
%20Development%20Aid%20at%20a%20Glance%202016.pdf	
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Anywhere	in	Uganda,	from	the	most	remote	rural	area	to	the	urban	jungle	of	the	capital	city	
Kampala,	 a	 puzzling	 fact	 confronts	 the	 observer:	 everybody	 is	 so	 young!	 Uganda	 has	 the	
second	 youngest	 population,	 after	 Niger16	–	 and	 the	 youngest	 of	 East	 Africa,	 the	 most	
populous	region	of	the	continent.	78%	of	the	population	is	under	30,	and	nearly	23%	of	the	
total	population	is	in	the	age	group	of	18-30	(the	Uganda	constitutional	definition	of	youth)	–	
about	twice	the	European	average17.	The	median	age	in	Uganda	is	around	16	–	which	seems	
exceptionally	 low	against	 the	European	median	age	of	43	years.	However,	considering	 that	
the	median	 age	 of	 sub-Saharan	 countries	 is	 18	 years18,	 the	Ugandan	 population	 is	 not	 far	
from	 the	 average.	Most	 neighbouring	 countries	 in	 the	 east	 African	 region	 have	 a	median	
age19	that	 is	even	lower	than	the	sub-Saharan	average.	The	fact	that	the	majority	of	youths	
are	employed	in	(subsistence)	agriculture	–	in	Uganda	as	in	most	sub-Saharan	countries	–	is	
also	 not	 unusual.	 Like	 in	 other	 sub-Saharan	 countries,	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 Ugandan	
population	 exacerbates	 the	 demographic	 dynamics	 (youth	 bulge	 and	 employment	
challenges)	driving	development	programmes	to	focus	on	youths.		
Certainly,	 there	 are	 specificities	 to	 the	 Ugandan	 case	 (for	 example,	 the	 strong	 regional	
disparities).	 These	 are	 bound	 to	 socio-cultural	 factors	 and	 affect	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	
development	trend	looks	in	practice,	when	implemented	on	the	ground.		These	socio-cultural	
specificities,	 however,	 can	 be	 expected	 also	 in	 other	 African	 countries	 where	 the	
development	trend	around	youth	in	agribusiness	is	 implemented.	These	peculiarities,	which	
are	 different	 for	 each	 country	 (and	 can	 take	 different	 forms,	 from	 heterogeneity	 to	
resistance),	are	in	fact	a	constant	trait	emerging	from	development	studies	(Scott	J.	 ,	1976)	
(Methorst,	 Roep,	 Verstegen,	 &	 Wiskerke,	 2017)	 (Escobar,	 2012)	 (Murray	 Li,	 2007).	 In	 my	
research,	 I	 pay	 close	 attention	 to	 these	 peculiarities,	which	 I	 highlight	 as	 defining	 traits	 of	
youths’	identities,	their	capacity	to	engage	in	agribusiness	and	their	relation	to	development	
																																																						
16Statistics	accessed	on	16/09/2018	on:	http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/niger-
population/	
17Statistics	accessed	on	16/09/2018	on:		
https://www.indexmundi.com/it/unione_europea/distribuzione_di_eta.html	
18	Statistics	accessed	on	27/10/2018	on:	
	http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-population/	
19Statistics	accessed	on	27/10/2018	on	http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/burundi-
population/	
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programmes.	Nonetheless,	 considering	 the	ways	 in	which	programmes	were	 implemented,	
Uganda	is	a	typical	case	in	many	ways.	
	
1.3	DEVELOPMENT	IN	UGANDA	
With	 this	 section	 I	 aim	 to	 put	 into	 historical	 perspective	 the	 recent	 development	 trend	
around	youth	in	agribusiness	by	giving	an	overview	of	Uganda’s	relation	with	development,	
since	 independence.	 Since	 the	 British	 left	 Uganda	 as	 colonisers	 in	 the	 1960s,	 Uganda	 has	
received	development	aid	from	various	multilateral	and	bilateral	donors.	As	it	is	shown	in	the	
Figure	 2	 below,	 however,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 net	 increase	 in	 ODA	 (Official	 Development	
Assistance20)	in	the	late	1980s,	with	another	spurt	in	aid	in	the	early	2000s,	around	the	time	
of	the	Millennium	Development	Goals.	This	phenomenon	follows	a	rather	consistent	pattern	
in	development	financing.	In	fact,	the	two	peaks	in	ODA	disbursement	are	common	to	other	
African	developing	countries,	as	shown	by	Desrosiers	and	Swedlund	(2018,	p.	8).	
	
																																																						
20	Stein	(Stein,	2009,	p.	13)	explains	that:	“Official	Development	Assistance	(ODA)	generally	includes	
grants	and	concessional	loans	(with	a	25-percent	grant	component	calculated	at	a	rate	of	discount	of	
10	percent)	from	government	and	other	official	sources	for	development/welfare	purposes”		
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FIGURE	 2.	 NET	 OFFICIAL	 DEVELOPMENT	 ASSISTANCE	 AND	 OFFICIAL	 AID	 RECEIVED	 (CURRENT	 US$).	 SOURCE:	
WORLD	BANK	DATA21	
In	the	spring	of	1987,	the	Ugandan	government	launched	an	Economic	Recovery	Programme	
with	the	substantial	support	of	multilateral	 financial	 institutions,	principally	the	World	Bank	
(WB),	 the	 International	 Monetary	 Fund	 (IMF),	 and	 DAC22	members.	 Stein	 (2009,	 p.	 18)	
explains	that:		
The	 initial	program	involved	a	77	percent	devaluation	(43	percent	 in	real	 terms),	an	
increase	 in	 all	 export	 crop	 prices,	 budgetary	 discipline,	 which	 improved	 through	
shifting	 access	 to	 bank	 credit	 for	 the	 private	 sector	 and	 parastatals	 rather	 than	
directly	from	the	coffers	of	the	government,	foreign	exchange	controls	that	were	to	
be	replaced	by	an	OGL	(open	general	licensing)	system,	price	control	reductions	and	
privatization	of	parastatals	including	the	liberalization	of	the	crop	marketing	system.	
Uganda	was	abundantly	rewarded	by	donors,	resulting	in	“one	of	the	most	rapid	increases	of	
debt	of	any	country	 in	the	world,	rising	by	571	percent	between	1980	and	1998.	Given	the	
structural	 weaknesses	 of	 exports	 and	 their	 heavy	 reliance	 on	 cash	 crops	 like	 coffee,	 the	
debt/export	ratio	rose	(…)”	(Stein,	2009,	p.	19).		Despite	the	fact	that	aid	began	to	slow	down	
in	 the	 late	 1990s,	 Uganda	 benefitted	 from	 the	 surge	 of	 budgeting	 for	 the	 Millennium	
Development	 Goals.	 In	 2014,	 Uganda	 was	 in	 the	 top-10	 ODA	 recipients	 in	 Africa.23	
Nevertheless,	Uganda	remains	 in	the	United	Nations	(UN)	 list	of	Least	Developed	Countries	
(LDCs)24.	Datzberger	(2018,	p.	133-134)	explains	that:	
Uganda	is	a	low-income	country	with	a	GDP	per	capita	equivalent	to	3	per	cent	of	the	
world’s	 average.	 Although	 Uganda’s	 GNI	 (Gross	 National	 Income)	 increased	
																																																						
21Accessed	on	16/09/2018	on:		
	https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=UG	
22	The	Development	Assistance	Committee	(DAC),	is	part	of	the	OECD	–	the	Organisation	for	Economic	
Co-operation	and	Development	–		since	1961,	and	is	a	forum	of	30	aid	donors.	Accessed	on	
17/09/2018:		http://www.oecd.org/development/developmentassistancecommitteedac.htm	.	
23	OECD	data	accessed	on	16/09/2018	on:	
https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/documentupload/2%20Africa%20-
%20Development%20Aid%20at%20a%20Glance%202016.pdf		
24	UN	data	accessed	on	17/09/2018:	
	https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf	
	 23	
significantly,	by	about	125%,	between	1985	and	2012,	 it	 continues	 to	 suffer	 from	a	
discriminatory	 global	 trading	 system	with	 negative	 impacts	 on	 the	 national	market	
due	 to	USD	2.31	billions	of	exported	goods	alongside	USD	5.52	billions	of	 imported	
goods	in	2015	alone.		
In	Uganda,	like	in	other	‘developing	countries’,	standards	and	criteria	are	set	as	to	what	still	
needs	to	be	achieved	for	a	country	to	be	considered	developed.	This	“subtraction	approach”	
–	a	developing	country’s	inability	to	be	more	like	a	developed	country	–	has	been	the	lens	for	
mainstream	economics’	reading	of	Africa’s	chronic	failure	of	growth	(Jerven	M.	,	2015,	p.	2).	
With	 the	National	Development	Plan	 (NDP)	 (GoU,	 2015)	 and	Vision	2040	 (GoU,	 2007),	 the	
Government	 of	 Uganda	 has	 set	 the	 ambitious	 objective	 of	 achieving	 the	 middle-income	
status	by	2020	(yet	does	not	seem	to	be	on	track	to	meet	this	deadline25).	
	
1.3.1	A	NEW	TREND	IN	DEVELOPMENT	
With	the	second	NDP	(GoU,	2015,	p.	46),	the	Ugandan	government	committed	to	sustaining	
youth	 employment	 through	 various	 programmes	 of	 its	ministries	 –	mainly	 the	Ministry	 of	
Gender,	Labour	and	Social	Development	(MGLSD)	with	the	Youth	Livelihood	Program	(YLP).	
The	 curricula	 in	 the	 education	 sector	 had	 been	 renovated	 in	 2008	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	
strengthening	the	BTVET	(business,	technical,	vocational	education	and	training).	Datzberger	
(2018,	p.	133)	noted	how	the	focus	on	youths’	education	for	technical	and	entrepreneurial	
skills	strengthened	an	orientation	towards	entrepreneurship	as	a	skill	for	self-employment	of	
youth:	“entrepreneurship	was	introduced	as	a	subject	at	both	lower	levels	of	education	and	
at	 university	 with	 a	 view	 of	 imparting	 practical	 knowledge	 and	 skills	 to	 enable	 youth	 to	
become	job	creators	in	an	environment	with	limited	employment	prospects.”		
In	2012,	the	GoU	launched	the	Uganda	Youth	Capital	Venture	Fund	(UYCVF),	which	facilitated	
access	to	credit	facilities	to	individual	young	entrepreneurs.	This	was	succeeded	by	the	Youth	
Livelihood	Program	(YLP),	which	ran	from	2013	to	2018,	and	provided	small	loans	to	groups	
of	youths	with	a	business	plan	(mostly,	in	the	agricultural	sector).	By	setting	the	guidelines	for	
																																																						
25	http://parliamentwatch.ug/will-uganda-become-a-middle-income-country-by-
2020/#.W7UE9BMzbOQ	
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development	 focus	 and	 targets,	 the	 NDP	 also	 catalysed	 programmes	 from	 other	
development	 institutions.	 For	 example,	 the	 FAO	 has	 been	 collaborating	with	 the	 Ugandan	
Ministry	of	Agriculture	 to	develop	a	 strategy	 for	 the	employment	of	 youth	 in	agriculture26;	
the	African	Development	Bank,	which	had	 funded	 the	ENABLE	Youth	programme27	in	West	
Africa,	was	piloting	the	programme	in	Uganda	at	the	time	of	my	fieldwork;	CGIAR	has	been	
promoting	 research	 for	 development	 to	 engage	 youth	 in	 agricultural	 entrepreneurship28,	
which	in	Uganda	was	mainly	implemented	by	IITA.	USAID29	through	the	programme	‘Feed	the	
Future’	 also	 invested	 in	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 rural	 development	 and	poverty	
alleviation.		
However,	 (youth)	 agro-entrepreneurial	 initiatives in	 development	 countries	 remain	
underexplored	by	both	academics	and	development	practitioners	 (Leeuwis,	et	al.,	2014).	 In	
particular,	little	is	known	about	the	role	of	factors	such	as	gender,	level	of	education,	marital	
status,	 location	 (urban/rural)	 (in	 chapter	 5	 I	 will	 show	 how	 these	 factors	 are	 crucially	
important).	The	very	definition	of	 ‘youth’	 remains	vaguely	defined	 in	development	policies,	
and	mostly	 is	 reduced	 to	 an	 age	 bracket,	which	 varies	 based	on	 the	 development	 agency.	
Depending	 on	 the	 development	 agency,	 it	 can	 be	 15-24	 (UN	 (Sommers,	 2015)),	 18-35	
(AfDB30),	and	18-30	(Ugandan	Constitution	(GoU,	2015)).			
Most	 programmes	 stress	 the	 component	 of	 entrepreneurship,	 which	 entails	 business	 and	
accountancy	 skills,	 next	 to	 the	 strictly	 agricultural	 techniques.	 Pushing	 youth	 to	 leave	
subsistence	 agriculture	 behind	 for	 a	 commercial,	market-oriented	 type	 of	 agriculture,	 or	 a	
‘agribusiness’.	The	entrepreneurial	effort	 to	enter	agribusiness	 is	described	 in	development	
jargon	 as	 ‘agripreneurship’	 –	 namely	 the	 “profitable	 marriage	 of	 agriculture	 and	
entrepreneurship”	(Bairwa,	Lakra,	Kushwaha,	Meena,	&	Kumar,	2014,	p.	1),	of	which	youths	
																																																						
26	http://www.fao.org/rural-employment/resources/detail/en/c/1069622/	
27http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/agribusiness-seen-as-a-solution-to-high-youth-
unemployment-on-the-continent-13293/	
28CGIAR	Strategy	and	Results	Framework	2016-2030:	
https://library.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/3865/CGIAR%20Strategy%20and%20Results%20Fra
mework.pdf?sequence=1	
29	https://chemonics.com/projects/creating-opportunities-youth-agriculture/	
30	https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/afdb-announces-new-youth-training-drive-to-promote-
agricultural-industrialization-17334/	
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would	be	 ‘agripreneurs’.	 In	 this	way,	 the	approach	resonates	with	 James	Scott’s	analysis	of	
development	 more	 broadly,	 in	 which	 he	 argues	 that	 development	 policy	 frequently	
transforms	 common	 villagers	 into	 “untrammelled	 Schumpeterian	 entrepreneurs	 and	 price	
and	profit	 become	 the	major	 standards”	 (1976,	 p.	 23).	 Price	 and	profit	 become	 the	major	
standards	 of	 success,	 stressing	 the	neoliberal	 values	 inherent	 to	 agribusiness	 development	
programmes.	
Moreover,	 there	 is	a	political	 component	 to	 the	 trend	of	 targeting	youth,	which	cannot	be	
overlooked.	78%	of	the	population	is	under	30	years	of	age	–	and	was	thus	born	under	the	
current	government,	since	the	current	president,	Museveni,	has	been	 in	power	since	1986.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 youth	 between	 18	 and	 30	 constitute	 more	 than	 half	 Uganda’s	 voters	
(Datzberger,	 2018,	 p.	 135).	 In	 fact,	 as	 it	 was	 reported	 to	me	 several	 times,	 off-record,	 by	
Ugandan	civil	servants	who	asked	to	remain	anonymous,	that	programmes	targeting	youths	
have	 the	 additional	 function	 of	 satisfying	 the	 electorate	 and	 calming	 public	 unrest	 over	
unemployment.	 This	 perspective	 on	 the	 political	 function	 of	 programmes	 targeting	 youths	
was	also	confirmed	by	the	most	outspoken	informants	in	the	field.	One	of	them	in	particular,	
a	 reverend31	on	 the	 slopes	 of	Mount	 Elgon	 in	 the	 east,	 entertained	me	 at	 length	with	 his	
sceptical	 views	 of	 governmental	 interests	 in	 development	 programmes	 for	 youths	 –	 one	
afternoon	in	late	June	while	we	were	stuck	by	a	torrential	rain.	He	told	me:		
For	me,	I	feel	they	[politicians]	know	the	population	of	the	youth	is	very	high,	and	you	
convince	the	youth	to	rally	[politically,	for	election	purposes]	behind	you…you	will	go	
through	 [i.e.	 ‘you’ll	 be	 elected’].	 And	 how	 do	 you	 convince	 these	 youths	 to	 rally	
behind	you?	is	to	talk	big	“we	shall	do	this…	we	shall	do	this…	we	shall	do	this”.	And	I	
think	that	is	the	biggest	problem	with	our	government	they	talk	big	and	they	do	very	
little.	When	it	comes	to	talking	of	how	they	are	going	to	help	the	youth…you	just	think	
life	is	going	to	change!	But	going	down	to	the	grass	root,	go	down	to	the	sub-county…	
can	you	find	there	a	well-organised	group	with	hope	of	developing?	
In	 fact,	 politics	 and	 development,	 particularly	 in	 the	 agricultural	 sector,	 have	 long	 been	
interconnected.	In	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	reform,	initiated	in	2001,	of	National	Agricultural	
																																																						
31	Extract	from	an	interview	in	the	outskirts	of	Mbale	on	22/06/2017	
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Advisory	 Services	 (NAADS),	 Kjær	and	 Joughin	 (2012,	p.	 329),	 describe	how	 the	programme	
was	increasingly	politicised	by	the	government:	
	As	 the	 costs	 of	 staying	 in	 power	 increased,	 public	 policies	 were	 also	 increasingly	
affected	 by	 political	 concerns	 (Barkan,	 2011;	 Mwenda	 &	 Tangri,	 2005).	 NAADS	
became	 gradually	 politicised	 and	 this	 affected	 implementation	 especially	 as	 the	
February	2011	elections	drew	closer.	Donors	were	not	able	to	navigate	in	this	process	
of	politicisation.		
The	process	of	reform	of	the	NAADS	was	instrumental	to	the	government,	since	this	platform	
has	 the	 potential	 of	 reaching	 out	 to	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 electorate,	 which	 is	 involved	 in	
agriculture.	While	this	 is	a	recent	example	of	politicisation	of	agricultural	development,	 it	 is	
nothing	new.	In	the	following	section,	I	will	give	an	historical	perspective	of	Uganda’s	political	
economy,	paying	particular	attention	to	the	agricultural	sector.	
	
1.3.2	BRIEF	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC	HISTORY	OF	UGANDA	SINCE	INDEPENDENCE		
Uganda’s	present	political	and	economic	situation	is	emblematic	of	issues	faced	by	a	number	
of	 Sub-Saharan	 African	 countries,	 yet	 at	 the	 same	 time	 has	 peculiar	 features	 that	make	 it	
unique.	 In	Uganda,	95%	of	the	poor	 live	 in	rural	areas	(Fan	&	Zhang,	2012)	and	60%	of	the	
population	 is	 engaged	 in	 agriculture32,	 unsettled	 rural	 development	 issues	 (land	 tenure	
inequalities,	 poor	 infrastructure	 and	 gender	 and	 generational	 inequalities)	 are	 rooted	 in	 a	
long	history	of	ethnic	tensions	and	regional	disparities.		
The	colonial	past	has	left	a	legacy	in	the	diversified	administration	of	the	various	regions	and	
districts	in	Uganda.	Green	(2015,	p.	492)	explains	that		
Under	 colonial	 rule	 most	 of	 Uganda	 was	 governed	 by	 a	 system	 of	 British	 district	
commissioners.	 Under	 these	 commissioners	 chiefs	 held	 powers	 over	 taxes,	 courts,	
local	councils	and	general	law	and	order.	In	the	eastern	and	northern	parts	of	Uganda	
which	had	no	tradition	of	kingdoms	or	hierarchical	leadership,	the	imposition	of	chiefs	
																																																						
32Data	of	the	Government	of	Uganda,	accessed	on	15th	May	2016:	http://gov.ug/content/agriculture	
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was	alien	and,	while	ruling	under	“customary”	law,	chiefs	in	such	areas	were	actually	
closer	to	modern	civil	servants	than	traditional	pre-colonial	rulers.		
However,	she	explains	(2015,	p.	492)	that	the	situation	was	different	for	the	traditional	“five	
kingdoms	of	Ankole,	Buganda,	Busoga,	Bunyoro	and	Toro	in	the	southern	and	western	part	of	
the	country,	which	had	a	long	pre-colonial	history	of	political	hierarchy,	in	some	cases	dating	
back	 centuries”.	 In	 these	 contexts,	 the	 colonisers	 implemented	 a	 system	of	 indirect	 rule	 –	
namely	giving	the	kings	the	responsibility	of	administrating	and	ruling	‘their’	populations.	The	
economic	situation	of	the	country,	towards	the	end	of	colonisation,	seemed	promising:		
On	 the	 eve	 of	 decolonisation	 –	 that	 moment,	 in	 the	 early	 1950s,	 between	 the	
hardships	of	the	Second	World	War	and	the	brave	new	world	of	sovereign	statehood	
–	 the	 economic	prospects	 of	much	of	Africa	were	bright,	 or	were	 at	 least	 cause	of	
some	optimistic	projections.	 (…)	For	the	colonial	administration,	the	 ‘pearl	of	Africa’	
was	becoming	its	little	nugget	of	economic	prosperity	in	the	heart	of	the	British	East	
Africa.	Indeed,	Uganda’s	annual	GDP	growth	(depending	on	which	source	we	believe)	
averaged	 5.9	 per	 cent	 between	 1962	 and	 1971,	 anticipating	 more	 recent,	 much-
celebrated	rates.	(Reid,	2017,	p.	216)	
However,	after	independence	in	1962,	Ugandans	experienced	several	repressive	regimes	and	
violent	conflicts	–	to	which	economic	decay	followed (Isgren,	2018,	p.	3).	Milton	Obote	was	
chosen	as	first	 leader	of	the	newly	 independent	Republic	of	Uganda	–	and	he	administered	
the	first	years	of	government	with	caution.	Power	was	consolidated	in	his	hands,	as	he	gained	
control	 over	 the	 congress	 and	 the	 executive	 power.	 His	 socialist	 ideology,	 particularly	
privileging	Ugandans	from	his	region	of	origin	(north-east),	divided	internal	politics	until	the	
constitutional	crisis	in	1966.	As	Mutibwa		(1992,	p.	33)	stresses,	the	tensions	within	the	party	
verged	on	ethnically-loaded	political	interests:	
The	split	soon	polarised	over	ideology	and	ethnicity,	for	Obote’s	faction	assumed	the	
mantle	of	a	nationalistic	and	socialist	movement	championing	the	interests	of	the	so-
called	 ‘disadvantaged’	 of	 the	 north	 and	 east,	 while	 Ibingira’s	 faction	 became	
identified	with	the	conservative	wing	of	 the	party	which	also	served	as	an	advocate	
for	 the	 position	 and	 interests	 of	 the	 Bantu	 people.	 (…)	 After	 the	 parliament	 had	
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decided	on	the	referendum,	the	Kabaka’s	government	too	decided	(…)	to	reassess	its	
cooperation	with	Obote.		
One	 year	 later,	Obote	 abolished	 kingships,	 and	 his	 politics	 became	 increasingly	 unpopular,	
generating	discontent	within	the	government	and	army.	In	1968,	Obote	announced	he	would	
adopt	a	socialist	strategy,	and	with	the	implementation	of	the	‘Move	to	the	Left’	he	planned	
the	move	60%	of	the	means	of	production	under	governmental	ownership.	However,	by	the	
time	Obote	was	overthrown,	this	strategy	was	not	yet	fully	implemented.	Obote	had	trusted	
Colonel	 Idi	 Amin,	 Deputy	 Army	 Commander,	with	 important	 operations	 in	 the	 Democratic	
Republic	of	the	Congo	(then	Zaire)	–	but	was	rewarded	with	a	coup:	Idi	Amin,	interpreting	the	
dissatisfaction	 of	 the	 army,	 overthrew	 him	 in	 1971.	 Reid	 (2017,	 p.	 56)	 explains	 how	 the	
forceful	 instauration	of	 Idi	Amin	was	 initially	welcomed	by	crowds	 in	Kampala:	 “Obote	was	
gone	(he	was	in	fact	out	of	the	country	when	the	coup	happened),	and	good	riddance,	said	
many	–	not	least	the	Ganda,	who	despised	Obote	for	his	destruction	of	their	kingdom	and	the	
exile	 of	 their	 king,	 and	who	were	 therefore	 among	Amin’s	most	 eager	 supporters,	 initially	
(…)”.		
In	economic	terms,	there	was	substantial	continuation	between	the	first	regime	of	Obote	and	
that	 of	 Idi	 Amin	 (Reid,	 2017,	 p.	 236):	 “A	 similar	 combination	 of	 economic	 patriotism	 and	
historical	 injustice	 informed	Amin’s	 ‘war’	on	parasites	and	 foreign	 influences;”.	 In	1972,	he	
ordered	 the	expulsion	of	all	non-citizen	Asians	“who	owned	too	much	and	contributed	 too	
little,	who	 sent	 their	 savings	abroad	 (or	 ‘home’,	 to	 India	and	Bangladesh),	 and	had	 for	 too	
long	stood	haughtily	apart	from	(even	above)	Ugandan	Africans.	As	Maxwell	(1995,	p.	1670)	
explains,	especially	in	the	central	region,	the	Ugandan	economy:		
was	severely	damaged	by	the	“war	of	economic	 independence”	of	the	Amin	regime	
(1971-79)	that	was	initiated	with	the	expulsion	of	the	Indian	minority	in	Uganda	and	
rapidly	 gave	 rise	 to	 a	 highly	 informal	magendo	 economy	 dominated	 by	 smuggling,	
illegal	 currency	 transactions	 and	 state	 appropriation	 of	 private	 property	 (Banugire,	
1985).	 In	the	early	to	mid-1980s,	a	guerrilla	war	was	centred	on	the	outskirts	of	the	
city.	 (…)	 Jamal	and	Weeks	 (1993)	note	 that	wages	 in	Kampala	had	been	among	 the	
highest	 in	East	Africa	 in	the	196Os,	but	fell	dramatically	 in	the	1970s.	By	the	198Os,	
the	urban	wage-earning	class	had	 shrunk	markedly	as	 city	 residents	were	 forced	 to	
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diversify	their	sources	of	income	to	compensate	for	the	drastic	drop	in	wage	earnings	
(Bigsten	and	Kayizzi-Mugerwa,	1992).	This	resulted	 in	the	massive	 informalization	of	
the	city’s	economy,	and	an	increase	in	urban	agriculture.		
During	 the	 eight	 years	 in	 which	 Idi	 Amin	 remained	 in	 power,	 hundreds	 of	 thousands	 of	
Ugandans	were	persecuted,	disappeared,	and	were	killed.	While	the	death	tolls	still	 remain	
unclear,	 the	 number	 of	 ethnically	 and	 politically	 motivated	 killings	 is	 estimated	 to	 range	
between	300.000	and	500.000.	In	1979,	Tanzanian	troops	won	a	conflict	over	the	border	and	
forced	 him	 to	 flee.	 Before	Obote	was	 re-elected	 in	 1980,	 power	was	 briefly	 held	 by	 three	
other	 interim	 presidents.	 The	 second	 term	 of	 Obote	 was	 signed	 by	 atrocities	 that	 further	
divided	the	northerners	from	the	rest	of	the	country,	fuelling	regional	tensions.	During	a	long	
‘guerrilla’	conflict	between	the	troops	of	Obote	and	Yoweri	Museveni’s	National	Resistance	
Army,	100.0000	to	500.000	people	died.	Obote	was,	again,	overthrown	in	a	military	coup	by	
General	 Tito	 Okello	 –	 but	 after	 a	 short,	 chaotic	 period,	Museveni	 was	 sworn	 president	 in	
January	1986.	
Ever	since	1986,	political	power	has	been	concentrated	in	the	person	of	president	Museveni,	
who	 has	 recognized	 kingships,	 promoted	 policies	 for	 regional	 integration	 and	
decentralization	 (Lindemann,	 2011,	 p.	 389)	 (Gentili,	 2008).	 The	 regime	 is	 considered	 an	
“hegemonic	 party	 regime,	 defined	 as	 one	 political	 party	 remaining	 continuously	 in	 power	
while	 holding	 regular	 multiparty	 elections	 (Reuter	 and	 Gandhi,	 2011;	 Tripp,	 2010),	 and	 is	
considered	an	electoral	authoritarian	regime.”	(Raffler,	2016,	p.	12).	In	fact,	despite	the	fact	
that	in	the	last	years	Museveni	has	implemented	a	decentralizing	policy,	“77%	of	districts	are	
headed	by	a	politician	from	the	NRM	(National	Resistance	Movement,	political	party	 led	by	
president	Museveni),	as	are	71%	of	subcounties”	(Raffler,	2016,	p.	13).	
The	regime	hegemony	of	Yoweri	Museveni	has	based	its	long	hold	on	power	on	elite	bargain	
and	 corruption,	 which	 have	 systematically	 excluded	 social	 groups	 based	 on	 ethnicity	
(Lindemann,	2011,	p.	388-9).	Since	1986	Uganda	has	seen	no	less	than	seven	civil	wars,	which	
mostly	took	place	in	the	northern	regions	of	the	country	(Lindemann,	2011,	p.	388).	Since	the	
late	1990s	however,	“territorial	power	has	been	shared	more	equitably	since	government’s	
decentralization	 programme	 has	 gathered	 momentum”	 (ibid).	 This	 has	 on	 the	 one	 hand	
prevented	more	civil	wars	and	eased	tensions	in	the	North,	and	on	the	other	created	a	sort	of	
	 30	
‘Pax	 Musevenica’	 (Campbell,	 2007).	 In	 the	 past	 decade,	 elections	 were	 reportedly	
fraudulent33,	 and	 opposition	 leaders	 have	 been	 jailed	 multiple	 times.	 The	 majority	 of	 the	
population,	being	under	30	years	of	age,	was	born	under	Museveni	–	and	has	recently	started	
to	 demand	 political	 change.	 Demonstrations,	 mainly	 by	 youths,	 took	 over	 the	 capital	 city	
when	the	age	limit	for	presidency	was	scrapped	in	2017.34		
While	economic	neo-liberalism	has	enthusiastically	been	embraced	three	decades	ago	–	on	
the	 tide	 of	 post-Washington	 consensus	 developmental	 reforms	 promoted	 by	 the	
international	 community	–	national	politics	have	 increasingly	disassociated	 from	 the	 liberal	
and	democratic	model	that	was	envisioned	by	that	same	international	community.	A	process	
of	decentralisation	has	originated	a	 fragmentation	of	 the	country	 in	112	districts	 (from	the	
original	39	when	NRM	came	to	power).	The	initial	promise	of	a	more	democratic	division	of	
political	power,	has	in	fact	served	the	(expensive)	maintenance	of	corrupt,	central	power.	As	
Green	(2015,	p.	503-504)	claims,	“the	problems	of	the	Ugandan	decentralization	programme	
are	rooted	in	its	lack	of	independence	from	Kampala	both	politically	and	economically,	which	
has	contributed	to	such	issues	as	a	lack	of	competent	staff,	corruption	and	an	obsessive	focus	
on	creating	new	districts	for	political	reasons.”	
Another	important	consequence	of	the	enthusiastic	liberalisation	conducted	by	Museveni,	is	
the	impact	on	grassroots	organisations	of	farmers,	and	the	copious	entrance	of	NGOs	in	the	
interstices	left	by	the	government.		The	economic	liberalization	that	“made	Uganda	a	‘poster	
child’	of	structural	adjustment”	has,	according	to	Isgren	(2018,	p.	3),	
far-reaching	 implications	 for	 agriculture,	 like	 the	 dismantling	 of	 marketing	 boards,	
slashed	budgets	for	research	and	extension,	and	further	collapse	of	the	cooperative	
system	(Flygare,	2006).	At	the	same	time	donors'	interest	in	NGOs	exploded	and	there	
was	 a	 huge	 surge	 in	NGOs	present	 in	Uganda,	 both	 domestic	 and	 international;	 by	
2000	there	were	over	4000	registered	NGOs	(Dicklitch	and	Lwanga,	2003).	Mamdani	
(1995)	described	civil	society	as	becoming	‘NGOized’	by	organizations	that	filled	gaps	
																																																						
33	Accessed	on	3/10/2018	on:		
	https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-election-idUSKCN0VT08A		
34Accessed	on	3/10/2018:		
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/scrapping-presidential-age-limits-sets-uganda-on-course-of-
instability/	
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left	by	the	state,	but	whose	members	received	charity	rather	than	rights	and	which	
were	primarily	accountable	to	donors.	
But	 the	 impact	 of	Museveni’s	 liberalisation	 on	 agriculture,	 is	 not	 a	 novelty	 in	 the	 relation	
between	politics,	agriculture	and	land	tenure.	As	I	will	show	below,	since	independence	the	
political	economy	has	been	strictly	 intertwined	with	the	agricultural	sector	–	employing	the	
wide	majority	of	the	population.		
	
1.3.2A	AGRICULTURE	AND	LAND	
Agricultural	 production	 and	 trade	 is	 a	 particular	 sensitive	 field	 in	 many	 African	 countries,	
where	 the	 post-independence	 history	 has	 deepened	 the	 socio-political	 distress	 inherited	
from	colonialism.	On	this	regard,	“Uganda	represents	a	good	example	of	a	country	accepting	
the	colonial	 legal	arrangements	of	 land	tenure	and	continuing	them	without	any	significant	
changes	 when	 independence	 was	 gained	 in	 October	 1962.”	 (McAuslan,	 2013,	 p.	 25).	
Distressed	relations	between	the	central	government	and	the	rural	population	have	shaped	
the	post-independence	history	of	this	country.	Sjögren	(2013,	p.	143)	argues	that	“Patterns	
of	 production,	 trade	 and	 education	 tended	 to	 deepen	 regional	 socio-economic	 disparities,	
accentuated	by	divide-and-rule	politics”.	
Uganda	has	been	seen	as	the	food	basket	of	East	Africa,	thanks	to	the	climatic	conditions	that	
allowed	 for	 double-cropping:	 with	 two	 rainy	 seasons	 per	 year,	 Ugandan	 agriculture	 is	
particularly	 productive	 in	 the	 central	 and	 south-western	 regions,	 which	 are	 densely	
populated.	Since	colonial	times,	Uganda’s	agricultural	production	has	been	oriented	as	much	
towards	 local	markets,	 with	 basic	 food	 crops,	 as	 towards	 international	markets,	 with	 cash	
crops.	 The	 production,	 mostly	 smallholder,	 focuses	 on	 food	 crops	 such	 as	 plantains	
(matooke),	 cassava,	 maize,	 millet,	 sorghum,	 sweet	 potatoes,	 and	 beans;	 the	 main	 export	
crops	are	coffee,	cotton,	cocoa,	and	tobacco	(Leliveld,	Dietz,	Foeken,	&	Klaver,	2013,	p.	10).			
However,	 food	 production	 does	 not	 necessarily	 translate	 in	 food	 security,	 and	 a	 slightly	
downward	trend	 in	dietary	energy	has	been	recorded	 in	 the	past	decades	–	 remaining	 just	
above	minimum	standards	of	food	security,	albeit	with	regional	disparities,	and	with	climate-
induced	famines	(ibid).	Leliveld	et	al		(2013,	p.	6-7)	stress	that	agricultural	productivity,	which	
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has	been	very	promising	since	post-independence,	has	been	frustrated	not	only	by	ecological	
and	climatic	factors,	but	also	by	the	political	vicissitudes:		
According	to	FAO	data,	in	the	1960s	agricultural	production	thrived:	thanks	mainly	to	
area	expansion,	but	also	to	yield	improvements	food	production	in	Uganda	increased	
more	 than	 population.	 In	 the	 1970s	 this	 process	 halted,	 and	 around	 1980	 the	
agricultural	area	decreased	to	a	much	lower	level.	After	1990	recovery	started,	visible	
in	 steady	 increase	 of	 cropping	 areas.	 However,	 Uganda	 has	 some	 of	 the	 highest	
population	growth	 figures	 in	Africa	 (around	3%	per	annum)	and	agricultural	growth	
can	 hardly	 cope	with	 population	 growth.	 (…)	What	 happened	 after	 the	 initial	 good	
years	 in	 the	 1960s?	 As	 is	well-known,	Uganda	was	 plagued	 by	 violent	 regimes	 and	
conflict	 in	the	1970s	and	1980s.	The	regimes	of	 first	 Idi	Amin	(1971-1979)	and	 later	
Milton	Obote	II	(1979-1985)	resulted	in	a	major	economic	crisis	in	Uganda	that	is	also	
visible	 in	 the	agricultural	performance	of	 a	 country	 that	was	 long	 seen	as	a	 land	of	
milk	and	honey.	
As	much	as	the	political	economy	of	the	country	influenced	agricultural	productivity,	so	has	
land	tenureship.	With	several	land	reforms	over	the	years	“the	state	and	individuals	grabbed	
and	converted	kibanja	tenure	[right	of	usufruct	 introduced	 in	1928]	 into	 landlord	tenure	of	
the	 lease	 and	 non-lease	 types.	 (…)	 The	 milder	 face	 of	 this	 conversion	 was	 the	 politics	 of	
“tribalism”	(Bazaara,	1994,	p.	59).	This	process	of	land	reform	from	1928	–	which	resulted	in	
the	creation	of	this	new	land	holding	system	called	kibanja	–	left	peasants	without	security	of	
tenureship,	and	many	evictions	were	perpetrated.	Again,	women	and	youth	were	the	most	
vulnerable	 social	 groups	 marginalized	 by	 these	 processes.	 Women	 in	 particular	 are	 still	
discriminated	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 land	 access,	 despite	 their	 legal	 claims	 to	 land	 (Butler	 &	
Kebba,	 2014,	 p.	 18).	 In	 1998	 the	 Land	 Act	 (amended	 in	 2010	 without	 much	 changes)	
reintroduced	 security	 of	 occupancy	 reinforcing	 tenants’	 rights,	 but	 the	Act	was	 never	 fully	
implemented	and	evictions	still	fuel	conflicts	over	land	(McAuslan,	2013).	These	“land-related	
conflicts	inevitably	have	negative	impact	on	productivity	as	well	as	equity”	(ibid:	89).	In	spite	
of	the	troubled	configuration	of	land	ownership,	ethnic	tensions	over	land	and	discrimination	
of	youth	and	women	in	land	access,	agriculture	still	employs	the	majority	of	the	population	
and	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 source	 of	 gainful	 employment	 from	 development	 organizations	 (Gollin	 &	
Rogerson,	2010)	(WB,	World	Bank,	2016).		
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Moreover,	 old	 colonial	 laws	 and	 tenure	 systems	 continue	 to	 exert	 influence	 in	 rural	
development	patterns	 (McAuslan,	2013,	p.	95).	This	 leaves	agriculture	 (and	 the	majority	of	
Ugandan	population)	in	a	stagnating	condition,	where	“lower	agricultural	growth	is	the	root	
cause	of	the	recent	increase	in	poverty”	(Kappel,	Lay,	&	Steiner,	2005,	p.	1).	As	Sjögren	(2013,	
p.	 147)	 puts	 it:	 “Uganda’s	 uneven	 regional	 development	 and	 fractured	 polity	 (…)	 followed	
from	 a	 combination	 of	 colonially	 imposed	 economic	 underdevelopment	 and	 indirect	 rule,	
reinforced	by	elite-controlled	politics	after	independence”.		
In	fact,	as	Mamdani	(1996,	p.	21)	argued,	indirect	rule	established	in	Uganda	was	organized	
as	 an	 “ethnic	 power	 enforcing	 custom	 on	 tribespeople”.	 “Native”	 institutions	 (e.g.	 Native	
Authority)	 were	 established	 to	 rule	 subjects,	 and	 this	 was	 the	 process	 in	 which	 ethnic	
identities	 were	 constructed.	 Not	 only,	 but	 ethnic	 identities	 were	 anchored	 through	
customary	 laws	 to	 the	 land:	 the	 “tribally”-individuated	 community	 was	 made	 customary	
proprietor	of	 land	while	the	appointed	“tribal”	political	 leaders	were	appointed	as	“holders	
and	 executors	 of	 that	 proprietorship”	 (Mamdani,	 1996,	 p.	 140).	 If	 “Tribalism	 then	was	 the	
very	form	that	colonial	rule	took	within	the	local	state	[…]	the	revolt	against	indirect	rule	also	
took	a	tribal	form”	(Mamdani,	1996,	p.	183).	
	
1.4	THEORETICAL	APPROACH	
Development	studies	are	multidisciplinary	by	nature,	as	they	borrow	from	various	schools	of	
thought	 –	 and	 can	 be	 inclined	 more	 towards	 anthropology,	 political	 sciences,	 economics,	
international	 relations,	 or	 public	 administration.	 Varying	 with	 their	 theoretical	 paradigms,	
scholars	 have	 approached	 the	 study	 of	 development	 phenomena	with	 different	 questions	
and	perspectives.	The	measurement	of	the	gap	between	policies	and	practices	has	been	the	
focus	 of	 positivist	 scholarly	 studies,	 while	 post-modernist	 scholars	 have	 focused	 on	 the	
deconstruction	of	the	rationales	behind	development	policies	and	practices.	The	first	body	of	
studies	 focuses	 more	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 top-down	 policies	 implemented,	 more	 or	 less	
effectively,	 on	 the	 ground.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	 second	body	of	 studies	 focused	on	 the	
bottom-up	dynamics,	forms	of	domination	and	resistance.	Foucault’s	analytical	framework	of	
study	 of	 discourse	 and	 power,	 offered	 the	 possibility	 of	 going	 beyond	 a	 top-down	 versus	
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bottom-up	 approach	 to	 development	 studies.	 As	 I	 approached	 the	 fieldwork	 research	 in	
Uganda,	 with	 this	 academic	 debate	 in	 mind,	 I	 chose	 to	 use	 anthropological	 methods	 to	
investigate	 how	 power	 relations	 were	 constructed	 through	 narratives,	 discourse	 and	
practices.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 give	 a	 brief	 overview	 of	 the	 debate	 and	 how	 the	 theoretical	
approach	 I	 have	 adopted	 contributes	 with	 a	 new	 perspective	 on	 the	 study	 of	 a	 recent	
development	trend.	
Arturo	Escobar	(2012)	analyses	the	invention	and	construction	of	development	as	“politics	of	
poverty”	 (ibid:	23),	 from	the	very	 ‘discovery’	 (and	problematization)	of	poverty	 in	 the	early	
post-World	War	II.	This	‘discovery’	identified	two/thirds	of	the	world	population	as	poor,	and	
in	a	seemingly	philanthropic	burst	poverty	became	the	object	of	a	project	of	modernization	
as	much	as	“the	poor	became	object	of	knowledge	and	management”	(ibid,	p.	23).	“Not	only	
poverty	 but	 health,	 education,	 hygiene,	 employment,	 and	 the	poor	quality	 of	 life	 in	 towns	
and	 cities	 were	 constructed	 as	 social	 problems,	 requiring	 extensive	 knowledge	 about	 the	
population	and	appropriate	modes	of	 social	 planning”	 (Escobar	1992a).	 In	 the	50s,	 ‘issues’	
identified	as	social	problems	became	the	object	of	professionalization	and	institutionalization	
of	 a	 “lucrative	 industry	 of	 development	 practitioners”	 (Escobar,	 2012,	 p.	 46).	 “Like	 the	
landing	of	 the	Allies	 in	Normandy,	 the	Third	World	witnessed	a	massive	 landing	of	experts,	
each	 in	charge	of	 investigating,	measuring,	and	theorizing	about	this	or	that	 little	aspect	of	
Third	World	 societies”	 (ibid,	 p.	 45).	 According	 to	 Escobar	 (2012,	 p.	 38),	 the	 development	
discourse	 re-branded	 countries	 of	 the	 global	 south	 as	 “underdeveloped	 countries”.	Within	
this	discourse	the	knowledge	(habits,	goals,	motivations	and	beliefs)	and	economic	system	of	
the	 people	 to	 be	 modernized	 and	 developed	 is	 homogenized	 as	 non-modern,	 under-
developed	and	condemned	as	inferior.	
As	Escobar	articulates,	development	as	modernization	 is	the	adoption	of	the	“right”	values,	
namely,	those	held	by	the	white	minority	(…)	those	embodied	 in	the	 ideal	of	the	cultivated	
European”	 (Escobar,	 2012,	 p.	 43).	 Development	 is	 a	 form	 of	 socio-economic	 engineering	
upon	the	tabula-rasa	of	non-places	of	a	generic	underdeveloped	country	–	to	be	developed	
according	 to	 constructed	 systems	 of	 development	 knowledge.	 The	 ‘right	 values’	 are	
systematized	 in	 truth	 regimes	which	 “(…)	 represent	 the	 Third	World	 as	 a	 child	 in	 need	 of	
adult	guidance”	–	a	sort	of	‘secular	theory	of	salvation’	(ibid,	p.	30)	that	infantilize	the	global	
south.	
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The	modelling	of	the	development	discourse	around	the	truth	regimes	of	the	global	north	is	
particularly	 evident	 in	 the	 field	 of	 agricultural	 and	 rural	 development.	 The	 classical	
agricultural	question	–	namely	the	transition	from	feudal	to	capitalist	industrial	agriculture	–	
is	that	growth	in	the	agricultural	sector	would	lower	rural	poverty	and	at	the	same	time	boost	
the	economy	as	 a	whole.	 This	 transition	 is	modelled	 after	 the	European	experience	of	 the	
industrial	revolution,	but	has	not	been	realized	elsewhere	in	the	same	way (Bernstein,	1996,	
p.	 24). In	 the	 past	 decades,	 various	 fads	 and	 trends	 have	 characterized	 the	 development	
discourse	 for	 agriculture,	 landing	 new	 fashions	 that	 continue	 to	 be	 modelled	 after	 the	
European	experience	of	agricultural	development.	However,	as	Scott	(1998,	p.	7)	bluntly	puts	
it:	 “formal	 schemes	of	order	are	untenable	without	 some	elements	of	practical	 knowledge	
that	 they	 tend	to	dismiss”.	 In	other	words,	policy	briefs	 tend	to	underestimate	the	 ‘hidden	
transcripts’,	 that	 “discourse	 that	 takes	 place	 “offstage”,	 beyond	 direct	 observation	 by	
powerholders”	of	the	rural	population	(Scott	J.	C.,	1990,	p.	4).	
For	 good	 reasons,	 the	 academic	 debate	 in	 critical	 development	 studies	 has	 focused	 its	
attention	 on	 different	 sets	 of	 issues	 in	 development,	 its	 politics	 and	 power	 relations,	
effectiveness,	ideology	and	mandates.	These	studies	have	operated	with	analytical	categories	
that	are	supposedly	borrowed	from	a	Foucauldian	study	of	power,	yet	have	reproduced	an	
interpretation	of	power	relations	in	terms	of	domination/sovereignty	that	Foucault	opposed	
(Foucault	M.	,	1976).	Most	studies	have	framed	the	power	relations	within	development	as	a	
relation	 of	 domination/resistance	 between	 groups	 of	 social	 actors	 at	 the	 top	 (i.e.	
development	 practitioners)	 and	 bottom	 (i.e.	 beneficiaries).	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 the	
development	 practitioners	 with	 their	 (supposedly	 dominant)	 discourse	 –	 produced	 and	
reproduced	by	those	social	actors	working	in	the	‘development	industry’;	on	the	other	hand,	
the	 development	 recipients	 with	 their	 own	 narratives	 and	 agency	 –	 more	 often	 than	 not	
contesting	the	dominant	development	discourse	enforced	on	them.		
Foucault	 (1976),	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 opposed	 an	 interpretation	 of	 power	 in	 terms	 of	
domination	 and	 sovereignty.	 By	 insisting	 on	 the	 discursive	 nature	 of	 power,	 which	 is	 a	
constant	process,	produced	and	reproduced	through	narratives,	knowledge	is	constructed	by	
all	social	actors	as	foundation	or	justification	of	power	relations.	In	fact,	he	showed	how	the	
mechanisms	 through	 which	 knowledge	 (broadly	 identified	 as	 the	 ensemble	 of	 oral	 and	
written	 narratives	 of	 social	 actors)	 is	 produced	 in	 everyday	 life,	 in	 every	 society,	 within	
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specific	 historical,	 socio-cultural	 and	 economic	 contexts.	 It	 is	 this	 knowledge	 that	 sustains,	
resists	and	reinforces	relations	and	structures	of	power	–	which	in	the	field	of	development	
catalyses	 limited	 resources	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 the	 constructed	 forms	 of	 development	
discourse.	Therefore,	he	invites	to	focus	on	the	tensions,	discrepancies	and	resistance	within	
as	much	as	between	groups	of	social	actors.		
My	own	research	has	been	developed	within	such	a	Foucauldian	 frame	of	analysis.	 In	 fact,	
considering	 the	 perspectives	 of	 Scott	 and	 Escobar	 on	 development	 as	 a	 discursive,	
historically-specific	 construct	 –	 I	 question	 the	motives	 and	modalities	 by	which	 the	 recent	
development	 trend	 around	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 has	 been	 constructed.	 Combining	 the	
scholars’	theoretical	framework	with	Foucault’s	analysis	of	how	social	actors’	narratives	and	
practices	 construct	 a	discourse,	 I	 analyse	how	 the	development	discourse	 around	 youth	 in	
agribusiness	 has	 been	 a	 mechanism	 of	 power	 in	 driving	 a	 new	 trend	 in	 development.	 By	
studying	 both	 development	 actors’	 and	 youths’	 perspectives,	 I	 bring	 together	 the	 study	 of	
top	 and	 bottom	 dimensions	 of	 this	 development	 trend	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 development	
practices	 on	 the	 ground	 –	 to	 understand	 how	 the	 mismatch	 affects	 the	 development	
outcomes.		
The	 social	 category	 of	 youth,	 despite	 being	 the	 object	 of	 much	 governmental	 and	
international	 development	 attention,	 remains	 a	 rather	 heterogeneous	 notion,	 which	 is	
defined	 in	different	ways	 in	 the	various	 socio-cultural	 contexts	of	Uganda.	 Yet,	 a	discourse	
has	 been	 constructed	 around	 youth,	 based	 on	 demographic	 and	 economic	 facts	
(unemployed,	bulging).	Youths’	engagement	 in	agribusiness	 is	prescribed	as	a	development	
formula	 to	 tackle	 such	 issues,	 and	 consequently	 development	 programmes	 have	 been	
implemented	across	the	country	–	yet,	still	little	is	known	about	their	impact	so	far.		
	
1.5	METHODS	
Robbins	 (2013a)	 highlights	 the	 role	 of	 anthropology	 in	 understanding	 different	 systems	 of	
values	 and	 challenges	 anthropologists	 to	 act	 as	 mediators	 between	 cultural	 worlds	 facing	
each	other	in	a	globalized	world.	An	anthropological	research	approach	seemed	best-suited	
to	carry	out	my	study	on	development	practitioners’	and	youths’	narratives	and	practices	on	
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the	recent	trend	in	development.	I	carried	out	qualitative	research	using	grounded	theory,	an	
inductive	 research	method	 that	 infers	 conclusions	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 ethnographic	 data	
through	 coding:	 this	 analytical	 process	 highlights	 recurring	 ideas	 and	 concepts,	 and	 thus	
allows	 to	 identify	 patterns	 –	 or	 narratives	 –	 in	 a	 body	 of	 texts	 or	 interviews.35	Grounded	
theory	 allowed	 me	 to	 identify	 the	 narratives	 of	 all	 development	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	
development	 trend	 around	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 in	 Uganda	 –	 namely	 both	 development	
practitioners	 (including	 Ugandan	 civil	 servants)	 and	 young	 farmers	 (or	 agripreneurs).	
Moreover,	 I	 could	 observe	 how	 the	 development	 programmes	 implemented	 across	 the	
country	had	affected	youths,	 in	terms	of	social	and	economic	 impact.	 In	fact,	by	combining	
the	 observations	 of	 perspectives	 of	 development	 practitioners	 and	 youths,	 I	 could	 identify	
and	analyse	 the	mismatch	between	development	policies,	 the	practices	of	 implementation	
and	the	outcomes	–	according	to	both	groups.		
In	 this	 way,	 I	 was	 able	 to	 recognize	 the	 narratives	 and	 practices	 that	 constructed	 the	
(Foucauldian)	 discourse	 sustaining	 the	 new	 trend	 in	 development.	 In	 fact,	 combining	
grounded	 theory	 for	a	 Foucauldian	analysis	means	 to	use	ethnographic	methods	 to	 collect	
empirical	 data	 on	 the	 narratives	 that	 construct	 the	 development	 discourse,	 but	 also	 to	
elaborate	an	analysis	of	the	implementation	of	the	programmes	to	evaluate	their	impact	on	
the	 ground.	 However,	 my	 use	 of	 a	 Foucauldian	 theoretical	 framework	 is	 in	 line	 with	 his	
elaborated	 analytical	 tools	 (such	 as	 the	 concepts	 of	 power,	 discourse,	 knowledge	 and	
narratives),	and	at	the	same	time	an	adaptation	of	his	theories	for	the	ethnographic	analysis	
of	 the	development	 trend	around	youth	 in	agribusiness.	Yet	 the	very	 twisting	of	Foucault’s	
theory	for	my	interpretative,	inductive	analysis,	 is	in	line	with	what	he	intended	his	work	to	
be:	a	‘toolbox’	to	be	pragmatically	adapted	to	each	study	(Vallois,	2015,	p.	462).	
Moreover,	 the	use	of	ethnographic	methods	allowed	me	to	shed	 light	on	 ‘who’	 the	youths	
are.	 It	 allowed	me	 to	 capture	 their	 heterogeneity	 and	 to	 record	 their	 perspectives	 on	 the	
programmes	 from	which	 they	 should	 be	 benefitting.	 The	 effort	 of	 collecting	 ethnographic	
data	 across	 the	 country,	 has	 confronted	 me	 heterogeneous	 and	 sometimes	 contrasting	
perceptions	and	views	(Mosse	2004).	Anthropological	research	methods	have	allowed	me	to	
investigate	the	systems	of	values	and	cultural	worlds	of	both	development	practitioners	and	
																																																						
35	I	will	explain	in	depth	both	the	methods	and	the	concepts	in	the	appropriate	chapter	on	Methods.		
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youths,	 besides	 collecting	 insights	 –	 through	 participant	 observations	 –	 on	 the	 flaws	 and	
strengths	of	the	implementation	of	development	programmes	for	youths	in	agribusiness.		
The	empirical	results	of	my	research	are	grounded	in	extensive	ethnographic	fieldwork	I	have	
conducted	 in	 Uganda	 in	 2016	 (1	 month),	 2017	 (6	 months)	 and	 2018	 (1	 month).	 As	
exemplified	 in	the	table	below,	 I	have	conducted	interviews	across	four	different	regions	 in	
Uganda,	in	order	to	account	for	the	regional	variety	and	disparity.	The	choice	of	the	location	
reflected	the	focus	of	the	development	programmes	that	I	have	observed	on	the	ground	(see	
chapter	3).		
Period	 Location	 Activity	
July	–	August	2016	 Kampala	 Pilot	fieldtrip	
22	interviews	with	
development	experts	and	
practitioners	
January	–	February	2017	 Kampala	(capital	city)	 24	interviews	with	
development	practitioners	
March	–	April	2017	 Gulu	(North	Uganda)	 29	interviews	with	young	
agro-entrepreneurs	
March	&	May	2017	 Kampala	(capital	city)	 26	interviews	with	young	
agro-entrepreneurs	
May	–	June	2017	 Mbarara	 (South-West	
Uganda)	
25	interviews	with	young	
agro-entrepreneurs	
June	2017	 Mbale	(East	Uganda)	 30	interviews	with	young	
agro-entrepreneurs	
May	2018	 Kampala	 Follow-up	fieldwork	
13	interviews	
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TABLE	1.	FIELD	SITES	AND	RESEARCH	PERIODS	
	
1.6	FINDINGS	AND	RELEVANCE		
1.6.1	OVERVIEW	OF	FINDINGS	
As	 argued	 in	 sections	 1.4	 and	1.5	 above,	 I	 have	used	ethnographic	 research	methods	 to	 a	
Foucauldian	 discourse	 analysis	 of	 how	 the	 trend	 in	 development	 around	 youth	 in	
agribusiness	has	been	constructed.	In	this	way,	I	was	able	to	show	that	‘youth’	does	not	have	
intrinsic	 explanatory	 power	 of	 who	 the	 youths	 actually	 are	 in	 Uganda	 and	 what	 their	
experience	 in	 engaging	 agribusiness	 entails.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 narrative	 analysis	 of	
interviews	 with	 youths	 and	 development	 practitioners	 has	 shown	 that	 there	 are	
heterogeneous	understandings	of	what	 it	means	to	be	young	 in	Uganda,	 in	the	agricultural	
sector.	In	fact,	these	are	contextual	to	the	regional	and	socio-cultural	environment,	that	are	
extremely	 diverse	 in	 this	 country.	 Such	 heterogeneity	 can	 be	 expected	 also	 for	 other	
developing	countries	in	which	youth	is	defined	only	as	an	age	range.		
Moreover,	 heterogeneity	 has	 been	 found	 also	 in	 the	 theories	 of	 change	 of	 development	
actors	 in	 targeting	 youth	 unemployment	 through	 the	 engagement	 in	 agribusiness.	
Furthermore,	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 programmes	 with	 this	 goal,	 I	 have	 observed	 a	
diversified	range	of	development	strategies	(from	public	to	private-sector	driven).		
Critical	development	studies	(Escobar,	2012)	(Scott	J.	 ,	1976)	denounced	a	tension	between	
aspirations	 and	 objectives	 at	 the	 ‘top’	 (on	 the	 side	 of	 development	 agencies),	 and	 at	 the	
‘bottom’	 (among	 young	 beneficiaries	 of	 programmes).	 My	 study	 has	 confirmed	 such	
discrepancy,	and	has	observed	an	additional	tension	within	development	actors	at	the	‘top’	
and	 ‘bottom’.	 In	 fact,	 I	 found	 that	 development	 agencies	 have	 different	 interests	 and	
incentives,	 as	 much	 as	 youths	 have	 different	 capacities	 and	 constraints.	 This	 finding	 is	
particularly	important	because	it	adds	to	the	debate	in	development	studies	by	stressing	that	
development	 as	 a	 process	 cannot	 be	 understood	 only	 as	 the	 enactment	 of	 policies	
(elaborated	at	the	top)	into	practices	(at	the	bottom).	On	the	contrary,	by	going	beyond	this	
dualistic	conceptualization	of	development,	it	is	possible	to	capture	dynamics	that	reveal	the	
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heterogeneity	 in	 development.	 Focusing	 on	 dynamics	 between	 and	 within	 groups	 of	
development	 actors	 allows	 for	 an	 understanding	 of	 development	 that	 reflects	 the	
heterogeneity	 on	 the	 ground,	 as	 much	 as	 sheds	 light	 on	 important	 dynamics	 influencing	
development	implementation.		
	
1.6.2	SCIENTIFIC	RELEVANCE	
Despite	the	growing	interest	among	scholars	in	the	study	of	youth	in	development,	still	little	
is	known	about	the	recent	trend	around	youth	in	agribusiness	–	neither	from	the	perspective	
of	 development	 organisations,	 nor	 from	 that	 of	 the	 beneficiaries.	 How	 has	 a	 new	
development	 trend	 developed	 around	 this	 topic?	 Certainly,	 there	 are	 pressing	 societal	
reasons	 to	 address	 issues	 of	 youth	 employability	 in	 agribusiness	 –	 but	 it	 is	 particularly	
important	to	have	empirical	evidence	on	how	a	new	trend	in	development	is	constructed	and	
perceived.	This	study,	contributes	to	filling	a	knowledge	gap	on	both	the	theoretical	puzzle	of	
why	this	trend	developed	as	it	did	in	Uganda,	and	the	empirical	question	of	its	impact	on	the	
ground.	 I	 did	 this	 by	 combining	 ethnographic	 methods	 with	 a	 Foucauldian	 approach	 to	
development	studies.		
Moreover,	this	study	adds	to	the	understanding	of	the	social	category	of	youth	in	a	context	–	
the	Ugandan	one	–	 in	which	youths	are	a	majoritarian	share	of	 the	population.	 In	 fact,	 the	
heterogeneous	nature	of	this	social	group	needs	to	be	systematised	for	‘youth’	(as	a	category	
and	concept)	to	have	explanatory	power	and	concreteness.		
This	 research	 has	 brought	 me	 to	 identify	 and	 analyse	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 intended	
development	 programmes	 and	 the	 actual	 outcomes	 on	 the	 ground,	 as	 perceived	 by	 the	
youths	 themselves.	 This	 study	 proposes	 an	 ethnographic	 account	 of	 the	 elaboration	 and	
implementation	of	a	specific	trend	in	development;	it	offers	a	perspective	on	how	this	trend	
in	 development	 is	 perceived,	 and	 how	 tensions	 and	 discrepancies	 are	 found	 between	
development	‘top’	and	‘bottom’,	but	also	within	these	groups	of	development	actors.	
This	study	contributes	to	an	understanding	of	how	development	works	in	Uganda,	specifically	
in	 relation	 to	a	 relatively	new	development	 trend.	As	mentioned,	studying	heterogeneity	 is	
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important	since	the	reality	I	have	observed	was	much	more	complex	than	a	dualistic	relation	
between	groups	of	actors	on	a	top-down	vs	bottom-up	model.	I	analyse	these	interactions	as	
development	 in	 action	 as	 negotiations	 and	 adaptation	 processes	 among	 the	 development	
actors	–	finding	divergence	not	so	much	between	development	practitioners	and	youths,	but	
rather	 within	 them.	 This	 finding	 reinforces	 the	 argument	 (elaborated	 in	 the	 first	 two	
chapters)	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 examine	 a	 development	 trend	 in	 its	 heterogeneity:	 the	
heterogeneity	 of	 development	 approaches,	 perceptions	 and	 experiences	 of	 development	
beneficiaries,	and	heterogeneity	of	 interactions,	negotiations	and	adaptations	to	the	reality	
on	the	ground.	
Moreover,	this	study	offers	a	confrontation	of	heterogeneous	perspectives	on	what	it	means	
to	 be	 young	 and	 engaged	 in	 development,	 in	 Uganda.	 The	 mainstream	 understanding	 of	
entrepreneurship	 is	 bound	 to	 a	 linear,	 productivist	 thinking	 (Seuneke,	 Lans,	 &	 Wiskerke,	
2013)	 targeting	 an	 increase	 of	 income	 for	 the	 rural	 poor	 (Toenissen,	 Adesina,	 &	 DeVries,	
Building	an	Alliance	for	a	Green	Revolution	in	Africa,	2008).	However,	research	on	street	food	
entrepreneurship	shows	how	entrepreneurs	escape	this	very	linear	and	productivist	business	
values,	 pursuing	 their	 own	 (Wegerif,	 2014).	 Remarkably	 little	 attention	 is	 paid	 to	
agripreneurs’	systems	of	values	 in	developing	countries:	 the	negotiation	of	 their	 identity	as	
youth	 and	 agripreneurs,	 their	 understandings	 of	 agribusiness	 and	 development,	 and	 their	
agency	 in	 navigating	market	 values.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 new	 development	 trend	 around	
youth	 in	 agribusiness,	 in	 which	 youth	 are	 invested	 of	 the	 responsibility	 of	 becoming	
agripreneurs,	 the	knowledge	gap	on	 their	 identity,	 capacities,	 constraints	 and	ambitions,	 is	
burning.		
Moreover,	this	study	helps	understand	how	development	policies	for	youths	in	agribusiness	
respond	to	the	political	agendas	of	development	organisations.	For	instance,	I	have	recorded	
in	 several	 instances	 how	public	 organisations	 respond	 to	 the	 political	 need	 of	 keeping	 the	
young	electorate	loyal	to	the	government	(see	chapter	5).		
	
	
	
	 42	
1.6.3	SOCIETAL	RELEVANCE	
The	 societal	 relevance	 of	 this	 study	 lays	 in	 the	 potential	 of	 this	 research	 to	 serve	 the	
improvement	of	 development	programmes	 and	 strategies	 for	 youths	 in	Uganda.	While	my	
research	 is	 not	 designed	 to	 assess	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 individual	 programs,	 my	 findings	
suggest	 that	 programmes	 that	 responded	 to	 local,	 contextual	 needs	 of	 youths	 were	
perceived	 as	more	 successful	 by	 the	 youths	 themselves.	 To	 this	 end,	 I	 organised	 feedback	
sessions	 with	 the	 major	 development	 agencies,	 in	 Kampala,	 to	 explain	 and	 validate	 my	
results.	 These	 were	 held	 at	 the	 Embassy	 of	 the	 Netherlands,	 at	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Gender,	
Labour	and	Social	Development,	and	at	 the	 International	 Institute	of	Tropical	Agriculture	 in	
2017	and	2018.		
Moreover,	understanding	“public	and	hidden	transcripts”	(Scott	J.	C.,	1990)	of	policy-makers	
on	the	one	hand	and	young	agripreneurs	on	the	other	can	produce	the	necessary	knowledge	
to	 foster	 synergies	 between	 stakeholders	 and	 promote	 effectiveness	 for	 those	 rural	
development	programmes	investing	in	youth	agripreneurship36.	It	is	important	to	understand	
the	 development	 potential	 of	 these	 programmes	 also	 by	 measuring	 the	 dynamic	 and	
engaged	 interaction	 of	 agripreneurs	 with	 the	 development	 institutions	 entitled	 to	 their	
development.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 this	 study	pays	particular	 attention	 to	 the	 implications	of	
these	 development	 programmes	 for	 young	 agripreneurs	 within	 and	 outside	 development	
schemes,	 and	 their	 response	 to	 such	 programmes.	 It	 aims,	 indeed,	 at	 bringing	 the	 emic37	
dimension	into	the	policy	enactment	process,	by	showing	the	agency	of	agripreneurs	and	not	
only	their	role	as	recipients	of	development.	The	societal	relevance	of	this	research	project,	
then,	lays	also	in	the	chance	the	study	gives	young	agripreneurs	to	report	their	feedback	of	
capacities	and	constraints	encountered	in	the	unfolding	this	development	trend	focusing	on	
																																																						
36	Consistent	investments	have	recently	been	made	by	the	African	Development	Bank	(AfDB)	in	
collaboration	with	the	International	Institute	for	Tropical	Agriculture	(IITA).	The	ENABLE	Youth	
Empowerment	Agribusiness	programme	is	the	latest	(agreement	signed	on	05.05.2015)	example:	
http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/innovative-programme-to-improve-employment-
and-income-outcomes-for-young-people-14217/	
	
37	In	anthropologic	jargon,	‘emic’	refers	to	the	perspective	of	the	social	group,	while	‘etic’	is	the	
perspective	of	the	observer.		
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them,	 also	 by	 highlighting	 their	 active	 interaction	 with	 development	 institutions	 targeting	
them.		
	
1.7	STRUCTURE	OF	THE	THESIS	
The	 thesis	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 In	 chapter	 two,	 I	 provide	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 academic	
debate	 in	 critical	 development	 studies,	 suggesting	 that	 in	 some	 instances	 his	 analysis	 of	
power	has	been	mis-interpreted.	By	explaining	some	of	the	core	concepts	of	Foucault’s	study	
of	discourse,	narratives	and	power,	 I	 aim	 to	develop	a	 theoretical	 frame	of	 analysis	 that	 is	
more	in	line	with	Foucault’s	original	intent.		
In	chapter	three,	I	explain	the	methodology	that	I	have	used	to	address	the	research	question	
in	great	detail.	In	particular,	I	justify	my	use	of	grounded	theory	and	provide	an	overview	of	
the	 fieldwork	and	ethnographic	data	 I	have	collected	 in	Uganda.	 I	 conclude	 the	chapter	by	
introducing	the	major	field	sites	and	actors.	
The	first	empirical	chapter,	chapter	four,	is	an	‘aidnography’	that	investigates	the	theories	of	
change	of	several	development	actors.	The	goal	of	the	chapter	is	to	show	how	these	different	
theories	 of	 change	 lead	 to	 different	 development	 approaches:	 one	 driven	 by	 the	 public-
sector	 and	 one	 driven	 by	 the	 private	 sector.	While	 national	 agencies	 are	more	 concerned	
with	 the	 issue	 of	 youth	 unemployment	 and	 the	 socio-political	 instability	 that	 could	 derive	
from	 it,	 international	 agencies	 are	 more	 anxious	 about	 the	 ‘youth	 bulge’.	 In	 both	 cases,	
however,	‘youth’,	as	a	phenomenon	and	as	a	concept,	has	become	a	distinct	social,	economic	
and	political	category,	turning	into	a	development	and	political	project.	
In	 chapter	 five,	 I	 examine	 youths’	 definitions	 of	 youth	 and	 agribusiness,	 highlighting	 how	
from	 their	 narratives	 they	 emerge	 as	 a	 very	 heterogeneous	 social	 category.	 I	 systematize	
such	heterogeneity	by	conceptualizing	the	factors	(e.g.	ethnicity,	gender,	age)	that	contribute	
to	their	diversity.	Moreover,	I	explore	the	relation	between	these	factors	by	inscribing	them	
in	three	dimensions	that	emerge	from	the	narrative	analysis	as	analytical	categories:	socio-
cultural,	territorial	and	value	chain	embedding.		
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In	chapter	six,	the	final	empirical	chapter,	I	explore	the	practices	through	which	development	
practitioners	implement	their	development	programmes.	I	argue	that	the	enactment	of	this	
development	 trend	 –	 from	 programme	 design,	 to	 implementation	 and	 outcomes	 –	 is	 a	
diverse	and	untidy	process	that	relies	on	practices	of	negotiations	among	many	development	
actors.	Through	the	analysis	of	negotiation	practices	among	development	actors	in	Kampala,	
I	show	how	their	relations	and	interactions	shape	the	course	of	the	programme	enactment.	
In	 fact,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 outcome	 of	 these	 negotiations	 is	 compromise	 between	 different	
incentives	and	stakes	of	the	actors	involved	before	the	programme	is	even	enforced	on	the	
ground.	Moreover,	as	development	actors	are	confronted	with	the	heterogeneity	of	youths	
on	the	ground,	they	either	fail	to	meet	youths	needs	and	capacities,	or	in	some	cases	adapt	
their	 programmes.	 This	 process	 of	 adaptation	 is	 only	 possible	 for	 those	 programmes	 that	
preserve	 flexibility	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 negotiated	 compromise	 with	 other	 development	
stakeholders.		
In	chapter	seven,	I	conclude	the	monograph,	summing	up	the	outcomes	outlined	in	each	of	
the	 three	 empirical	 chapters	 and	 placing	 these	 findings	 within	 the	 larger	 context	 of	 the	
project’s	 theoretical	 framework	 and	 the	 academic	 debate	 in	 critical	 development	 studies	
more	broadly.	Moreover,	in	this	chapter,	I	highlight	the	general	(and	generalizable)	empirical	
and	theoretical	conclusions	of	this	thesis.		
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CHAPTER		2	
THEORET ICAL 	FRAMEWORK 	
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We	have	to	study	power	outside	the	model	of	Leviathan,	outside	the	field	delineated	by	
juridical	sovereignty	and	the	institution	of	the	State.	We	have	to	analyse	it	by	beginning	with	
the	techniques	and	tactics	of	domination.		(Foucault	M.	,	1976,	p.	34)	
	
2.1	INTRODUCTION	
In	 this	 chapter	 I	explore	 the	academic	debate	 in	development	 studies	and	operationalize	a	
theoretical	 approach	 for	 my	 analysis	 of	 the	 trend	 in	 development	 around	 youth	 in	
agribusiness	in	Uganda.	I	investigate	the	theories	scholars	have	used	and	developed,	showing	
how	critical	scholars	have	relied	on	a	Foucauldian	paradigm.	I	operationalize	such	paradigm	
to	 serve	 the	purpose	of	 answering	 the	 research	question	of	 this	 study:	How	has	 the	 social	
category	of	 youth	been	driving	a	new	 trend	 in	development	around	agribusiness,	and	what	
has	been	its	impact	so	far?		
This	 research	question	 lays	 the	 focus	of	 the	 research	on	 the	mechanisms	 through	which	a	
new	 trend	 in	 development	 has	 emerged,	 and	 on	 the	 impact	 it	 has	 had	 so	 far.	 As	 I	 have	
outlined	in	the	previous	chapter,	there	are	demographic	and	economic	issues	around	youth	
and	agribusiness,	which	are	at	the	root	of	concerns	of	development	practitioners.	As	stressed	
by	critical	development	studies	–	such	as	Scott,	Escobar,	Ferguson,	Murray	Li	–,	there	also	are	
political	 agendas	 and	 interests	 in	 the	 construction	 and	 implementation	 of	 a	 new	 trend	 in	
development.	In	their	analysis,	development	and	its	outcomes	is	intertwined	with	structures	
of	 power	 and	 power	 relations.	 These	 scholars	 have	 studied	 power	 relations	 within	
development	with	reference	to	Foucault’s	analytical	paradigm	of	power.	In	line	with	them,	I	
also	explore	the	recent	development	trend	around	youth	in	agribusiness	in	Uganda	by	using	a	
Foucauldian	analytical	framework.	With	Escobar	(2012,	p.	10)	I	understand	development	as	a	
historically	contingent	creation	of	a	“domain	of	thought	and	action”,	but	also	as	a	“category	
of	practice”	(Mosse,	2013,	p.	227).	As	a	category	of	practice,	development	is	produced	and	
reproduced	 by	 social	 actors	 in	 particular	 historical	 circumstances,	 reiterating	 particular	
cultural	knowledges.	For	these	reasons,	anthropological	research	methods	were	adopted	to	
collect	data	on	the	mechanisms	through	which	this	trend	was	constructed	and	implemented	
in	Uganda	(see	following	chapter	3).	
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In	 contrast	 to	 several	 critical	 scholars	 in	 development	 studies,	 however,	 I	 explore	
development	as	a	process	that	is	a	more	heterogeneous	than	the	dualistic	contraposition	of	
development	practitioners	to	their	(supposed)	beneficiaries.	Scholars	in	critical	development	
studies	 explored	 development	 as	 a	 more	 or	 less	 effective	 or	 contested	 exercise	 of	
domination	 of	 the	 ‘development	 industry’	on	 local	 populations.	 In	 this	 study,	 I	 attempt	 an	
investigation	of	the	development	trend	‘outside	the	model	of	the	Leviathan’	that	contraposes	
development	 efforts	 to	 its	 ‘beneficiaries’.	As	opposed	 to	 seeing	power	 as	 centralized	 in	 an	
institution	 (e.g.	 the	 government,	 the	 development	 agencies)	 or	 social	 category	 –	 the	
Leviathan	 –	 (e.g.	 civil	 servants,	 development	 practitioners)	 Foucault	 describes	 power	 as	 a	
function	that	cannot	be	localized:	
Power	must,	I	think,	be	analysed	as	something	that	circulates,	or	rather	as	something	
that	functions	only	when	it	 is	part	of	a	chain.	It	 is	never	localized	here	or	there,	 it	 is	
never	in	the	hands	of	some,	and	it	is	never	appropriated	in	the	way	that	wealth	or	a	
commodity	 can	 be	 appropriated.	 Power	 functions.	 Power	 is	 exercised	 through	
networks,	 and	 individuals	 do	 not	 simply	 circulate	 in	 those	 networks;	 they	 are	 in	 a	
position	 to	 both	 submit	 to	 and	 exercise	 this	 power.	 They	 are	 never	 the	 inert	 or	
consenting	targets	of	power;	they	are	always	its	relays.	In	other	words,	power	passes	
through	individuals.	It	is	not	applied	to	them.	(Foucault	M.	,	1976,	p.	29-30) 	
While	 the	 model	 of	 the	 Leviathan	 assumes	 the	 logic	 of	 sovereignty	 between	 an	
institutionalized,	 centralized	power	 and	 its	 subjugated	–	 Foucault	 argues	 that	power	 is	 the	
omnipresent	 function	 that	 sustains	 and	 structures	 networks	 and	 relations	 among	 citizens,	
between	citizens	and	the	state,	and	within	the	state	itself.	Power	is,	thus,	a	pervasive	process	
that	is	embodied,	contested	and	reshaped	by	all	actors	in	society	–	and	political	institutions	
and	 authorities	 are	 a	 mere	 expression	 of	 the	 process.	 Within	 this	 framework,	 power	 is	
understood	 as	 a	 process	 that	 is	 constantly	 in	 the	 making,	 through	 the	 elaboration	 of	
knowledge	structures	and	relations	between	social	actors	who,	with	their	agency,	enact	and	
counteract	power	structures.		
This	 process	 unfolds	 through	 the	 constant	 construction	 and	 contestation	 of	 knowledge	
structures:	 the	stories	and	narratives	 that	contribute	 to	 the	development	discourse.	Social,	
political	and	economic	values	and	norms	underpinning	specific	development	efforts	(like	the	
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engagement	 of	 youth	 in	 agribusiness)	 are	 expressed	 through	 such	 knowledge	 structures.	
Power	 relations,	development	policies	and	programmes	are	 justified	and	enforced	 through	
the	 development	 discourse.	 Foucault	 identifies	 specific	 yet	 diverse	 forms	 through	 which	
power	 is	 exercised	 on	 and	 by	 social	 actors	 and	 institutions	 and	 their	 narratives.	 In	 an	
interview,	 ‘The	Confession	of	 the	 Flesh’	 (1980,	 p.	 194),	 Foucault	 defines	 and	explains	 such	
mechanisms	of	power:	an	‘apparatus’,	or	ensemble	of	devices	(or	dispositif)	as			
a	 thoroughly	 heterogeneous	 ensemble	 consisting	 of	 discourses,	 institutions,	
architectural	 forms,	 regulatory	 decisions,	 laws,	 administrative	 measures,	 scientific	
statements,	philosophical,	moral	and	philanthropic	propositions	-	in	short,	the	said	as	
much	as	the	unsaid.	Such	are	the	elements	of	the	apparatus.	The	apparatus	 itself	 is	
the	 system	of	 relations	 that	 can	be	established	between	 these	elements.	 Secondly,	
what I am	trying	to	identify	in	this	apparatus	is	precisely	the	nature	of	the	connection	
that	can	exist	between	these	heterogeneous	elements.		
In	 the	 realm	 of	 development	 cooperation,	 thus,	 power	 is	 distributed	 and	 enforced	 and	
constructed	by	all	social	actors	involved	–	both	development	practitioners	and	beneficiaries,	
who	 through	 spoken	 and	 unspoken	 devices	 sustain,	 contest	 or	 reshape	 power	 dynamics.	
Development	itself,	as	stressed	by	development	studies	scholars,	is	a	discourse	–	a	device	–	
that	underpins	power	structures.		
To	understand	how	a	given	development	trend	functions	 in	the	specific	context	of	Uganda,	
means	to	study	how	power	structures	are	constructed	in	the	system	of	relations	between	the	
elements	of	its	apparatus.	Hence,	I	argue	that	it	will	be	necessary	to	investigate	the	‘devices’	
through	which	power	structures	operate	and	shape	relations	between	and	within	the	various	
groups	 of	 social	 actors	 involved.	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	 argue	 for	 a	 re-elaboration	 of	 the	
Foucauldian	 theoretical	 paradigm	 of	 power	 that	 escapes	 the	 logic	 of	 sovereignty	 and	
domination.	 Moreover,	 in	 the	 following	 I	 highlight	 how	 the	 use	 of	 qualitative	 research	
methods	 allowed	 to	 collect	data	on	 the	 study	of	 this	 trend	as	 a	discourse	–	with	 concrete	
impact	on	the	ground.		
This	 chapter	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 First	 (section	 2.2),	 I	 set	 the	 scene	 of	 the	 academic	
debate	 in	development	studies,	narrowing	down	the	broad	field	of	development	studies	to	
the	specific	debate	around	agribusiness	and	youth.	I	start	by	reviewing	how	development	has	
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been	defined	(2.2.1)	by	some	of	the	major	scholars	before	coming	to	my	working	definition	
of	development.	 I	then	restrict	the	overview	to	exploring	the	literature	around	agribusiness	
(2.2.2)	 and	 youth	 (2.2.3).	 Through	 this	 section	 I	 argue	 that	 this	 field	 of	 study	 can	 best	 be	
analysed	through	a	Foucauldian	development	approach.	In	the	following	section	(2.3)	I	move	
on	to	examining	Foucault’s	analytical	paradigm	of	power,	exploring	his	conceptualizations	of	
knowledge	 and	 practices,	 and	 the	 devices	 underpinning	 power	 structures	 (discourse	 and	
narratives).	In	section	2.4,	I	examine	the	academic	debate	around	development	by	scholars	in	
critical	development	studies,	showing	how	they	relied	on	a	Foucauldian	paradigm.	However,	I	
show	how	most	scholars	have	developed	their	analysis	of	power	relations	between	groups	of	
social	actors	 in	development,	 thereby	reinforcing	a	narrative	of	domination	–	 the	model	of	
the	 Leviathan.	 In	 section	 2.5,	 I	 operationalise	 the	 Foucauldian	 paradigm	 in	 light	 of	 the	
ethnographic	study	I	intend	to	make	in	the	field	of	critical	development	studies.	Here,	I	show	
the	analytical	tools	I	will	use	to	study	development	practitioners’	and	youths’	narratives	and	
practices.	I	conclude	this	chapter	(section	2.6)	by	arguing	how	the	approach	I	operationalised	
will	allow	to	conduct	my	study	outside	of	the	model	of	the	Leviathan,	thereby	contributing	to	
the	academic	debate	in	critical	development	studies.		
	
2.2	SETTING	THE	SCENE	OF	THE	ACADEMIC	DEBATE		
2.2.1	DEVELOPMENT	STUDIES	
I	 refer	 to	 development	 as	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 effort	 exercised	 by	 various	
(inter)national	 agencies,	 governments	 and	 institutions	 to	 alleviate	 poverty	 and	 improving	
living	 conditions	 in	 the	 global	 south.	 Therefore,	 I	 focus	 on	 development	 as	 (inter)national	
cooperation	for	socio-economic	change	–	also	referred	to	as	‘aid’	–	that	is	distinguished	from	
humanitarian	aid	or	disaster	relief.	 	 I	 find	myself	 in	 line	with	Pallotti	and	Zamponi	 (2014,	p.	
19),	as	they	define	development	as	
a	process	aiming	at	the	achievement	of	better	life	conditions	and	enhanced	capacity	
for	self-reliance	in	economies	that	are	technically	more	complex	and	more	dependent	
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on	processes	of	global	 integration	compared	to	the	past	 (…);	and	 it	 requires	a	 long-
term	structural	change	of	society		
This	definition	positions	development	as	a	historically	grounded	process.	In	fact,	not	only	the	
economic	 change	 is	 often	 result	 of	 political	 efforts	 of	 both	 national	 and	 international	
agencies,	but	it	is	also	contextual	to	the	society	for	which	structural	change	is	envisioned.		
Arturo	 Escobar	 (2012)	 develops	 an	 analysis	 of	 what	 he	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 ‘development	
industry’	 from	 post-World	 War	 II	 until	 our	 decade,	 and	 stresses	 not	 only	 the	 historical	
contingency	 of	 development	 programmes,	 but	 also	 its	 political	 dimension.	 He	 argues	 that	
development	was	 ‘invented’	 in	 the	post-war	West	and	construction	as	“politics	of	poverty”	
(ibid:	23):	poverty	was	‘discovered’	and	problematized	as	a	condition	to	be	eradicated.	This	
‘discovery’	 identified	 two/thirds	 of	 the	world	 population	 as	 poor,	 and	poverty	 became	 the	
object	of	a	project	of	modernization	as	much	as	“the	poor	became	object	of	knowledge	and	
management”	 (ibid:	23).	 In	 the	1950s,	 the	 identified	 social	problems	became	 the	object	of	
professionalization	 and	 institutionalization	 of	 a	 “lucrative	 industry	 of	 development	
practitioners”	 (Escobar	 2012:	 46).	 “Like	 the	 landing	 of	 the	 Allies	 in	 Normandy,	 the	 Third	
World	witnessed	 a	massive	 landing	 of	 experts,	 each	 in	 charge	 of	 investigating,	measuring,	
and	theorizing	about	this	or	that	little	aspect	of	Third	World	societies”	(ibid:	45).		 	
Since	the	1950s,	development	aid	has	taken	different	forms	and	strategies	–	what	Swedlund	
(2017,	p.	3)	refers	to	as	aid	delivery	mechanisms:		
From	 microfinance	 to	 results-based	 aid,	 from	 basket	 funding	 to	 general	 budget	
support,	 development	 aid	 is	 continuously	 reinventing	 itself,	 claiming	 to	 have	 finally	
found	 the	 next	 big	 idea	 that	 is	 going	 to	 make	 aid	 more	 effective.	 This	 relentless	
innovation—what	 some	 call	 aid	 fads	 or	 fashions—leads	 to	 rapid	 paradigm	 shifts	 in	
development	 cooperation	 that	 are	 difficult,	 if	 not	 impossible,	 for	 development	
practitioners	to	keep	up	with.	
The	reasons	for	the	changes	in	paradigm	shifts	are	several,	ambiguous	and	contextual	–	but	
certainly	should	be	read	in	a	historical	perspective.	A	development	delivery	mechanism	that	
is	considered	to	be	valid	and	true	in	a	specific	moment	in	history	will	change	even	radically	
with	 time.	 Together	 with	 the	 shifts	 in	 aid	 delivery	 mechanisms,	 development	 discourses	
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around	 poverty	 and	 Africa	 have	 also	 been	 fluctuating,	 as	 Jerven	 (2015,	 p.	 123)	 argues:	
“narratives	on	African	economic	development	can	switch	from	one	extreme	to	the	other	so	
swiftly.	Of	course,	the	truth	lies	somewhere	between	the	‘miracles’	and	‘tragedies’.	We	went	
from	 a	 rhetoric	 of	 ‘Bottom	 Billion’	 to	 ‘Africa	 Rising’	 within	 half	 a	 decade.”	 These	 changes	
show	 both	 the	 political	 and	 cultural	 dimension	 of	 aid	 delivery	 –	 also	 in	 the	 field	 of	 rural	
development:		
Any	attempt	to	portray	evolving	ideas	in	rural	development	over	the	past	half-century	
risks	 oversimplification.	 While	 it	 is	 superficially	 neat	 to	 characterise	 the	 1960s	 as	
modernisation,	 the	 1970s	 as	 state	 intervention,	 the	 1980s	 as	market	 liberalisation,	
and	the	1990s	as	participation	and	empowerment,	popular	 ideas	and	their	practical	
effects	 on	 rural	 policies	 did	 not,	 indeed,	 undergo	 these	 transitions	 in	 such	 an	
uncluttered	manner.	(Ellis	&	Biggs,	2001,	p.	437)	
	
Recently,	 development	 programmes	 have	 shifted	 attention	 from	 ‘poverty’	 to	 ‘the	 poor’	
(Mosse	2010	in	(Pallotti	&	Zamponi,	2014,	p.	45).	According	to	Ferguson	(2014,	p.	20-21),	this	
shift	 is	 a	 process	 of	 depoliticization	 of	 development	 which	 ‘pathologises’	 the	 subject	 (the	
poor)	‘to	be	developed’.	In	the	early	post-World	War	II	the	‘social	problem’	“discovered”	was	
poverty;	 today,	 it	 appears	 from	development	narratives,	 the	problem	 is	people	being	poor	
rather	 than	 the	 (systemic,	 and	 thus	 political)	 causes	 producing	 poverty.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 a	
generic	‘poor’	for	which	replicable	development	measures	can	be	adopted.	In	his	analysis	of	
state	simplification	and	legibility,	Scott	(1998:	81)	argues:	
First,	the	knowledge	that	an	official	needs	must	give	him	or	her	a	synoptic	view	of	the	
ensemble;	 it	 must	 be	 cast	 in	 terms	 that	 are	 replicable	 across	 many	 cases.	 In	 this	
respect,	 such	 facts	 must	 lose	 their	 particularity	 and	 reappear	 in	 schematic	 or	
simplified	form	as	a	member	of	a	class	of	facts.	Second,	in	a	meaning	closely	related	
to	 the	 first,	 the	 grouping	 of	 synoptic	 facts	 necessarily	 entails	 collapsing	 or	 ignoring	
distinctions	that	might	otherwise	be	relevant.	
In	 line	 with	 Scott’s	 analysis,	 international	 development	 ideology	 has	 been	 critiqued	 for	
proposing	 uniform,	 replicable	 and	 technocratic	 solutions.	 In	 fact,	 critical	 scholars	 (mainly	
Scott,	 Escobar,	 Ferguson,	Mosse)	 identified	 a	 tension	 between	 development	 practitioners’	
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vision	of	change	and	‘indigenous’	farmers.	Such	a	gap	has	been	recognised	as	being	the	main	
motive	 for	 farmers’	 resistance	 to	 development	 programmes	 (Scott	 J.	 ,	 1992).	 Lewis	 and	
Mosse	 (2006,	 p.	 2)	 have	 shown	 that	 in	 fact	 there	 is	 a	 disjuncture	 between	 the	 ideal	
development	policy	to	be	 implemented	and	the	reality	on	the	ground,	concluding	even	the	
best	development	practices	cannot	bridge	this	gap:	
First,	 and	 most	 commonly	 within	 the	 technical	 and	 managerial	 framework	 that	
defines	aid	policy,	“order”	can	be	understood	as	the	“ideal	worlds”	that	development	
actors	aim	to	bring	about	through	the	execution	of	proper	policy	and	project	design.	
Disjuncture	 comes	 from	 the	 gap	 between	 these	 ideal	 worlds	 and	 the	 social	 reality	
they	have	 to	 relate	 to.	 This	 comes	 to	be	managed	 in	one	of	 two	ways.	On	 the	one	
hand,	the	gap	between	intention	and	outcome	must	be	narrowed	through	the	pursuit	
of	proper	 implementation	and	“best	practice”—a	continuing	task	of	agency	workers	
at	 all	 levels,	 and	 one	 corresponding	 to	 the	 long-term	 academic	 anthropological	
concern	 with	 the	 contradictions	 between	 what	 is	 said	 and	 what	 is	 done	 in	
development.	On	the	other	hand,	developers	“try	and	see	to	it	that	the	‘ideal	worlds’	
[are]	 consistent	with	what	we	know	about	how	real	 societies	actually	work,	 so	 that	
‘development’	planning	can	set	itself	objectives	capable	of	being	realised”	(…).	
Considering	the	failures	of	development	programmes	due	to	this	gap	between	the	intended	
and	the	actual	outcomes,	Ferguson	(2014)	elaborates	his	theory	of	the	anti-politics	machine.	
He	refers	to	development	as	an	industry	(ibid:	8),	and	“not	a	machine	for	eliminating	poverty	
that	 is	 incidentally	 involved	with	 the	 state	bureaucracy;	 it	 is	 a	machine	 for	 reinforcing	 and	
expanding	the	exercise	of	bureaucratic	state	power,	which	incidentally	takes	“poverty”	as	its	
point	 of	 entry	 (…)”	 (2014,	 p.	 255).	While	 not	managing	 to	 eradicate	 poverty,	 this	machine	
does	have	(un)intended,	concrete	consequences:	“By	uncompromisingly	reducing	poverty	to	
a	technical	problem,	and	by	promising	technical	solutions	to	the	suffering	of	powerless	and	
oppressed	 people,	 the	 hegemonic	 problematic	 of	 “developmnet”	 is	 the	 principal	 means	
through	which	the	question	of	poverty	is	de-politicized	in	the	world	today”	(Ferguson,	2014,	
p.	256).	
According	 to	Mosse	 (2013,	 p.	 229),	 this	 industry	 is	 a	 “historical	 system	 of	 thought	 to	 the	
interactions	 of	 various	 actors	 and	 systems	 of	 knowledge”.	 With	 Mosse,	 the	 analysis	 of	
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development	also	takes	in	particular	consideration	the	human	dimension	of	those	who	make	
development:	 the	 “communities	 of	 development	 advisors,	 consultants,	 policy	 makers,	 aid	
administrators	 and	 managers	 –	 those	 involved	 in	 the	 construction	 and	 transmission	 of	
knowledge	about	global	poverty	and	its	reduction.”	(Mosse,	2011,	p.	1).	The	complex	world	
surrounding	 development	 institutions,	 organizations,	 policy	 papers,	 and	 communities	 of	
physical	development	actors	is	referred	to	by	Apthorpe	(in	Mosse,	2011,	p.	199)	as	‘Aidland’	
–	 a	 concept	 that	 hints	 at	 the	 virtual,	 as	much	 as	 real,	 nature	 of	 development.	 In	 fact,	 the	
author	defines	 (Mosse,	2011,	p.	199)	 the	concept	of	Aidland	as	“a	macro	construct,	whose	
microapplications	 are	 interesting.	 Aidland	 has	 its	 own	 mental	 topographies,	 languages	 of	
discourse,	 lore	 and	 custom,	 and	approaches	 to	organizational	 knowledge	and	 learning.	 (…)	
several	aspects	of	these	[expert	knowledges]	prove	to	be	in	some	ways	more	virtual	than	real	
–	hence	the	degree	of	virtual	reality	of	Aidland”.	
Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	study	 the	 ‘languages	and	discourses’	of	development	not	only	
for	 the	extent	 to	which	 they	have	an	 impact	on	 the	 local	 realities	on	 the	ground,	but	 also	
because	they	sustain	the	development	industry.	It	is	through	the	historically-specific	‘systems	
of	thought’	that	the	complex	world	within	and	around	development	institutions	are	sustained	
and	justified.	Beyond	the	evaluation	of	the	actual	 impact	and	effectiveness	of	development	
programmes,	 the	 study	 of	 development	 as	 ‘domain	 of	 thought	 and	 action’	 allows	 us	 to	
deconstruct	relations	of	power.		
Interestingly	 in	 fact,	 development	 studies	 have	 ventured	 the	 investigation	 of	 the	 rationale	
behind	 development	 ‘thought	 and	 action’.	 In	 particular	 Scott	 (2014,	 p.	 67)	 identifies	 the	
neoliberal	 agenda	 behind	 development,	 and	 questions	 ‘the	 human	 product’	 of	 capitalist	
labour	schemes	pushed	forward	by	development	and	political	agendas:		
What	 if	 we	 were	 to	 ask	 a	 different	 question	 of	 institutions	 and	 activities	 than	 the	
narrow	 neoclassical	 question	 of	 how	 efficient	 they	 are	 in	 terms	 of	 costs	 (e.g.,	
resources,	labour,	capital)	per	unit	of	a	given,	specified	product?	What	if	we	were	to	
ask	what	kind	of	people	a	given	activity	or	institution	fostered?	
Along	 the	 same	 line	 of	 questions,	 if	we	 consider	 the	 shift	 in	 the	 focus	 from	 agriculture	 to	
agribusiness	 we	 are	 then	 prone	 to	 ask:	What	 type	 of	 rural	 development	 is	 envisioned	 by	
policy	makers	 emphasizing	 the	 role	 of	 the	 private	 sector?	 Under	 this	 logic,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	
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understand	what	 types	of	expectations	are	projected	on	 farmers	when	envisioning	 (youth)	
agripreneurship	in	development	policies.		
2.2.2	AGRICULTURAL	DEVELOPMENT	AND	AGRIBUSINESS	
Swinging	 along	 the	 lines	 of	 development	 changes,	 agricultural	 development	 has	 also	
witnessed	different	fluctuations	since	the	1960s.	Such	changes	involved	both	the	ideological	
politico-economic	 frame	 of	 reference,	 as	 the	 consequent	 strategies	 for	 development	
programmes.	 The	 interaction	 of	 the	 international	 development	 community	 with	 the	 rural	
world	 in	 developing	 countries	 gave	 over	 the	 years	 more	 importance	 to	 different	
stakeholders:	in	the	1960s	emphasis	was	given	to	smallholders,	in	the	1970s	to	the	state,	in	
the	1980s	to	NGOs,	in	the	1990s	to	the	(liberalized)	market	and	in	the	2000s	again	to	family	
farming.	The	‘historical	pendulum’,	as	Cotula	(Cotula,	2013,	p.	25)	names	it,	shifted	over	the	
years	 between	 plantation,	 contractualized	 agriculture	 and	 family	 farming.	 Lately,	 with	 the	
policy	regime	shifting	from	aid	to	trade	increasing	hopes	and	expectations	have	been	laid	on	
private	 sector	 initiatives	 for	 the	 rural	 development	 of	 emerging	 countries	 (Westen	 and	
Zoomers	2014).		
Agribusiness	 has	 come	 to	 assume	 an	 increasingly	 significant	 position	 in	 the	 development	
agenda	 in	 the	 last	 decades,	 pushing	 for	 a	 new	wave	of	 commercialization.	On	 this	matter,	
some	 scholars	 (Collier	 &	 Dercon,	 2013;	 Toenissen,	 Adesina,	 &	 DeVries,	 2008)	 have	 been	
arguing	 for	 a	 commercialization	 of	 agriculture;	 pushing	 an	 agri-business	 agenda	 that	
subordinates	 agriculture	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 capitalistic	 and	 industrial	 development	
processes	 (Pallotti	&	 Zamponi,	 2014,	 p.	 59).	 In	 this	 framework,	 rural	 development	 policies	
that	 focus	on	petty	commodity	producers	become	a	 tool	 for	 legitimizing	neoliberal	policies	
for	 rural	 development	 (Pallotti	 &	 Zamponi,	 2014).	 As	 a	 new	 rural	 development	 fashion,	
development	 institutions	 and	 African	 governments	 are	 now	 increasingly	 investing	 in	
agribusiness,	with	a	specific	focus	on	youth.		
As	part	of	 the	general	shift	 from	aid	to	trade,	 the	private	sector	has	made	 its	way	 into	the	
realm	 of	 development	 cooperation,	 for	 example	 through	 private-public	 partnerships	 (PPP)	
(Mosse,	2013,	p.	238-239).	The	private	sector	has	become	a	development	agent,	while		
	 55	
corporate	 agendas	 captured	 in	 the	 unintentionally	 revealing	 slogan	 “Make	 poverty	
business.”	This	goes	to	the	heart	of	the	wider	institutional	assemblage	(Dolan	2012,	p.	
4)	labelled	“bottom	of	the	pyramid”	(BoP)	capitalism	(Prahalad	2005),	through	which,	
Dolan	 (2012)	 argues,	 development	 itself	 is	 outsourced	 to	 the	 “under-utilised	 poor”	
(…).	
Along	the	same	lines,	in	the	field	of	rural	and	agricultural	development,	the	private	sector	has	
entered	 as	 an	 actor	 of	 change.	 On	 the	 edge	 between	 development	 and	 private	 sector,	
responsible	 supply	 chains	 (e.g.	 Fairtrade)	 have	 emerged	under	 the	 increasing	demands	 for	
sustainable	 products	 (Wiskerke,	 2009).	 However	 the	 results	 of	 this	 type	 of	 for-profit	
development	 initiatives	 have	 delivered	 controversial	 and	 sometimes	 counter	 effective	
outcomes	 (Blowfield	 &	 Dolan,	 2010)	 (Dolan,	 2001)	 (Freeman,	 2009),	 leaving	 open	 the	
question	whether	 the	private	 sector	 can	 indeed	 act	 as	 development	 agent	 (Westen	 van	&	
Zoomers,	2014)	(McMichael	P.	,	2013).	The	commercial	agrifood	sector	itself	has	undergone	
important	changes.	 In	particular,	due	 to	 the	 ‘supermarket	 revolution’	 (Reardon,	Timmer,	&	
Minten,	 2012)	 a	 process	 of	 restructuring	 the	 global	 food	 market	 changed	 pathways	 of	
procurement	to	comply	with	retailers’	rules.		
However,	 the	 private	 sector	 has	 entered	 the	 field	 of	 agricultural	 development	 also	 as	 a	
paradigm	 for	 development	 programmes.	 Reflecting	 on	 these	 changes,	 some	 scholars	
(Toenissen	 ,	 Adesina,	 &	 DeVries,	 2008)	 (Collier	 &	 Dercon,	 2013)	 have	 been	 arguing	 for	 a	
commercialization	 of	 agriculture;	 pushing	 an	 agri-business	 agenda	 that	 subordinates	
agriculture	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 capitalistic	 and	 industrial	 development	 processes	
(Pallotti	&	Zamponi,	2014,	p.	59).		
The	 concept	 of	 ‘agripreneurship’	 emerged	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 increased	 attention	 to	
agribusiness,	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 development.	 Including	 the	 element	 of	 entrepreneurship	 in	 the	
field	 of	 agricultural	 development,	 makes	 the	 task	 of	 agribusiness	 dependent	 on	 the	
entrepreneurial	 capacities	 of	 the	 farmer.	 In	 fact,	 the	 beneficiaries	 of	 agricultural	
development	become	the	very	implementers	of	the	programmes	–	making	their	own	success	
in	agribusiness	dependent	on	their	personal	qualities.	As	Mosse	(2013,	p.	239)	argues,		
Such	 “BoP	 entrepreneurs”	 are	 analysed	 as	 both	 instruments	 and	 beneficiaries	 of	
processes	 that	 change	 donor-	 recipient	 relationships,	 create	 “legibility”	 to	 global	
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business,	produce	entrepreneurial	subjectivities	and	recode	products	in	ethical	terms,	
while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 dividing,	 differentiating,	 and	 depleting	 aspects	 of	 social	 life	
(Dolan	2012).		
Investing	 in	 agribusiness	 as	 a	 development	 tool	 to	 be	 achieved	 through	 agripreneurship	
reduces	 agriculture	 to	 its	 business	 component.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 also	 places	 the	
responsibility	of	success	in	the	qualities	of	the	farmer	who,	when	engaging	in	an	agribusiness	
enterprise	 –	 is	 referred	 as	 an	 ‘agripreneur’,	 in	 development	 jargon.	New	hopes	have	been	
recently	laid	on	the	new	generations	of	‘agripreneurs’	–	the	youths.	In	the	next	section	I	will	
explore	the	academic	debate	around	this	social	category	as	the	new	target	of	development	
efforts.		
	
2.2.3	YOUTH	IN	AGRIBUSINESS:	A	NEW	DEVELOPMENT	TREND		
Recently,	 the	 focus	 of	 development	 programmes	 on	 agribusiness	 and	 agripreneurship	 has	
been	laid	on	youths	–	‘the	future	of	agriculture’.	The	justification	for	the	increased	interest	in	
this	 social	 category	 lays	 in	 the	 sheer	 dimension	 of	 the	 demographic	 phenomenon.	 The	
concerns	 attached	 to	 the	 ‘youth	 bulge’	 are	 related	 to	 risks	 of	 social	 instability	 that	 could	
derive	from	widespread	unemployment.	The	shift	towards	youth	within	the	narrative	of	risk	
has	been	observed	by	Van	Dijk	et	al	(2011,	p.	2),	among	others:	
Within	this	paradigm	of	the	relation	between	youth	and	risk,	instigated	by	the	sheer	
size	of	the	problem,	an	aid-industry	has	come	to	fruition.	 In	 its	many	NGO	activities	
and	 initiatives,	 this	 aid-industry	 apparently	 has	 shifted	 policy-orientations	 from	 the	
‘rural’,	 the	 ‘women’	 or	 the	 ‘household’,	 to	 the	 ‘youth’	 as	 the	 new	 developmental	
target	and	hope	for	the	future.	
From	this	analysis,	 the	development	focus	on	youths	as	a	 ‘risky’	demographic	phenomenon	
emerges	as	a	new	trend	sustaining	the	development	industry.	However,	there	is	still	light	to	
be	shed	on	the	concept	of	youth.	In	fact,	Sommers	(2015,	p.	10)	argues	that	it	is	precisely	the	
vagueness	of	this	concept	that	allows	to	keep	youth	an	‘outcast’	social	category:		
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A	 fundamental	 reason	why	youth	are	 so	misunderstood	and	support	 for	 them	 is	 so	
underwhelming	is	that	nobody	seems	entirely	sure	just	who	they	are.	The	definitions	
that	 many	 experts	 have	 drummed	 up	 invite	 confusion	 because	 they	 conflict.	
Governments	 and	 international	 agencies	 typically	 rely	 on	 age	 ranges	 to	 determine	
who	 youth	 are.	While	 that	 may	 seem	 simple	 enough,	 the	 result	 is	 a	 muddle.	 One	
problem	arises	from	the	fact	that	there	 is	no	agreement	on	what	those	ages	should	
be.			
Besides	defining	youth	as	an	age	category,	scholars	have	also	considered	other	coordinates	
to	accurately	define	and	analyse	this	social	category.	As	van	Dijk	et	al	 (2011,	p.	5)	argue,	 in	
fact,	 the	 ‘situational’	 and	 ‘local’	 dimension	 of	 youth	 is	 crucial	 in	 defining	 the	 concept	 of	
youth:	
As	social	science	in	Africa	has	moved	away	from	conceptualising	youth	only	in	terms	
of	time	–	a	passage	through	the	generations	–	and	has	included	the	notion	of	space	–	
not	when	one	is	youth	but	also	where	one	is	youth	–	the	‘situational’	exploration	of	
youth	 has	 at	 least	 allowed	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 looking	 at	 space	 and	 place	 as	 new	
modes	 of	 understanding.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 youth	 as	 emphasising	 the	
‘situational’	it	has	also	turned	into	the	‘locational’	dimensions.	(…)	Redefining	youth	as	
an	 identity-project	of	 ‘becoming	somebody’,	this	becoming	 is	captured	 in	navigating	
certain	spaces	and	places	–	the	bar,	the	disco,	the	funeral,	the	school,	the	church,	the	
state,	the	house	and	so	forth.		
Since	youth	has	entered	the	realm	of	development’s	 thought	and	action,	 it	has	become	an	
‘identity-project	of	 ‘becoming	 somebody’–	where	 the	development	 community	defines	 the	
objectives	 of	 this	 process	 of	 becoming.	 In	 particular,	 development	 resources	 have	 been	
deployed	 for	youths	 to	venture	agribusiness	and	become	agripreneurs.	 In	 fact,	 the	authors	
(van	 Dijk,	 de	 Bruijn,	 Cardoso,	 &	 Butter,	 2011,	 p.	 7)	 stress	 that	 “Youth	 has	 become	 an	
ideological	project	because	an	arena	of	 interests	and	scarce	 resources	has	been	generated	
around	it”. 
Interestingly,	in	the	development	shifts	analysed	above,	emerges	a	pattern	of	framing	of	the	
development	 issues	 –	 from	 poverty	 to	 the	 poor,	 from	 agriculture	 to	 agribusiness	 and	
agripreneurship	 and	 the	 youths	 –	 that	 sustain	 a	 neoliberal	 ideology	 of	 development.	 Such	
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shifts	 in	 the	 strategies	 and	 investments	 of	 development	 cooperation	 are	 supported	 by	
narratives	that	underpin	and	justify	them.	By	studying	these	narratives,	it	is	possible	to	shed	
light	on	the	underlying	assumptions	and	ideologies	guiding	development.		
From	the	 sections	above	 it	becomes	clear	 that	development	paradigm	has	 recently	 shifted	
the	attention	of	programmes	towards	commercial	agriculture.	In	order	to	make	the	‘markets	
work	 for	 the	 poor’,	 a	 development	 discourse	 has	 been	 constructed	 that	 aims	 at	 shifting	
agriculture	from	subsistence	towards	agribusiness.	At	the	same	time,	the	social	category	of	
‘youth’	has	become	the	objective	of	such	programmes	for	agribusiness.	However,	youth	has	
not	been	defined	other	 than	as	an	age	range	–	and	 is	 identified	as	 ‘a	project	of	becoming’	
(van	Dijk,	de	Bruijn,	Cardoso,	&	Butter,	2011).	In	the	following	chapters	I	will	analyse	the	ways	
in	which	such	discourse	has	been	constructed	in	Uganda.	A	Foucauldian	analytical	approach	
allows	us	to	frame	the	construction	of	the	trend	around	youth	and	agribusiness	in	Uganda,	in	
terms	of	narratives	and	practices.	Within	the	Foucauldian	approach,	narratives	and	practices	
construct	a	discourse	–	and	are	seen	as	devices	of	power.	In	the	section	below,	I	will	explore	
Foucault’s	theorization	of	power	and	the	related	functions	and	devices.	
	
2.3	A	FOUCAULDIAN	PARADIGM	FOR	DEVELOPMENT	STUDIES		
2.3.1	POWER	
Foucault’s	 understanding	 of	 power	 has	 often	 been	 endorsed	 (and	 adjusted)	 by	 scholars	 in	
development	studies.	Development	studies	is	a	very	political	arena	for	at	least	two	reasons.	
First,	 often	 political	 strings	 (e.g.	 good	 governance)	 are	 attached	 to	 the	 delivery	 of	
development	 aid	 (but	 this	 is	 not	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 study);	 and,	 second,	 because	 when	
resources	are	distributed	economic	relations	are	formed,	causing	a	relationship	of	force.		
The	relation	between	power	and	the	economy	are	so	strongly	intertwined	that	their	relation	
has	been	questioned	by	Foucault	(1976,	p.	14,	my	italics),	in	these	terms:		
First:	Is	power	always	secondary	to	the	economy?	Are	its	finality	and	function	always	
determined	by	the	economy?	Is	power's	raison	d'etre	and	purpose	essentially	to	serve	
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the	economy?	Is	it	designed	to	establish,	solidify,	perpetuate,	and	reproduce	relations	
that	are	characteristic	of	the	economy	and	essential	to	its	workings?	(…)	Or	if	we	wish	
to	analyse	 it,	 do	we	have	 to	operate—on	 the	 contrary—with	different	 instruments,	
even	 if	 power	 relations	 are	 deeply	 involved	 in	 and	 with	 economic	 relations,	 even	 if	
power	relations	and	economic	relations	always	constitute	a	sort	of	network	or	loop?	If	
that	 is	 the	 case,	 the	 indissociability	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 politics	 is	 not	 a	matter	 of	
functional	subordination,	nor	of	formal	isomorphism.	It	is	of	a	different	order,	and	it	is	
precisely	that	order	that	we	have	to	isolate.		
Clarifying	 the	 relation	 between	 economy,	 resources	 and	 power	 is	 particularly	 important	 in	
the	field	of	development	studies.	In	fact,	while	‘indissociable’,	one	is	not	subordinate	to	the	
other:	 it	 is	 not	 that	 (development)	 resources	 cause	 or	 shape	 power	 relations.	 Instead,	
Foucault	(1978,	p.	92)	insists	power	is	to	be	understood	in	other	terms:		
It	seems	to	me	that	power	must	be	understood	in	the	first	instance	as	the	multiplicity	
of	force	relations	immanent	in	the	sphere	in	which	they	operate	and	which	constitute	
their	 own	 organization;	 as	 the	 process	 which,	 through	 ceaseless	 struggles	 and	
confrontations,	 transforms,	 strengthens,	 or	 reverses	 them;	 as	 the	 support	 which	
these	force	relations	find	in	one	another,	thus	forming	a	chain	or	a	system,	or	on	the	
contrary,	 the	disjunctions	and	contradictions	which	 isolate	 them	 from	one	another;	
and	 lastly,	 as	 the	 strategies	 in	 which	 they	 take	 effect,	 whose	 general	 design	 or	
institutional	crystallization	 is	embodied	 in	 the	state	apparatus,	 in	 the	 formulation	of	
the	law,	in	the	various	social	hegemonies. 
Force	 (economic)	 relations,	 like	 institutional	bodies	and	 laws	are	expressions	of	hegemonic	
relations,	but	 they	do	not	embody	power	–	 like	 the	 state	and	 its	officials	do	not:	 Foucault	
identifies	power	 in	the	system	which	relates	these	expressions	of	power	to	one	another.	 In	
his	view,	power	circulates	and	therefore	is	not	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	any	entity:		
Power	must,	I	think,	be	analysed	as	something	that	circulates,	or	rather	as	something	
that	functions	only	when	it	 is	part	of	a	chain.	It	 is	never	localized	here	or	there,	 it	 is	
never	in	the	hands	of	some,	and	it	is	never	appropriated	in	the	way	that	wealth	or	a	
commodity	 can	 be	 appropriated.	 Power	 functions.	 Power	 is	 exercised	 through	
networks,	 and	 individuals	 do	 not	 simply	 circulate	 in	 those	 networks;	 they	 are	 in	 a	
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position	 to	 both	 submit	 to	 and	 exercise	 this	 power.	 They	 are	 never	 the	 inert	 or	
consenting	targets	of	power;	they	are	always	its	relays.	In	other	words,	power	passes	
through	individuals.	It	is	not	applied	to	them.	(Foucault	M.	,	1976,	p.	29)	
This	understanding	of	power	as	a	function	that	passes	through	individuals	is	important	to	my	
analysis	of	development	because	it	shifts	the	focus	of	the	analysis.	Instead	of	analysing	power	
relations	 between	 development	 practitioners	 and	 youths,	 power	 should	 be	 explored	 as	 a	
function	 underpinning	 these	 relations.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 interpretation	 of	 some	of	 the	most	
prominent	 authors	 in	 development	 studies	 (see	 next	 section	 2.4)	 Foucault	 incites	 to	 the	
analysis	of	power	beyond	the	relation	of	domination.		
	
2.3.1A	DOMINATION	
Without	denying	the	brutality	of	exercise	of	domination	and	sovereignty,	Foucault	(1976,	p.	
27)	invites	a	broader	understanding	of	domination	as	a	function	of	power,	deconstructing	its	
functions:		
I	 have	 been	 trying	 to	 do	 the	 opposite,	 or	 in	 other	 words	 to	 stress	 the	 fact	 of	
domination	in	all	its	brutality	and	its	secrecy,	and	then	to	show	not	only	that	right	is	
an	instrument	of	that	domination—that	is	self-evident—but	also	how,	to	what	extent,	
and	in	what	form	right	(and	when	I	say	right,	I	am	not	thinking	just	of	the	law,	but	of	
all	 the	 apparatuses,	 institutions,	 and	 rules	 that	 apply	 it)	 serves	 as	 a	 vehicle	 for	 and	
implements	 relations	 that	 are	 not	 relations	 of	 sovereignty,	 but	 relations	 of	
domination.	And	by	domination	I	do	not	mean	the	brute	fact	of	the	domination	of	the	
one	 over	 the	 many,	 or	 of	 one	 group	 over	 another,	 but	 the	 multiple	 forms	 of	
domination	 that	can	be	exercised	 in	society;	 so,	not	 the	king	 in	his	central	position,	
but	 subjects	 in	 their	 reciprocal	 relations;	 not	 sovereignty	 in	 its	 one	 edifice,	 but	 the	
multiple	subjugations	that	take	place	and	function	within	the	social	body.		
While	 subjugation	 of	 one	 or	 multiple	 subjects	 can	 be	 analysed	 as	 an	 expression	 of	
sovereignty,	 he	 stresses	 that	 it	 is	 in	 the	 procedures	 and	 relations	 of	 all	 social	 actors	 that	
power	resides.	And	later	in	the	same	lecture	at	the	College	de	France	(Foucault	M.	,	1976,	p.	
29-30),	he	continues:		
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It	 is	 therefore,	 I	 think,	 a	mistake	 to	 think	 of	 the	 individual	 as	 a	 sort	 of	 elementary	
nucleus,	a	primitive	atom	or	some	multiple,	inert	matter	to	which	power	is	applied,	or	
which	 is	 struck	by	a	power	 that	 subordinates	or	destroys	 individuals.	 In	 actual	 fact,	
one	 of	 the	 first	 effects	 of	 power	 is	 that	 it	 allows	 bodies,	 gestures,	 discourses,	 and	
desires	to	be	identified	and	constituted	as	something	individual.	The	individual	is	not,	
in	 other	 words,	 power's	 opposite	 number;	 the	 individual	 is	 one	 of	 power's	 first	
effects.	 The	 individual	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 power-effect,	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 and	 to	 the	
extent	that	he	 is	a	power-effect,	 the	 individual	 is	a	relay:	power	passes	through	the	
individuals	it	has	constituted.		
Domination	is	thus	not	the	effect	of	power	on	one	person	or	group	of	individuals,	but	rather	
the	expression	of	a	system	of	power	that	constitutes	individuals,	and	which	they	reinforce	or	
resist.	 Domination	 does	 not	 contrapose	 groups	 of	 power-holders	 against	 those	 to	 whom	
power	 is	 applied.	 Rather	 there	 are	 power	mechanisms	 in	which	 individuals	 are	 embedded	
that	allow	 for	domination	as	an	expression	of	power.	 In	 the	next	paragraph,	 I	 thus	explore	
the	concept	of	resistance	according	to	Foucault.			
 
2.3.1B	RESISTANCE	
Resistance	is	a	concept	that	emerges	in	the	dialectic	of	domination,	and	like	domination	is	an	
expression	of	power.	In	fact,	within	Foucault’s	understanding	of	power,	individuals	enforce	as	
much	as	they	counteract	power	structures:		
Where	 there	 is	 power,	 there	 is	 resistance,	 and	 yet,	 or	 rather	 consequently,	 this	
resistance	 is	never	 in	a	position	of	exteriority	 in	relation	to	power.	Should	 it	be	said	
that	 one	 is	 always	 "inside"	 power,	 there	 is	 no	 "escaping"	 it,	 there	 is	 no	 absolute	
outside	where	it	is	concerned,	because	one	is	subject	to	the	law	in	any	case?	Or	that,	
history	being	 the	 ruse	of	 reason,	power	 is	 the	 ruse	of	history,	 always	emerging	 the	
winner?	 This	 would	 be	 to	misunderstand	 the	 strictly	 relational	 character	 of	 power	
relationships.	Their	existence	depends	on	a	multiplicity	of	points	of	resistance:	these	
play	the	role	of	the	adversary,	target,	support,	or	handle	in	the	power	relationships.	
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These	points	of	 resistance	are	present	everywhere	 in	 the	power	network.	 (Foucault	
M.	,	1978,	p.	95) 
Resistance	 is	 exercised	 by	 individuals	 as	 an	 expression	 of	 power.	 Moreover,	 the	 very	
existence	of	power	relations	 is	dependent	on	the	points	of	 resistance.	 In	 this	way	Foucault	
defines	 the	 ubiquitous	 and	 relational	 nature	 of	 power.	 The	way	 in	which	 power	 functions	
through	power	devices,	is	explained	in	the	next	paragraph.				
	
2.3.2	NARRATIVES	AND	DISCOURSE	
According	to	Foucault	there	is	an	intricate	and	diverse	range	of	devices	through	which	power	
functions	–	what	he	calls	 the	apparatuses,	or	dispositive.	Foucault	 refers	 to	apparatuses	as	
knowledges,	 truths,	 norms,	 and	 discourses.	 Devices	 such	 as	 discourses	 and	 knowledge	 are	
crucial	 in	 the	 functioning	 of	 power:	 through	 stories	 people	 tell,	 they	 express	 a	 narrative	
which	reflects	a	discourse.	A	narrative	is	the	logic	within	which	a	certain	story	makes	sense,	
while	 a	 discourse	 is	 a	 broader	 meta-narrative	 that	 comprises	 and	 underpins	 (individual)	
narratives.		
Such	dispositives	sustain	the	power	structures	and	relations,	by	constantly	reshaping	them	in	
the	 actions	 and	 narratives	 of	 individuals.	 According	 to	 Foucault	 (1976,	 p.	 25),	 the	 way	 in	
which	 power	 functions	 is	 by	 systematizing	 relations,	 knowledge,	 actions	 and	 resources	
according	to	specific	discourses:		
Power	 constantly	 asks	 questions	 and	 questions	 us;	 it	 constantly	 investigates	 and	
records;	it	institutionalizes	the	search	for	the	truth,	professionalizes	it,	and	rewards	it.	
We	 have	 to	 produce	 the	 truth	 in	 the	 same	 way,	 really,	 that	 we	 have	 to	 produce	
wealth,	and	we	have	to	produce	the	truth	in	order	to	be	able	to	produce	wealth.	In	a	
different	sense,	we	are	also	subject	to	the	truth	in	the	sense	that	truth	lays	down	the	
law:	 it	 is	 the	discourse	of	 truth	that	decides,	at	 least	 in	part;	 it	conveys	and	propels	
truth-effects.	 After	 all,	 we	 are	 judged,	 condemned,	 forced	 to	 perform	 tasks,	 and	
destined	to	live	and	die	in	certain	ways	by	discourses	that	are	true,	and	which	bring	
with	them	specific	power-effects.		
	 63	
The	 function	 of	 discourses	 is	 thus	 to	 normalize	 and	 institutionalize	 regimes	 of	 truth	which	
sustain	power	relations.	The	consequences	of	such	devices	are	very	concrete	as	they	shape	
the	actions	and	decisions	of	individuals	in	a	society	dominated	by	a	given	system	of	truth.	At	
the	same	time,	individuals	are	themselves	the	actors	who	create	and	therefore	can	resist	the	
same	 system	 of	 truth.	 In	 fact,	 there	 is	 nothing	 stable	 and	 deterministic	 in	 this	
conceptualization	of	the	functioning	of	power	through	its	devices.	On	the	contrary,	Foucault	
(1978,	p.	101)	stresses	how	this	is	a	continuous	and	instable	process:		
We	must	make	allowance	 for	 the	complex	and	unstable	process	whereby	discourse	
can	be	both	an	instrument	and	an	effect	of	power,	but	also	a	hindrance,	a	stumbling-
block,	a	point	of	 resistance	and	a	 starting	point	 for	an	opposing	strategy.	Discourse	
transmits	and	produces	power;	 it	 reinforces	 it,	but	also	undermines	and	exposes	 it,	
renders	 it	 fragile	 and	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 thwart	 it.	 In	 like	 manner,	 silence	 and	
secrecy	are	a	shelter	for	power,	anchoring	its	prohibitions;	(…).		
Interestingly,	 Foucault	 stresses	 how	 not	 only	 active	 engagement	 with	 power,	 through	
discourses,	 establishes	 systems	 of	 truth.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 silence	 and	 secrecy	 are	 also	
functional	to	anchoring	truths,	crystalizing	norms	of	action.		
	
2.4	 LITERATURE	 REVIEW	 OF	 DEVELOPMENT	 STUDIES	 USING	 A	
FOUCAULDIAN	APPROACH	
Arturo	 Escobar	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 prominent	 authors	 in	 development	 studies,	 who	 has	
examined	 the	 power	 relations	 in	 development	 cooperation	 by	 using	 a	 Foucauldian	
framework.	He	defines	(2012,	p.	45)	development	as	a		
historical	 construct	 that	 provides	 a	 space	 in	 which	 poor	 countries	 are	 known,	
specified	 and	 intervened	 upon.	 To	 speak	 of	 development	 as	 a	 historical	 construct	
requires	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 it	 becomes	 an	 active,	 real	
force.	These	mechanisms	are	structured	by	forms	of	knowledge	and	power	and	can	
be	studied	in	terms	of	processes	of	institutionalization	and	professionalization.	
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In	 his	 analysis	 of	 how	 development	 grew	 from	 the	 1960s,	 he	 stresses	 the	 importance	 of	
understanding	 the	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 power	 relations	 are	 established	 and	
reinforced	 through	 development	 discourse,	 with	 explicit	 reference	 to	 Foucault	 (Escobar,	
2012,	p.	5):		“Foucault’s	work	on	the	dynamics	of	discourse	and	power	in	the	representation	
of	social	reality,	in	particular,	has	been	instrumental	in	unveiling	the	mechanisms	by	which	a	
certain	 order	 of	 discourse	 producers	 permissible	 modes	 of	 being	 and	 thinking	 while	
disqualifying	and	even	making	others	impossible”.	In	this	understanding	of	development	as	a	
discourse,	a	power	dynamic	is	identified	between	a	dominant	discourse	–	what	Escobar	later	
refers	to	as	‘development	industry’	–	enforced	on	those	countries	of	the	Global	South	which	
have	 long	 been	 represented	 as	 ‘Third	 World’.	 In	 his	 analysis	 of	 development,	 Escobar	
identifies	a	power	structure	with	a	top	and	bottom	–	and	studies	the	dynamics	in	between	in	
terms	of	domination,	a	hegemonic	exercise	of	power	(ibid,	p.	53).		
Along	 the	 same	 lines,	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 development	 as	 an	 ‘anti-politics	 machine’,	 James	
Ferguson	(2014)	takes	up	the	Foucauldian	analysis	of	the	genealogy	the	of	prison	to	explain	
failure	in	development	as	an	(un)intended	outcome	that	produces	depoliticization	of	poverty	
and	the	poor.	In	the	introduction	of	his	book	(Ferguson,	2014,	p.	20-21),	the	author	explains:		
Specifically,	 the	 remaining	 chapters	will	 show	how	outcomes	 that	 at	 first	 appear	as	
mere	 “side	 effects”	 of	 an	 unsuccessful	 attempt	 to	 engineer	 an	 economic	
transformation	become	legible	in	another	perspective	as	unintended	yet	instrumental	
elements	in	a	resultant	constellation	that	has	the	effect	of	expanding	the	exercise	of	a	
particular	sort	of	state	power	while	simultaneously	exerting	a	powerful	depoliticizing	
effect.	 It	 is	 this	 unauthored	 resultant	 constellation	 that	 I	 call	 “the	 anti-politics	
machine”.		
Taking	 the	 dichotomic	 representation	 (with	 a	 top	 and	 bottom	 end	 of	 power	 relations)	 of	
development	 even	 a	 step	 forward,	 James	 Scott	 has	 studied	 the	 hidden	 transcripts	 of	
peasants’	 morality	 and	 practices.	 In	 this	 earlier	 study	 on	 ‘Domination	 and	 the	 Art	 of	
Resistance’	Scott	 (1992)	gives	a	dualistic	 interpretation	of	Foucault’s	analysis	of	power	and	
domination.	He	opens	 this	 study	by	 referring	 to	an	Ethiopian	proverb	 that	declaims	 ‘When	
the	great	lord	passes	the	wise	peasant	bows	deeply	and	silently	farts’.	The	division	between	
lords	 and	 peasants	 in	 the	 case	 study	 of	 Scott	 (1992,	 p.	 54)	 is	 analysed	 in	 its	 dualistic	
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opposition,	distributing	power	on	 the	one	hand	 (the	 top)	 and	 resistance	on	 the	other	 (the	
bottom):	
The	 balance	 of	 power	 in	 the	 village,	 however,	 was	 sufficiently	 skewed	 against	 the	
harvester	 that	 they	 abstained,	 out	 of	 prudence,	 from	 publicly	 contesting	 the	 self-
serving	definition	applied	by	the	rich.	(…)		Euphemisms	in	the	broad	sense	I	am	using	
the	term	–	the	self-interested	tailoring	of	descriptions	and	appearances	by	dominant	
powerholders	–	is	not	confined	to	language.	It	may	be	seen	in	gestures,	architecture,	
ritual	actions,	public	ceremonies,	any	other	actions	in	which	the	powerful	may	portray	
their	 domination	 as	 they	wish.	 Taken	 together	 they	 represent	 the	 dominant	 elite’s	
flattering	self-portrait.		
In	fact,	as	he	proceeds	in	his	analysis	of	class	relations	in	a	Malay	village,	Scott	takes	further	
the	 discursive	 analysis	 of	 Foucault	 by	 reading	 power	 relations	 as	 in	 a	 dramaturgical	
metaphor:		
Most	acts	of	power	from	below,	even	when	they	are	protests	–	implicitly	or	explicitly	
–	will	 largely	observe	the	“rules”	even	if	their	objective	is	to	undermine	them	(…)	As	
Foucault	notes,	such	formulas	“cause	beggars,	poor	folks,	or	simply	the	mediocre	to	
appear	 in	 a	 strange	 theatre	 where	 they	 assume	 poses,	 declamations,	
grandiloquences,	where	they	dress	up	 in	bits	of	drapery	which	are	necessary	 if	 they	
want	to	be	paid	attention	to	on	the	stage	of	power”.	The	“strange	theatre”	to	which	
Foucault	 refers	 is	 deployed	 not	 merely	 to	 gain	 a	 hearing	 but	 often	 as	 a	 valuable	
political	resource	in	conflict	and	even	in	rebellion.		
Within	the	school	of	Scott	and	Ferguson,	Murray	Li	(2007,	p.	277)	has	examined	the	ways	in	
which	 development	 in	 Indonesia	 has	 attempted	 and	 failed	 to	 be	 adaptive	 to	 demands	 of	
farmers.	 In	 fact,	 she	shows	how	development	schemes	 fail	 to	 recognize	and	work	with	 the	
heterogeneity	of	the	reality	on	the	ground:	
Villagers	resented	being	required	to	spend	long	hours	and	days	in	meetings	drawing	
pictures	 and	 making	 themselves	 attractive	 to	 patrons,	 for	 which	 they	 received	
minimal	material	 payback	 and	 no	 serious	 response	 to	 the	 fundamental	 problem	 of	
access	to	land.	(…)	Yet,	as	I	have	argued,	analysis	of	what	empowerment	programmes	
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and	participatory	 initiatives	 fail	 to	do	–	empower	people,	 alleviate	poverty,	 achieve	
“genuine”	consultation,	or	even	contain	and	depoliticize	–	does	not	exhaust	the	topic.	
(…)	as	Foucault	 insisted,	programs	of	intervention	are	not	“abortive	schemas	for	the	
creation	of	 reality.	 They	 are	 fragments	 of	 reality	which	 induce…particular	 effects	 in	
the	real”.		
In	her	analysis,	Murray	Li	stresses	how	the	development	schemes	she	studied	failed	to	deliver	
their	objectives	and	admits	that	although	failing,	these	programmes	still	have	effects	on	the	
reality	on	the	ground	–	if	only	exasperating	locals	and	depoliticizing	their	role	in	society	(by	
‘rendering	society	technical’	in	(Mosse,	2011,	p.	57-79)).		
Although	 problematized,	 explored	 in	 their	 dimensions	 of	 agency,	 contestation	 and	 failure,	
the	analytical	categories	used	by	these	authors	have	been	assumed	to	be	in	contraposition	to	
each	 other	 as	 a	 top	 and	 bottom	 dimensions	 of	 development.	 There	 is	 a	 (seemingly)	
Foucauldian	understanding	of	development	that	divides	actors,	their	narratives	and	practices	
within	 a	 dualistic	 understanding	 and	 categorization	 of	 development	 as	 a	 structure	 that	 is	
formed,	embodied,	and	reproduced	through	agency.		
However,	 as	 I	 showed	 in	 the	 section	 above	 (2.3)	 Foucault	 (1976,	 p.	 29)	 gives	 a	 different	
interpretation	of	domination	and	distribution	of	power:	
Third	methodological	precaution:	Do	not	regard	power	as	a	phenomenon	of	mass	and	
homogeneous	 domination—the	 domination	 of	 one	 individual	 over	 others,	 of	 one	
group	over	others,	or	of	one	class	over	others;	keep	it	clearly	in	mind	that	unless	we	
are	 looking	 at	 it	 from	 a	 great	 height	 and	 from	 a	 very	 great	 distance,	 power	 is	 not	
something	 that	 is	 divided	 between	 those	 who	 have	 it	 and	 hold	 it	 exclusively,	 and	
those	who	do	not	have	it	and	are	subject	to	it.		
In	this	perspective,	in	fact,	power	functions	outside	of	a	dichotomic	contraposition	of	power-
holders	 and	 subjects.	 Power	 is	 exercised	 by	 individuals	 in	 relation	 to	 each	 other,	 and	 the	
force	 relations	 between	 them	 are	 the	 result	 of	 mechanisms	 such	 as	 truth	 discourses.	
Therefore,	Foucault	pointed	the	analysis	of	power	 in	a	different	direction	than	the	dualistic	
contraposition	of	a	top	and	bottom	–	without	denying	hegemony:		
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It	 is	 in	this	sphere	of	force	relations	that	we	must	try	to	analyse	the	mechanisms	of	
power.	 In	 this	way	we	will	escape	from	the	system	of	Law-and-Sovereign	which	has	
captivated	political	thought	for	such	a	long	time.	And	if	it	is	true	that	MachiavelIi	was	
among	the	few	-	and	this	no	doubt	was	the	scandal	of	his	"cynicism"-	who	conceived	
the	power	of	the	Prince	 in	terms	of	 force	relationships,	perhaps	we	need	to	go	one	
step	further,	do	without	the	persona	of	the	Prince,	and	decipher	power	mechanisms	
on	the	basis	of	a	strategy	that	 is	 immanent	in	the	force	relationships.	(Foucault	M.	,	
1978,	p.	97)	
The	methodological	 prescription	 of	 Foucault	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 power	 –	 and	 thus	 also	 the	
analysis	power	 in	development	–	 is	a	paradigmatic	change.	 It	encourages	to	 investigate	the	
‘power	mechanisms’	sustaining	the	force	relationships,	rather	than	the	force	relationships	as	
relations	of	sovereignty.	Therefore,	the	study	of	power	should	focus	on	the	mechanisms	that	
sustain	power	structures,	rather	than	on	a	dichotomic	relation	between	the	sovereign	(top)	
and	the	dominated	(bottom).	
On	the	contrary,	while	scholars	such	as	Scott,	Ferguson	and	Escobar	have	studied	the	power	
relations	 between	 development	 top	 and	 bottom,	 few	 studies	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 socio-
economic	 and	political	 dynamics	within	 the	bottom	 (Scott	 J.	 ,	 1992)	 (Murray	 Li,	 2007)	 and	
within	 the	 top	 (Mosse,	 2011).	 My	 study	 proposes	 a	 combined	 study	 of	 development	
dynamics	 between	 and	 within.	 The	 Foucauldian	 conceptualization	 of	 power	 prescribes	 an	
analysis	of	power	mechanisms	and	apparatuses	to	understand	the	strategies	and	rationales	
of	 force	 relationships	 –	 as	 they	 function	 everywhere	 (though	 not	 homogenously).	 Given	 a	
case	 study	 (e.g.	 agricultural	 practices	 in	 a	 Malay	 village,	 or	 the	 development	 industry	 in	
Lesotho),	the	Foucauldian	analysis	deconstructs	the	discourses,	practices	and	knowledge	that	
are	 immanent	 in	all	 social	 relations	and	structures.	 In	order	 to	understand	and	explain	 the	
power	 structures	 and	 relations,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 elaborate	 an	 analysis	 of	 its	 functioning	
devices	and	what	their	effect	 is.	Therefore,	 it	 is	not	sufficient	to	explain	that	homogeneous	
development	programmes	fail	to	adjust	and	embrace	the	heterogeneity	on	the	ground,	nor	
to	 highlight	 the	 (un)intended	 consequences	 of	 hegemonic	 relations	 in	 the	 field	 of	
development.		
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In	the	remaining	of	this	chapter,	I	attempt	to	adapt	the	Foucauldian	paradigm	of	analysis	to	
the	study	of	empirical	data	collected	on	the	field.	I	will	ground	the	analysis	of	power	relations	
within	the	Foucauldian	approach	to	the	relations	between	development	actors	in	Uganda.	In	
this	 way,	 I	 will	 operationalise	 the	 study	 of	 discourse	 and	 practices	 of	 development	
practitioners	and	youths.		
	
	
2.5	 FOUCAULT	 IN	 DEVELOPMENT:	 A	 FRAMEWORK	 FOR	 AN	
ETHNOGRAPHIC	ANALYSIS	OF	DEVELOPMENT	TREND	AROUND	YOUTH	
IN	AGRIBUSINESS	IN	UGANDA	
In	 the	 previous	 sections,	 I	 have	 considered	 the	 Foucauldian	 paradigm	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	
power	 and	 the	 interpretations	 given	 by	 some	 scholars	 in	 development	 studies,	 as	 they	
adjusted	 it	 to	 their	 field	 of	 study.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 attempt	 the	 elaboration	 of	 an	
operationalized	Foucauldian	theoretical	 framework	 for	 the	study	of	 the	development	 trend	
around	youth	in	agribusiness	in	Uganda.		
Rather	 than	 studying	 development	 policies	 and	 programmes	 for	 what	 they	 prescribe	 and	
then	 evaluating	 how	 or	 whether	 they	 work	 –	 development	 analysis	 should	 focus	 on	 the	
mechanisms	 that	 produce	 the	 regimes	 of	 truth	 supporting	 development	 policies	 and	
programmes.	Regimes	of	truth	being	the	knowledge,	meaning-giving	process	and	system	of	
values	that	underpin	the	development	trend	around	youth	in	agribusiness	in	Uganda.	 	Such	
regimes	 of	 truth	 are	 what	 I	 refer	 to	 as	 discourses,	 and	 are	 constituted	 by	 narratives	 and	
practices	(I	examine	these	concepts	below).		
	
2.5.1	DISCOURSE,	KNOWLEDGE	AND	NARRATIVES	 	
Within	a	Foucauldian	approach,	the	scholar	in	development	studies	operates	a	hermeneutic	
exercise	 on	 the	 discourses	 (in	 its	 narratives	 and	 practices)	 –	 what	 Escobar	 calls	 an	
‘hyperethnography’	 of	 development.	 In	 fact,	 while	 the	 paradigm	 of	 Foucault	 is	 extremely	
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theoretical	 in	 nature,	 scholars	 in	 development	 studies	 have	 operationalised	 it	 (therefore	
adjusting	it)	by	means	of	qualitative	studies	–	in	search	for	the	social	meaning	underlying	and	
constituting	power	structures.		
Within	this	type	of	ethnographic	investigation	of	power	within	development,	narratives	and	
practices	constitute	the	bricks	of	discourses.	Narratives	are	the	frame	against	which	stories	
and	oral	or	written	accounts	make	sense.	‘Making	sense’	is	the	process	of	laying	the	bricks	of	
truths	which	social	actors	hold	on	to	 in	order	to	give	meaning	to	their	socio-cultural	world.	
Practices	 are	 the	 embodiment	 of	 the	 truths	 constructed	 within	 narratives.	 Together,	
narratives	 and	 practices	 constitute	 a	 discourse	 –	 which	 is	 a	 process	 ever	 evolving	 in	 the	
talking	and	doing	of	 the	 social	 actors	 involved.	 In	 this	way,	discourses	 function	 in	 creating,	
sustaining	or	changing	the	established	social	and	political-economic	norms	regulating	social	
relations.	 In	 such	 process,	 discourses	 function	 as	 power.	 Where	 development	 actors	 talk	
about	 their	 ideas	 and	 activities	 as	 concrete	 facts,	 they	 do	 not	 only	 tell	 a	 story	 –	 but	 they	
create,	in	doing	that,	the	foundations	for	development	action.		
Even	 though	 we	 speak	 of	 these	 actions	 as	 if	 our	 understandings	 are	 hard	 and	
concrete,	 they	 are	 in	 reality	 the	 narrative	 stories	 we	 construct	 as	 plausible	
explanations.	What	we	 take	 to	 be	 'fixed	 truths'	 are	 only	 the	 stories	 that	 have	 over	
time	 come	 to	 be	 consensually	 accepted	 as	 plausible	 by	 a	 significant	 number	 of	
people,	 including	 influential	 interpreters	 of	 political	 events,	 such	 as	 journalists,	
political	 elites,	 scholars,	 and	 the	 like.	 (…)	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 commonly	 accepted	 inter-
subjective	meanings	are	embedded	 in	 the	very	 institutions	and	practices	of	 society;	
and	without	them	these	institutions	and	practices	would	be	dramatically	different,	if	
they	existed	at	all.	In	short,	these	social	entities	cannot	be	discussed	independently	of	
them.	Social	meanings,	 in	 short,	 cannot	 simply	be	abstracted	and	 treated	as	one	of	
the	various	variables	explaining	institutions.	(Fischer,	2003,	p.	43-44)	
Fisher	stresses	that	not	all	stories	develop	into	fixed	truths:	individuals	do	not	create	meaning	
alone,	but	 as	 social	 beings	with	others.	 The	 shared	dimension	of	discourse	 is	 precisely	 the	
relational	 nature	 of	 power.	 Fischer	 (2003,	 p.	 39)	 refers	 to	 ‘fixed	 truths’,	 not	 as	 static	 but	
rather	as	shared	discourses	that	become	dominant.		
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Their	 [words,	 things,	 knowledge]	 regulatory	 discourses	 produce	 'truth'	 in	 the	 sense	
that	they	supply	systematic	procedures	for	the	generation,	regulation,	and	circulation	
of	statements.	The	knowledge	produced	is	a	part	of	the	discursive	practices	by	which	
rules	 are	 constructed,	 objects	 and	 subjects	 are	 defined,	 and	 events	 for	 study	 are	
identified	and	constituted.		
This	process	of	generation	of	knowledge,	truth	and	meaning	has	been	the	object	of	study	of	
anthropologists	 for	 decades.	 With	 Geertz,	 anthropologists	 investigated	 knowledge	 and	
actions	in	political-economic	and	social	contexts	in	the	understanding	that	"man	is	an	animal	
suspended	in	webs	of	significance	he	himself	has	spun,	I	take	culture	to	be	those	webs,	and	
the	 analysis	 of	 it	 to	 be	 therefore	 not	 an	 experimental	 science	 in	 search	 of	 law	 but	 an	
interpretive	one	in	search	of	meaning"	(Geertz,	1973,	p.	5).	 
In	 order	 to	 understand	 and	 explain	 the	 mechanisms	 of	 power	 within	 development,	 it	 is	
necessary	to	make	a	‘thick	description’	of	narratives,	practices	and	the	context	in	which	they	
take	place.		
Thick	 description	 is	 an	 approach	 for	 exploring	 and	 discovering	 the	 meanings	
embedded	 in	 the	 language	 and	 actions	 of	 social	 actors.	 Because	 meanings	 are	
attached	 to	 the	 actors	 being	 described,	 the	 process	 is	 both	 descriptive	 and	
interpretive	(Maxwell	1992:	288).	The	depth	of	such	meanings,	writes	Geertz,	can	be	
revealed	only	 through	detailed	descriptions	of	 the	 social	 context	of	 the	 situation	 in	
which	communication	and	action	 take	place.	 In	describing	 the	context	of	an	action,	
the	 anthropologists	 make	 their	 field	 notes	 'thick'	 with	 underlying	 inferences	 and	
implications	 relevant	 to	 their	 descriptions.	 (Fischer,	 Reframing	 Public	 Policy.	
Discursive	Politics	and	Deliberative	Practices,	2003,	p.	150	)	
Here,	I	take	the	thick	description	of	a	case	study	in	development	to	be	the	operationalisation	
of	 the	Foucauldian	paradigm	for	 the	analysis	of	development	discourses	and	power.	 In	 this	
context,	‘communication’	and	‘action’	–	which	I	here	take	as	‘narratives’	and	‘practices’	–	are	
the	 entry	 points	 for	 a	 qualitative	 analysis	 of	 discourses	 and	 power	 in	 development.	 By	
contextualizing	 and	 deconstructing	 (see	Methods	 chapter)	 such	 narratives	 and	 practices,	 I	
hope	 to	 bring	 to	 light	 the	 underlying	 discourses	 structuring	 the	 new	 development	 trend	
around	youth	in	agribusiness	in	Uganda.	
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2.5.1A	YOUTH	AND	AGRIBUSINESS	AS	CATEGORIES	OF	KNOWLEDGE	AND	ACTION	
The	 first	 most	 evident	 knowledge	 category	 created	 by	 this	 recent	 development	 trend	 in	
Uganda	 is	 youth.	 As	 Van	Dijk	 et	 al	 (2011,	 p.	 1)	 stress,	 discussions	 on	 the	 definition	 of	 this	
social	category	have	emerged	while	 the	development	 trend	 increasingly	 investing	 in	youth:	
“Under	the	current	dispensation	of	donor	funding,	relief	programmes	and	international	aid,	
these	discussions	[on	the	definition	of	youth]	have	made	the	‘youth’	the	major	beneficiary	of	
what	these	policies	offer	and	imply”.		
Moreover,	Sommers	 (2015)	has	stressed	how	despite	the	 increased	development	attention	
for	 this	 social	 category	 of	 youth	 –	 development	 agencies	 mostly	 do	 not	 operate	 with	 a	
definition	 of	 youth	 other	 than	 a	 simple	 age	 range.	 It	 is	 thus	 a	 generic	 ‘youth’	 –	 for	which	
replicable	 development	 measures	 are	 adopted.	 In	 his	 analysis	 of	 state	 simplification	 and	
legibility,	Scott	(1998:	81)	argues:	
First,	the	knowledge	that	an	official	needs	must	give	him	or	her	a	synoptic	view	of	the	
ensemble;	 it	 must	 be	 cast	 in	 terms	 that	 are	 replicable	 across	 many	 cases.	 In	 this	
respect,	 such	 facts	 must	 lose	 their	 particularity	 and	 reappear	 in	 schematic	 or	
simplified	form	as	a	member	of	a	class	of	facts.	Second,	in	a	meaning	closely	related	
to	 the	 first,	 the	 grouping	 of	 synoptic	 facts	 necessarily	 entails	 collapsing	 or	 ignoring	
distinctions	that	might	otherwise	be	relevant.	
Standardized	human	subjects	are	“uniform	in	their	needs	and	even	interchangeable	(…)	they	
have	none	of	the	particular,	situated,	and	contextual	attributes	that	one	would	expect	of	any	
population”	(Scott	1998:	346).	Societies	are,	then,	reified	objects	–	subject	to	a	kind	of	social	
gardening	tuned	to	the	abstract	knowledge	of	development.	In	the	specific,	the	development	
knowledge	 in	 place	 is	 the	 assumption	 that	 investing	 in	 “youth”	 in	 “agribusiness”	 will	
contribute	at	solving	the	“development	problem”	–	namely	“youth	unemployment”	and	un-
commercial/unproductive	agriculture.		
Within	this	paradigm	of	the	relation	between	youth	and	risk,	instigated	by	the	sheer	
size	of	the	problem,	an	aid-industry	has	come	to	fruition.	 In	 its	many	NGO	activities	
and	 initiatives,	 this	 aid-industry	 apparently	 has	 shifted	 policy-orientations	 from	 the	
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‘rural’,	 the	 ‘women’	 or	 the	 ‘household’,	 to	 the	 ‘youth’	 as	 the	 new	 developmental	
target	and	hope	for	the	future	(van	Dijk,	de	Bruijn,	Cardoso,	&	Butter,	2011,	p.	2)	
Interestingly,	the	discourse	relating	youth	to	risk	and	violence	is	almost	exclusively	referring	
to	 young	 men.	 Reviewing	 some	 of	 the	 stereotypizing	 discourses	 around	 young	 men,	
Sommers	(2015,	p.	21)	points	at	an	important	flaw	inherent	to	argumentations	(often	backed	
with	statistics):	“The	statements	set	out	here	look	unassailable.	Young	men	are	violent.	When	
their	numbers	become	excessive,	they	threaten	their	own	societies.	However,	although	most	
violent	criminals	may	be	male	youth,	most	male	youth	are	not	criminals.”.	In	fact,	Sommers	
continues	(2015,	p.	21),	the	correlation	is	not	necessarily	causal:	
As	 with	 crime,	 most	 male	 youth	 don’t	 get	 involved	 in	 warfare,	 either.	 “While	 the	
youth	 bulge	 argument	 is	 compelling”,	 Barker	 and	 Ricardo	 note,	 “it	 is	 important	 to	
reaffirm	 that	 in	 any	 of	 these	 settings,	 only	 a	minority	 of	 young	men	 participate	 in	
conflicts.	For	example,	the	vast	majority	of	young	men,	even	those	unemployed	and	
out	of	school,	were	not	involved	in	conflicts	in	Liberia	and	Sierra	Leone”	(2006:	181).	
This	 counter-argumentation	 to	 the	discourse	 that	 relates	 a	 youth	bulge	 to	 violence	 shows,	
indirectly,	 how	 the	 development	 attention	 for	 youth	 is	 justified	 by	 a	 discourse	 of	 fear	 for	
conflict.	By	building	a	development	discourse	on	the	strategic	assumption	that	an	increased	
young	 population	might	 lead	 to	 increased	 criminality	 and	 even	 warfare,	 the	 development	
industry	has	laid	the	ideology	that	calls	for	development	intervention.			
However,	 van	 Dijk	 et	 al	 (2011,	 p.	 9)	 argue	 that	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 development	 ideology	
around	youth	is	not	a	prerogative	of	development	actors	alone:		
While	 ‘youth’	has	become	a	project	 for	 governments,	 religious	and	political	 leaders	
and	 NGOs	 in	 the	 ordering	 of	 society	 and	 production	 and	 control	 of	 interests	 and	
resources,	youth	has	become	an	active	ideology	for	themselves	in	the	pursuit	of	their	
own	interests;	in	other	words,	they	have	acquired	an	ideological	force	of	their	own.		
This	argument	suggests	that	indeed	the	development	does	not	project	its	forces	as	a	form	of	
domination,	 shaping	 social	 realities	 and	 prescribing	 roles,	 relations	 and	 ambitions	 for	 the	
youths.	As	Foucault	stresses,	the	discursive	nature	of	power	is	embodied	by	all	social	actors	
involved	and	is	not	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	some.		
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At	the	same	time,	looking	into	the	‘ideological	project’	(van	Dijk,	de	Bruijn,	Cardoso,	&	Butter,	
2011)	of	development	agencies	 for	youth,	 it	 is	 clear	how	 it	prescribes	 their	engagement	 in	
agribusiness.	 As	 mentioned	 above,	 the	 development	 agenda	 encouraging	 a	 turn	 from	
subsistence	to	commercial	agriculture	is	not	new	–	but	the	specific	target	of	these	policies	for	
youth	is	recent.	Agribusiness	is	supported	by	development	programmes	as	a	strategy	for	the	
increase	of	agricultural	productivity	and	the	marketization	of	the	sector:	an	openly	neoliberal	
agenda.	 	 As	 Scott	 (1976:	 23)	 argues,	within	 this	 neoliberal	 approach	 common	 villagers	 are	
“transformed	into	untrammelled	Schumpeterian	entrepreneurs	and	price	and	profit	become	
the	major	standards”.	These	neoliberal	values	are	not	in	line	with	the	“subsistence	ethic”	or	
anyhow	the	“moral	economy	of	the	peasants”	(ibid).	
According	 to	 Scott	 (ibid:	 264)	 the	 ‘imperial	 pretentions’	 of	 development	 is	 the	 inability	 to	
incorporate	 knowledge	 from	 outside	 its	 own	 paradigm.	 Inevitably,	 certain	 forms	 of	
knowledge	–	like	the	development	discourse	–	require	a	narrowing	of	population,	and	spaces	
into	 closed	 systems	 of	 categories.	 Categories	 make	 the	 environment	 legible	 and	 thus	
manageable,	 and	 Scott	 (ibid:	 83)	 describes	 them	 as	 an	 “authoritative	 tune	 to	 which	most	
population	must	dance”.		
	
2.5.1B	THEORY	OF	CHANGE	
In	 this	 section	 I	 set	 the	 theoretical	 premises	 for	 the	 use	 of	 an	 analytical	 tool	 for	 the	
investigation	of	narratives	of	development	actors:	 ‘theories	of	 change’.	 I	 refer	 to	 theory	of	
change	 as	 a	meta-concept	 of	 development	 organisations,	which	 emerged	 inductively	 from	
the	 analysis	 of	 interviews	with	 practitioners.	 	 In	 fact,	 it	 appeared	 from	 the	 interviews	 that	
organisations	 had	 an	 implicit	 vision	 of	what	 the	 development	 problem	was,	what	 its	 ideal	
solution	 would	 be	 and	 what	 their	 strategy	 should	 be.	 I	 systematised	 development	
practitioners’	strategic	views	on	development	in	Uganda	in	chapter	4	(‘Aidnography’),	using	
their	theories	of	change	as	analytical	tool38.		
																																																						
38	I	do	not	make	reference	to	any	specific	body	of	literature	theorizing	on	this	concept	because	it	is	
functional	to	my	analysis	only	within	the	Foucauldian	understanding	of	discourse	analysis.	In	
particular,	I	elaborate	on	Mosse’s	study	of	development	discourses	and	‘aidland’.		
	 74	
A	theory	of	change	is	the	inherent	idea	behind	a	development	policy,	programme	or	project	
that	 there	 is	 a	 pathway	 of	 development	 that	 should	 lead	 from	 an	 identified	 development	
problem	to	an	ideal	development	outcome.	In	fact,	as	Chabal	(2009,	p.	4)	argues,	I	am	aware	
that	 the	 assumptions	underlying	development	programmes	 can	be	particularly	powerful	 in	
steering	 its	 directions:	 “Theories	 of	 development,	 whatever	 their	 guise,	 made	 two	 clear	
assumptions:	 the	 first	 was	 that	 there	 is	 	 a	 path	 to	 (economic	 and	 political)	 development,	
which	all	countries	follow,	if	in	different	ways;	the	second	was	that	Africa	is	merely	behind	on	
that	path	but	that	it	will	eventually	catch	up.”.			
In	his	overview	of	development	studies,	Mosse	(2013,	p.	228)	argues	that:	
The	anthropology	of	development	raises	core	anthropological	questions	about	human	
similarity	and	difference,	Western	modernity,	and	the	terms	of	economic	and	cultural	
integration.	International	development	itself	has	a	commitment	both	to	the	principle	
of	 difference	 and	 to	 similarity	 (Corbridge	 2007,	 p.	 179).	 Its	 narrative	 of	 progress	
implies	 that	 difference	 is	 a	 deficit	 to	 be	 overcome,	 whereas	 its	 narrative	 of	
emancipation	implies	that	difference	is	sovereign	self-determination	and	thus	present	
equality	(Rottenburg	2009).		
The	framing	of	development	in	these	terms,	stresses	the	importance	of	the	ideologies	in	the	
development	effort	of	ascribing	similarities	and	difference	to	the	subjects	‘to	be	developed’	–	
with	 a	 tendency	 to	 position	 such	 differences	 and	 similarities	 on	 a	 moral	 scale	 defining	
‘poverty’	 as	 deficit	 in	 the	 tension	 towards	 the	 achievement	 of	 Western	 standards	 of	
modernity.	This	“subtraction	approach”	–	a	developing	country’s	 inability	 to	be	more	 like	a	
developed	country	–	has	been	the	lens	for	mainstream	economics’	reading	of	Africa’s	chronic	
failure	 of	 growth	 (Jerven	 M.	 ,	 2015,	 p.	 2).	 Development	 cooperation	 has	 based	 its	
interventions	on	complex	discourses	that	problematized	and	defined	‘poverty’	and	‘the	poor’	
in	 different	 fashions	 throughout	 history.	 In	 Uganda,	 like	 in	 other	 ‘developing	 countries’,	
standards	 and	 criteria	 are	 set	 as	 to	 what	 still	 needs	 to	 be	 achieved	 for	 a	 country	 to	 be	
considered	 developed.	 The	 development	 discourse	 shapes	 this	 agenda,	 but	 according	 to	
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Mosse	 (2004,	p.	664)	 it	 is	an	 illusion	 to	 think	 that	good	development	policies	 shape	 reality	
according	to	the	agenda	they	explicitly	set:		
The	 ‘public	 transcripts’	 of	 development	 are	 sustained	 by	 the	 powerful	 and	 the	
subordinate,	 both	 of	 whose	 interests	 lead	 them	 to	 ‘tactically	 conspire	 to	
misrepresent’	(Scott,	1990:	2).	In	development,	we	cannot	speak	of	policy	controlling	
or	 disciplining,	 being	 resisted	 or	 subverted.	 Policy	 is	 an	 end	 rather	 than	 a	 cause;	 a	
result,	 often	a	 fragile	one,	of	 social	 processes.	 Projects	 are	 successful	because	 they	
sustain	policy	models	offering	a	significant	interpretation	of	events,	not	because	they	
turn	policy	into	reality.	In	this	way	the	gap	between	policy	and	practice	is	constantly	
negotiated	away.	
With	policy	being	an	end	rather	than	a	cause,	Mosse	means	to	explain	that	yes,	development	
policy	shapes	reality	by	establishing	powerful	metaphors	and	narratives	around	(segments	of)	
societies	which	it	approaches	–	but	more	through	its	hidden	agenda	(Ferguson	refers	to	it	as	
unintended).	 Such	 underpinning	 development	 ideology	 can	 be	 extrapolated	 by	 means	 of	
conducting	an	aidnography	(Mosse,	2013)	–	namely	an	ethnography	of	development	aid.	
	
2.5.2	PRACTICES	
I	 refer	 to	 development	 practices	 as	 the	 actions	 and	 practical	 behaviours	 of	 development	
actors	 involved	 in	 the	enactment	of	a	development	programme	or	project.	These	practices	
entail	 activities	 involving	 prevalently	 development	 practitioners,	 such	 as	 stakeholders	
meetings,	 negotiations	 of	 strategies,	 agenda’s	 and	 budget	 allocation,	 implementation,	
capacity	building,	extension	services,	monitoring	and	evaluation;	but	also	activities	involving	
development	beneficiaries	such	as:	adoption	and/or	resistance	to	development	programmes.	
Below,	I	specify	two	particular	types	of	practices	in	development:	negotiation	and	adaptation.	
Within	 a	 Foucauldian	understanding	of	 power,	 according	 to	 Lewis	 and	Mosse	 (2006,	 p.	 3),	
development	 practices	 are	 part	 of	 the	 discourse	 and	 can	 be	 studied	 by	 means	 of	
ethnography:		
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The	conception	of	a	power	that	is	productive	rather	than	repressive,	that	comes	from	
below	 as	 well	 as	 above,	 that	 is	 heterogeneous,	 diffuse,	 immanent	 and	 unstable	
(Gedaloff,	1999,	pp.	8	–	9),	 informs	understanding	of	the	practices	and	negotiations	
around	development	“orders”	in	the	ethnographies	that	follow.		
Moreover,	I	draw	from	Bourdieu’s	‘Theory	of	Practice’,	which	is	the	study	of	why	social	actors	
do	what	 they	do	 the	way	 they	do	 that	–	and	 the	 related	concept	of	habitus.	 In	Bourdieu’s	
theorization,	habitus	refers	to	the	embodied	dispositions	and	tendencies	to	perceive	and	act	
on	the	social	world,	thereby	reflecting	and	shaping	social	structures.	Bourdieu	(1990,	p.	53)	
refers	to	habitus	as:	
Systems	 of	 durable,	 transposable	 dispositions,	 structured	 structures	 predisposed	 to	
function	as	structuring	structures,	that	 is,	as	principles	which	generate	and	organize	
practices	 and	 representations	 that	 can	 be	 objectively	 adapted	 to	 their	 outcomes	
without	 presupposing	 a	 conscious	 aiming	 at	 ends	 or	 an	 express	 mastery	 of	 the	
operations	necessary	 in	order	 to	attain	 them.	Objectively	 “regulated”	and	 “regular”	
without	being	in	any	way	the	product	of	obedience	to	rules,	they	can	be	collectively	
orchestrated	without	being	the	product	of	the	organizing	action	of	a	conductor.	
This	understanding	of	practices	as	habitus	allows	to	search	for	the	embodied	and	performed	
activities	 in	 development	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Foucauldian	 discourse	 –	 or	 as	Mosse	 refers	 to	 as	
‘domain	 of	 thought	 and	 action’.	 In	 my	 analysis	 of	 the	 development	 trend	 on	 youth	 in	
agribusiness,	 I	 specifically	 concentrate	on	 the	 implementation	of	programmes	and	projects	
both	on	the	ground	(the	actual	agricultural	ground)	and	in	formal	official	settings	in	Kampala.	
In	particular,	practices	that	include	relations	between	different	social	actors	in	development	
–	the	experts	and	the	youths	–	are	crucial	to	the	structuration	of	power	in	development.	In	
fact,	as	Leweis	and	Mosse	(2006,	p.	4)	argue:		
An	 important	 tradition	 in	both	 the	 sociology	 and	anthropology	of	 development	has	
made	such	routines,	immediate	practices,	and	the	lifeworlds	of	agents	and	“targets”	
of	 development	 its	 focus,	 arguing	 that	 it	 is	 from	 these	 social	 interactions	 and	
interfaces	that	meaning	and	structures	of	power	emerge.			
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2.5.2A	NEGOTIATION	
As	mentioned	above,	Mosse	has	shown	how	the	very	practices	 in	development	make	good	
policy	 unimplementable.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 will	 pay	 particular	 attention	 (chapter	 6)	 to	
processes	of	negotiation	among	development	actors.	I	refer	to	negotiation	in	development	as	
a	 practice	 that	 involves	mostly	 development	 practitioners	 (civil	 servants	 and	 professionals	
working	 in	 the	 development	 industry),	 at	 different	 levels	 of	 the	 hierarchy	 –	 who	 need	 to	
compromise	 on	 their	 divergent	 interests	 and	 views.	 Negotiations	 can	 happen	 at	 a	 round	
table,	where	 decisions	 need	 to	 be	made	 (for	 example	 about	 the	 design	 of	 a	 development	
programme	or	project),	but	can	also	happen	 in	 the	 informal	 interactions	and	practices	 (for	
example	in	the	selection	of	target	groups,	management	of	funds	and	partners)	that	shape	a	
development	programme	or	project	‘in	action’.		
Organizational	 theory	 has	 helped	 anthropologists	 show	 how	 bureaucratic	 systems	
(NGO	or	 state)	 tend	 to	prioritize	 their	own	 internal	 “system	goals”	 (of	maintenance	
and	 survival)	 over	 meeting	 official	 policy	 goals	 (Mintzberg	 1979,	 via	 Quarles	 van	
Ufford	 1988).	 Moreover,	 the	 “institutional	 organizations”	 that	 typify	 the	 field	 of	
international	 development	 are	 those	 that	 are	 compelled,	 “[to]	 serve	 first	 and	
foremost	the	legitimation	narrative	assigned	to	them	by	their	[political]	environment”	
(Rottenburg	2009,	p.	68),	which	contains	such	a	diversity	of	competing	interests	that	
these	official	narratives	are	characterized	by	vagueness	and	ambiguity.	The	result	 is	
pervasive	disjuncture	in	development	order	(Lewis	&	Mosse	2006b).	
	
2.5.2B	ADAPTATION	
The	 pervasive	 disjuncture	 that	 Lewis	 and	Mosse	 refer	 to,	 emerges	 in	 the	 implementation	
phase	where	 the	development	programmes	or	projects	meet	 reality	on	 the	ground.	This	 is	
the	body	of	practices	that	I	refer	to	as	adaptation:	the	process	by	which	a	given	development	
programme	 or	 project	 comes	 to	 terms	 with	 the	 reality	 on	 the	 ground,	 thereby	 adjusting	
strategies	and	means	to	fit	the	sociocultural,	economic	and	value	chain	context.	In	practice,	
this	 adaptation	 entails	 a	 change	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 project	 to	 adjust	 to	 the	
heterogeneity	factors	characterising	youths	and	their	needs	and	capacities	in	agribusiness.		
	 78	
It	 is	 a	 process	 that	 is	 particularly	 influenced	 by	 the	 agency	 and	 resistance	 exercised	 by	
development	recipients,	and	has	the	effect	of	modifying	the	modus	operandi	of	a	programme	
or	 project.	 This	 process	 can	 be	 described	 as	 a	 youths’	 demand-driven	 change	 in	 the	
implementation	 and	 even	 design	 of	 the	 development	 programme	 or	 project.	 While	 this	
process	 is	most	 evident	 in	 the	 implementation	 phase,	 it	 has	 effects	 on	 the	 outcomes	 of	 a	
development	programme	or	project	–	and	might	(in	few	cases)	influence	the	re-designing	of	
a	programme,	thereby	influencing	the	negotiation	process.		
I	find	myself	in	line	with	Lewis	and	Mosse	(2006,	p.	4-5)	as	they	use	the	concept	of	agency	to	
operationalize	the	Foucauldian	theoretical	analysis:	“This	focus	on	agency	allows	for	a	useful	
and	 important	corrective	 to	a	subjectless	Foucauldian	analysis.	However,	we	cannot	simply	
substitute	 an	 endless	 multiplicity	 of	 actor	 perspectives,	 intentions	 and	 scenarios	 for	
Foucault’s	anonymous	micro-physics	of	power.”	
	
2.6	CONCLUSION	
In	 this	chapter	 I	have	set	 the	 theoretical	grounds	 for	my	study	on	 the	 recent	development	
trend	around	youth	in	agribusiness	in	Uganda.	I	have	explored	the	current	academic	debate	
in	development	studies	and	contextualized	the	particular	focus	on	agribusiness	and	youth.	I	
have	 argued	 that	 like	most	 critical	 development	 scholars,	 I	will	make	use	of	 a	 Foucauldian	
paradigm	 for	 my	 study.	 In	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 youth	 has	 come	 to	 the	 centre	 of	
programmes	 for	agribusiness,	 I	will	 study	 the	narratives	of	both	development	practitioners	
and	youth.	Moreover,	 in	order	to	understand	the	 impact	of	 these	programmes,	 I	will	 study	
the	practices	on	the	ground.	A	Foucauldian	approach	to	this	study	will	allow	to	understand	
how	the	development	trend	has	been	constructed,	considering	Foucauldian	understanding	of	
discourse	and	knowledge	as	devices	of	power.	
In	section	2.3	of	this	chapter,	I	have	elaborated	on	Foucault’s	theorization	of	power	and	his	
conceptualization	 of	 the	 analysis	 of	 knowledge	 and	 discourse	 to	 understand	 and	 explain	
power	 structures.	 By	 exploring	 how	 scholars	 in	 development	 studies	 have	 used	 this	
Foucauldian	theoretical	paradigm,	I	have	showed	that	there	were	some	inconsistencies	in	the	
operationalization	 of	 Foucault’s	 theory.	 In	 fact,	 some	 of	 the	 studies	 of	 Scott,	 Escobar	 and	
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Ferguson,	for	example,	have	not	escaped	the	logic	of	the	Leviathan	–	thereby	understanding	
power	as	a	quality	that	some	social	actors	can	accumulate	and	exercise	upon	others.	On	the	
contrary,	 Foucault	 (1976,	p.	 29	 )	 stressed	 that	power	 circulates,	 functions	 and	 is	 exercised	
through	networks	and	individuals.		
This	understanding	of	power	implies	that	the	construction	of	power	structures	and	relations	
in	development	is	the	result	of	narratives,	practices	and	interactions	of	all	actors	involved.	In	
other	 words,	 development	 practitioners	 and	 youths	 also	 interact	 among	 themselves	 and	
thereby	 construct	 the	 discourse	 that	 sustains	 a	 new	 trend	 in	 development.	 It	 is	 not	
necessarily	 the	 case	 that	development	organisations	 impose	 their	will	 and	programmes	on	
youths	 –	 as	 a	 vertical	 exercise	 of	 power	 (domination).	 Rather,	 the	 Foucauldian	 approach	
invites	to	investigate	the	construction	of	power	also	horizontally,	as	the	result	of	interactions,	
narratives	 and	 practices.	 Therefore,	 the	 use	 of	 this	 paradigm	 allows	 to	 analyse	 the	
construction	of	a	development	trend	as	a	heterogeneous	process.			
By	using	this	 theoretical	approach	to	the	study	of	 the	recent	 trend	 in	development	around	
youth	 in	 agribusiness,	 I	 expect	 to	 unravel:	 1)	 how	 through	 narratives	 and	 practices	 the	
category	of	youths	has	driven	the	recent	trend	around	agribusiness;	2)	what	the	impact	has	
been	so	far,	through	the	practices	of	implementation	of	the	programmes.			
Understanding,	 with	 Escobar	 (2012)	 and	 Mosse	 (2013),	 development	 as	 a	 political	 and	
historically	contextual	process,	ethnographic	research	methods	will	allow	to	collect	data	on	
this	process.	By	means	of	anthropological	theories	and	methods,	I	adjust	Foucault’s	paradigm	
to	 the	 study	 of	 the	 development	 trend	 of	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 in	Uganda.	 As	Mosse	 and	
Lewis	(2006,	p.	5)	argue,	in	fact	development	can	be	analysed	as	a	process	where	narratives	
and	practices	are	intertwined	and	constitute	what	Foucault	would	call	a	development	system	
of	power	discourse	and	relations:		
In	 various	 ways	 the	 ethnographies	 in	 this	 issue	 demonstrate	 that	 policy	 does	 not	
precede	or	order	practice.	(…)	the	disjuncture	arising	from	the	autonomy	of	practice	
from	rationalizing	policy	is	not	an	unfortunate	“gap	to	be	bridged”	between	intention	
and	action,	but	 is	 instead	necessary	and	must	 therefore	be	actively	maintained	and	
reproduced.		
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3.1	INTRODUCTION	
The	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 lay	 out	 the	 methodological	 frame	 I	 have	 used	 in	 for	 the	
collection,	present	the	ethnographic	data	and	outline	the	qualitative	analysis	of	my	data.	 In	
this	study,	I	explore	the	ways	in	which	a	trend	in	development	policy	making	around	youth	in	
agribusiness	 is	 adopted	 and	 implemented	 in	 Uganda.	 I	 assume,	 as	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	
chapter,	 that	 such	 trend	 is	 constructed	 through	 the	 narratives	 and	 practices	 of	 all	
development	actors	involved	(both	youths	and	practitioners).	Through	qualitative	research,	I	
attempt	to	answer	the	following	research	question:	
How	 has	 the	 social	 category	 of	 youth	 been	 driving	 a	 new	 trend	 in	 development	 around	
agribusiness,	and	what	has	been	its	impact	so	far?		
To	 describe,	 interpret	 and	 explain	 development	 as	 a	 socially	 constructed	 reality	 requires	
qualitative	 methods.	 Therefore,	 this	 research	 entails	 the	 investigation	 of	 what	 the	 social	
actors	involved	say	and	do.	As	Beuving	and	de	Vries	(2015,	p.	15)	explain,	qualitative	research	
means:		
studying	 people	 in	 everyday	 circumstances	 by	 ordinary	 means.	 This	 includes	
observing	how	people	go	about	their	daily	business	and	how	they	interact,	listening	to	
what	they	have	to	tell,	considering	what	they	accomplish	and	produce,	understanding	
what	 their	 stories,	 interactions	 and	 accomplishments	mean,	 and	 reporting	 back	 to	
them.	
The	 study	 of	 people’s	 interaction,	 stories	 and	 actions	 is	 a	 quest	 for	 meaning.	 In	 the	
understanding	that	words	and	actions	are	the	fundamental	bricks	through	which	social	actors	
construct	meaning	 and	make	 sense	 of	 their	 experiences,	 the	 qualitative	 study	 of	 people’s	
words	and	actions	is	an	interpretation	of	their	symbolic	representation	“that	can	serve	in	the	
pursuit	 of	 uncovering	 the	mental	 categories	 by	 which	 a	 society	 functions”	 (Beuving	 &	 De	
Vries,	 2015,	 p.	 41).	 In	 fact,	 qualitative	 research	 methods	 are	 the	 most	 suitable	 for	 the	
investigation	 of	 narratives	 and	 practices,	 in	 the	 process	 of	 construction	 of	 a	 development	
trend.		
The	use,	adaptation	and	adjustment	of	theoretical	frameworks	and	concepts	is	crucial	to	the	
process	 of	 ethnographic	 research.	 In	 fact,	 qualitative	 research	 entails	 the	 data	 collection	
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within	a	 theoretical	 framework	 that	helps	 the	 research	during	 fieldwork	–	and	which	often	
needs	 to	be	adjusted	after	ethnographic	data	has	been	analysed.	 This	process	 is	 crucial	 to	
most	qualitative	research,	and	specifically	the	grounded	theory	methods	I	have	chosen.	The	
role	and	use	of	theories,	is	described	by	Sanjek	(1990,	p.	396)	in	these	terms:	
In	addition	to	significant	theories,	the	fieldworker	develops	terrain-specific	theories	of	
significance	about	people,	events,	and	places.	These	determine	much	of	the	 looking	
and	 listening	 that	are	recorded	 in	 fieldnotes	and,	 in	 turn,	confirm,	extend,	or	 revise	
the	significant	theories.	
Prior	 knowledge	 of	 the	 theoretical	 debates	 around	 development	 studies	 helped	me	 shape	
preliminary	 ideas,	 or	 ‘sensitizing	 concepts’,	 of	what	 I	was	 to	 explore	 through	ethnographic	
research.	 Sensitizing	 concepts	 “are	 not	 seen	 as	 hypotheses	 that	 have	 to	 be	 tested	 against	
data,	but	as	interesting	or	challenges	ideas	to	be	further	explored	in	the	field”	(ibid:	60).		In	
fact,	Smit	(2017,	p.	51)	refers	to	Middleton	who	writes	that	“[w]hat	the	fieldworker	does	in	
essence	 is	 to	build	up	hypothetical	 structures	or	patterns	as	he	goes	along.	Every	new	fact	
that	he	gathers	can	either	be	fitted	into	that	structure,	or	if	not,	he	is	forced	to	change	the	
structure”.		
The	 chapter	 is	 structured	 in	 five	 sections.	 In	 the	 following	 section	 3.2,	 I	 outline	 the	mixed	
methods	 I	 have	 used,	 showing	 how	 grounded	 theory	 combines	 with	 the	 Foucauldian	
paradigm	 (delineated	 in	 chapter	2).	 In	 section	3.3	 I	operationalise	 the	 theoretical	 concepts	
that	are	key	to	my	analysis,	and	describe	the	knowledge	categories	related	to	my	informants.	
Subsequently	(section	3.4),	I	move	to	the	description	of	my	fieldwork	design,	the	justification	
of	country	selection	and	its	generalisability,	and	an	overview	of	the	data	I	have	collected.	In	
section	3.5,	 I	 zoom	 in	 the	 field	 sites	of	my	analysis,	 to	 contextualise	 the	history	 and	 social	
background	of	my	fieldwork.	 In	the	next	section	(3.6),	 I	describe	the	qualitative	methods	of	
analysis	 I	 have	 used,	 with	 a	 critical	 reflection	 on	 the	 representation	 of	 data.	 I	 conclude	
(section	3.7)	with	a	reflection	on	the	limitations	of	my	ethnographic	research.		
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3.2	MIXED	METHODS:	FOUCAULT	AND	GROUNDED	THEORY	
In	order	to	elaborate	an	analysis	of	the	devices	that	sustain	the	design	and	implementation	of	
recent	development	trend	around	youth	in	agribusiness	in	Uganda,	I	explore	the	systems	of	
knowledge	and	practices	constructed	and	performed	by	the	social	actors	involved	–	both	the	
development	practitioners	as	the	youths.	I	attempt	an	analysis	and	explanation	of	the	power	
‘dispositives’	 (Foucault	 M.	 ,	 1976)	 and	 the	 structures	 they	 endorse	 (and	 contest).	 In	
particular,	 I	 focus	on	 the	construction	of	knowledge	structures	 through	narratives,	and	 the	
practices	 for	 the	 implementation	of	development	programmes	and	projects	–	which	define	
relations	and	power	distribution	among	social	actors	in	development.		
As	Fisher	(2003,	p.	43-44)	argues:		
Thus,	given	that	the	languages	of	politics	 inscribe	the	meanings	of	a	policy	problem,	
public	 policy	 is	 not	 only	 expressed	 in	words,	 it	 is	 literally	 'constructed'	 through	 the	
language(s)	in	which	it	is	described.	To	offer	a	simple	but	clear	example,	it	makes	an	
important	difference	whether	policy	deliberations	over	drug	addiction	are	framed	in	a	
medical	or	a	legal	discourse.	That	is,	to	say	something	one	way	rather	than	another	is	
to	also	implicitly	say	a	whole	host	of	other	things,	which	will	be	grasped	by	some	and	
not	by	others.	In	this	way,	a	political	'agenda	is	established	out	the	history,	traditions,	
attitudes,	 and	 beliefs	 of	 a	 people	 encapsulated	 and	 codified	 in	 the	 terms	 of	 its	
political	 discourse'	 (Hewlett	 and	 Ramesh	 1995:	 110;	 Jenson	 1991).	 A	 discursive	
approach	not	only	examines	these	discourses,	but	seeks	to	determine	which	political	
forces	lead	to	their	construction.		
The	 focus	 of	my	 analysis	 are	 the	 dispositives	 –	 narratives	 and	practices	 –	 constructing	 the	
development	trend	around	youth	in	agribusiness	in	Uganda,	positioning	this	study	within	the	
field	of	development	studies.	At	the	same	time,	the	methods	I	used	to	collect	data	on	these	
dispositives	have	been	ethnographic,	because	of	the	nature	of	the	research	question:	it	does	
not	aim	at	defining	whether	 development	works,	but	 rather	how	 it	 functions,	 and	what	 its	
consequences	are	on	the	ground.		
As	 mentioned,	 I	 conducted	 such	 investigation	 of	 narratives	 and	 practices	 with	 qualitative	
methods	 because	 they	 are	 the	most	 suitable	 to	 investigate	meaning-giving	 processes	 and	
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discourses.	 In	 fact,	 Boeije	 	 (2010,	 p.	 11)	 defines	 qualitative	 research	 as	 the	 process	 of	
interpretative	investigation	of	the	meanings	people	give	to	social	phenomena:		
The	purpose	of	qualitative	research	is	to	describe	and	understand	social	phenomena	
in	 terms	of	 the	meaning	people	 bring	 to	 them.	 The	 research	questions	 are	 studied	
through	flexible	methods	enabling	contact	with	the	people	involved	to	an	extent	that	
is	 necessary	 to	 grasp	 what	 is	 going	 on	 in	 the	 field.	 The	 methods	 produce	 rich,	
descriptive	data	that	need	to	be	interpreted	through	the	identification	and	coding	of	
themes	 and	 categories	 leading	 to	 findings	 that	 can	 contribute	 to	 theoretical	
knowledge	and	practical	use.		
Escobar	encourages	an	“hyperethnography	of	development”	 (2012:	 xv):	 an	ethnography	of	
the	regimes	of	representation	constructed	by	development	discourse.	The	deconstruction	of	
development	 as	 a	 discourse,	 aims	 to	 highlight	 its	 forms	 of	 knowledge,	 system	 of	 power	
regulating	development	practices	and	the	forms	of	subjectivity	fostered	by	the	development	
discourse	 (ibid:	 10).	 I	 delved	 into	 this	 ethnographic	 field	 exploring	 the	 peculiar	 processes	
attributing	 meaning	 to	 social,	 economic	 and	 political	 phenomena	 related	 to	 youth	
engagement	in	agribusiness:		
Policy	 discourse	 generates	 mobilizing	 metaphors	 (‘participation’,	 ‘partnership’,	
‘governance’,	 ‘social	 capital’)	 whose	 vagueness,	 ambiguity	 and	 lack	 of	 conceptual	
precision	is	required	to	conceal	ideological	differences,	to	allow	compromise	and	the	
enrolment	 of	 different	 interests,	 to	 build	 coalitions,	 to	 distribute	 agency	 and	 to	
multiply	 criteria	 of	 success	 within	 project	 systems	 (cf.	 Dahl,	 2001:	 20;	 Li,	 1999).	
(Mosse,	2004,	p.	663)	
With	this	study,	I	embark	an	analysis	of	the	‘mobilizing	metaphors’	shaping	the	development	
discourse	 around	 youth	 and	 agribusiness	 –	 as	 it	 is	 constructed	 by	 both	 development	
practitioners	and	youths	themselves.	Anthropological	methods	of	 inquiry	serve	the	purpose	
of	 understanding	 how	 development	 works,	 beyond	 the	 deconstruction	 of	 the	 regimes	 of	
representation,	 and	 beyond	 the	 technocratic	 question	 of	whether	 development	works	 (i.e.	
how	successful	development	is)	(Mosse	2013).	In	fact,	as	Ferguson	(2014:	17)	argues:		
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As	an	anthropologist,	one	cannot	assume,	for	instance,	as	many	political	economists	
do,	 that	 a	 structure	 simply	 and	 rationally	 “represents”	 or	 “expresses”	 a	 set	 of	
“objective	 interests”;	 one	 knows	 that	 structures	 are	 multi-layered,	 polyvalent,	 and	
often	contradictory,	and	that	economic	functions	and	“objective	interests”	are	always	
located	within	 other,	 encompassing	 structures	 that	may	 be	 invisible	 even	 to	 those	
who	inhabit	them.	(…)	the	anthropologist	knows	well	how	easily	structures	can	take	
on	lives	of	their	own	that	soon	enough	overtake	intentional	practices.		
Without	 assuming	 any	 knowledge	 structure	 or	 discourse	 as	 a	 given,	 I	 too	 acknowledge	
development	as	a	situated	social	practice,	where	“social	reality	is	not	a	thing	‘out	there’	that	
determines	our	actions,	but	 instead	 is	 a	web	of	 sustained	 interaction,	 (…)	 constantly	being	
created	and	recreated	by	people	through	their	interaction”	(Beauving	&	de	Vries	2015:	52).	
Drawing	from	such	theoretical	framing	of	the	object	of	study	(the	new	development	trend),	
the	research	and	analysis	methods	I	choose	is	grounded	theory,	or	naturalistic	inquiry.			
Grounded	 theory	 is	 committed	 to	 remaining	 close	 to	 lived	 experience	 and	 situated	
social	 practice.	 It	 views	 these	 not	 as	 some	 psychological	 by-product	 of	 the	 socio-
structure,	 but	 as	 constituting	 the	 core	 of	 social	 life.	 Theorizing	 is	 not	 done	 by	
deducting	hypothesis	 from	theory	to	be	tested	against	some	body	of	empirical	data	
selected	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 verification.	 Instead	 what	 is	 needed	 is	 to	 formulate	
propositions	 inspired	by	the	empirical	data	themselves.	 (…)	 In	grounded	theory,	 the	
same	 theories	 are	 not	 considered	 to	 be	 universal	models	 of	 society,	 but	 rather	 as	
offering	 interesting	 ideas	 that	 can	 serve	 as	preliminary	 guidance	 in	 the	 selection	of	
cases”	(Beauving	&	de	Vries	2015:	53).		
Applying	 grounded	 theory	 to	 the	 study	 of	 a	 new	 development	 trend	 such	 as	 youth	 in	
agribusiness	 means	 building	 a	 theoretical	 explanation	 by	 inferring	 from	 description,	
interpretation	 and	 explanation	 of	 the	 conditions	 that	 give	 rise	 to	 the	 development	 trend	
itself.		
Ethnography	is	defined	by	Fabietti	and	Remotti	(2009,	p.	274)	as	(my	translation):	“both	the	
research	 activity	 carried	 out	 during	 prolonged	 periods	 of	 stay	 in	 direct	 contact	 with	 the	
object	of	study,	and	the	production	of	an	anthropological	 text.”	The	process	that	takes	the	
ethnographer	from	theory,	to	empirical	data	and	then	back	to	theory	requires	the	researcher	
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to	be	his	or	her	own	tool	of	research.	 In	particular	during	the	period	of	data	collection,	the	
fieldwork,	the	ethnographer	uses	the	knowledge	gathered	from	literature	to	scan	and	select	
the	 relevant	 socio-cultural	 events,	 which	 will	 be	 revealing	 for	 the	 research	 question.	 This	
process	is	punctually	described	by	Sanjek	(1990,	p.	396):		
In	 the	 early	 stage	 of	 fieldwork	 the	 ethnographer	 “opportunistically”	 records	 wide-
ranging	fieldnotes	about	whatever	goes	on,	but	the	objective	is	not	to	continue	doing	
this	 forever	 (Honigmann	 1970b:	 269;	 Powdermaker	 1966:	 61;	 Saberwal	 1975).	 This	
charting	of	the	ethnographic	terrain	is	filtered	through	theory	so	that	more	selective	
and	 systematic	 participant	 observation	 will	 follow.	 The	 net	 of	 people,	 places	 and	
activities	 studied	opportunistically	may	 continue	 to	widen	 in	 fieldnotes,	 but	 theory-
guided	research	activities	will	narrow	at	the	same	time	
Specifically,	 I	 have	used	a	number	of	 concepts,	 both	 in	my	 first	 approach	 to	 the	 field,	 and	
later	 after	 I	 had	 analysed	 the	 data	 and	 returned	 to	 the	 theory,	 developing	 a	 Foucauldian	
frame	of	analysis.	In	the	following	I	examine	such	concepts	as	I	bend	them	to	be	theoretical	
tools	for	analysis	of	empirical	data,	in	the	following	chapters.		
	
3.3	OPERATIONALIZING	CONCEPTS		
In	this	paragraph,	I	will	explore	the	practical	use	of	some	of	the	theoretical	concepts	I	have	
discussed	 in	the	previous	chapter	(Theory):	discourse,	narratives	and	practices.	Moreover,	 I	
will	 also	 describe	 how	 I	 use	 the	 main	 knowledge	 categories:	 development	 actors,	
practitioners,	youths,	agribusiness	and	ethnicity.		
3.3.1	DISCOURSE:	NARRATIVES,	PRACTICES	
As	I	have	analysed	in	the	previous	chapter,	scholars	(Mosse,	2013;	Murray	Li,	2007;	Escobar,	
2012)	in	critical	development	studies	have	examined	development	as	a	social	construct	and	
as	 a	 discourse.	 Particularly	 within	 its	 Foucauldian	 understanding,	 discourse	 is	 a	 slippery	
concept	 to	 operationalize,	 since	 its	 use	 has	 mainly	 been	 within	 the	 realm	 of	 philosophy.	
Within	this	study,	discourse	is	understood	as	the	frame	against	which	social	actors’	narratives	
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and	 practices	 make	 sense.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 produced	 as	 much	 as	 it	 reproduces	 itself	 through	
narratives	and	practices,	which	can	be	in	agreement	or	in	tension	with	each	other.	Therefore,	
the	analysis	of	development	as	discourse	is	an	interpretative	quest	for	meaning.	Combining	
the	Foucauldian	understanding	of	discourse	with	qualitative	research,	bends	the	concept	to	
an	 interpretative	 approach:	 a	 thick	 description	 of	 the	 constituent	 parts	 of	 discourse	
(narratives	and	practices)	will	reveal	the	meaning	of	discourse.	Meaning	is	important	because	
it	has	concrete	influence	on	social	formations	and	actions.	Meaning	can	be	constructed	both	
through	oral	or	written	narratives,	and	through	actions	–	or	practices.		
The	 concept	 of	 ‘narratives’	 refers	 to	 the	 meaning	 socially	 constructed	 and	 attached	 by	
individuals	 or	 groups	 of	 people	 to	 practical	 and	 concrete	 situations	 –	 working	 both	 as	 a	
justification	 and	 explanation.	 Narratives	 are	 thus	 extracted	 as	 meta-analysis	 from	 oral	 or	
written	 stories,	 which	 emerge	 from	 the	 way	 in	 which	 people	 perceive,	 understand	 and	
explain	their	world.	The	stories	a	narrator	 (an	 individual,	group	or	 institution)	tells	 reflect	a	
cultural	ideology,	political	beliefs	and	social	norms	at	that	given	point	in	time	–	they	can	be	
written,	oral	or	be	reflected	in	actions	and	behaviours	that	reinforce	such	cultural	constructs.	
Development	actors	(practitioners,	policy	makers	and	beneficiaries)	create	meaning	through	
narratives	 –	 which	 again	 is	 the	 driver	 of	 development	 action.	 Below,	 I	 will	 explain	 how	 I	
collected	and	analysed	such	narratives.	
As	 Beuving	 and	 De	 Vries	 argue	 (2015,	 p.	 32):	 “People	 act	 according	 to	 the	meaning	 they	
impute	 in	 situations.	 Once	 enacted,	 these	 behavioural	 consequences	 or	 social	 formations	
have	an	impact	on	how	people	define	new	situations,	on	how	they	continue	to	think	and	act.	
(…)	 [A]cts	 and	meaning	 continuously	 interact	 –	 there	 is	 a	 dialectical	 relationship	 between	
them.”	 Discourse	 is,	 thus,	 the	meaning	 and	 rationale	 behind	 the	 development	 trend	 I	 am	
investigating;	the	process	through	which	discourse	is	constructed	is	the	object	of	analysis	in	
the	empirical	chapters	that	follow.		
These	acts	are	what	I	refer	to	as	‘practices’,	in	the	context	of	the	analysis	of	the	development	
trend.	These	practices	entail	activities	involving	prevalently	development	practitioners,	such	
as	 stakeholders	 meetings,	 negotiations	 of	 strategies,	 agenda’s	 and	 budget	 allocation,	
implementation,	 capacity	 building,	 extension	 services,	monitoring	 and	 evaluation;	 but	 also	
	 88	
activities	 involving	 development	 beneficiaries	 such	 as:	 adoption	 and/or	 resistance	 to	
development	programmes,	adaptation	
	
3.3.2	ETHNICITY	
Ethnicity	 is	 a	 problematic	 knowledge	 category,	 since	 it	 has	 served	 ‘tribalizing’	 political	
purposes	 during	 colonial	 times	 (Mamdani	 1996).	 	 In	 fact,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 tensions	
between	groups	of	people	in	Uganda	had	emerged	before	colonisation,	also	on	the	basis	of	
socio-cultural	 and	 political	 identities	 –	 the	 indirect	 rule	 has	 fossilized	 tensions	 and	
consolidated	ethnic	distinctions	to	serve	the	purpose	of	domination.	In	fact,	Mamdani	(1996,	
p.	 21)	 has	 argued,	 indirect	 rule	 established	 in	 Uganda	was	 organized	 as	 an	 “ethnic	 power	
enforcing	 custom	 on	 tribespeople”.	 “Native”	 institutions	 (e.g.	 Native	 Authority)	 were	
established	 to	 rule	 subjects,	 and	 this	 was	 the	 process	 in	 which	 ethnic	 identities	 were	
constructed.	Not	only,	 but	 ethnic	 identities	were	 anchored	 through	 customary	 laws	 to	 the	
land:	the	“tribally”-individuated	community	was	made	customary	proprietor	of	land	while	the	
appointed	 “tribal”	 political	 leaders	 were	 appointed	 as	 “holders	 and	 executors	 of	 that	
proprietorship”	(Mamdani,	1996,	p.	140).	 If	“Tribalism	then	was	the	very	form	that	colonial	
rule	 took	within	 the	 local	 state	 (…)	 the	 revolt	 against	 indirect	 rule	 also	 took	 a	 tribal	 form”	
(Mamdani,	1996,	p.	183).		
The	historical	 construction	of	 the	concept	of	ethnicity,	and	particularly	 its	political	use,	are	
very	 sensitive	 and	 complex	 processes.	 Moreover,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 discern	 the	 pre-	 and	 post-	
colonial	denotations	of	the	concept,	although	this	distinction	is	crucial	for	the	contemporary	
use	of	 the	concept	 in	academia.	To	 this	purpose,	 the	analysis	of	Reid	 (2017,	p.	299-300)	 is	
useful:			
But	 a	 note	 of	 caution	 is	 required	 here.	 (…)	 Claustrophobia	 and	 entrapment	
unquestionably,	 in	 many	 cases,	 produced	 more	 competitive,	 militant	 identities	 –	
identities	 which	 were	 less	 porous,	 it	 is	 argued,	 less	 flexible,	 more	 ‘otherising’	 and	
exclusive,	 than	 anything	 which	 existed	 in	 the	 broadly	 defined	 ‘precolonial’	 era.	
However	this	was	also	a	process	of	some	antiquity,	and	a	multitude	of	groups	were	
palpably	 and	 demonstrably	 not	 ‘invented’	 during	 colonial	 rule	 in	 any	 meaningful	
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sense,	 but	 which	 were	 evolving	 long	 before	 1900	 (…).	 Colonial	 rule	 made	 ethnic	
identity	a	zero-sum	game,	in	many	cases,	and	the	fragile	nation	suffered	as	a	result;	
but	‘ethnic	identity’	itself	has	become	reified	as	a	modern	phenomenon,	and	nuance	
is	 needed	 in	 considering	 the	 twentieth-century	 evolution	 of	 political	 culture.	
Groupings	that	previously	had	some	degree	of	 internal	cultural	and	linguistic	affinity	
now	began	to	consolidate,	and	cohere	more	closely.		
Having	 made	 these	 considerations,	 I	 make	 use	 of	 ‘ethnicity’	 as	 an	 analytical	 category.	
Ethnicity	will	not	be	a	sampling	criteria	or	variable	 in	the	selection	of	the	case	study,	but	 it	
remains	 an	 important	 identity	 marker	 in	 the	 individual	 and	 social	 interactions	 involving	
access	to	land.	I	have	accounted	for	ethnicity	in	my	participant	observation	among	youths,	to	
understand	 whether	 and	 how	 it	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 the	 making	 of	 agribusiness	 for	 young	
entrepreneurs.		
In	fact,	my	informants	were	very	much	aware	of	ethnic	differences	and	disparities,	as	much	
as	ethnicity	was	an	important	trait	of	their	identity.	The	very	process	of	obtaining	adulthood	
was,	particularly	for	men,	strictly	tied	to	the	achievement	of	the	full	belonging	to	their	ethnic	
group.		
	
3.3.3	COLLECTION	OF	DATA:	SAMPLING	STRATEGY	
In	 the	 sampling	 of	my	 informants	 I	 paid	 attention	 to	 three	 social	 categories:	 development	
practitioners,	 youths,	 and	 their	 engagement	 in	 agribusiness	 –	 possibly	 making	 them	
agripreneurs.	 I	 adopted	wide	 selection	 parameters	 in	my	 selection,	 in	 order	 to	 reflect	 the	
diversity	 of	 the	 sample.	 In	 the	 following	 sub-sections,	 I	 define	 the	profile	 of	 social	 actors	 I	
sampled.	 All	 of	 them	were	 engaged	 in	 development,	 and	 can	 thus	 be	 called	 development	
actors.	
I	refer	to	development	actors	as	all	the	social	actors	involved	in	the	development	enactment	
process:	 policy-makers,	 civil	 servants,	 employees	 of	 development	 agencies	 (national	 and	
international,	 governmental	 and	 non-),	 extension	 service	 providers,	 private	 sector	
companies,	but	also	youths	engaged	 in	agribusiness,	both	within	and	outside	development	
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schemes.	The	ensemble	of	all	these	social	actors,	engaged	with	different	roles	in	the	design,	
implementation	or	reception	of	development	activities,	are	here	referred	to	as	development	
actors.	 For	 the	 sake	 of	 structuring	 the	 investigation,	 I	 have	 divided	 this	 group	 in	 two	 sub-
categories:	development	practitioners	and	youths	(see	below).		
	
3.3.3A	DEVELOPMENT	PRACTITIONERS	
According	 to	 the	Oxford	 dictionary39	a	 practitioner	 is	 “a	 person	 actively	 engaged	 in	 an	 art,	
discipline,	 or	 profession,	 especially	 medicine”.	 In	 this	 study,	 I	 refer	 to	 development	
practitioners	 as	 those	 social	 actors	 employed	 in	 development	 agencies,	 both	 national	 and	
international,	at	different	levels	of	the	hierarchical	structure	of	the	organization.	Notably,	the	
majority	of	 the	development	practitioners	 I	 have	 interviewed	were	males,	 despite	 the	 fact	
that	I	did	not	purposefully	select	males.		
The	 range	 of	 practitioners	 I	 have	 selected	 was	 representative	 of	 the	 development	
practitioners	engaged	in	the	development	trend	around	youth	in	agribusiness.	In	fact,	as	I	will	
show	 in	 more	 detail	 below,	 I	 have	 interviewed	 practitioners	 from	 most	 national	 and	
international	development	organisations	involved	in	this	trend.	
	
3.3.3B	YOUTH	
As	 mentioned,	 78%	 of	 the	 Ugandan	 population	 is	 under	 30	 years,	 and	 development	
organisations	adopt	several,	conflicting	definitions	of	youth	(Sommers,	2015).	In	fact,	it	is	the	
very	 vagueness	 of	 the	 definition	 of	 youth	 that	 triggered	 my	 research	 interest	 in	 the	 first	
place.	The	very	knowledge	category	of	youth	is	constantly	under	construction,	and	it	was	as	
such	object	of	my	investigation:	the	meanings	and	definitions	of	youth.		
Accordingly,	 for	 sampling	 purposes,	 I	 selected	 social	 actors	 in	 the	 age	 range	 15-35,	 the	
broadest	bracket	possible	bracket,	including	all	definitions	from	relevant	development	actors.	
																																																						
39	Oxford	Dictionary	consulted	on	31/07/2018:	
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/practitioner	
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This	bracket	is	rather	problematic	given	that	the	life	expectancy	in	Uganda	is	about	60	years	
of	age:	in	fact,	this	age	range	includes	in	the	category	of	‘youth’	also	Ugandans	in	their	mid-
life	stage.	In	the	sampling	of	the	social	group	of	youths	across	the	country	I	paid	attention	to	
the	representativeness	of	the	respondents	 I	 interviewed.	 I	attempted	to	gather	youths	that	
reflected	the	heterogeneity	of	this	social	group,	across	the	country.		
3.3.3	C	AGRIBUSINESS,	AGRIPRENEURSHIP,	AGRIPRENEURS	
The	 universe	 of	 possible	 case	 studies	 is	 quite	 extensive	 given	 60%	 of	 the	 population	 is	
engaged	 in	agriculture	and	68%	of	 the	working	population	are	youths	 (15-34	years)	 (World	
Bank,	2013).		
While	agribusiness	has	been	in	the	agenda	of	development	agencies	for	a	while,	there	is	no	
clear,	uniform	definition	of	what	the	concept	actually	refers	to.	The	basic	working	definition	
identifies	 agribusiness	 as	 any	 income-generating	 agricultural	 activity	 conducted	 on	 strictly	
commercial	 principles.	However,	 especially	 those	development	programmes	 that	 are	more	
private-sector	driven	and/or	oriented,	refer	to	a	commercial	type	of	agriculture	that	aims	at	
maximising	profit	 through	the	capitalisation	of	 income.	This	capitalistic	 type	of	agribusiness	
often	 has	 a	 strongly	 competitive	 and	 hierarchical	 structure,	 and	 ideally	 it	 is	 envisioned	 to	
have	 a	 trickle-down	 effect	 for	 employment	 of	 labour.	 Agripreneurship	 is	 thus	 the	
entrepreneurial	mentality	that	farmers	need	to	have,	either	as	an	innate	quality	or	as	a	learnt	
skill,	 to	 make	 an	 agribusiness	 of	 their	 agricultural	 activity.	 Those	 who	 do,	 are	 defined	
‘agripreneurs’.	 However,	 this	 definition	 of	 agribusiness	 and	 agripreneur	 comprises	 a	 great	
variety	 of	 small	 to	 large	 scale	 enterprises,	 and	 professional	 figures.	 Paradoxically,	 in	 my	
experience,	 development	 practitioners	 defined	 as	 agripreneurs	 both	 those	 most	 wealthy	
businessmen	or	women	working	on	large	agri-food	enterprises,	and	small-holders	who	barely	
made	 it	 to	 the	end	of	 the	month.	As	 for	 the	sampling	of	my	 informants,	 thus,	 I	had	a	very	
broad	universe	of	possible	cases,	and	 I	have	adopted	 the	emic40	definition	of	development	
organisations.	Therefore,	I	have	interviewed	those	young	farmers	who	were	targeted	for	the	
development	programmes.		
																																																						
40	In	anthropology,	‘emic’	refers	to	the	perspective	or	point	of	view	of	the	informants,	in	
contraposition	to	‘etic’	–	namely	the	perspective	of	the	observer.	
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3.4	FIELDWORK	
The	field	selection	was	focused	on	a	single	case	study,	Uganda,	for	two	main	reasons.	First,	
because	of	the	explorative	nature	of	the	research	question,	which	required	an	in-depth	focus	
on	 the	 process	 of	 formulation	 and	 implementation	 of	 development	 programmes.	 The	
research	 question	 investigated	 meanings,	 perspectives	 and	 practices	 of	 the	 social	 actors	
involved	 in	order	 to	describe	development	as	a	process,	and	therefore	required	exhaustive	
examination	 of	 one	 case	 study.	 Second,	 this	 study	 sat	 out	 to	 describe	 a	 recent	 trend	 in	
development,	 on	 which	 little	 academic	 literature	 and	 theory	 was	 available.	 The	 inductive	
methods	 aimed	 at	 generating	 hypotheses	 on	 a	 recent	 trend	 around	 youth	 in	 agribusiness,	
rather	 than	 testing	 available	 theories.	 As	 Donmoyer	 (2000,	 p.	 51-52)	 argues,	 single	 “case	
study	 research	might	 be	 used	 to	 expand	 and	 enrich	 the	 repertoire	 of	 social	 constructions	
available	to	practitioners	and	others;	it	may	help,	in	other	words,	in	the	forming	of	questions	
rather	than	in	the	finding	of	answers.”.		
From	the	analysis	of	the	single	case	study	of	Uganda,	it	is	possible	to	infer	the	general	themes	
in	 the	 development	 discourse	 around	 youth	 in	 agribusiness.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 specific	
ethnographic	 knowledge	 can	 be	 generated	 around	 the	 implemented	 programmes	 on	 the	
ground	and	its	beneficiaries.	Moreover,	by	studying	the	narratives	and	practices	in	depth,	it	is	
possible	 to	understand	 the	power	mechanisms	 that	 sustain	 the	 recent	development	 trend.	
Such	mechanisms	can	be	inferred	to	be	valid	also	for	other	sub-Saharan	countries	of	which	
Uganda	 is	 a	 representative	 case.	 Moreover,	 Flyvbjerg	 (2006,	 p.	 235)	 holds	 that	 “The	
advantage	 of	 the	 case	 study	 is	 that	 it	 can	 “close	 in”	 on	 real-life	 situations	 and	 test	 views	
directly	 in	 relation	 to	 phenomena	 as	 they	 unfold	 in	 practice”.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 single	 case	
study	in	Uganda	allows	to	test	and	add	to	the	available	academic	literature	on	development	
studies.		
The	risk	of	a	single	case	selection	 is	related	to	the	generalisability:	while	the	specificities	of	
the	single	case	are	peculiar	to	the	socio-cultural	context	investigated,	the	meta-analysis	and	
interpretation	 of	 the	 results	 leads	 to	 generalizable	 conclusions.	 The	 generalisability	 of	 the	
conclusions	of	this	study	is	related	to	the	representativeness	of	the	case	study	selected	(see	
section	below).			
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3.4.1	UGANDA	–	A	TYPICAL	CASE		
The	selection	of	Uganda	as	case	study	for	the	exploration	of	the	recent	trend	around	youth	in	
agribusiness	 is	 justified	 by	 the	 representativeness	 of	 the	 country	 for	 other	 sub-Saharan	
countries.	The	goal	of	this	study	is	to	understand	how	development	programmes	for	youth	in	
agribusiness	are	adopted	and	implemented,	and	what	their	impact	is.	Therefore,	the	focus	of	
this	study	 is	on	the	rationale	and	enactment	of	a	new	trend	in	development	policy	making.	
The	 range	of	possible	 case	 studies	 for	 this	 analysis	 is	 extended	 to	 all	 the	African	 countries	
where	such	programmes	are	adopted.		
I	have	chosen	Uganda	as	a	‘typical	case’	(Gerring,	2008)	in	comparison	to	other	sub-Saharan	
countries	 receiving	 Official	 Development	 Assistance	 (ODA).	 In	 fact,	 as	 I	 have	 explained	 in	
chapter	1	(sections	1.2.3	and	1.3)	Uganda	has	an	important	though	rather	standard	relation	
with	development	assistance.	Like	other	developing	countries	on	the	continent,	Uganda	has	
experienced	shifts	in	development	approaches	–	from	structural	adjustment	to	liberalisation.	
Moreover,	development	agencies	have	focused,	in	the	past	decades	across	the	continent,	on	
various	themes:	education,	health,	family	farming,	gender,	agribusiness	–	and	recently,	youth	
in	agribusiness.	Of	 the	 top-10	ODA	 receiving	 countries,	Uganda	 is	 representative	of:	 a)	 the	
demographic	trend	recording	a	 ‘youth	bulge’;	b)	youth	engagement	 in	agriculture;	c)	youth	
unemployment;	d)	recipient	of	the	major	programmes	in	this	field41.	In	fact,	with	relation	to	
the	mentioned	criteria,	Uganda	falls	 in	the	averages.	In	the	table	below,	I	have	summarised	
the	main	data	related	to	the	criteria	of	representativeness	selected.		
ODA	recipients42	,		
%	of	total	USD	
disbursed	
Youth	
population	
Youth	in	
agriculture	
Average43:	
64%		
Youth	
unemployment44	
Programmes	
for	youth	in	
agribusiness	
																																																						
41	I	have	here	considered	the	major	multilateral	programme,	by	the	African	Development	Bank	–	
ENABLE	Youth	programme,	which	aims	at	engaging	youth	in	commercial	agribusiness.	In	terms	of	
budget,	it	seems	to	be	the	major	programme	in	this	field.	However,	there	is	little	transparency	of	the	
development	agencies	I	have	worked	with,	regarding	the	budgets.	
42	OECD	2018	report,	on	2016	data,	accessed	on	4/10/2018:	http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-
sustainable-development/development-finance-data/Africa-Development-Aid-at-a-Glance-2018.pdf	
43	I	was	not	able	to	find	uniform	data	for	all	countries,	and	therefore	I	refer	to	the	average	
employment	of	African	youth	in	agriculture	(64%),	which	varies	significantly	between	rural	youths	
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1. Ethiopia	8%	 Median	
age45:	17.9	
%	of	
population46:	
34	
60.9%47	 7.4%	 (AfDB)48	
ENABLE	
Youth	
programme	
2. Nigeria	5%	 Median	age:	
18.4	
%	of	
population:	
31	
33.8%47	 13.4%	 (AfDB)	
ENABLE	
Youth	
programme	
3. Tanzania	5%	 Median	age:	
17.7	
%	of	
population:	
32	
65.6%47	 3.9%	 (AfDB)	
ENABLE	
Youth	
programme	
4. Kenya	4%	 Median	age:	
19.7	
%	of	
population:	
33	
Average:	
64%	
26.2%	 (AfDB)	
ENABLE	
Youth	
programme	
																																																																																																																																																																								
(76%)	and	urban	youths	(39%).	According	to	WB	data	from	2012	(Brooks,	Zorya,	Gautam,	&	Goyal	,	
2013,	p.	12),		accessed	on	5/10/2018	on:	
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15605/WPS6473.pdf?sequence=1&i
sAllowed=y	
44	World	Bank	data	on	youth	unemployment	refers	to	the	%	of	youth	(15-24)	who	do	not	work	(also	
not	in	the	informal	sector).	WB	definition	of	youth	unemployment:	“share	of	the	labor	force	ages	15-
24	without	work	but	available	for	and	seeking	employment”.	Accessed	on	4/10/2018:		
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS	
45The	CIA	World	Factbook,	accessed	on	4/10/2018:	https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/2177.html	
46	In	order	to	access	uniform	data	for	all	selected	countries,	I	have	used	UNFPA	data.	I	have	here	
reported	the	percentage	of	the	population	in	the	age	range	10-24,	which	is	out	of	my	operational	
definition	of	youth	(18-35).	This	choice	was	taken	because	I	could	not	find	uniform	data	on	the	age	
group	18-35	for	all	countries.	I	accessed	UNFPA	statistics	on	4/10/2018	on:		
https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard	
47	Africa	Agriculture	Status	Report	2015,	defining	youth	as	16-35.	Accessed	on	5/10/2018	on:	
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/africa-agriculture-status-report-2015.pdf	
48	Information	accessed	on	5/10/2018	on:	https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/innovative-
programme-to-improve-employment-and-income-outcomes-for-young-people-14217/	
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5. Egypt	4%	 Median	age:	
23.9	
%	of	
population:	
26	
Average:	
64%	
34.4%	 	
6. DR	Congo	4%		 Median	age:	
18.6	
%	of	
population:	
32	
Average:	
64%	
7.3%	 (AfDB)	
ENABLE	
Youth	
programme	
7. Morocco	4%	 Median	age:	
29.3	
%	of	
population:	
25	
Average:	
64%	
18%	 	
8. Uganda	4%	 Median	age:	
15.8	
%	of	
population:	
34	
67.1%47	 2.9%	 (AfDB)	
ENABLE	
Youth	
programme	
9. South	Sudan	3%		 Median	age:	
17.3	
%	of	
population:	
33	
Average:	
64%	
17.6%	 (AfDB)	
ENABLE	
Youth	
programme	
10. Mozambique	3%		 Median	age:	
17.2	
%	of	
population:	
33	
Average:	
64%	
42.7%	 (AfDB)	
ENABLE	
Youth	
programme	
TABLE	2.	COMPARISON	TOP-10	ODA-RECEIVING	COUNTRIES.	
	
Given	the	representativeness	of	Uganda	as	an	ODA	receiving	country	with	young	population,	
it	 can	be	considered	a	 typical	 case	study	of	how	development	 functions	–	particularly	with	
regards	 to	 the	 trend	 around	 youth	 in	 agribusiness.	 The	 process	 of	 adoption	 and	
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implementation	 of	 the	 recent	 trend	 in	 development	 targeting	 youths	 in	 agribusiness,	 is	
typical	 to	other	developing	countries	on	 the	African	continent.	Also	 in	other	countries,	 the	
trend	 is	 constructed	 through	 the	 narratives	 and	 practice	 of	 development	 actors	 involved.	
Moreover,	 the	 socio-cultural	 specificities	 that	 influence	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	
development	 programmes	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 play	 an	 important	 role	 also	 in	 other	 sub-
Saharan	 countries	 (see	 chapter	 7).	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 several	
considerations	 I	 make	 around	 this	 trend	 in	 development	 are	 applicable	 also	 to	 other	
contexts.	However,	empirical	research	in	other	aid	receiving,	sub-Saharan	countries	would	be	
necessary	to	verify	the	applicability	of	the	conclusions	drawn	from	this	study.			
3.4.2	DESIGN	
I	have	carried	out	my	ethnographic	fieldwork	during	three	periods:	a	pilot	fieldtrip	of	5	weeks	
in	2016;	extensive	 fieldwork	 for	6	months	 in	2017;	and	a	 follow	up	 field	 trip	of	4	weeks	 in	
2018.	Altogether,	the	fieldwork	activities	stretched	along	the	timeline	reported	in	table	3.2,	
and	allowed	me	to	collect	134	semi-structured	and	in-depth	interviews.	
I	 have	 carried	out	multi-sited	 fieldwork	 in	order	 to	have	an	overview	of	how	development	
programmes	were	implemented	across	the	country.	In	fact,	I	have	selected	four	sub-regions:	
Kampala	in	the	central	region,	Gulu	in	the	northern	region,	Mbale	in	the	eastern	and	Mbarara	
in	the	south-western	region.	Within	each	of	these	regions,	I	have	selected	the	precise	areas	
of	 my	 fieldwork	 based	 on	 the	 areas	 of	 interest	 of	 the	 main	 development	 programmes	 I	
followed	up	on	the	ground.	The	selection	of	the	programmes	to	follow	up	resulted	from	the	
first	 phase	 of	 fieldwork,	 in	 which	 I	 interviewed	 the	 main	 development	 agencies	 engaging	
youth	 in	 agribusiness.	 Conducting	multi-sited	 fieldwork	meant	 I	 had	 the	 chance	 to	 explore	
the	diversity	of	Uganda’s	regions.		
	
3.4.2A	FIELD	SITES	AND	RESEARCH	PERIODS	
Period	 Location	 Interviews	
July	–	August	2016	 Kampala	 Pilot	fieldtrip	
22	respondents:	
development	experts	
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and	practitioners	
January	 –	 February	
2017	
Kampala	(capital	city)	 24	respondents:	
development	
practitioners	
March	–	April	2017	 Gulu	(North	Uganda)	 29	respondents:	young	
agro-entrepreneurs	
involved	in	2	dev	
schemes	+	1	control	
group	
March	&	May	2017	 Kampala	(capital	city)	 26	respondents:	young	
agro-entrepreneurs	
involved	in	2	dev	
schemes	+	1	control	
group	
May	–	June	2017	 Mbarara	 (South-West	
Uganda)	
25	respondents:	young	
agro-entrepreneurs	
involved	in	2	dev	
schemes	+	1	control	
group	
June	2017	 Mbale	(East	Uganda)	 30	respondents:	young	
agro-entrepreneurs	
involved	in	2	dev	
schemes	+	1	control	
group	
May	2018	 Kampala	 Follow-up	fieldwork	
13	interviews	with	
development	
practitioners.	
TABLE	3.	FIELD	SITES	AND	RESEARCH	PERIODS	
	
The	 pilot	 field	 trip	 was	 useful	 to	 ground	 my	 research	 focus	 on	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 in	
empirical	 evidence	 of	 the	 development	 trends,	 and	 become	 acquainted	 with	 the	 socio-
cultural	reality	in	which	I	was	to	conduct	fieldwork.	Most	importantly	it	was	useful	to	narrow	
down	 my	 research	 question:	 from	 a	 general	 interest	 in	 the	 recent	 trend	 in	 development	
focusing	 on	 youth,	 to	 a	 question	 on	 its	 construction	 through	 narratives	 and	 practices	 of	
development	practitioners	and	youths.	Therefore,	I	structured	the	extended	fieldwork	in	two	
phases:	 I	would	spend	 two	months	 interviewing	practitioners	 in	Kampala,	and	 four	months	
interviewing	 youths.	 Interviewing	 development	 practitioners	 from	 various	 development	
agencies	helped	me	to	identify	their	agency’s	sampling	strategies,	definitions	of	youths,	and	
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objectives,	as	well	as	the	approaches	of	the	implemented	programmes.	 I	then	elaborated	a	
preliminary	 analysis	 of	 the	 narratives	 of	 development	 practitioners	 as	 precursor	 to	 my	
interviews	with	youths.		
Based	on	the	results	of	this	first	phase	of	my	research	and	considering	two	pilot	fieldtrips	 I	
conducted	in	the	north	(Gulu)	and	east	(Mbale)	of	the	country,	I	identified	two	main	variables	
of	 interest.	 	 These	 variables	 emerged	 from	 the	 interviews	 as	main	 factors	 diversifying	 the	
development	 programmes:	 1)	 different	 development	 approaches	 adopted	 by	 the	
development	 organisations	 (public	 or	 private-sector	 driven);	 and	 2)	 geographic	 location.	
These	 two	 variables	 diversified	 the	 development	 approaches	 of	 the	 various	 agencies	 I	 had	
interviewed,	 and	were	 therefore	assumed	 to	have	different	 impacts	on	 the	ground.	 I	 have	
thus	selected	the	two	most	diverse	development	approaches	(private-sector	driven	approach	
VS	 public	 approach),	which	 I	 followed	 up	 on	 the	 ground.	 Secondly,	 I	 have	 selected	 4	 sub-
regions	 (Gulu,	 Kampala,	 Mbarara	 and	 Mbale)	 to	 locate	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the	 two	 above-
mentioned	 development	 approaches.	 The	 choice	 of	 the	 locations	 was	 justified	 by	 two	
factors:		I	have	considered	the	locations	where	the	different	development	organisations	were	
most	 actively	 implementing	 their	 programmes.	 Moreover,	 I	 have	 considered	 the	 disparity	
between	 the	 regions	 in	 terms	of	development,	 infrastructures,	modes	of	production,	 value	
chains,	socio-cultural	and	historical	background.	 I	suspected	that	the	disparity	and	diversity	
between	 these	 regions	 would	 have	 had	 an	 influence	 on	 the	 way	 the	 development	
programmes	were	implemented.	In	order	to	have	an	overall	perspective	of	the	impact	of	the	
programmes	 for	 the	 engagement	 of	 youths,	 I	 needed	 to	 collect	 an	 overview	 of	 the	
implementation	in	its	diverse	contexts	on	the	ground.		
In	 addition	 to	 considering	 the	 variables	 of	 development	 approach	 and	 locations,	 I	 have	
considered	a	control	group	of	young	agripreneurs	who	were	not	involved	in	any	development	
scheme,	 for	 each	 of	 the	 four	 field	 sites.	 This	 sampling	 strategy	 is	 illustrated	 in	 the	 below	
figure	(	Figure	3.	Sampling	strategy):		
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FIGURE	3.	SAMPLING	STRATEGY	
	
I	 have	dedicated	about	2	weeks	of	 intense	 fieldwork	 activities	 in	 each	of	 the	 four	 sites,	 to	
which	added	about	one	week	of	preparations	and	one	week	of	fieldnotes	elaboration.		
After	returning	from	the	field,	I	have	elaborated	the	discourse	analysis	of	all	the	interviews,	
and	 written	 the	 first	 two	 empirical	 chapters	 (‘aidnography’	 and	 ‘youthnography’),	 and	
inevitably	 new	 questions	 emerged	 after	 structuring	 the	 analysis	 into	 written	 accounts.	 In	
order	 to	 answer	 some	 of	 these	 new	 questions,	 and	 as	 part	 of	 the	 grounded	 theory	 I	 had	
chosen	for	my	methods,	I	embarked	in	a	final	follow-up	field	trip.	During	this	time,	I	focused	
on	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 programmes	 through	 the	 practices	 that	 took	 development	
practitioners	to	translate	their	narratives	into	concrete	actions.		
	
3.4.3	THE	DATA	
As	mentioned,	 I	have	collected	ethnographic	data	during	 three	periods	of	 fieldwork,	which	
are	described	in	more	detail	in	Table	4	below.		
3.4.3A	DATASET	FROM	FIELDWORK	WITH	DEVELOPMENT	PRACTITIONERS	(2016,	2017,	2018)	
Pilot	fieldtrip	2016	 Extensive	fieldwork	2017	 Follow-up	fieldwork	2018		
3	Government	civil	servants	 7	Government	civil	servants	 4	Government	civil	
servants	
Locations	
Development	
approaches
Target	group Youth	in	agribusiness	
Private	
sector	
approach
North	(Gulu)
Central	(KLA)
South-West
East	(Mbale)
Public	
approach
North	(Gulu)
Central	(KLA)
South-West
East	(Mbale)
Control	
group
North	(Gulu)
Central	(KLA)
South-West
East	(Mbale
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0	Ugandan	agencies	
practitioners	
6	Ugandan	agencies	
practitioners	
2	Ugandan	agencies	
practitioners	
9	International	agencies	
practitioners		
11	International	agencies	
practitioners	
7	International	agencies	
practitioners	
7	agripreneurs	 See	below	 	
12	Males		
7	Females	
Males	20	
Females	4	
Males	11	
Females	2	
Total	19	(12	practitioners)	 Total	24	practitioners	 Total	13	
TABLE	4.	DATASET	OF	FIELDWORK	WITH	DEV.	PRACTITIONERS	
	
I	used	a	semi-structured	approach	during	interviews,	working	from	a	common	guideline	but	
deviating	when	 interesting	 ideas	 and	 topics	 emerged.	While	 all	 semi-structured	 interviews	
were	 modelled	 along	 the	 themes	 described	 below,	 I	 adjusted	 the	 formulation	 of	 the	
interviews	to	the	context	I	was	in.	This	(relative)	flexibility	allowed	me	to	be	more	receptive	
to	the	issues	that	emerged	as	being	more	burning	in	the	specific	contexts.		
Interview	guideline’s	themes	
1. Agribusiness	structure	&	trajectory	
History,	 management,	 trajectory	 in	 productivity,	 profit	 and	 investments,	 marketing	
strategies	and	opportunities,	definitions	of	‘agribusiness’,	‘farmer’	and	‘agripreneur’.		
2. Social	dimension	of	agribusiness	(partly)	
Cooperation	with	others,	decision-making	strategies,	what	others	are	up	to	
3. Personal	dimension	of	agribusiness	
General	 feeling,	vision	for	the	future,	what	should	be	done	differently/what	 is	necessary,	
what	is	the	vision	for	their	kids	
4. Relation	with	donor/development	scheme	(partly)	
Reflection	on	before/after,	decision-making	strategies	and	negotiations	with	donor,	what	
works	and	what	needs	to	be	done	differently,	navigating	different	opportunities	
TABLE	5.	INTERVIEWS	GUIDELINE	FOR	DEV.	PRACTITIONERS	(THEMES)	
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3.4.3B	DATASET	FROM	EXTENSIVE	FIELDWORK	WITH	YOUTHS	(2017)	
The	majority	of	the	interviews	has	been	recorded	and	transcribed,	except	a	few	ones	which	
have	been	only	noted	in	my	fieldnotes,	as	the	context	(mostly	the	market	place)	didn’t	allow	
me	to	pull	out	my	recorder.	In	each	of	the	four	locations	I	have	selected	I	have	interviewed	
people	who	were	 engaged	 in	 either	 a	 public-sector	 development	 scheme,	 a	 private-sector	
driven	programme,	and	a	control	group,	which	were	not	members	of	either.	Generally,	the	
youths	 in	public	sector	programmes	were	more	difficult	 to	access	because	of	a	widespread	
suspicion:	 most	 of	 them	 had	 troubles	 returning	 the	 loan	 they	 had	 received	 to	 start	 their	
agribusiness,	 and	 in	 that	 period	 governmental	 authorities	 were	 patrolling	 and	 even	 jailing	
incompliant	youths.	This	situation	left	me	with	an	unbalanced	number	of	youths	 in	the	two	
different	development	schemes:	
Region	 Recorded	 Not-
recorded	
Dev.	scheme		 Gender	 Focus	 group	
discussions	
29	North	 24	 5	 12	private-sector		
8	public	
9	control	group	
Males	19	
Females	13	
4	
26	Central	 18		 8	 9	private-sector	
2	public	
15	control	group	
Males	8	
Females	11	
1	
25	West	 25	 /	 11	private-sector	
2	public	
12	control	
Males	23	
Females	9	
2	
30	East	 25	 5	 10	private-sector	
7	public	
13	control	
Males	19	
Females	8	
3	
-	Total	private	sector:	42	
-	Total	public	sector:	19	
-	Total	control:	49	
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-	Total	males:	69	
-	Total	females:	41	
-	Total	recorded:	92	
TOTAL:	110	
TABLE	6.	DATASET	OF	FIELDWORK	WITH	YOUTHS	
	
3.4.4	THE	INTERPRETERS	
Many	 languages	 (4349)	 are	 spoken	 in	 Uganda,	 besides	 English	 official	 language	 –	 which	
Ugandans	 inherited	 from	 the	 colonial	 times.	 Despite	 being	 the	 main	 language	 taught	 in	
school,	and	also	the	official	language	of	instruction	–	English	is	still	not	spoken	in	most	rural	
areas,	as	children	often	only	attend	the	(compulsory)	elementary	school.		On	the	contrary	in	
Kampala,	 being	 a	 multicultural	 and	 multi-ethnic	 environment,	 English	 is	 spoken	 by	 the	
majority	of	people	–	next	to	the	local	language,	Luganda.	Besides	the	rural-urban	difference	
in	English	literacy,	however,	there	also	was	a	class	disparity	–	both	in	rural	areas	and	within	
Kampala:	 the	 poorer	 could	 not	 afford	 an	 education	 beyond	 compulsory	 schooling,	 and	
therefore	did	not	speak	English.		
Because	of	all	these	reasons,	the	majority	of	my	youth	informants	did	not	speak	English,	and	
therefore	I	often	needed	to	conduct	my	interviews	with	the	help	of	a	translator.	Interestingly,	
the	interpreter	was	not	only	useful	for	the	task	of	translation,	but	also	as	‘cultural’	broker	in	
circumstances	in	which	I	could	not	make	sense	of	behaviours	or	answers	to	my	questions.	In	
fact,	the	interpreter	turned	out	to	also	become	a	key	informant	–	and	in	one	case	also	a	close	
friend.	Therefore,	I	find	myself	in	line	with	McMichael	(2002,	p.	176)	as	she	stresses	that	she	
“did	not	use	an	interpreter,	but	worked	with	an	interpreter,	(…)	This	approach	enhanced	the	
interview	 process,	 as	 we	 were	 able	 to	 work	 together	 and	 bring	 different	 skills	 and	
perspectives	to	the	research	project.”.		
Fortunately,	I	had	the	chance	of	working	with	capable	interpreters,	but	since	I	did	not	speak	
the	local	languages	I	could	not	judge	whether	the	translations	were	accurate,	during	the	time	
																																																						
49Ethnologue,	visited	on	3/08/2018	on:		https://www.ethnologue.com/country/UG	
	 103	
of	 fieldwork.	 In	 order	 to	 minimize	 the	 possible	 mistakes	 and	 misunderstandings	 in	 the	
translations	of	my	interpreters,	 I	have	hired	native	speakers	research	assistants	affiliated	to	
IITA	to	type	out	the	recordings	of	the	interviews.		
	
3.4.4A	NORTH:	CATHY	TRANSLATES	ACHOLI	
I	met	my	first	 interpreter,	Cathy,	 in	a	shopping	mall	 in	Kampala.	She	was	selling	honey	as	a	
peddler	and	as	I	bought	a	pot	from	her	I	figured	she	was	indeed	an	agripreneur:	in	fact,	she	
had	explained	how	she	would	buy	the	honey	in	bulk,	and	add	value	by	bottling	and	marketing	
it	with	her	own	brand.	We	got	in	conversation,	and	she	proved	to	have	great	knowledge	of	
the	honey	 value	 chain	 from	 the	north.	After	 I	 had	 interviewed	her,	 on	 another	 occasion,	 I	
realised	 she	 had	 great	 command	 of	 English,	 was	 knowledgeable	 of	 socio	 cultural	
environment	 of	 the	 area	 surrounding	 Gulu,	 and	 spoke	 the	 local	 language	 –	 Acholi.	 Most	
importantly,	she	seemed	to	immediately	grasp	the	rationale	of	my	research	and	the	methods	
of	 data	 collection.	 For	 all	 these	 reasons,	 and	 also	 simply	 because	 I	 had	 the	 feeling	 I	 could	
trust	her,	 I	chose	her	to	be	my	interpreter	and	‘cultural	broker’	for	my	field	trip	to	Gulu.	 In	
fact,	 she	 served	 the	 last	 purpose	 better	 than	 the	 translations,	 since	 sometimes	 her	
vocabulary	of	rural	circumstances	and	agricultural	activities	was	a	bit	rusty	–	since	her	main	
language	was	English.			
	
3.4.4B	CENTRAL	AND	SOUTH-WESTERN	REGIONS:	JOYCE	TRANSLATES	LUGANDA	AND	
LUNYANKOLE	
During	the	pilot	fieldtrip	to	Kampala	in	2016,	an	agribusiness	expert	from	IITA	brought	me	in	
touch	 with	 Joyce,	 a	 “very	 successful	 young	 agripreneur”	 producing	 and	 exporting	 red	
peppers.	I	visited	Joyce	at	her	place,	where	she	welcomed	warmly	and	was	glad	to	share	with	
me	her	experience	as	an	agripreneur.	This	informal,	first	interview	with	her	indicated	that	she	
was	going	 to	be	a	key	 informant	and	a	good	 friend.	She	has	a	BA	 in	management	and	has	
been	working	 in	 a	 hotel	 before	 jumping	 into	 true	 passion	 –	 agribusiness.	 She	 started	with	
hiring	2ha	of	land	in	the	outskirts	of	Kampala,	and	by	the	time	of	our	first	interview	she	was	
managing	20ha.	During	the	extended	fieldwork	in	2017	I	visited	Joyce	weekly	while	she	was	
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pregnant,	and	three	months	after	she	gave	birth	she	started	helping	me	with	translations	in	
Kampala	–	when	she	guided	me	through	the	main	vegetables	market.	Since	our	collaboration	
was	working	 smoothly,	 she	 joined	me	 as	 on	 the	 field	 trip	 to	 the	 south-western	 region.	Or	
rather,	 I	 followed	her	 to	her	home	village,	where	we	stayed	at	her	mother’s	place	 for	 two	
weeks.	Staying	at	her	mother’s	place	was	crucially	important	to	facilitate	my	fieldwork	in	the	
area:	her	mother,	the	teacher	at	the	 local	school	was	a	respected	figure	 in	the	community,	
which	gave	me	access	to	contacts	of	district	authorities,	farmers	and	community	leaders.		
	
3.4.4C	EAST:	WILBERFORCE	AND	TIMOTHY	TRANSLATE	LUGISU	
During	the	first	fieldtrip	to	Mbale	in	February	2017,	Wilberforce,	a	research	assistant	at	IITA,	
helped	me	as	interpreter.	Together	with	Wilberforce,	I	visited	the	wholesale	market	in	Kamu,	
up	 on	Mount	 Elgon.	 This	was	 also	 the	 place	where	 he	 had	 built	 a	 house	with	 his	wife,	 to	
whom	he	introduced	me.	Wilberforce	was	an	ideal	interpreter,	since	he	was	accustomed	to	
collaborating	with	researchers	and	he	was	familiar	with	many	agripreneurs	 in	the	area	who	
fell	in	my	sampling	criteria.	Unfortunately,	he	was	not	available	during	the	second	field	trip	to	
Mbale,	in	June	2017	so	he	directed	me	to	his	friend	Timothy.	While	the	relation	with	Timothy	
had	not	been	as	ideal	as	with	Wilberforce,	he	was	a	competent	interpreter	and	he	facilitated	
the	majority	 of	 the	 interviews	 I	 conducted	 in	 the	 area.	He	 had	 himself	 completed	 a	 BA	 in	
social	studies	and	was	acquainted	with	the	research	methods	of	my	fieldwork.			
3.4.5	PARTICIPANT	OBSERVATIONS	
Besides	 the	 collection	 of	 interviews,	 I	 have	 also	 done	 participant	 observations.	 This	
anthropological	 research	 practice	 is	 defined	 by	 Fabietti	 and	 Remotti	 (2009,	 p.	 544,	 my	
translation)	 as	 a	 technique	 that	 “implies	 the	 immersion	 in	 the	 daily	 activities	 of	 the	
community	to	be	studied,	(…)	it	is	based	on	the	concept	of	empathy,	it	aims	at	minimizing	the	
problem	 of	 reactivity	 and	 the	 distorting	 effect	 of	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 anthropologist,	
dissolving	the	presence	of	the	observant	among	the	observed”.	The	proximity	of	the	observer	
to	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 case	 study	 is	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 an	 advanced	 understanding	 of	 the	
dynamics	that	are	object	of	study	(Flyvbjerg,	2006,	p.	236).	Participant	observations	in	a	case	
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study	 allow	 to	 cast	 off	 preconceived	 notions	 and	 theories,	 letting	 theory	 emerge	 from	
empirical	observations	(ibid).		
In	 the	 case	 of	 my	 multi-sited	 fieldwork,	 participant	 observations	 entailed	 mainly	 the	
observation	 of	 how	my	 informants	 interacted	with	 each	 other.	 Particularly	 useful	 was	 the	
observation	 of	 how	 development	 practitioners	 interacted	 with	 youths	 (supposedly)	
benefitting	from	their	programmes.	In	the	third	empirical	chapter	I	will	elaborate	an	analysis	
of	this	phase	of	the	implementation	of	the	programmes.		
However,	 given	 the	multi-sited	 nature	 of	 the	 fieldwork	 I	 collected,	 the	 time	 I	 reserved	 for	
participant	 observations	was	 limited	 in	 comparison	with	 the	 relevance	 of	 interviews	 in	my	
data.	 In	 fact,	 participant	 observation	 requires	 the	 immersion	 of	 the	 ethnographer	 in	 the	
‘natural	environment’	of	 the	 informants,	 to	 live	with	 them,	and	 to	make	part	of	 their	daily	
life.	On	the	contrary,	I	had	only	a	one-time	contact	with	the	majority	of	my	informants.		
The	 risks	 of	 participant	 observation	 are	 related	 to	 two	 main	 issues.	 First,	 the	 subjective	
perspective	of	the	observer,	who	will	make	personal	 interpretations	of	the	reality	observed	
on	 the	 ground.	 The	 subjectivity	 of	 the	 observer	 is	 not	 unique	 to	 ethnographic	 research	
methods,	 but	 the	 ‘real	 life’,	 transient,	 context	 of	 observations	 hinder	 the	 possibility	 of	
verification	 of	 observations.	 To	 strengthen	 the	 validity	 of	 participant	 observations,	
ethnographers	adopt	two	techniques:	first,	punctual	annotation	of	events	and	observations	
in	 verifiable	 field	 notes;	 second,	 critical	 reflexivity	 –	 namely	 the	 researcher’s	 awareness	 of	
her/his	 relation	 to	 the	 field,	which	must	be	accounted	 for	 in	 the	ethnography	 (see	 section	
3.7).		
	
3.5	CONTEXTUALIZING	THE	FIELDS		
‘The	 pearl	 of	 Africa’	 has	 a	 complex	 and	 troubled	 socio-political	 history	 that	 makes	 it	 a	
particularly	sensitive	context	in	which	to	conduct	this	research.	In	Uganda,	where	95%	of	the	
poor	 live	 in	 rural	 areas	 (Fan	 &	 Zhang,	 2012)	 and	 60%	 of	 the	 population	 is	 engaged	 in	
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agriculture 50 ,	 unsettled	 rural	 development	 issues	 (land	 tenure	 inequalities,	 poor	
infrastructure	and	gender	and	generational	inequalities)	are	rooted	in	a	long	history	of	ethnic	
tensions	 and	 regional	 disparities.	 Furthermore,	 Uganda	 is	 an	 extremely	 diverse	 country	 in	
terms	of	its	geography	and	ecology,	history,	ethnicities,	languages	and	cultures.		
	
FIGURE	4.	MAP	OF	UGANDA	WITH	FIELD	SITES	MARKED.	SOURCE:	GOOGLE	MAPS	
	
Its	area	is	also	quite	extended:	“It	has	a	total	area	of	241,551	square	kilometres,	of	which	the	
land	area	covers	200,523	square	kilometres”	(UBOS,	2017,	p.	1)	–	six	times	bigger	than	The	
Netherlands	(41,543	km²),	and	a	bit	smaller	than	Italy	(301,338	km²).		The	country	is	divided	
into	 116	 districts	 (as	 of	 August/September	 2014).	 The	 districts	 are	 further	 subdivided	 into	
200	Counties,	1,378	Sub-counties	and	6,495	Parishes.	The	role	of	these	administrative	units	is	
to	implement	and	monitor	government	programmes	at	the	respective	levels	(UBOS,	2017,	p.	
1).	 
																																																						
50Data	of	the	Government	of	Uganda,	accessed	on	15th	May	2016:	http://gov.ug/content/agriculture	
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Population	has	been	growing	steadily,	at	about	an	annual	growth	rate	of	3%,	since	the	1960s.	
Population	size	and	population	growth	rates,	1969-2014	
Census	year	 Male	 Female	 Total	 Inter-censual	
period	
Average	annual	
growth	 rate	
(%)	
1969	 4,812,447	 4,722,604	 9,535,051	 	 	
1980	 6,259,837	 6,376,342	 12,636,179	 1969-1980	 2.7	
1991	 8,185,747	 8,485,558	 16,671,705	 1980-1991	 2.5	
2002	 11,824,273	 12,403,024	 24,227,297	 1991-2002	 3.2	
2014	 17,060,832	 17,573,818	 34,634,650	 2002-2014	 3.0	
FIGURE	5.	POPULATION	SIZE	AND	GROWTH	1969-2014.	(UBOS,	2017,	P.	2)	
	
URBANIZATION		
While	the	majority	of	the	population	 lives	 in	rural	areas,	 there	 is	a	there	 is	a	clear	trend	of	
urbanization,	as	more	and	more	youth	are	moving	towards	the	cities	to	find	employment	–	
thereby	 leaving	 their	 agricultural	 activities.	 This	 process	 is	 often	 invoked	 by	 development	
organisations	as	a	justification	for	the	needs	to	focus	on	youth	employment	in	agribusiness	–	
thereby	counteracting	the	process	of	urbanization.	
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FIGURE	6.	RURAL	VS	URBAN	POPULATION	1990-2016.	SOURCE:	FAOSTAT	201751	
	
	
FIGURE	7.	RURAL	VS	URBAN	POPULATION	2017.	SOURCE:	FAOSTAT	201752	
	
																																																						
51FAOSTAT	country	profile	–	Uganda;	accessed	on	27/07/2018:		
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#country/226	
52FAOSTAT	country	profile	–	Uganda;	accessed	on	27/07/2018:		
http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#country/226	
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There	 is	 a	 substantial	 disparity	 in	 the	 levels	 of	 development	 of	 the	 regional	 economies,	
infrastructures,	 education	 levels	 and	 access	 to	 medical	 institutes.	 Overall,	 the	 greatest	
disparity	is	between	rural	and	urban	areas.	This	disparity	is	shown	both	in	the	ownership	of	
assets	 and	 access	 to	 facilities	 (Figure	 8.	 ownership	 of	 assets	 and	 access	 to	 facilities	
(proportion	 of	 pop.).	 ,	 below),	 and	 in	 the	 levels	 of	 education	 (Figure	 9.	 Youths'	 levels	 of	
education.	,	below).	In	the	following	sections	I	will	delve	deeper	in	the	particularities	of	each	
of	the	four	field	sites	where	I	have	carried	out	fieldwork.		
Proportion	of	households	owning	selected	assets	by	sex	of	household	head	and	residence	
Type	of	asset	 Sex	of	household	head	 Residence	
	 2002	 Male	 Female	 Rural	 Urban	 National	
Non-movable	Asset	
House	 78.2	 73.9	 60.6	 83.3	 40.8	 72.8	
Agricultural	Land	 na	 63.2	 56.5	 70.6	 33.7	 61.6	
Transport	
Motor	vehicle		 1.7	 4.3	 2.5	 2.2	 8.9	 3.9	
Motor	cycle	 2.5	 10.3	 3.1	 8.2	 10.0	 8.6	
Bicycle		 33.7	 35.6	 18.4	 35.4	 19.5	 31.5	
Canoe/boat	 0.7	 2.2	 1.7	 2.2	 1.6	 2.1	
Donkey	 0.5	 1.5	 1.4	 1.5	 1.2	 1.5	
ICT	Equipment	
Television	 4.6	 14.1	 13.1	 5.5	 39.7	 13.9	
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Radio	 49.2	 63.0	 48.9	 58.3	 63.7	 59.6	
Fixed	phone	 0.5	 5.5	 3.9	 5.0	 5.4	 5.1	
Computer		 na	 4.0	 1.6	 1.9	 10.4	 3.8	
Generator	 na	 2.4	 1.6	 1.9	 2.7	 2.1	
FIGURE	 8.	 OWNERSHIP	 OF	 ASSETS	 AND	 ACCESS	 TO	 FACILITIES	 (PROPORTION	 OF	 POP.).	 (UBOS,	 UGANDA	
BUREAU	OF	STATISTICS,	2014,	P.	37)	
		
Educational	attainment	of	youth	in	Uganda	
Qualification		 Kampala	 Central	 Eastern	 Northern	 Western	 Uganda	
None		 2	 4	 2	 17	 6	 6	
P1-P7	 30	 42	 45	 53	 50	 46	
S1-S4	 42	 39	 38	 22	 31	 34	
S5-S6	 16	 9	 9	 3	 5	 7	
Above	S6	 10	 6	 6	 5	 7	 6	
Years	of	
education	
(mean)	
9.4	 8.2	 8.2	 6.0	 7.5	 7.7	
Literacy		 92	 87	 74	 75	 85	 81	
Source:	Uganda	Youth	Watch	Survey	2011	
Literacy	is	defined	as	‘can	write	in	at	least	one	language’	
FIGURE	9.	YOUTHS'	LEVELS	OF	EDUCATION.	(BANKS	&	SULAIMAN,	2012,	P.	11)	
	
3.5.1	KAMPALA	
Kampala	 is	 not	 only	 the	 capital	 of	 Uganda,	 but	 also	 the	 country’s	 largest	 urban	 centre.	
Officially,	 about	 1.5	 million	 people	 live	 in	 Kampala,	 twice	 as	 many	 as	 in	 the	 1990s53.	
Unregistered	inhabitants	and	daily	commuters	contribute	to	make	the	city	congested	with	a	
non-quantifiable	amount	of	people.	As	mentioned	above,	Kampala	has	 the	highest	 level	of	
literacy	in	the	country,	and	the	longest	school	attendance	(in	terms	of	years	of	education).		
The	city	stretches	over	a	very	extended	area,	covering	about	200	km2	across	seven	hills.	It	has	
a	hectic	business	and	trading	centre	and	an	extended	residential	area	that	reaches	the	shores	
																																																						
53	City	population	–	accessed	on	26/07/2018:		http://www.citypopulation.de/php/uganda-admin.php	
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of	 Lake	 Victoria.	 Most	 of	 governmental	 institutions	 are	 located	 in	 Kampala	 (and	 a	 few	 in	
Entebbe,	near	the	presidential	residence),	as	are	most	offices	of	(inter)national	private	sector	
companies	and	development	agencies.	From	the	street	markets	to	the	central	market	to	the	
offices	district,	Kampala	ferments	with	(informal)	business	activities.		
The	 strategic	 importance	 of	 Kampala	 for	 national	 and	 regional	 trade	 and	 politics	 dates	
centuries	back.	Before	being	the	capital	of	Uganda,	Kampala	was	and	still	is	the	capital	of	the	
kingdom	of	Baganda.		
The	 importance	 of	 Lake	Victoria	 trade	meant,	 from	 the	 1840s	 onward,	 the	 gradual	
rootedness,	consolidation	and	expansion	of	the	Ganda	royal	capital	across	the	hills	of	
modern	 day	 central	 Kampala.	 Urban	 growth	 reflected	 the	 expansion	 of	 economic	
scale,	certainly	in	the	case	of	Kampala;	they	comprised	larger	markets,	housed	more	
or	less	permanently	resident	trading	communities,	both	foreign	and	indigenous,	and	
represented	the	desire	to	maximise	both	profit	and	control.	(Reid,	2017,	p.	240)	
The	politico-economic	stronghold	of	 the	city	has	been	strengthened	throughout	history,	by	
the	succession	of	the	various	political	hegemonies.	Also	the	British,	during	the	colonial	times,	
had	chosen	Kampala	to	be	the	capital	–	and	the	area	their	residential	district	 is	still	today	a	
well-off	neighbourhood,	where	most	embassies	are	located.	
	From	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 urban	 growth	 resulted	 from	 a	 long-term	
combination	of	economic	drivers,	with	towns	becoming	stable	centres	of	commerce	
and	industry,	the	locations	of	major	regional	markets,	and	pools	of	labour,	as	well	as	
being	sites	of	socio-economic	opportunity.	As	Kampala,	in	particular,	expanded,	it	had	
a	wider	economic	impact:	by	the	beginning	of	the	1950s,	farmers	surrounding	the	city	
tended	to	grow	less	cotton	and	more	food	for	sale	in	town.	Towns	were	the	target	of	
labour	migration,	mostly	men,	but	 increasingly	women,	 too,	which	was	much	more	
worrying	to	colonial	and	chiefly	patriarchy.	As	the	local	economy	changed,	providing	
opportunities	 as	 well	 as	 introducing	 new	 hardships,	 women	 sought	 new	 ways	 of	
earning	 their	 own	 living,	 including	moving	 to	 town	 in	 the	process	of	 asserting	 their	
economic	independence	from	men.	(Reid,	2017,	p.	241)	
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These	social	and	politico-economic	developments	contributed	to	making	Kampala	a	relatively	
multicultural	and	multi-ethnic	city.	While	 it	 is	very	unusual	 in	the	rest	of	the	country,	 inter-
ethnic	marriages	are,	 in	Kampala,	quite	common.	This	contributed	to	making	the	sample	of	
people	I	interviewed	in	Kampala	rather	diverse,	and	at	the	same	time	their	perceptions	about	
ethnicity	 and	 gender	 relations	 more	 progressive	 than	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 country.	
Nevertheless,	the	majority	of	the	population	are	Baganda,	from	the	Ganda	ethnic	group	(the	
suffix	 ba-	 characterizes	 the	 plural	 form	 of	 ganda).	 Throughout	 history,	 “Kampala’s	
demographic	 composition	 has	 been	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 politics	 and	 by	 the	 fortunes	 and	
misfortunes	of	the	nation’s	ethnic	groups”	(Mwakikagile,	2009,	p.	52).		
In	Kampala,	 I	have	conducted	fieldwork	over	four	periods	of	time	with	two	groups	of	social	
actors.	 Firstly,	 during	 the	 pilot	 field	 trip	 in	 2016,	 when	 I	 have	 spoken	 with	 development	
experts,	 practitioners	 and	 some	 young	 agripreneurs.	 During	 the	 extensive	 ethnographic	
fieldwork	in	2017	I	have	spent	two	months	interviewing	development	practitioners	from	17	
different	development	organisations	–	thereby	spending	most	of	my	fieldwork	time	in	offices	
and	on	boda-bodas	(motor-taxis,	the	most	popular	public	means	of	transport);	and	another	
month	 interviewing	 young	 agro-entrepreneurs	 in	or	 around	 the	 city.	 Finally	 in	 2018	 I	 have	
spent	 a	 month	 following	 up	 with	 a	 final	 field	 trip,	 which	 I	 spent	 mostly	 interviewing	
development	practitioners,	and	giving	them	feedback	on	the	results	of	my	research	thus	far.	
Altogether,	Kampala	is	where	I	have	been	based,	in-between	field	trips	to	other	locations	of	
my	ethnographic	 research.	Coming	back	 there	 in	2018	 felt	 somehow	 like	 coming	home:	 in	
fact,	during	the	time	I	spent	there	I	have	built	a	solid	network	of	friends	(mostly	expats),	and	
have	learnt	my	way	around	the	city,	its	amenities	and	dangers.		
	
3.5.2	GULU	
The	 fieldwork	 I	 conducted	 in	 the	 north	 was	 the	 first	 ethnographic	 research	 I	 carried	 out	
outside	 of	 Kampala.	 The	 journey	 that	 took	 me	 there	 gave	 me	 a	 first	 impression	 of	 the	
ecological	change	as	I	moved	passed	the	Nile:	it	was	in	the	middle	of	the	dry	season,	and	yet	I	
had	left	behind	a	lush	and	green	environment	in	the	central	region,	which	make	the	yellow	
and	dry	picture	of	the	region	around	Gulu	very	striking.	As	intense	as	the	colours	of	the	arid	
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environment	 they	 live	 in,	 Acholi	 people	 have	 made	 a	 strong	 impression	 on	 me	 for	 their	
unusually	directness	in	speech,	and	for	the	strength	of	their	character	–	having	endured	one	
of	 the	most	violent	 conflicts	of	 the	past	decades.	Besides	 their	 tragic	past	however,	Acholi	
people	I	interviewed	were	exceptionally	proud	of	their	cultural	traditions	and	history.		
In	 fact,	 Gulu	 is	 a	 town	 counting	 about	 150	 thousand	 inhabitants,	 located	 in	 a	 widely	
uninhabited,	arid	area.	There	are	small	villages	scattered	throughout	the	country	side,	mostly	
concentrated	along	 the	main	 roads.	Outside	of	Gulu,	people	mostly	 live	 in	 communities	of	
extended	 families,	 around	 commonly	 owned	 and	 cultivated	 land	 (which	 is	 inherited	
patrilineally).	 With	 the	 land	 tenure	 being	 communal,	 the	 social	 structure	 is	 closely	 knit	
around	 agricultural	 production	 as	 a	 community-effort.	 The	main	 agricultural	 production	 in	
this	 region	 includes	 mostly	 grains	 and	 other	 food	 crops:	 millet,	 sorghum,	 beans,	 and	
groundnuts;	 recently	 large-scale	 farming	 has	 expanded	 the	 production	 of	maize,	 soya	 and	
rice.		
The	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 population	 of	 that	 area	 belongs	 to	 the	 Acholi	 ethnic	 group	 and	
speaks	Luo,	a	Nilotic	 language.	 	Acholi	people	started	 identifying	themselves	as	such	at	 the	
end	of	the	19th	century	when	tensions	arose	in	the	north	of	Uganda	around	the	slave	trade	
(Reid,	2017,	p.	150-151).	Different	ethnic	groups	in	the	area	started	competing	for	economic	
and	political	power	–	particularly	with	the	Langi	and	the	Teso,	who	continued	to	migrate	as	a	
consequence	 of	 the	 conflicts	 around	 slave	 trade.	 Furthermore,	 tensions	 arose	 with	 both	
Ethiopian	 an	 Arab	 merchants,	 and	 later	 against	 the	 Anglo-Egyptians	 who	 were	 militarily	
present	 in	 the	 southern	 part	 of	 Sudan	 and	 northern	 Uganda.	 The	 Acholi	 “sought	 to	 take	
advantage	 of	 an	 increasingly	 volatile	 and	 unstable	 political	 environment.	 (…)	 this	 did	
‘Acholiland’	begin	its	journey	into	the	modern	era	violently	insecure	–	and	with	a	reputation	
for	clannish	and	incessantly	bloodthirsty	feuding”	(ibid,	p.	151).	Reid	continues	arguing	that	
the	 favouring	 relation	 that	 the	 British	 colonialists	 established	 with	 Baganda	 from	 central	
region	discriminated	Acholi	people	who	were	imagined	as	the		
internal	‘other’,	and	this	has	been	perpetuated	by	the	current	government	(…)	[T]his	
is	a	question	of	 ‘reversal	of	fortune’,	from	north	to	south.	Uganda	in	origin	owes	an	
enormous	amount	to	the	north	in	terms	of	politics,	culture,	religion;	but	the	south	has	
latterly	 come	 to	 dominate	 in	 political	 and	 economic	 terms,	 in	 part	 the	 curse	 of	
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geopolitics	 and	 nature,	 but	 largely	 the	 result	 of	 particular	 hegemonic	 visions	 of	
political	and	economic	modernity.	And	so	in	some	ways	it	is	no	coincidence	that	the	
first	 twenty	 years	 of	 Uganda’s	 independence	 were	 dominated	 by	 northern	
governments	with	self-consciously	modernist,	unitary	and	patriotic	visions	of	Uganda.	
In	 fact,	 I	 have	 found	 that	many	 of	my	 informants	 –	who	were	 openly	 against	 the	 current	
government	–	were	nostalgic	of	Milton	Obote.	While	in	conducting	fieldwork	in	rural	areas,	I	
happened	 to	 record	 traditional	 songs	 that	had	proudly	 incorporated	 in	 their	 lyrics	excerpts	
from	that	historical	period	in	which	Acholi	were	the	ruling	elite.		
The	economy	and	socio-political	reality	of	this	region	has	been	heavily	impacted	by	the	long	
war	 that	 has	 affected	 the	 region	 between	 1987	 and	 2006-2008.	 Although	 the	 conflict	 is	
considered	 to	 be	 over,	 Joseph	 Kony	 (its	 main	 leader)	 and	 the	 LRA	 are	 still	 active	 in	
neighbouring	countries.	More	than	half	of	Acholi	people	were	re-settled	in	IDP	camps,	and	all	
my	informants	had	experienced	the	atrocities	of	the	war	either	personally	or	in	their	family;	
the	majority	of	them	had	lived	in	camps	until	about	5	to	7	years	before.		
Despite	 the	 prolonged	 conflict,	 the	 there	 is	 a	 “relatively	 high	 level	 of	 literacy	 in	 North	
Uganda,	even	though	this	region	displays	the	highest	number	of	youth	who	have	never	been	
enrolled	 in	 school	 and	 the	 fewest	 youth	 who	 have	 reached	 secondary	 school.”	 (Banks	 &	
Sulaiman,	2012,	p.	11)	
I	have	concentrated	my	fieldwork	activities	in	four	locations:	Gulu	town;	Atiak	–	almost	at	the	
border	with	South	Sudan	–;	Parabongo,	on	the	way	to	Atiak;	and	Odek	to	the	west	of	Gulu,	
the	place	of	birth	of	Joseph	Kony.	The	selection	of	these	places	was	mainly	determined	by	the	
availability	of	 informants:	 farmers	 living	 in	Parabongo,	were	working	within	a	private	sector	
driven	 development	 scheme	 led	 by	 USAID	 Feed	 the	 Future	 –	 the	 Youth	 Leadership	 in	
Agriculture	Activities	(YLA);	the	governmental	programme	led	by	the	Ministry	of	Gender,	the	
Youth	 Livelihood	Programme	 (YLP),	which	was	 implemented	by	 the	 district	 authorities,	 led	
me	to	Odek;	for	the	selection	of	a	control	group	I	went	to	Atiak,	where	a	group	of	farmers	
was	working	in	beekeeping,	besides	their	own	personal	agribusiness;	in	Gulu	town,	I	gathered	
contextual	knowledge	about	the	local	culture,	language	and	beliefs.			
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FIGURE	10.	MAP	OF	FOUR	FIELD	SITES	IN	NORTH:	GULU,	ATIAK,	PARABONGO,	ODEK.	SOURCE:	GOOGLE	MAPS.	
	
3.5.3	MBALE	
Mbale	is	a	small	town	at	about	1000	mt	above	sea	level,	positioned	at	the	slopes	of	Mount	
Elgon,	at	the	border	with	Kenya.	240	Km	and	5	hours	ride	away	from	Kampala,	Mbale	gives	
the	visitor	a	feeling	of	being	landed	in	a	quiet	bubble:	its	81	thousand	inhabitants	mind	their	
own	business,	there	is	little	hustling	on	the	streets,	few	cars	and	a	colder	climate	–	thanks	to	
the	 proximity	 to	 the	 mountain.	 Life	 starts	 early	 in	 the	 morning	 to	 make	 the	 best	 of	 the	
shorter	days	(because	of	the	shade	of	the	mountain),	and	after	7	pm	there	is	no-one	to	be	
seen	 in	 the	 streets.	 The	environment	 is	dominated	by	 the	breath-taking,	 lush	green	of	 the	
mountain.	Land	is	densely	cultivated	and	fragmented	in	small	patches.	The	main	agricultural	
production	is	coffee,	which	catalyses	a	variety	of	jobs	along	its	chain.	There	are	a	few	coffee	
cooperatives	employing	young	labour	force,	but	predominantly	the	coffee	chain	is	dominated	
by	older	farmers	(because	of	issues	of	land	ownership	and	the	long-term	nature	of	the	coffee	
production).	Another	major	value	chain,	employing	youths,	 is	horticulture	–	which	 supplies	
the	local	market,	Kampala	and	Kenyan	markets	–	and	the	production	of	some	crops	(onions	
and	cabbages	mostly)	makes	its	way	until	South	Sudan.	
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The	majority	of	 the	population	belongs	 to	 the	Gisu	ethnic	 group,	 speaking	 lugisu	 language	
and	 some	 Swahili	 –	 because	 of	 the	 proximity	 to	 Kenya.	 The	 identification	with	 this	 ethnic	
group	was	strongly	felt	by	my	informants,	particularly	male	ones	–	but	the	elaboration	of	an	
ethnic	identity	in	this	context	is	described	as	being	emerged	alongside	the	change	brought	by	
the	 colonial	 rule.	 The	 grouping	 that	 was	 first	 related	 to	 language	 and	 common	 cultural	
practices,	became	institutionalised	and	reified	in	the	twentieth	century	(Reid,	2017,	p.	300):		
Among	Gisu,	the	anthropologist	J.S.	La	Fontaine	observed	the	rise	of	‘tribal	policy’	by	
the	1950s,	and	she	described	the	emergence	of	 ‘tribalism’	 in	Bugisu,	 (…)	This	 [tribal	
policy]	 is	action	by	Gisu	 leaders	on	behalf	of	 the	tribe	as	a	whole	over	 issues	which	
appeared	 to	 them	 either	 to	 threaten	 their	 new	 identity	 or	 seemed	 to	 deny	 them	
rights	accorded	to	other	tribes.	Tribalism	in	Bugisu	is	thus	the	mobilisation	of	loyalties	
which,	 in	 the	 traditional	 system,	 were	 latent	 and	 expressed	 only	 ritually,	 into	 a	
political	pressure	group.		
Whether	it	happened	at	once	or	in	phases,	it	is	important	to	notice	how	the	mobilisation	of	a	
Gisu	identity	was	the	necessary,	political	response	of	defence	of	the	socio-cultural	traditions.		
In	 this	 area,	 I	 have	 concentrated	 my	 fieldwork	 at	 the	 slopes	 of	 the	 mountain,	 moving	 to	
different	 locations	 to	 reach	 representatives	 of	 the	 three	 groups	 of	 youths	 (attached	 to	 a	
public-sector	 development	 programme,	 private	 sector-driven	 one,	 and	 control	 group).	 The	
first	group	of	 informants	 I	have	 interviewed	was	the	control	group,	which	 I	encountered	 in	
Kamu	 in	February	2017.	 I	 returned	 to	 the	area	 in	 June,	after	 the	 rainy	season	–	which	had	
made	transport	almost	impossible	due	to	bad	infrastructures	on	the	mountain.	I	had	looked	
for	 youths	engaged	 in	 the	governmental	 YLP	 (Youth	Livelihood	Programme)	 in	Wanale	and	
Bumalunda	 –	 but	 I	 found	 that	 they	 were	 reluctant	 to	 meet	 me;	 therefore	 in	 those	
mountainous	areas	I	have	interviewed	more	youths	who	were	not	part	of	any	development	
scheme.	 I	 interviewed	youths	 involved	 in	the	YLP	 in	Lwaso	and	Mbale	town.	Furthermore,	 I	
have	 interviewed	 youths	 working	 within	 a	 private	 sector	 driven	 development	 scheme	
sponsored	 by	 USAID’s	 YLA.	 This	 programme	was	 implemented	 by	 the	 pumpkin	 processing	
company	 ‘Byeffe’,	 and	 I	 reached	 youths	 in	 this	 programme	 in	 the	 localities	 of	 Bungokho,	
Kiende	and	Mbale	town.	These	localities	are	all	so	small	that	are	not	even	found	on	google	
maps.	
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FIGURE	11.	MAP	OF	FIELD	SITES	IN	THE	EAST:	MBALE	AND	MOUNT	ELGON.	SOURCE:	GOOGLE	MAPS		
	
3.5.4	MBARARA	
The	south-western	region	around	Mbarara	 is	known	in	popular	wisdom	as	‘the	land	of	milk	
and	 honey’	 because	 indeed	 is	 a	 verdant	 and	 fertile	 part	 of	 Uganda.	 With	 less	 than	 70	
thousand	inhabitants,	Mbarara	is	the	biggest	urban	centre.	The	most	important	value	chains	
are	 coffee	 and	 dairy,	 while	 horticulture	 is	 also	 a	 major	 income-generating	 sector,	 with	
matooke	(green	bananas,	or	plantain)	as	main	food	and	cash	crop.	
The	 socio-cultural	 reality	 of	 the	 south-western	 region	 around	 Mbarara	 is	 defined	 by	 the	
ethnic	identities	of	the	hima	and	iru	–	or,	as	the	local,	 language	declines	the	plural:	bahima	
and	bairu.	They	both	share	 the	same	 language,	 lunyankore,	and	 in	 fact	both	belong	 to	 the	
Nkore	ethnic	group.	There	 is	 little	agreement	whether	they	are	simply	two	social	classes	of	
the	same	ethnic	group,	or	whether	there	are	two	separate	ethnic	groups	sharing	a	common	
language	and	history.	Reid	(2017,	p.	197)	argues	for	the	theory	of	class	divisions:		
In	Nkore,	economic	specialism	came	to	denote	social	and	political	 status,	and	there	
was	 an	 increasing	 emphasis	 on	 the	 distinction	 between	 Hima	 herdsmen	 and	 Iru	
farmers;	by	 the	eighteen	century,	 cattle-keeping	and	 farming	were	almost	mutually	
exclusive	and	unquestionably	 represented	 the	parameters	of	 class	 formation.	While	
the	clans	were	associated	with	various	economic	specialisms,	the	king	was	arbiter	and	
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ritually	 the	embodiment	of	unity,	 seeking	 to	 represent	both	 farming	and	herding	 in	
ceremonial	terms.		
Another	hypothesis,	which	 is	not	necessarily	 in	contradiction	with	 that	of	Reid,	argues	 that	
these	two	ethnic	groups	are	associated	with	the	hutu	(iru)	and	tutsi	(hima)	of	neighbouring	
Rwanda	and	Burundi.	Green	(2010,	p.	9)	draws	the	progeny	of	herders	and	farmers	among	
the	Nkore	from	the	ethnic	descent	of	neighbouring	countries:		
the	 stratified	 systems	 of	 Ankole	 [Nkore],	 Rwanda,	 and	 Burundi,	 where	 society	 was	
split	 between	 cattle	 keepers	 (Bahima	 in	 Ankole;	 Tutsi	 in	 Rwanda	 and	 Burundi),	
farmers	(Bairu	in	Ankole;	Hutu	in	Rwanda	and	Burundi),	and,	in	Rwanda	and	Burundi,	
an	 underclass	 group	 named	 the	 Twa	 (Pygmies).	 In	 Ankole	 the	 “political	 elite	 was	
drawn	almost	exclusively	 from	 the	Bahima	segment	of	 the	population,	whereas	 the	
Bairu	stood	largely	outside	direct	political	 involvements	 in	the	state	system	and	in	a	
variety	 of	 areas	 enjoyed	 lesser	 rights	 and	 privileges	 in	 their	 contacts	 with	 the	
Bahima,”	and	intermarriage	between	the	two	groups	was	extremely	limited.		
The	strong	ethnic	identities	and	class	relations	between	Hima	and	Iru	was	not	only	reportedly	
important	 to	 my	 informants	 in	 that	 region,	 but	 is	 also	 crucial	 for	 national	 and	 regional	
politics.	 In	 fact,	 president	 Museveni	 belongs	 to	 the	 Hima	 ethnic	 group	 and	 has	 allegedly	
favoured	 Nkore	 (and	 Hima	 people	 in	 particular)	 in	 the	 allocation	 of	 political,	 military	 and	
economic	 positions	 of	 power.	 Moreover,	 the	 south-western	 region	 of	 Uganda	 has	
experienced	a	 faster	development	 in	 infrastructures	and	welfare	 than	other	 regions	of	 the	
country.	From	a	regional	perspective	on	the	history	power	redistribution	and	conflicts	in	the	
Great	 Lakes	 region,	 Museveni	 developed	 important	 alliances	 around	 his	 belonging	 to	 the	
Hima	ethnic	 group.	 Particularly	 strong	were	 the	political	 and	military	 ties	with	 fellow-hima	
presidents	 Kagame	 (Rwanda)	 and	 Buyoya	 (former	 president	 of	 Burundi).	 As	 Lemarchand	
(2001,	p.	89)	maintains:		
This	mutual	dependence	is	also	true	of	Buyoya	in	Burundi,	whose	fortunes	are	linked	
to	those	of	his	neighbours	to	the	west	and	the	north.	Even	more	important	in	creating	
strong	solidarity	among	Kagame,	Buyoya,	and	Museveni	is	their	sense	of	belonging	to	
the	 same	 embattled	 minority	 subculture,	 to	 the	 same	 pastoralist	 interlacustrine	
diaspora.	 Whether	 Tutsi	 (Kagame),	 Tutsi-Hima	 (Buyoya),	 or	 Hima-Munyankole	
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(Museveni),	 they	 share	 the	 same	 cultural	 self-awareness	 and	 therefore	 see	
themselves	 as	 the	 spokesmen	 of	 threatened	minorities.	 Deeply	 distrustful	 of	 what	
they	see	as	the	tyranny	of	the	majority	implicit	in	Western	forms	of	democracy,	they	
regard	as	their	first	obligation	to	ensure	the	survival	of	their	respective	communities.		
Because	of	the	politically	and	culturally	loaded	dimension	of	ethnic	identification	in	this	area,	
I	have	selected	the	field	sites	in	a	way	that	would	account	for	diversity	and	ethnic	balance.	In	
fact,	 fieldwork	 in	 this	 sub-region	has	 required	me	 to	 travel	 the	most	 –	 compared	 to	other	
regions.		
I	 have	 interviewed	 young	 farmers	 engaged	 in	 the	 YLP	 in	 Sheema;	 youths	 working	
independently	of	any	development	scheme	(control	group)	 in	Sheema	and	Bushenyi.	As	for	
the	 youths	 engaged	 in	 a	 private-sector	 driven	 programme,	 I	 focused	 on	 the	Dutch-funded	
TIDE	 project	 in	 dairy,	 implemented	 by	 a	Dutch	NGO,	 SNV.	 I	met	 these	 youths	 in	Mbarara,	
Khasaka,	Kyakabonga,	Ntungamo	and	Sanga	
	
	
FIGURE	 12.	 MAP	 OF	 FIELD	 SITES	 IN	 SOUTH-WEST:	 MBARARA,	 NTUNGAMO,	 SANGA,	 BUSHENYI,	 KIRUHURA	
(IBANDA).	SOURCE:	GOOGLE	MAPS		
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3.6	QUALITATIVE	ANALYSIS	AND	REPRESENTING	THE	DATA	
After	having	collected	all	the	ethnographic	data,	begins	the	phase	of	the	analysis	and	written	
representation	of	data.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 account	 for	 the	ethnographic	 analytical	methods	 I	
have	used.	According	to	Geertz	 (1973,	p.	11)	“[d]oing	ethnography	 is	 like	 trying	to	read	 (in	
the	 sense	 of	 “construct	 a	 reading	 of”)	 a	 manuscript	 –	 foreign,	 faded,	 full	 of	 ellipses,	
incoherencies,	 suspicious	 emendations,	 and	 tendentious	 commentaries,	 but	written	 not	 in	
conventionalized	graphs	of	sound	but	in	transient	examples	of	shaped	behaviour.”	I	took	this	
interpretative	approach	 to	 the	analysis	of	 the	 interviews	and	observations	 I	 collected,	with	
the	 purpose	 of	 writing	 an	 ethnographic	 ‘thick	 description’	 of	 the	 narratives	 and	 practices	
around	youth	 in	agribusiness.	Again,	Geertz	has	been	 illuminating	on	 the	methods	 to	carry	
out	and	ethnography	and	make	sense	of	the	empirical	data,	which	alone	is	dull	of	the	socio-
cultural	 meanings	 encrypted.	 Fisher	 (2003,	 p.	 150	 )	 reports	 famous	 example	 from	 his	
ethnography	of	village	life	in	Bali,	serves	the	purpose	of	explaining	the	value	of	the	method:	
Geertz's	 most	 famous	 example	 of	 thick	 description	 concerns	 cock-fighting	 in	 a	
Balinese	 village.	 While	 it	 would	 appear	 that	 only	 the	 cocks	 are	 fighting,	 they	 are	
discovered	in	fact	to	be	fighting	because	the	men	are	fighting.	Geertz	(1983)	sets	his	
detailed	 description	 of	 the	 strange	 features	 of	 cock-fighting	 against	 the	 holistic	
background	 of	 Balinese	 culture,	 including	 its	 understanding	 of	 social	 relations,	
traditional	 beliefs,	 and	 religious	 practices.	 Placing	 his	 contextual	 interpretation	 in	
ever-widening	concentric	circles,	he	reveals	the	'common	world'	in	which	the	practice	
of	cock-fight	betting	makes	sense	to	its	participants.	 In	the	end,	what	appears	to	be	
an	economically	 irrational	game	of	betting	for	financial	gain	is	disclosed	to	be	about	
social	structure	and	status	relations	in	the	village	community.		
Through	 the	 elaboration	 of	 thick	 descriptions	 of	 the	 narratives	 and	 practices	 of	 both	
development	practitioners	and	youths,	I	have	attempted	an	interpretative	explanation	of	the	
way	 in	which	this	development	 trend	 is	being	constructed,	and	what	 its	consequences	are.	
Based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 interviews,	 informal	 conversations,	 stories	 I	 have	 heard	 and	
practices	I	observed,	I	identified	the	main	narratives	of	the	two	groups	of	social	actors.		
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The	main	 task	 in	 the	 narrative	 analysis	 of	 the	 interviews	 is	 coding	 (Fischer,	 2003,	 p.	 173),	
which	is	defined	as:	“the	process	by	which	segments	of	data	are	identified	as	relating	to,	or	
being	 an	example	of,	 a	more	 general	 idea,	 instance,	 theme	or	 category.	 Segments	of	 data	
from	across	the	whole	dataset	are	placed	together	in	order	to	be	retrieved	together	at	a	later	
stage.”		(Lewins	and	Silver	2007,	p.	81	in	Boeije,	2010,	p.	95).	This	process	of	segmenting	and	
coding	data	is	a	lengthy	process	that	requires	a	lot	of	going	back	and	forth	through	the	data.	
Thanks	to	the	qualitative	analysis	programme	Atlas.ti,	 I	could	carry	out	this	task	digitally	on	
my	laptop.	This	computer	programme	helps	to	locate,	code	and	annotate	findings	on	primary	
data,	and	also	to	systematically	group	and	compare	fragments	through	the	codes,	which	are	
manually	attributed	by	the	researcher.	This	process	allows	me	to	identify	trends	and	themes,	
and	 eventually	 through	 systematic	 comparison	 the	 narratives	 and	 meta-narratives	 across	
interviews.		
	
3.7	ETHNOGRAPHIC	PITFALLS	AND	MY	POSITION	AS	RESEARCHER	 	
With	 ethnographic	 research,	 a	 concern	 for	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 study	 generally	 rises	 (Smit,	
2017,	p.	55),	particularly	with	regard	to	the	biases	of	the	researcher,	who	is	her/himself	the	
instrument	 of	 the	 study.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 will	 examine	 my	 position	 as	 white,	 female	
researcher	in	the	field	of	agribusiness	development	in	the	paragraphs	below.	Reflexivity	is	in	
fact	 the	best	antidote	 to	 flaws	 in	my	 research	 that	are	 related	 to	my	very	presence	 in	 the	
field.	 While	 reflexivity	 allows	 the	 researcher	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 flaws,	 it	 does	 not	
eliminate	 them	 (Salzman,	 2002,	 p.	 807).	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 account	 for	 the	
position	 of	 the	 researcher	 in	 the	 field.	 Rosaldo	 (2000,	 p.	 533	 in	 Salzman,	 2002,	 p.	 807)	
elaborates	on	the	researcher’s	reflexivity	on	her/his	position:		
The	ethnographer,	as	a	positioned	subject,	grasps	certain	human	phenomena	better	
than	others.	He	or	she	occupies	a	position	or	structural	location	and	observes	with	a	
particular	angle	of	vision.	Consider,	for	example,	how	age,	gender,	being	an	outsider,	
and	association	with	a	neo-colonial	 regime	 influence	what	 the	ethnographer	 learns.	
The	 notion	 of	 position	 also	 refers	 to	 how	 life	 experiences	 both	 enable	 and	 inhibit	
particular	kinds	of	insight.		
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Within	 this	 understanding	 of	 the	 position	 of	 the	 researcher,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 any	
observer	or	commentator	(also	in	other	scientific	fields)	 is	positioned.	“Claims	of	objectivity	
and	 truth	 are	 really	 just	 claims	 of	 power”	 (2002,	 p.	 807)	 continues	 Salzman.	 Therefore,	
reflexivity	helps	to	overcome	the	flaws	brought	along	by	the	researcher’s	position	in	the	field.	
Moreover,	 the	prolonged	 interaction	with	 the	 field	 allows	 the	ethnographer	 to	develop	an	
empathic	understanding	of	the	informants	and	their	socio-cultural	environment.			
Another	concern	is	my	position	as	an	independent	researcher	in	the	field.	I	have	carried	out	
fieldwork	 in	 Uganda	 in	 collaboration	with	 and	 supported	 by	 the	 International	 Institute	 for	
Tropical	Agriculture	(IITA).	This	institute,	which	is	50	years	old,	is	pioneer	in	the	researching	
the	 role	 of	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 and	 has	 recently	 been	 appointed	 by	 the	 African	
Development	 Bank	 (AfDB)	 to	 lead	 a	 consistent	 development	 programme	 on	 youth	 in	
agribusiness54.	 They	 offered	 logistical	 support	 (use	 of	 their	 office	 and	 accommodation	
facilities,	 support	 in	 visa	 application,	 facilitating	 access	 to	 their	 network	 of	 experts	 and	
practitioners)	 and	 supervision	 in	 the	 field.	 My	 collaboration	 with	 this	 institute	 has	 been	
initiated	in	summer	2016	as	I	visited	their	offices	in	Kampala	and	Kigali.	Subsequently,	I	have	
relied	on	IITA’s	support	during	field	trips	to	Uganda	in	2017	and	2018.	I	have	been	attached	
to	the	institute	as	a	‘graduate	research	fellow’,	holding	a	position	as	independent	researcher.	
While	their	views	and	aspirations	within	the	development	trend	around	youth	in	agribusiness	
may	have	 influenced	my	approach,	my	continued	relation	with	supervisors	at	Radboud	and	
Bologna	secured	the	impartiality	of	my	position	as	researcher.			
	
3.7.1	A	white	lady	in	the	(agricultural)	field:	“Mzungu!	Mzungu!”	
An	inevitable	yet	crucial	factor	in	the	process	of	fieldwork	research	has	been	the	white	colour	
of	my	skin,	in	a	context	where	the	wide	majority	of	white	people	in	Uganda	are	development	
practitioners.	 Furthermore,	 regardless	 of	 the	 actual	 income,	 all	 white	 people	 are,	 in	 my	
experience,	considered	to	belong	to	a	higher	socio-economic	class.	For	both	male	and	female	
whites,	 Ugandans	 throughout	 the	 country	 use	 the	 Bantu	 word	 ‘mzungu’,	 which	 literally	
																																																						
54‘ENABLE	youth	programme’,	info	accessed	on	25/10/2016	on:	http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-
events/article/innovative-programme-to-improve-employment-and-income-outcomes-for-young-
people-14217/	
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means	 “someone	who	 roams”,	 or	 “someone	who	 is	 far	 from	home	 and	 lost	 his/her	way”.	
Interestingly,	 this	 term	 which	 originally	 did	 not	 have	 any	 racial	 connotation,	 is	 nowadays	
mainly	 used	 for	 white	 people,	 or	 rich	 blacks	 who	 have	 lived	 abroad	 –	 regardless	 of	 their	
nationality.		
From	the	fieldnotes	of	22	may	2017,	while	on	the	fieldtrip	to	the	South-West	region,	a	first	
impression	at	the	arrival	is	revealing:		
We	meet	many	people,	as	soon	as	we	arrive	at	Rose’s	home	[the	mother	of	Joyce,	the	
interpreter]:	 everybody	 wants	 to	meet	 Joyce	 and	 the	 babies,	 as	much	 as	 they	 are	
curious	to	meet	the	mzungu.	There	is	so	much	fuzz	around	my	presence,	that	I	almost	
feel	uncomfortable.	(…)	We	go	and	visit	the	nearby	church,	where	a	group	of	women	
is	cooking	at	the	reverend’s	house.	(…)	The	ladies	react	very	surprised	by	the	visit	of	a	
mzungu.	They	all	want	to	greet	me	and	shake	hands,	they	are	very	friendly	and	all	ask	
me	‘how	are	you	mzungu?’	which	is	the	only	English	words	they	know.	It	is	as	funny	as	
embarrassing	for	me,	because	besides	being	white,	I	have	no	right	to	be	there	inside	
the	 house	 of	 the	 revered,	 taking	 the	 seats	 of	 honour	 (while	 the	majority	 is	 sitting	
outside	on	whatever	seat).		
A	few	days	later,	on	the	same	trip,	my	fieldnotes	reveal	how	uncomfortable	I	was	feeling	in	
my	skin:	“Joyce	is	really	doing	her	best	to	make	my	stay	as	easy	and	pleasant	as	possible,	as	
much	as	mama	Rose	is	the	sweetest	host	I	could	hope	for.	I	never	feel	alone,	even	though	it	
becomes	clearer	by	the	day	that	I	do	not	belong	here:	the	recurrent	theme	in	my	days	is	the	
colour	of	my	skin	–	mzungu!”	
Also	during	fieldtrips	to	the	north	and	east	I	had	experienced	this	type	of	“discrimination”	–	
but	 the	 scarce	 presence	 of	 development	 programmes	 in	 the	 South-West	 region	 (which	 is	
more	developed	than	other	parts	of	the	country)	also	contribute	to	making	the	presence	of	
white	people	more	of	an	exception.		
Moreover,	 it	 also	 must	 be	 mentioned	 that	 being	 perceived	 a	 ‘mzungu’	 also	 might	 have	
mislead	 some	 of	 my	 informants.	 In	 fact,	 since	 the	 majority	 of	 whites	 in	 Uganda	 work	 in	
development,	 they	 are	 often	 associated	 with	 profitable	 opportunities.	 Particularly	 in	 the	
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north	 where	 the	 population	 has	 experienced	 humanitarian	 aid	 after	 the	 war,	 I	 have	
encountered	an	attitude	of	entitlement	to	(monetary)	help.		
Within	the	context	of	anthropology	of	development,	I	thus	feel	in	line	with	the	arguments	of	
Mosse	(2005,	p.	243):		
The	 ground	 of	 anthropological	 practice	 has	 changed	 fundamentally	 in	 the	 past	 two	
decades.	 The	 fact	 that	 anthropologists	 are	 no	 longer	 justified	 as	 value-free	 and	
objective	 observers,	 the	 source	 of	 politically	 neutral	 and	 authoritative	 scientific	
knowledge	places	anthropology	back	within	historical	 relations	of	power.	 In	 relation	
to	 international	 development	 this	 provides	 opportunities,	 if	 not	 obligations,	 for	
engagement	and	self-critical	reflection,	for	hope	and	critical	understanding	–	neither	
of	 which	 is	 possible	 without	 close	 encounters	 with	 the	 administrative	 politics	 of	
development	practice.		
In	 fact,	 my	 position	 in	 the	 field	 has	 been	 influenced	 by	 the	 social	 and	 historical	 role	 of	
‘benefactor’	that	whites	have	played	in	my	informants’	lives,	despite	the	efforts	I	have	made	
during	each	interview	to	clarify	I	was	an	independent	researcher.	Being	aware	of	the	way	in	
which	 I	 might	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 white	 researcher,	 I	 remained	 reflexive	 of	 the	 position	 of	
power	in	which	I	found	myself.	 I	exercised	reflexivity	in	three	ways.	First,	 I	punctually	asked	
my	translators	to	explain	to	the	informants	that	I	was	a	student	and	was	not	in	any	position	
to	 financially	 help	 them.	 I	 took	 considerable	 time,	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 my	 interviews,	 to	
contextualise	 and	 explain	 the	 scientific	 purposes	 of	 my	 research.	 Second,	 the	 translator	
her/himself	helped	me	to	discern	those	statements,	during	interviews,	that	were	conditioned	
by	a	bias	towards	me	as	a	(powerful,	external)	white	lady.	Third,	and	more	importantly,	in	the	
process	 of	 analysis	 and	 writing,	 I	 discerned	 the	 biased	 and	 unbiased	 narratives	 of	 my	
informants,	to	retain	only	those	which	were	not	too	influenced	by	my	position	of	power.		
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55	The	term	‘aidnography’	is	drawn	from	Mosse	2013	–	I	don’t	claim	any	intellectual	property	or	
originality	on	this	term.	
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4.1	INTRODUCTION	
“The	first	issue	to	be	raised,	perhaps,	is	that	the	present	study	is	an	anthropological	one.	
Unlike	many	anthropological	works	on	“development”,	this	one	takes	as	its	primary	object	
not	the	people	to	be	“developed”,	but	the	apparatus	that	is	to	do	the	“developing”.	This	is	
not	principally	a	book	about	the	Basotho	people,	or	even	about	Lesotho;	it	is	principally	a	
book	about	the	operation	of	the	international	“development”	apparatus	in	a	particular	
setting”	(Ferguson,	1994,	p.	17)	
	
This	 chapter	 aims	 at	 answering	 the	 first	 research	 question	 of	 this	 study,	 namely:	 how	 are	
development	organizations	adopting	youth	in	agribusiness	strategies	in	Uganda?	The	chapter	
presents	the	analysis	of	ethnographic	fieldwork	conducted	among	development	practitioners	
in	Kampala.	In	this	chapter	I	will	pay	particular	attention	to	the	narratives	emerging	from	the	
interviews	 I	 conducted	 with	 development	 practitioners,	 leaving	 the	 observations	 of	
development	 practices	 for	 chapter	 6.	 This	 narrative	 approach	will	 be	 particularly	 useful	 to	
elaborate	an	explenation	to	the	‘how’	of	the	research	question	leading	this	chapter.		
All	of	my	 informants	were	 involved	 in	promoting	youth	engagement	 in	agribusienss,	within	
Ugandan	and	international	development	agencies.	In	this	chapter,	I	elaborate	an	aidnography	
–	 namely	 an	 examination	 and	 deconstruction	 of	 the	 narratives	 that	 are	 produced	 and	
reproduce	the	development	discourse.	I	analyse	such	system	of	knowledge	(the	development	
discourse),	 in	 the	 effort	 of	 investigating	 how	 “the	 delineation	 of	 [development]	 emerges	
from,	and	produces,	particular	historical	circumstances,	particular	cultural	logics,	and	finally,	
particular	subjectivities”	(Curtis	&	Spencer	2012,	p.	179	in		(Mosse,	2013,	p.	230).	The	goal	of	
an	 aidnography	 is	 to	 offer	 a	 critical	 reflection	 on	 the	 elaboration	 and	 implementation	 of	
development	policies	and	programmes.	Development	cooperation	is	far	from	just	a	neutral,	
a-political	philanthropic	hurl	to	make	the	world	a	better	place:	it	has	its	interests	and	politics,	
and	is	very	much	contingent	to	its	socio-historical	context	(Ferguson,	2014)	(Escobar,	2012)	
(Scott	 J.	 ,	1998)	 (Mosse,	2011).	An	analysis	of	how	the	development	discourse	evolved	can	
shed	light	on	the	politics	driving	one	strategy	rather	than	another.		
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The	 chapter	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 In	 section	 4.2	 I	 briefly	 introduce	 the	 research	 and	
analytical	methods	I	have	used	to	collect	the	data	for	this	aidnography.	In	section	4.3	I	start	
the	 empirical	 analysis	 by	 introducing	 the	 way	 in	 which	 development	 change	 is	 being	
conceptualized	by	the	development	practitioners	I	interviewed	in	Kampala.	Subsequently,	in	
section	4.4,	I	describe	the	analytical	tool	of	the	theory	of	change,	namely	a	structure	of	three	
steps	 (development	 problem,	 vision	 and	 pathway	 to	 change)	 which	 I	 will	 use	 to	 analyse	
practitioners’	narratives.	 In	section	4.5	 I	delve	 into	the	discourse	analysis	of	the	theories	of	
change	 of	 development	 practitioeners,	 step	 by	 step.	 I	 outline	 the	 narratives	 adopted	 by	
development	practitioners		in	conceptualizing	the	development	problem,	the	ideal	outcome	
they	 envision,	 and	 the	 implementation	 strategy	 to	 operationalize	 their	 vision	 for	 change.	
Moreover,	 I	 comparatively	 analyze	 the	 theories	 of	 change	 of	 Ugandan	 and	 international	
development	organizations.	 In	 sub-section	4.5.4,	 I	 describe	how	development	practitioners	
aim	to	target	youths	as	object	of	 their	development	programmes.	 In	section	4.6,	 	 I	analyze	
the	different	development	approaches	that	emerge	from	the	theory	of	change,	showing	how	
Ugandan	 an	 international	 organisations	 have	 a	 tendency	 towards	 public	 or	 private-sector	
driven	 strategies.	 In	 section	 (4.7),	 I	 confront	 the	 theories	 of	 change	 and	 approaches	 that	
emerged	 from	 the	 interviews	 with	 development	 practitioners,	 with	 those	 emerging	 from	
policy	papers.	I	hereby	validate	or	problematize	the	discrepancies	between	oral	and	written	
perspectives	 on	 development	 for	 youths	 in	 agribusiness.	 I	 conclude	 (section	 4.8)	 by	
summarising	 and	 discussing	 the	 conclusions	 of	 the	 aidnography.	 I	 argue	 that	 there	 are	
heterogeneous	 approaches	 to	 development	 and	 tensions	 within	 the	 proposed	 goals	 and	
strategies	 to	 achieve	 them.	 In	 particular,	 I	 confront	 the	 approaches	 of	 national	 and	
international	views	to	the	same	‘development	problem’.	
	
4.2	RESEARCH	AND	ANALYTICAL	METHODS		
In	my	analysis	of	how	the	policy	discourses	frame	the	development	problems	affecting	youth	
in	agribusiness,	I	have	adopted	an	inductive	method	of	analysis	(Boeije,	Analysis	in	Qualitative	
Research,	 2010)	 (Beuving	 &	 De	 Vries,	 2015).	 I	 approached	 the	 study	 of	 the	 development	
narratives	by	analysing	of	 the	semi-structured	 interviews	 I	conducted	with	24	development	
practitioners	from	17	development	organizations	based	in	Kampala,	all	engaged	in	supporting	
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youths’	 engagement	 in	 agribusiness.	 I	 carried	 out	 these	 interviews	 during	 two	 months	 of	
fieldwork	in	Kampala,	in	2017.	Table	7	below	provides	a	list	of	the	17	organisations56	where	I	
conducted	the	interviews:		
Type	of	development	agency	 Development	agencies	
International	 Multilateral	development	
cooperation	
	
1. Food	and	Agriculture	
Organization			
2. African	Development	Bank	
Bilateral	development	
cooperation	
	
3. Embassy	of	the	Kingdom	
of	the	Netherlands	
4. USAID	-	Feed	the	Future,	
commodity	production	
and	marketing	(CPM)	&	
Youth	Leadership	in	
Agriculture	Activity	(YLA)	
5. AgriProFocus	
(agripreneurs	network	and	
agribusiness	facilitator)	
Non-governmental	
organizations		
6. AVSI	(Italian	NGO	
implementing	the	Dutch-
funded	SKY	programme)	
7. ICCO	(Dutch	NGO)	
8. ZOA	(Dutch	NGO)	
Private	sector		
	
9. MasterCard	Foundation	–	
DYNAMIC	project	
10. Triodos	Bank	–	BRAC	
programme	
National	 Grassroots	organizations,	
public	and	private	
	
11. AKORION	(services	and	
marketing	provision	
company)	
12. Young	Farmers	Coalition	
of	Uganda	(farmers’	
network)	
13. Young	Farmers	Champions	
Network	(farmers’	
network)	
14. CURAD	(incubation	centre)	
Public	sector		 15. Makerere	University	
Kampala		
																																																						
56	In	the	following,	I	use	development	‘organizations’	and	‘agencies’	interchangeably,	as	much	as	I	
refer	to	development	actors,	informants	and	respondents	as	synonymous.	
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	 16. Ugandan	Ministry	of	
Agriculture,	Animal	
Industries	and	Fisheries	
17. Ugandan	Ministry	of	
Gender,	Labor	and	Social	
Development	
TABLE	7.	DEVELOPMENT	ORGANISATIONS	WHERE	I	CONDUCTED	INTERVIEWS.	
Importantly,	the	individual	interviews	are	in	my	analysis	assumed	to	be	representative	for	the	
views	of	development	organization	the	respondent	was	affiliated	to	–	unless	expressly	stated	
to	be	a	personal	view.	I	was	able	to	assume	the	representativeness	of	the	respondents’	views	
for	 their	 organizations’	 because	 during	 the	 interviews	 I	 prompted	 the	 development	
practitioners	 to	 elaborate,	 in	 their	 answers,	 on	 the	 views	 of	 their	 agency.	 As	 much	 as	
possible,	 I	 cross-checked	 the	 organisational	 positions	 elaborated	 by	 the	 interviewees	 with	
relevant	policy	documents	from	these	institutions	(see	section	4.7).		
I	explored	the	conceptualizations,	definitions	and	ambitions	of	the	development	practitioners		
I	interviewed	with	the	understanding	that	“if	people	define	a	situation	as	real,	it	is	real	in	its	
consequences”	(Thomas	1928	in		(Boeije,	2010,	p.	13).	The	development	discourse	is	not	only	
a	 matter	 of	 knowledge	 production	 withinin	 the	 development	 world,	 but	 a	 knowledge	
production	that	has	specific	influences	in	the	historical	circumstances	it	is	embededd	in.	
Development	narratives	also	have	the	 function	of	mobilising	support.	 In	 fact,	Rap	 (2006,	p.	
1303)	continues:		
(…)	 particular	 stories,	 called	 policy	 narratives,	 are	 influential	 in	 informing	 policy-
making.	 They	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 force	 in	 themselves	 and	 do	 not	 change	 even	
when	 they	 are	 confronted	with	 ‘contradicting	 empirical	 data’,	 as	 ‘they	 continue	 to	
underwrite	 and	 stabilize	 the	 assumptions’	 for	 policy-making	 ‘in	 the	 face	 of	 high	
uncertainty,	 complexity,	and	polarization’	 (Roe,	1994:	2;	Fairhead	and	Leach,	1995).	
Other	related	analytical	approaches	study	policy	as	argumentation	or	as	a	discourse:	
‘an	 ensemble	 of	 ideas,	 concepts	 and	 categories	 through	which	meaning	 is	 given	 to	
phenomena’.	 They	 illustrate	 how	 ‘policy	 discourses	 frame	 certain	 problems’,	
distinguishing	 ‘some	 aspects	 of	 a	 situation	 rather	 than	 others’	 (Hajer,	 1993,	 in	
Apthorpe	and	Gasper,	1996:	2).		
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I	first	carried	out	open-coding	of	the	transcribed	24	interviews	with	the	development	actors,	
in	 Atlas.ti.	 I	 then	 extrapolated	 the	 themes	 which	 were	most	 representative	 of	 the	 actors’	
views	on	 the	 issues	around	youth	and	agribusiness.	 These	 themes,	which	are	not	mutually	
exclusive,	 contain	 the	 actors’	 understandings	 on	 the	 development	 trend	 they	 are	 principal	
practitioners	 in	 shaping,	 through	 their	 discourses,	 in	 Aidland	 (Mosse,	 2011).	 At	 the	 same	
time,	 these	 themes	 are	 also	my	 abstraction	 and	meta-analytical	 conceptualization	 of	 their	
narratives.	
	
4.3	DEVELOPMENT	CHANGE	–	EMIC	VIEWS	
In	 this	 section,	 I	 introduce	 the	 development	 sector	 in	 Kampala	 and	 the	 development	
practitioners	I	have	interviewed	by	presenting	their	views	on	what	they	see	to	be	necessary	
for	 youth	 to	 engage	 in	 agribusiness.	 Through	my	 anthropological	 analysis	 of	 development	
discourse	around	youth	and	agribusiness,	I	aim	to	shed	light	on	the	narrative	of	progress	that	
emerges	from	my	interviews	with	the	development	practitioners	I	interviewed	in	Kampala.		
For	 example,	when	 envisioning	 a	 future	 for	 the	Ugandan	 agricultural	 sector,	 an	 informant	
from	the	African	Development	Bank57	noted:			
[…W]e	know	that	the	aged	population	will	wear	out.	What	do	we	do?	…[R]emember	
that	no	country	becomes	self-sufficient	in	food	production	by	turning	all	its	youths,	or	
its	nationals	into	farmers.	In	America,	how	many	percentage	of	the	people	population	
are	 involved	 in	agriculture?	 In	 Italy,	 in	other	parts	of	Europe,	what	 is	 the	percent	of	
the	people	that	are	involved	in	agriculture?	But,	it	 is	also	interesting	to	know	that	in	
Africa,	a	lot	of	people	almost	up	to	60%	of	the	people	are	involved	in	agriculture.		
In	this	passage,	the	respondent	reveals	that	his	narrative	of	progress	leads	to	a	specific	type	
of	 modernity.	 A	 modernity	 that	 resembles	 the	 agricultural	 value	 chains	 of	 “developed”	
countries	(“like	where	you	come	from”).	She	continues:	
																																																						
57	At	the	African	Development	Bank	I	have	interviewed	three	development	practitioners		(in	the	same	
group	interview):	a	country	programme	officer,	a	senior	macroeconomist,	and	an	agricultural	and	
rural	development	expert.	I	will	not	specify,	for	each	quote,	who	of	the	three	respondents	said	it	as	to	
protect	their	identity.	This	interview	took	place	on	17/01/2017	
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Someone	who	 is	 doing	 agribusiness	 will	 need	 electricity,	 will	 need	 communication,	
will	 need	 to	 communicate	 to	 access	markets.	 So	 that	 kind	of	 needs…	 [will	 need	 to]	
package,	 add	 value:	 package,	 have	 designs	 and	 you	 know… Modern,	 it	 is	 modern	
agriculture.	 Actually,	 when	 you	 talk	 about	 modern	 agriculture,	 modernization	 of	
agriculture,	you	talk	about	mechanization,	value	addition,	processing,	packaging	and	
all	that.	So	you	look	at	aspect	of	kind	of	a	modern	style	of	farming. 	
This	description	of	what	modernity	entails	–	mechanization,	processing,	value	addition	etc.	–	
sketches	 a	 rather	 straightforward	 profile	 of	 what	 the	 desirable	 outcome	 of	 development	
efforts	can	be.		
The	 conceptualization	 of	 development	 in	 agriculture	 as	 a	 commercialization	 of	 the	 sector,	
with	 the	 required	modernization	and	 technology	adoption,	 is	well	explicated	by	one	of	 the	
directors	at	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	Animal	Industry	and	Fisheries,	whom	I	interviewed	in	
the	headquarters	in	Entebbe58:		
[W]e	want	to	guide	them	[the	youth]	to	look	at	agriculture	as	an	investment.	You	have	
to	get	money	and	invest.	(…)		Yes,	they	should	just	continue	or	even	[get?]	bigger	but	
also	now	put	fertilizers,	put	good	food,	even	seed,	can	you	put	some	mechanization	
or	can	you	may	be	do	some	supplementary	irrigation,	so	that	at	least	the	productivity	
goes	up.	We	are	trying	to	say,	can	you	please	do	it	better	so	that	the	yield	is	bigger,	
and	 your	 volume	 is	 higher?	 Can	 you	 invest?	 Can	 you	 buy	 seed?	 Can	 you	 buy	
fertilizers?	Can	you	may	be	like	hire	tractors	so	that	when	you	do	it	in	time,	and	you	
are	seen	to	be	doing	commercial	business?	Can	you	make	that	investment	profile	and	
see	what	 you	 are	 going	 to	produce?	Can	 you	be	 linked	 to	 a	market	 so	 that	 people	
don’t	come	to	your	farm	looking	for	 [agricultural	produce]?	May	be	can	you	 join	up	
with	some	other	people	doing	the	same	enterprise	in	the	area	and	have	a	warehouse	
or	 store	where	 you	 can	 put	 your	 grain,	 it	 is	 sorted,	 it	 is	 good	 quality	 then	 you	 can	
market?	 
The	 respondent	 makes	 a	 long	 list	 of	 the	 technical	 changes	 that	 are	 envisioned	 to	 be	
necessary	 for	 a	modern	 type	 of	 agriculture	 that	 is	 competitive	 on	 the	market.	 In	 fact,	 the	
																																																						
58	This	interview	took	place	on	27/01/2018	
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desirable	outcome	in	her	view	is	either	large-scale	or	intensive	production59,	which	with	the	
support	of	technologies	and	stronger	business	perspectives,	would	turn	subsistence	farming	
into	modern	agribusiness.		
Importantly,	 the	 turn	 towards	 this	 specific	 understanding	 of	 modernity	 is	 depicted	 as	 a	
choice:	 the	 civil	 servant	 asks	 the	 farmer	 to	 choose	 to	 become	 an	 agripreneur,	 and	 they	
respond	positively.	In	most	interviews,	respondents	mentioned	that	such	change	–	very	much	
a	 choice	 –	was	 a	matter	 of	mindset	 change60	.	 Participants	 in	 their	 development	 schemes	
were	asked	to	choose	to	be	more	entrepreneurial	and	“don’t	do	business	as	usual”,	wherein	
the	 usual	 business	 is	 subsistence	 agriculture	 and	 does	 not	 result	 in	 revenue.61	Particularly	
youth,	who	are	 (also)	 seen	as	 the	 future	of	 (commercial)	agriculture,	were	depicted	as	 the	
share	of	society	who	is	to	be	mentored	to	change	their	mind.	When	asked	what	investing	in	
youth	 in	Uganda	means,	 one	 respondent,	 for	 example,	 explained	 that	 it	meant	 inducing	 a	
mindset	 change.	 According	 to	 her,	 their	 role	 as	 development	 actors	 is	 mentoring	 and	
coaching	them	to	make	this	mental	shift.	In	her	words,	“They	were	used	to	begging,	now	they	
are	 turning	 to	 be	 self-sufficient.”.62	This	 respondent,	 who	 works	 for	 a	 large	 bilateral	
development	 organization,	 clearly	 envisions	 change	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 choice:	 from	 being	
dependent	 to	 being	 self-sufficient,	 which	 in	 agriculture	 translates	 from	 being	 subsistence	
farmers	to	becoming	agripreneurs.		
In	 her	 narratives,	 the	 missing	 link	 between	 the	 choice	 of	 changing	 one’s	 own	 mind	 and	
actually	enacting	 the	envisioned	outcome	 is	a	matter	of	a)	acquiring	 the	right	skills;	and	b)	
accessing	finance.	As	a	respondent	working	for	a	multilateral	donor	organization	explained:		
Those	who	are	 interested	 in	agricultural	production,	 they	can	go	 into	 it.	Those	who	
are	 interested	 in	 value	 addition,	 they	 can	 go	 into	 value	 addition.	 Those	 who	 are	
																																																						
59	Where	large-scale	refers	to	commercial	agriculture	on	a	large	plot	of	land	owned	by	one	
corporation	or	individual,	and	intensive	production	refers	to	a	higher	use	of	agricultural	inputs,	labor	
and	machinery	to	obtain	the	highest	yield	possible	also	from	a	limited	plot	of	land.	
60	Mind-set	change	was	explicitly	mentioned,	without	prompting	from	my	side,	in	the	majority	of	the	
interviews	with	all	development	actors,	as	I	will	describe	in	more	depth	in	section	4.c.	
61	See	section	on	Agriculture	in	the	previous	chapter	for	a	detailed	discussion	on	the	
conceptualization	of	agriculture.		
62	This	quote	is	extracted	from	the	transcript	of	one	of	the	interviews	I	carried	out	at	the	Kampala	
offices	of	USAID	–	the	respondent	is	to	remain	anonymous.		
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interested	 in	service	related	to	 the	agriculture	 in	 the	value	chain	can	also	go	 in	and	
that	 is	why	 the	programme	 is	mainly	 focusing	on	 capacity	building	 for	 the	 youth	 in	
terms	of	the	incubation,	changing	their	mindset	and	designing	projects	that	they	are	
interested	in	and	linking	them	to	financing.63	
The	mindset	 change	 described	 by	my	 informants	 in	 Kampala	 resonates	with	 the	 discourse	
recorded	by	Ferguson	in	Lesotho,	decennia	back:		
Achieving	“development”	is	thus	largely	a	matter	of	changing	values	and	attitudes,	of	
winning	over	individual	Sotho	hearts	and	minds.	In	its	extreme	forms,	“development”	
discourse	sometimes	even	speaks	as	if	the	problem	of	poverty	is	all	in	the	hear	–	as	if	
impoverished	villagers	could	escape	their	condition	by	a	simple	change	of	attitude	or	
intellectual	 conversion.	 The	 religious	 imagery	 suggested	 by	 the	 common	 self-
description	of	teams	of	“development”	experts	as	“missions”	is	thus	well	sustained	in	
their	search	for	“converts”.	(Ferguson,	1994,	p.	58)	
As	 described	 by	 Ferguson	 and	 explicitly	 stated	 by	 my	 respondent,	 this	 mindset	 change	 is	
attitudinal	and	the	role	of	development	practitioners	is	to	facilitate	this	change	by	mentoring	
and	 coaching	 the	 youth	 to	 adopt	 an	 entrepreneurial	 and	 business-oriented	 mindset.	 “To	
develop”	is	something	that	can	be	taught,	and	therefore	justifies	the	presence	and	activities	
of	development	practitioners	as	the	experts	and	mentors.		
Indeed,	 it	emerges	from	their	own	accounts,	that	development	practitioners	often	perceive	
themselves	to	have	a	mentoring	role.	As	highlighted	by	Ferguson	(2014),	in	the	development	
industry	 stakeholders	 take	 on	 the	 role	 of	 experts	 in	 a	 redeeming	 function	 that	 can	 “cure”	
poverty	by	operating	a	mind-set	change.	In	reference	to	youth’s	engagement	in	agribusiness	
and	their	presumed	impatience,	I	was	told	at	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	that:		
Most	youth	were	not	interested	in	that	[agribusiness],	so	we	are	looking	to	guide	our	
youth	 to	 think	 in	 terms	 of	 having	 positive	work	 ethics	 that	 you	must	work	 hard	 in	
order	to	benefit	and	you	must	be	patient	enough	in	order	to	attain	what	you	require	
so	this	 is	 just	a	matter	of	 like	sensitizing,	encouraging	them	and	motivating	them	to	
invest	more	 into	 the	 abilities	 that	 they	 have.	 Yeah,	 so	 that’s	 the	 thing	 that	we	 are	
																																																						
63	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	02/02/2017	
	 134	
looking	 at.	 Just	 continuous,	 even	 as	 you	 do	 your	 thing,	 you	 should	 know	 that	 you	
believe	in	yourself	that	you	can	achieve	it	and	it	will	take	you	longer	than	you	think.	
You	encourage	 them	 that	 you	 see	when	 it	 gets	harder,	 you	are	 about	 to	 reach	 the	
solution	so	you	don’t	give	up	when	you	see	things	are	getting	 tougher	so	 it’s	about	
talking	to	them	and	making	them	understand	that	things	are	possible	and	it’s	not	just	
about	having	something	beautiful.	64	
In	this	account,	it	is	suggested	that	by	being	patient,	motivated	and	believing	in	one-self	it	is	
possible	 to	 obtain	 successful	 results	 in	 agribusiness.	 While	 the	 mentioned	 attitudes	 and	
values	are	ascribed	to	a	“positive	work	ethic”,	the	role	of	the	development	practitioner	is	the	
messianic	one	of	a	mentor.	In	fact,	it	seems	that	the	opportunities	for	development	are	there	
to	be	grasped.	The	role	of	the	development	practitioner	is	to	simply	point	them	out	to	young	
inexpert	who	have	yet	to	figure	out	how	to	sustain	themselves	through	agriculture.	As	one	
respondent	told	me:		
[…T]here	are	so	many	opportunities	out	there	in	the	food	industry,	in	agriculture	and	
agribusiness	 where	 they	 [the	 youth]	 can	 sustain	 themselves	 and	 their	 lives	 and	 be	
able	to	make	it	big	actually	in	the	near	future	if	you	know	what	to	do.	So	for	us,	our	
role	is	to	help	them	you	know,	for	example	to	keep	the	records	and	track	their	inputs	
and	see	what	 they	get	out.	To	help	 them	do	marketing,	 for	example	good	markets,	
good	 prices.	 Help	 them	 to	 do	 good	 business	 plans,	 feasibility	 studies	 and	 business	
plans	so	that	they	able	to	know	that	if	I	want	to	go	into	beans	in	this	area,	in	this	area	I	
can	only	go	for	maize,	chicken	and	if	I	go	for	chicken,	what	type	of	chicken	and	if	am	
ready,	 where	 do	 I	 sell.	 So	 that’s	 where	 agribusiness	 is	 going	 to	 come	 in,	 to	 guide	
them65.				
Specific	skills	(accounting,	records-keeping,	market	knowledge)	can	be	taught	for	the	purpose	
of	 succeeding	 in	 the	 predefined	 objective	 identified	 as	 successful	 (“make	 it	 big”).	 In	 the	
previous	and	 following	 fragments,	by	 the	same	respondent,	 the	 religious	 imaginary	evoked	
by	Ferguson	(2014)	stand	out:		
																																																						
64	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	27/01/2017	
65	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	19/01/2017	at	a	large	bilateral	development	agency;	as	asked	by	
the	respondent,	I	cannot	refer	either	to	the	organisation	nor	to	his	identity.	
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Me:	Okay.	So	you	said	that	the	opportunities	are	there	and	your	role	is	to? 	
Respondent:	 Mentor,	 coach	 and	 mentor	 and	 transform	 them.	 Coach,	 mentor	 and	
transform	them. 	
Me:	What	do	you	mean	transform? 	
Respondent:	Transform	is	[for	example]	Maya,	don’t	tell	me	you	can’t	do	it.	Okay? 	
Me:	So	it’s	about	mindset. 	
Respondent:	Mindset.	And	actually,	investing	along	with	[for	example]	Maya	to	make	
sure	Maya	sees,	because	Maya	may	say	“oh	no	 it’s	not	possible”.	And	 I	 say	 “no	 it’s	
possible.	Where	is	the	risk?”-	“I	cannot	buy	that	thing	alone,	I	don’t	have	the	money”	
–	“I	cost	share	with	you,	pilot	this	scheme,	let	him	see	it.”	
	
In	this	passage	the	respondent	argues	that	successful	agribusiness	is	a	matter	of	choice	and	
belief.	 The	 role	 of	 the	 development	 actor,	 the	 respondent	 states,	 is	 that	 of	 shaping	 this	
mindset	 and	 making	 the	 youth	 believe	 (in	 his	 words:	 ‘transform’)	 the	 capabilities	 and	
business	values	he	himself	believes	to	be	the	right	ones	for	agribusiness.	Several	more	topics	
emerge	 from	 this	 account:	 as	 in	 the	 above	 fragments,	 opportunities	 to	 succeed	 in	
agribusiness	 are	 there	 but	 young	 people	 don’t	 see	 it,	 and	 it	 is	 for	 the	 development	
practitioners	 to	 play	 the	 role	 of	 mentoring,	 guiding	 and	 coach	 towards	 transformation.	
‘Development’	is	a	transformation	that	first	of	all	happens	in	the	minds	of	young	Ugandans,	
thanks	to	the	mentoring	role	of	development	practitioners.		
	
4.4 ANALYTICAL	FRAMEWORK	–	THEORY	OF	CHANGE	
In	order	 to	 systematise	 the	narratives	of	development	practitioners,	 I	needed	an	analytical	
tool	that	would	capture	their	views	on	youth	in	agribusiness,	and	would	allow	for	comparison	
among	organisations’	views.	I	have	elaborated	a	theory	of	change	on	the	basis	of	the	themes	
that	emerged	from	the	analysis	of	my	 interviews:	development	problem,	vision	for	change,	
and	pathway	to	change	(see	Figure	4.2).			
The	three	key	propositions	summarized	by	Bacchi	(2009,	p.	xxi)	for	theory	of	change	analysis	
are	three:		
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1. We	are	governed	through	problematizations.	
2. We	need	to	study	problematizations	(through	analysing	the	problem	representations	
they	contain),	rather	than	‘problems’.		
3. We	 need	 to	 problematize	 (interrogate)	 the	 problematizations	 on	 offer	 through	
scrutinizing	the	premises	and	effects	of	the	problem	representations	they	contain.”	
I	thus	elaborated	an	analytical	tool,	shaped	around	theory	of	change	(TOC),	which	I	have	used	
in	 the	analysis	of	 the	 semi-structured	 interviews	with	development	practitioners.	 This	 tool,	
which	 is	 conceptualized	 in	 the	 below	 figure	 (Figure	 13),	 has	 been	 used	 to	 screen	 the	
narratives	 in	 three	 different	 phases.	 These	 phases	 were	 not	 identified	 before	 I	 started	
conducting	interviews	with	development	actors,	but	emerged	in	the	inductive	analysis	of	the	
interviews,	 as	 major	 themes.	 Although	 the	 respondents	 never	 referred	 to	 the	 concept	 of	
TOC,	it	appeared	from	their	narratives	that	they	were	relying	on	an	implicit	idea	(or	ideology)	
of	how	development	works	or	should	work.	I	am	aware	of	the	critical	scholarly	debate	around	
the	 linearity	 of	 development	 (Rap,	 2006)	 (Scott	 J.	 ,	 1998)	 (Mosse,	 2004),	 and	my	 analysis	
follows	 the	 linearity	 of	 TOC	 only	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 helps	 clarify	 the	 discourses	 of	 the	
development	actors.	As	Rap	(2006,	p.	1303)	argues:		
According	to	the	linear	or	instrumental	model,	all	policies	run	through	the	successive	
phases	 of	 problem	 identification,	 policy	 formulation,	 implementation,	 and	 impact	
evaluation	(Sutton,	1999;	Mosse,	2004).	(…)	As	the	political	decision	to	pursue	a	policy	
is	taken	as	a	given,	the	usual	concern	of	policy	analysts	is	how	to	implement	the	policy	
and	 how	 to	 realise	 institutional	 models	 in	 practice.	 Underlying	 this	 instrumental	
approach,	 (…)	 is	 a	 positivist	 epistemological	 framework	 (Stirrat,	 2001).	 This	 implies	
that	success	can	be	measured	with	a	coherent	set	of	policy	objectives	as	clear	criteria	
for	impartial	researchers	that	use	scientific	methods	and	universal	theories.	
In	this	chapter,	my	analysis	concerns	only	the	phases	of	problem	identification,	development	
programme	 formulation	 and	 envisioned	 implementation,	 in	 the	 search	 for	 particular	
meanings	(narratives)	and	underlying	structures	of	meaning	(grand	narratives).		
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FIGURE	13.	THE	THREE	PHASES	OF	THE	THEORY	OF	CHANGE	
Below,	 I	 outline	 the	 aspects	 I	 investigated	 with	 the	 theory	 of	 change	 I	 elaborated	 as	 my	
analytical	tool	for	the	discourse	analysis	of	my	interviews	with	development	actors.		
	
	The	 development	 problem	 entails	 the	 circumstances	 and	 social	 or	 institutional	 actors	
identified	as	development	problem:	
§ Problematization	of	issue:	problem	representation	
§ Areas	of	change:	which	sectors	need	to	be	tackled	
The	vision	for	change	entails	the	envisioned	development	outcome:	
§ Ideal	outcome:	what	 is	 the	goal	of	development	efforts?	how	 is	 the	 solution	 to	 the	
development	problem	envisioned?	What	are	the	role	models?	
The	 pathway	 to	 change	 entails	 the	 trajectory	 and	 necessary	 steps	 to	 concretize	 the	
development	goal:	
§ Strategy	 for	 change:	 which	 are	 the	 concrete	 implementation	 strategies	 and	
instruments?	
§ Targeting:	 who	 is	 the	 objective	 of	 development	 programmes	 and	 how	 are	
beneficiaries	conceptualized?	
Development	
problem
••problematization	of	
issue
••social	actors	
problematized
Vision	for	
Change
••ideal	outcome
Pathway	to	
change
••strategy for	
change
••targeting
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4.5	THEORIES	OF	CHANGE:	EMIC	VIEWS	
As	 Autesserre	 (2017,	 p.	 119)	 rightly	 puts	 it,	 “theories	 of	 change	 are	 not	 “theories”	 in	 the	
academic	understanding	of	the	term;	instead,	they	are	“explanations	of	how	and	why	a	set	of	
activities	 will	 achieve	 desired	 objectives	 (Lederach,	 Neufeldt,	 and	 Culbertson	 2007,	 25)”.	
Rather	 than	 explicitly	 relying	 on	 theories	 of	 change,	most	 development	 organisations	 and	
their	 programmes	 implicitly	 rely	 on	 assumptions	 of	 how	 their	 activities	will	 deliver	 desired	
outcomes.	In	fact,	theories	of	change	are	often	not	even	part	of	the	process	of	programme	
planning.	Assumptions	and	rationales	underpinning	policy	briefs,	programmes	and	projects	–	
or	even	the	organisations’	central	structures	–	can	be	deconstructed	to	dissect	their	 logical	
framework.	As	scholars	have	stressed	(Cameron	et	al	2015;	and	and	Brown	et	al	2015;	both	
in	 Autesserre,	 2017,	 p.	 120)	 the	 problems	with	 these	 underlying	 assumptions	 or	 (implicit)	
theories	of	change,	is	that	they	often	are	unrealistic,	simplistic	and/or	make	gigantic	leaps	in	
logic.	 As	 the	wide	 range	of	 examples	 in	 development	 failures	 shows,	 the	process	between	
programmes	elaboration	and	their	outcomes	is	not	self-evident	nor	linear,	and	often	results	
in	 unexpected	 outcomes	 or	 failure.	 A	 case	 in	 point	 is	 the	 example	 of	 mosquito	 nets	
distirbution	 for	malaria	prevention,	which	are	 instead	used	 for	 fishing,	 to	protect	 crops,	 to	
build	 chicken	 coops	 or	 even	 as	 wedding	 veil66.	 Assumptions	 play	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	
elaboration	 and	 implementation	 of	 development	 programmes,	 as	 they	 direct	 investment	
from	 a	 perceived	 development	 problem	 to	 an	 envisioned	 outcome	 through	 pathways	 that	
are	 often	 devious.	 Considering	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 development	 trend	 around	 youth	 in	
agribusiness	in	Uganda	is	relatively	new,	theories	of	change	were	not	yet	tested	at	the	time	
of	 my	 fieldwork	 research.	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 they	 were	 mostly	 implicit	 (in	 the	 form	 of	
assumptions)	in	the	narratives	of	development	practitioners	I	interviewed.		
My	use	of	theory	of	change	was	thus	explorative,	as	an	investigation	of	their	assumptions	and	
rationales.	The	theory	of	change	 (TOC)	 is	here	used	as	 framework	to	search	the	discourses	
and	 strategies	 of	 development	 actors.	 Below	 I	 outline	 the	 narratives	 and	 trends	 emerging	
from	my	interviews,	for	each	of	the	three	TOC	steps.		
																																																						
66 	Journal	 article	 from	 31/01/2018,	 from	 The	 Guardian,	 accessed	 on	 24/01/2019	 on:		
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/31/global-use-of-mosquito-nets-for-
fishing-endangering-humans-and-wildlife	
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4.5.1	THE	DEVELOPMENT	PROBLEM	
So	many	people	 around	here	 [are]	 talking	 about	 the	 youth	 climate	 change	 and	 the	
youth	agriculture	and	the	youth,	education	and	the	youth	so	the	youth	has	now	come	
so	much	top	of	the	agenda	of	many	disciplines	so	meaning	that	the	government	has	
now	 realized	 that	 the	 issues	 of	 the	 youth	 is	 becoming	 a	 big	 challenge.	 And	 it	
happened	 also	 during	 the	 campaigns,	 last	 year;	 the	presidential	 campaigns	 and	 the	
MPs.	Most	of	the	people	who	were	being	arrested	because	of	misbehaviour	and	the	
like,	were	the	youth.	Most	of	the	people,	who	were	fighting	and	doing	this	and	this,	
were	the	youth.	So	am	sure	the	president	would	advise	we	need	to	do	something	for	
the	youth	otherwise	it’s	going	to	be	a	time	bomb.	This	is	a	time	bomb	which	is	going	
to	 be	 really	 a	 big	 challenge	 to	 us.	 So	 right	 now	many	 of	 them	 are	 going	 into	 that	
approach.	67 
The	considerations	of	 this	 respondent—a	professor	at	 the	Makerere	College	of	Agricultural	
and	Environmental	Sciences,	collaborating	with	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	in	the	elaboration	
of	 the	new	Strategy	 for	 Youth	—summarize	 some	of	 the	 common	 concerns	 shared	by	 the	
development	practitioners	I	have	interviewed.	He	himself	was,	at	the	time	of	the	interview,	
involved	 in	 the	 development	 of	 a	 development	 Strategy	 for	 Youth	 for	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture,	 Animal	 Industry	 and	 Fisheries	 (MAAIF).	 Besides	 the	 specific	 challenges	 which,	
according	 to	 him,	 youths	 in	 Uganda	 are	 facing	 (climate	 change,	 agriculture	
commercialization,	education),	he	mentioned	political	concerns	regarding	the	topic	of	youth	
in	 agribusiness.	 He	 stresses	 the	 increasing	 attention	 that	 this	 issue	 is	 receiving	 in	 the	
(inter)national	development	efforts	–	a	strengthened	focus	on	the	issue	that	conceptualizes	it	
as	 a	 development	 problem.	 Through	 discourse	 analysis,	 in	 the	 following	 section,	 I	 aim	 to	
analyse	the	conceptualization	of	youth	and/in	agribusiness	as	a	development	problem.			
Firstly,	 I	 clustered	 the	 spontaneous	 and	 variegated	 answers	 of	 my	 respondents	 into	 five	
categories	(Table	1):	these	categories	emerged	from	the	qualitative	analysis	(open	coding	in	
Atlas.ti)	of	the	semi-structured	interviews.	
	
																																																						
67	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	25/01/2017	
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Unemployment		 Food	security		 Demography	 Stability	 Other	
Formal	
unemployment	and	
under-
employment,	here	
referring	to	youth:	
this	category	
comprises	different	
understandings	and	
forms	of	shortage	
or	inadequacy	of	
absorption	of	the	
workforce	in	the	
labour	market;	
competences	or	
skills	mismatch	(e.g.	
educated	youth	
doing	unskilled	
work).	It	is	a	
category	that	hides	
the	fundamental	
truth	that	the	
majority	of	
unemployed	is	
indeed	engaged	in	
agricultural	
activities	(though	
often	unpaid),	and	
is	thus	not	entirely	
idle.		
This	category	
includes	
concerns	
regarding	the	
food	security	
(strictly	
speaking)	of	
Ugandans	but	
also	worries	
about	the	
necessary	
productivity	
of	the	
agricultural	
sector	(to	
secure	food	
security).	
Here	I	include	
references	to	
the	‘youth	
bulge’	(or	in	
any	case	the	
concerns	
regarding	the	
growth	of	the	
young	share	of	
the	
population),	
about	the	
aging	of	the	
population	in	
the	agricultural	
sector.	
This	category	
comprises	the	
social	and	political	
stability	of	
Uganda:	
respondents	
expressed	their	
concerns	about	
the	possibility	for	
the	demographic	
reality	of	Uganda	
to	result	in	social	
unrest	and	for	the	
widespread	youth	
unemployment	to	
cause	political	
instability.		
Mainly	refers	
to	two	
concerns,	
expressed	
respectively	by	
two	
respondents:	
the	lack	of	
adequate	skills	
and	education	
of	youth	and	
the	concern	for	
Uganda	to	
obtain	middle-
income	status.	
TABLE	8.	CATEGORIES	CLUSTERING	THE	CONCEPTUALIZATIONS	OF	THE	DEVELOPMENT	PROBLEM	
These	 categories	 are	 useful	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 trends	 in	 the	 narratives	 of	 my	
respondents,	 and	 thus	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 change	 of	 the	 various	
development	organizations	–	both	national	and	international.	68		
I	have	also	calculated	the	frequency	in	which	development	agencies	made	reference	to	these	
five	 categories.	69		 These	 categories	 are	 not	mutually	 exclusive	 but	 rather	 indicative	 of	 the	
																																																						
68	I	refer	to	the	development	organizations	listed	and	described	in	the	previous	section.		
69	In	cases	in	which	I	have	interviewed	more	than	one	development	practitioner	per	agency,	I	have	
only	considered	the	incidence	of	the	mentioned	categories	per	agency,	as	shown	in	the	appendix	in	
this	chapter.	
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emphasis	 they	 put	 on	 one	 theme	 rather	 than	 the	 other.	 Observing	 the	 incidence	 of	
references	 to	 these	categories,	allowed	me	 to	deduce	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	organisations	
conceptualised	the	development	problem.	The	majority	of	organizations	 (about	65%	of	 the	
17	organizations)	 conceptualize	 the	development	problem	 in	 terms	of	unemployment.	 The	
second	major	 concern	 (47%)	 is	 the	 booming	 young	 population	 and	 the	 aging	 of	 the	 rural	
population	 (Figure	14).	 Food	 security	 and	agricultural	 productivity	worry	 about	30%	of	 the	
organizations.	The	social	and	political	stability	of	the	country	are	reasons	of	apprehension	for	
23%	of	 the	organizations	 –	mainly	with	 reference	 to	 the	distress	 deriving	 from	 the	 “youth	
bulge”	 and	 youth	 unemployment.	 The	 achievement	 of	 the	 middle-income	 status	 and	 the	
supposedly	 inadequate	 education	 of	 the	 youth	 were	 only	 distinctly	 mentioned	 in	 two	
interviews.		
	
FIGURE	 14.	 TRENDS	 IN	 CONCEPTUALIZATION	 OF	 THE	 DEVELOPMENT	 PROBLEM,	 AS	 REPORTED	 BY	
DEVELOPMENT	PRACTITIONERS	IN	ALL	(17)	ORGANIZATIONS	
However,	the	trend	looks	different	when	we	look	at	‘national’	vs.	‘international’	organizations	
(Figure	15).	Looking	more	closely,	unemployment	concerns	all	national	organizations	but	only	
40%	 of	 the	 international	 organizations.	 Alternatively,	 while	 apprehensions	 about	 the	
demographic	 dividend	 of	 the	 country	 are	 widespread	 among	 international	 organizations	
(70%),	 they	 are	 a	more	minor	 concern	 for	 national	 organizations	 (14%).	 Food	 security	 and	
agricultural	productivity	worry	national	organizations	more	 than	 international	organizations	
64.7
29.4
47
23.5
5.9
ALL	DEVELOPMENT	ACTORS
Conceptualization	of	development	problem
Unemployment Food	Security Demography Stability Other
	 142	
(20%	vs	43%)	–	and	the	same	disparity	is	observed	for	the	socio-political	stability	of	Uganda	
(about	43%	for	national	organizations	vs.	10%	of	international	ones).			
	
FIGURE	15.	TRENDS	IN	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	THE	DEVELOPMENT	PROBLEM	AS	REPORTED	BY	RESPONDENTS	
OF	DEVELOPMENT	ORGANIZATIONS	CLUSTERED	IN	NATIONAL	VS	INTERNATIONAL	
Having	 identified	 the	 trends	 in	 the	 conceptualization	 of	 the	 development	 problem	 by	
development	 practitioners	 in	 all	 development	 organizations	 I	 accessed,	 and	 differences	
among	international	and	national	organizations,	I	continue	to	the	discourse	analysis.	I	will	do	
that	by	category,	following	an	order	of	importance.		
	
4.5.1A	UNEMPLOYMENT	
This	concept	emerges	predominantly	 in	 the	conceptualization	of	 the	development	problem	
among	national	development	organizations	and	public	institutions.	It	is	problematized	by	the	
respondent	 below	 as	 comprising	more	 than	 ‘formal’	 unemployment	 –	 which	 according	 to	
World	 Bank	 (WB,	 World	 Bank,	 2008/2009)	 data	 reaches	 up	 to	 83%	 of	 the	 population	 in	
working	 age.	 At	 the	Ministry	 of	Gender	 Labour	 and	 Social	Development,	 I	was	 told	 by	 the	
Assistant	Commissioner	of	the	Youth	Livelihood	Programme	that:		
40
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My	personal	view	is	that	yes	[the	youth	bulge]	is	a	time	bomb	but	the	problem	here	in	
Uganda,	when	you	talk	about	statistics,	truly	from	a	realistic	perspective,	the	problem	
here	 in	 Uganda	 is	 not	 unemployment	 per	 se,	 unemployment	 going	 by	 the	 strict	
definition	 of	 ILO,	 is	 not	 that	 very	 high.	 But	 under-employment.	 There	 are	 so	many	
young	people	who	are	under	employed.	70	
Besides	the	time	bomb	of	the	youth	bulge,	what	worries	the	respondent	is	the	dissatisfaction	
of	the	young	people	in	Uganda,	who	are	not	necessarily	unemployed	–	the	informal	economy	
is	 flourishing71	–	 but	 employed	 below	 their	 potential.	 This	 is	 attracting	 the	 attention	 of	
development	 practitioners	 and	 civil	 servants	 who	 are	 starting	 to	 wonder	 “how	 to	 handle	
these	youths”:	
Youth	unemployment	is	a	big	thing	and	because	of	that	we	have	so	many	issues	[later	
in	the	interview	he	refers	to	socio-political	instability]	in	the	country.	That’s	why	right	
now	what	I	see	everybody	literally	is	thinking	about;	how	do	we	handle	these	youths?	
because	they	have	to	be	involved	in	some	gainful	employment,	something	which	will	
hold	 them,	 something	 which	 will	 guide	 them,	 make	 them	 good	 citizens.	 But	
unemployment	is	a	big	task72.	 
As	 a	 professor	 at	 the	 Makerere	 College	 of	 Agricultural	 and	 Environmental	 Sciences,	 this	
respondent	 links	the	development	problem	of	unemployment	to	that	of	stability	(discussed	
below).	Employment	is	envisioned	as	tool	for	social	stability.		
	
4.5.1B	DEMOGRAPHY	
As	mentioned	 above,	 under	 this	 category	 go	 all	 the	 concerns	 related	 to	 the	 demographic	
dividend	of	Uganda’s	youth	bulge.	Often	the	demographic	phenomenon	 is	described	 in	the	
																																																						
70	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	20/01/2017	
71	World	Bank	data	reports	that	more	than	60%	of	the	economy	is	informal,	accessed	on	28/09/2018	
on:	
	http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/understanding-the-informal-economy-in-african-cities-recent-
evidence-from-greater-kampala	
72	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	25/01/2017	
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development	discourse	with	a	threatening	vocabulary	with	particular	reference	being	made	
to	 the	 problem	 being	 a	 time	 bomb.	 This	 is	 exemplified	 in	 the	 account	 below,	 which	 was	
extracted	 from	 an	 interview	 with	 the	 Chief	 of	 Party	 of	 one	 of	 USAID’s	 ‘Feed	 the	 Future’	
programmes:		
This	 is	 a	 time	 bomb	 for	 Uganda.	 It’s	 alarming	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 if	 you	 look	 at	 the	
statistics,	I	mean	the	demographics,	the	sheer	number	of	youth	and	concentration	of	
specific	age	group	in	the	Uganda	population	is	one	where	a	significant	percentage	of	
the	population	is	young.	73 
While	 the	 concern	 with	 the	 youth	 bulge	 seems	 to	 be	 overwhelmingly	 widespread	 among	
development	actors,	 I	was	curious	to	hear	 from	them	whether	they	thought	that	 this	 issue	
would	justify	a	long-term	focus	of	the	development	sector	on	this	topic	–	or	whether	it	was	a	
development	 trend	 doomed	 to	 fade	 shortly.	 Thus,	 I	 questioned	my	 informants	 about	 the	
longevity	of	 the	development	 trend	 focusing	on	youths.	At	a	Dutch	NGO,	 the	development	
actor	 –	 a	 programme	 manager	 –	 told	 me	 that	 it	 is	 the	 very	 demographic	 situation	 that	
requires	such	development	attention:		
It	should	at	least	for	now	stay,	I	mean	not	for	now	but	looking	at	the	number	
of	 youth	 in	 this	 country,	 if	 you	 don’t	 do	 something	 it’s	 going	 to	 explode	 or	
implode	or	something74.		
Another	Chief	of	Party	at	‘Feed	the	Future’	responded	along	the	same	lines:		 
Respondent:	The	youth	will	not	go;	you	know	the	biggest	challenge	was	in	age.	Those	
who	are	 in	 farming	 they	are	68	years	old.	They	will	 start	dying	off.	Who	 is	going	 to	
feed	you?	So	we	need	to	attract	more	youth	into	agriculture	to	make	them	farm	and	
provide	services	and	make	money	to	feed	the	nation.	Otherwise	we	have	a	time	bomb	
of	hunger.	(…)	The	time	bomb	we	were	fighting	was	two	things.	Unemployment	and	
hunger.  
																																																						
73	As	explicitly	demanded	by	this	actor,	I	cannot	further	identify	him/her	by	specifying	the	specific	
programme	within	Feed	the	Future	for	which	this	actor	was	Chief	of	Party.	This	interview	was	carried	
out	on	02/02/2017		
74	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	23/01/2017		
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Me:	So	you	mean	the	time	bomb	will	be	youth	unemployment	or	aging	farmers?  
Respondent:	 The	 aging	 farmers	 with	 the	 hunger	 because	 they	 will	 not	 be	 able	 to	
produce	anymore.	Having	the	highest	number	of	youth	population	in	the	world,	okay	
in	Africa,	meaning	not	everybody	can	be	employed.	75 
 
In	this	fragment	of	 interview,	different	themes	emerge:	the	development	trend	focusing	on	
youth	 is	 expected	 to	 last;	 it	 is	 considered	 to	be	a	demographic	phenomenon	 concerning	a	
wide	share	of	 the	population	(the	 ‘bulge’),	which	 is	particularly	problematic	because	of	 the	
unemployment	 attached	 and	 it	 has	 implications	 for	 the	 food	 security	 of	 the	 country.	 The	
demographic	phenomenon	 is	described	with	an	alarming	 tone	 for	 two	 reasons:	because	 in	
the	 meantime	 the	 farming	 population	 is	 aging	 –	 therefore	 affecting	 food	 security	 –	 and	
because	“not	everybody	can	be	employed”.		
	
4.5.1C	FOOD	SECURITY	
Food	security	emerged	in	fewer	interviews	compared	to	the	previous	themes.	The	capacity	to	
feed	 the	 growing	 population	 and	 even	 ‘to	 feed	 Africa’	 was	 a	 concern	 that	 entailed	 the	
agricultural	productivity	and	the	efficiency	of	agribusiness.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	a	matter	of	
employment	 –	 showing	 how	 development	 practitioners	 perceived	 youths	 as	 being	 more	
interested	in	engaging	in	other	forms	of	employment.	A	classic	concern	was	the	“boda	boda”	
(motor	bicycles	which	serve	as	informal	transport	service,	see	also	section	below	on	stability).	
In	several	 interviews	and	casual	conversation	this	form	of	employment	was	mentioned	as	a	
preferred	 income-generating	 strategy	 to	 agriculture,	 thereby	 contributing	 to	 rural-urban	
migration	of	young	males:		
But	 we	 are	 also	 sure	 as	 a	 nation	 that	 there	 will	 be	 food	 in	 the	 nation	 because	 if	
everybody	runs	away	from	agriculture	and	they	go	into	“boda	boda”	riding,	and	they	
go	into	gambling,	sports	betting,	then	who	is	going	to	produce	the	food.	76	
																																																						
75	Also	this	respondent	explicitly	demanded	to	remain	anonymous,	so	I	cannot	further	identify	
him/her	by	specifying	the	specific	programme	within	Feed	the	Future	for	which	this	actor	was	Chief	of	
Party.	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	19/01/2017	
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In	 this	 fragment,	 the	 respondent	–	a	professor	at	 the	Makerere	College	of	Agricultural	and	
Environmental	Sciences	–	expresses	his	worries	about	youths	running	away	from	agriculture	
and	thereby	endangering	the	agricultural	productivity	and	food	security.	Interestingly,	“boda	
boda”	 driving	 is	 associated	 to	 other	 depraved	 activities	 such	 as	 gambling	 and	 betting	 –	
implicitly	ascribing	agricultural	work	to	the	morally	positive	endeavours.		
At	the	USAID	offices,	a	respondent	–	who	wished	to	remain	anonymous	–	working	within	the	
programme	‘Feed	the	Future’,	argued	that	there	are	a	number	of	factors	concurring	to	food	
insecurity	in	Uganda:			
Respondent:	 …	 the	 average	 age	 of	 Ugandan	 farmers	 is	 now	 67	 years	 old.	 And	
definitely	 67	 years	 means	 productivity	 would	 have	 reduced.	 And	 the	 farmers	 who	
were	trained	20	years	ago	are	now	old	to	actually	go	into	farming…And	that	means	in	
a	 long	 run	 there	 will	 be	 shortage	 of	 food	 because…	 unless	 we	 come	 out	 with	
mechanization,	but	most	of	the	Ugandan	farmers	still	practice	the	hand	hoe	method.	
Mechanization	is	not	rampant	across	there.	That’s	one.	Second	one,	Uganda	have	the	
highest	youth	population	in	the	world.77	
Aging	population,	lack	of	mechanisation	and	growing	young	population	are,	in	his	views,	the	
major	factors	of	concern	for	the	food	security	of	the	country.			
	
4.5.1D	STABILITY	
Stability,	 which	 (explicitly)	 concerned	 more	 national	 than	 international	 development	
agencies,	 was	 explicitly	 linked	 to	 youth	 unemployment.	 The	 dissatisfaction	 and	 inability	 of	
youths	 to	 be	 economically	 independent	 would,	 in	 the	 narratives	 of	 development	
practitioners,	push	them	into	criminal	activities.	At	the	Ministry	of	Gender,	I	was	told:		
And	in	addition	to	that,	these	youths	when	they	are	not	employed…	unemployment	
causes	political	 instability.	At	 all	 times,	 they	 are	 in	need	of	money	and	 they	 cannot	
access	 it,	 they	 always	 keep	 on	 breaking	 into	 people’s	 houses	 at	 night	 looking	 for	
																																																																																																																																																																								
76	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	25/01/2017	
77	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	19/01/2017	
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money,	at	the	same	time	they	don’t	have	money	to	purchase	what	to	use.	So,	if	you	
empower	them	to	get	employed	in	agriculture,	you	are	empowering	them	financially	
as	well	putting	the	country’s	political	stability	at	rest.	78		
The	respondent	referred	to	political	instability,	while	actually	exemplifying	the	concern	with	
reference	to	criminality:	 it	seems	that	 in	her	views	the	political	stability	 is	directly	 linked	to	
purchasing	power	and	safety	of	the	citizens.	Agriculture	is	thus	mentioned	as	a	tool	for	the	
financial	empowerment	of	youths,	with	the	indirect	effect	of	allowing	socio-political	stability	
to	 be	maintained.	 From	 this	 narrative,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 the	 employment	of	 youths	 in	
agriculture	 is	 (also)	 used	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 pursuing	 a	 specific	 political	 goal,	 namely	 political	
stability.	 Where	 the	 threat	 of	 political	 instability	 becomes	 a	 development	 problem,	
agriculture	 is	 represented	 as	 a	 political	 tool.	 Youths	 are	 reserved	 a	 space	 of	 political	
convenience:	employ	them	to	avoid	social	distress	–	 in	agricultural	business	–	to	contribute	
to	economic	growth	and	food	security,	therefore	securing	political	stability.	At	an	interview	at	
a	 public	 institution,	my	 respondent	 stressed	 the	 link	 between	 unemployment	 and	 political	
instability	with	these	words:		
So	if	you	have	many	involved	in	work,	you	certainly	get	out	of	some	demonstrations	
you	know,	some	agitation	you	know,	they	get	quickly	agitated	because	they	lack	the	
money	but	if	they	have	something	to	do.	79	
Chaos,	riots	and	criminality	as	a	result	of	discontent	with	unemployment	were	mentioned	in	
several	 other	 interviews	 –	 each	 stressing	 the	 capacity	 of	 agriculture	 to	 offer	 a	 distraction	
from	 political	 unrest.	 Interestingly,	 criminality	 and	 political	 instability	 were	 considered	 as	
being	part	of	the	same	issue,	which	anyhow	is	related	to	the	capacity	of	the	government	to	
ensure	stability	to	the	country.	Between	2016	and	2017	there	have	been	several	episodes	of	
social	unrest,	translating	into	political	instability	for	Museveni’s	government.	During	election	
times	 demonstrations	 and	 oppositions	 triggered	 violent	 reaction	 of	 the	 police80,	 and	 few	
																																																						
78	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	20/01/2017	
79	The	respondent	explicitly	asked	to	remain	anonymous	with	reference	to	his/her	opinions	on	this	
topic.	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	20/01/2017	
80	Aljazeera	covered	the	news	of	the	days	preceding	elections	in	February	2016:	
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/uganda-opposition-leader-arrested-days-elections-
160215132155444.html	
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months	later	a	demonstration	in	Kasese81	was	repressed	with	fierce	violence.	In	late	2017	in	
Kampala,	 students	organized	demonstrations	and	strikes82	against	 the	proposed	removal	of	
the	age	 limit	 for	presidency	–	which	would	allow	Museveni	 to	 remain	 in	power.	During	an	
interview	at	a	Ugandan	farmers’	organization83,	the	respondent	reflected	on	social	unrest:		
One	 like	 I	 have	 said,	 it	 is	 a	 threat	 because	when	 people	 don’t	 have	what	 to	 do,	 in	
simple	terms	they	say	it	is	a	“devil’s	work”.	So	I	expect	high	crime	rate	as	a	challenge	
and	you	know	what	that	means,	I	also	expect,	these	young	people	can	influence	even,	
they	can	be	a	threat	to	create	some	chaos	in	terms	of	riots	and	that	is	also	a	challenge	
because	the	government	can	spend	on	tear	gas	trying	to	calm	them	down…	 
Unemployment	and	the	supposedly	consequent	high	crime	rate	is	here	referred	to	as	“devil’s	
work”.	 The	 social	 unrest	 and	 government	 repression	 is	 envisioned	 as	 a	 risk	 for	 the	 future,	
thereby	justifying	the	necessity	of	development	interventions.	
Moreover,	 the	 issue	 of	 unemployment	 and	 instability	 seem	 to	 be	 related	 to	 two	 other	
concerns:	 rural-urban	 migration	 and	 “boda-bodas”.	 Both	 are	 quite	 burning	 issues,	 yet	
interestingly	 have	 not	 been	 explicitly	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 interviews	 I	 collected	 if	 only	 en	
passent.	In	a	policy	brief	by	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	(MAAIF,	2016),	these	issues	emerged	
as	being	related	to	one	another,	as	much	as	they	seem	to	have	a	strong	connection	to	both	
unemployment	and	stability	of	the	country:		
The	 participation	 of	 youth	 in	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 is	 minimal	 and	 is	 partially	
attributed	 to	 the	migration	 of	 youth	 from	 rural	 to	 urban	 areas,	 to	 engage	 in	 small	
urban	based	income	generating	activities	like	riding	‘bodaboda’	(motorcycles	for	hire),	
petty	trade	and	service	sector	work.	The	youth	prefer	to	participate	in	activities	that	
offer	quick	and	regular	income	with	less	risk	and	yet	opportunities	for	them	to	cause	
																																																						
81	Human	Rights	Watch	issued	a	special	report	in	May	2017:	
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/15/uganda-ensure-independent-investigation-kasese-killings	
82Protests	in	September	2017	were	covered	by	various	news:	
https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/ugandan-students-defy-ban-to-protest-over-presidential-age-
limit-20170921	
83	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	02/02/2017	
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change	in	rural	communities	with	their	increased	involvement	exist	especially	if	they	
can	perceive	agriculture	as	a	business	while	adopting	commercially	viable	practices	
For	 all	 the	 issues	 mentioned	 in	 this	 passage,	 the	 solution	 proposed	 seems	 to	 be	 the	
engagement	of	youths	in	agricultural	activities.	I	was	surprised	that	the	phenomenon	of	rural-
urban	migration	had	not	been	mentioned	in	the	interviews	and	only	briefly	referred	to	in	one	
of	the	10	policy	briefs	I	analysed	(see	section	below).		
	
4.5.1E	OTHER	
A	 few	 development	 practitioners	 mentioned	 issues	 as	 development	 problems	 in	 Uganda	
which	do	not	fit	the	above-mentioned	categories	–	despite	being	closely	related	to	them:	the	
education	 and	 skills	 of	 young	Ugandans,	 and	 the	 concern	 for	 obtaining	 the	middle-income	
status	by	2020	(mentioned	as	a	problem	in	itself,	rather	than	as	an	objective	–	which	will	be	
explored	 in	 more	 depth	 in	 the	 paragraphs	 below).	 I	 here	 report	 a	 somewhat	 lengthy	
fragment	 of	 an	 interview	 with	 one	 of	 the	 Chiefs	 of	 Party	 at	 USAID’s	 ‘Feed	 the	 Future’	
programme,	 which	 besides	 problematizing	 the	 Ugandan	 education	 system,	 offers	 an	
emblematic	example	of	what	it	currently	lacks:		
There	 future	 is	 their	 youth	 so	 if	 they	 are	 not	 investing	 in	 education,	 you	 are	 not	
investing	 in	 the	 policies	 actually	 where	 you	 can	 change	 these	 patterns	 making	
education	more	accessible,	making	quality	education	really	worthy	so	there	are	kids	
no	matter	what	who	get	the	skills,	 in	 the	 long	term	you	have	 invested	 in	the	young	
population	to	be	prepared	with	the	necessary	skills	that	are	of	value	to	private	sector.		
(…)	I	don’t	have	any	drivers	for	these	tractors	you	know	any	drivers,	because	there	are	
no	skills	to	drive	these	tractors	needless	to	say	they	repair	them.	I	need	to	bring	my	
drivers	skilled	from	Germany,	Zimbabwe	a	South	Africa	at	a	huge	expense.	I	am	dying	
to	get	those	skills	here.	(…).	Let	them	know	that	four	inches,	which	is	a	measurement	
that	you	have	been	taught	in	school,	is	relevant	when	you	see	precisely	seed	planted	
four	 inches	by	four	 inches	and	take	them	to	the	classroom	here,	when	you	get	that	
kid	and	have	him	sit	for	the	first	time	in	his	life,	in	the	huge	monster	tractor	and	tell	
him	when	you	are	twenty-five,	this	could	be	you.	That’s	the	behaviour.	 
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In	his	account,	the	respondent	explains	that	there	is	a	lack	and	need	for	skilled	labourers	who	
could	 be	 employed	 in	 the	mechanized	 agricultural	 enterprises.	 He	 suggests	 that	 if	 youths	
would	 be	 educated	 and	 shown	 what	 they	 could	 aspire	 to	 become	 (driving	 a	 modern	
“monster”	 tractor),	 that	 they	 could	 be	 happily	 employed	 in	 agribusiness.	 Implicitly,	 it	 is	
suggested	 that	operating	agricultural	machinery	 is	 an	 ideal	of	 success	–	 for	which	only	 the	
right	behaviour	and	skills	are	necessary:	that	is	what	to	invest	in,	that	is	the	future	envisioned	
for	youths	and	for	the	agricultural	sector.	In	the	following	section	I	will	analyse	more	closely	
the	narratives	around	development	organizations’	visions	for	change.		
	
4.5.2	THE	VISION	FOR	CHANGE	
Considering	the	variegated	conceptualization	of	the	development	problem,	we	might	expect	
an	accordingly	diversified	 range	of	envisioned	development	goals.	 Instead,	 I	 found	a	 rather	
homogenous	 narrative	 on	 the	 ‘vision	 for	 change’,	 which	 can	 be	 summarized	 in	 two	main	
categories	(Table	9):	economic	growth	and	agricultural	modernization.	Moreover,	while	the	
objectives	between	international	and	national	organizations	varied,	there	was	no	substantial	
difference	 between	 the	 vision	 for	 change	 of	 national	 and	 international	 development	
organizations.		
Economic	growth	 Agricultural	modernization	
This	category	concerns	a	generic	economic	
transformation	to	achieve	the	middle-
income	status	(by	2020,	as	envisioned	by	
the	president).	It	is	a	shift	from	largely	
informal	to	a	formal	economy	which	ensures	
taxation	capacity,	and	it	principally	draws	
from	the	incentivizing	of	small	and	large	
businesses	–	as	stated	in	the	National	
Development	Plan	II.		It	is	a	tension	towards	
a	“modern”	economy,	an	openly	neo-liberal	
one,	which	would	have	the	‘trickle-down’	
capacity	of	lifting	the	poor	from	the	bottom.		
This	category	comprises	a	varied	range	of	
mostly	technical	transformation	necessary	
to	achieve	an	idea	of	modernization	in	the	
agricultural	sector:	mechanization,	
intensification,	productivity	enhancement	
through	agricultural	technologies	and	
quality	inputs.		Altogether,	it	is	a	radical	shift	
from	subsistence	farming	towards	a	market-
led	agriculture.	As	described	in	the	previous	
chapter,	the	ideal	for	this	sector	is	
agribusiness	–	a	neoliberal	model	for	this	
sector,	which	requires	a	mind-set	change	for	
an	agripreneurial	attitude.	
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TABLE	9.	MAIN	CATEGORIES	SUMMARIZING	THE	VISIONS	FOR	CHANGE	OF	ALL	DEVELOPMENT	PRACTITIONERS	
INTERVIEWED	
Below,	I	will	examine	the	narratives	of	these	two	categories.		
	
4.5.2A	ECONOMIC	GROWTH	
The	vision	 leading	development	endeavours	 involving	youths	and	agribusiness	 in	Uganda	 is	
that	of	economic	growth.	This	is	not	so	surprisingly	considering	the	debated	shift	from	aid	to	
trade	 (Westen	 &	 Zoomers,	 2014),	 which	 prescribes	 a	 neoliberal	 agenda	 of	 markets	
liberalisation,	as	driver	of	development	change.	Within	this	framework,	increasing	hopes	and	
expectations	 have	 been	 laid	 on	 private	 sector	 initiatives	 for	 the	 rural	 development	 of	
emerging	 countries.	 This	 vision	 is	 clearly	 explained	 in	 the	 following	 fragment	 from	 an	
interview	with	an	actor	from	a	private	sector	development	agency: 
Because	 we	 need	 to	 have	 money	 in	 the	 economy,	 we	 need	 to	 have	 the	 tax	 base	
increasing	and	I	think	the	other	thing	that	 I	would	 like	to	have	 is	the	question	that	 I	
would	 love	 to	 see	 ...because	 in	 such	a	 case	we	need	 to	always	 is,	 so	when	 they	do	
that,	 they	make	money.	 (…)	The	more	youth	 registered	businesses	we	have,	 I	 think	
the	better.	It	doesn’t	mean	registration	say...right	but	what	does	that	mean,	you	are	
counted	 in	 the	economy	and	you	are	moving	away	 from	an	 informal	economy	 to	a	
formal	 economy.	 You	 are	 moving	 to	 one	 which	 recognizes	 this	 work	 as	 a	 formal	
agribusiness84.	85	
On	 the	 contrary	 at	 the	Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 I	was	 told	 that	 the	 vision	 should	 be	 that	 of	
making	people	rich	not	through	taxation	but	through	boosting	the	market	economy:		
the	way	I	look	at	it	among	the	economies,	I	am	against	a	situation	where	you	over	tax	
people	 and	 they	 don’t	 have	money;	 disposable	 income.	 Give	 people	money,	make	
																																																						
84	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	09/03/2017		
85	the	respondent	explicitly	asked	to	remain	anonymous.	
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them	 rich	 so	 that	 they	 can	 buy	 so	 if	 we	 empower	 these	 youth,	 we	 make	 them	
productive,	in	the	end	they	will	be	the	market;	a	huge	market	for	East	Africa.86 
The	perspective	of	both	respondents,	which	is	emblematic	for	the	widespread	vision	I	have	
recorded	 in	most	 of	my	 interviews,	 suggests	 that	 boosting	 the	 formal	 economic	 growth	 –	
particularly	through	agribusiness	–	is	the	answer	to	the	development	problems	of	Uganda	–	
particularly	 concerning	 youths.	 In	 his	 anthropology	 of	 international	 development,	 Mosse	
(2013,	p.	237)	describes	this	agenda	as	an	effort	to	make	the	markets	work	for	the	poor.	This	
vision	 lies	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 economic	 growth	 will	 have	 a	 trickle-down	 effect	 on	
unemployment;	 a	mechanism	which	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 poverty	 alleviation	 strategies	Mosse	
(2013,	p.	238)	refers	to	as	“bottom	of	the	pyramid	capitalism”.	
This	vision	implies	a	peculiar	ideology	of	success,	which	was	well	exemplified	by	one	Chief	of	
Party	at	‘Feed	the	Future’:		
Why	should	I	take	up	providing	[agricultural]	services	in	the	village,	why	can’t	I	sit	 in	
the	 bank?	 That	means	 you	 need	 to	make	more	money	 than	 the	 guy	 seated	 in	 the	
bank.	That	is	the	motivation	by	greed.	Maya	is	working	in	the	bank,	earns	400	dollars.	
But	 you,	 if	 you	are	able	 to	work	with	250	 farmers,	or	230	 farmers,	 you	make	6000	
dollars.87	 
The	 respondent	 explicitly	 lays	 the	 accent	 on	 greed	 as	 drive	 for	 success,	 where	 success	 is	
defined	in	terms	of	financial	success.			
	
4.5.2B	AGRICULTURAL	MODERNIZATION	
As	described	in	the	previous	section,	the	vision	for	change	in	the	agricultural	sector	rests	on	
the	 persuasion	 that	 agriculture	 needs	 to	 turn	 from	 subsistence	 farming	 to	 agribusiness.	
Moreover,	in	the	view	of	a	respondent	from	the	African	Development	Bank	reported	below,	
this	seems	to	be	the	only	future	perspective	that	ensures	food	security:			
																																																						
86	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	06/02/2017	
87	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	19/01/2017	
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So	that	is	why	the	bank	is	targeting	a	lot	of	activities	to	ensure	that	Africa	feeds	itself.	
(…)	And	 so	we	want	 to	 see	a	 situation	where	we	could	make	agriculture	 instead	of	
being	a	subsistence	type	of	thing	so	that	it	becomes	commercial	in	nature.	88	
Therefore,	there	is	the	need	for	radical	transformation	of	the	agricultural	sector	–	continues	
the	same	respondent	from	the	African	Development	Bank:		
…	the	overall	objective	of	the	Bank	is	to	transform	the	agricultural	sector.	Not	only	the	
youth	but	the	entire	agricultural	sector.	To	transform	it	from	the	subsistence	level	the	
way	 it	 is	 into	 a	 self-sustaining	 agricultural	 business	 right	 from	 production	 up	 to	
consumption,	value	addition,	and	everything.		
The	 envisioned	 transformation	 entails	 the	 industrialization	 and	 commercialization	 of	
agriculture.		
	
4.5.2C	AGRIPRENEURSHIP	
Agripreneurship,	 in	 my	 analysis,	 does	 not	 emerge	 as	 a	 vision	 in	 itself,	 but	 more	 as	 a	
consequent	by-product	of	the	vision	for	economic	growth	and	agricultural	modernization.	It	
is	 a	 means	 to	 an	 end,	 rather	 than	 an	 end	 it	 of	 itself.	 However,	 as	 it	 emerges	 from	 the	
fragments	 reported	 below,	 it	 becomes	 an	 objective	 of	 development	 programmes	 to	make	
sure	farmers	turn	into	agripreneurs:		
Actually	we	no	longer	look	at	farmers	as	farmers:	farmers	are	entrepreneurs.	So	the	
only	 issue	 is	 to	 give	 them	 an	 opportunity	 to	 do	 what	 they	 do	 in	 a	 more	 business	
oriented	manner	which	we	call	farming	as	a	business.	So,	yes	they	might	be	in	primary	
agriculture	but	 they	have	 to	 do	 it	 as	 a	 business…to	make	 sure	whatever	 they	do	 is	
profitable.	 (…)	 It’s	 for	all	 the	population.	Everyone	 involving	 in	agriculture	should	do	
for	a	market	perspective	not	for	the	sake	of	it	because	if	you	use	a	market	perspective	
89	
																																																						
88	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	17/01/2017	
89	To	protect	the	anonymity	of	the	respondent	I	will	not	specify	the	name	of	the	incubation	centre.	
This	interview	was	carried	out	on	23/01/2017	
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This	respondent,	executive	director	of	a	Ugandan	agribusiness	 incubation	centre,	spells	out	
what	 can	 be	 expected	 from	 an	 agripreneur.	 The	 personal	 and	 professional	 qualities	 of	 an	
agripreneur	are	envisioned	within	the	neoliberal	framework	which	also	shapes	the	visions	for	
change	previously	analysed.	These	qualities	are	exemplified	in	the	fragment	below,	which	is	
extracted	from	an	interview	with	a	development	actor	working	at	AgriProFocus	in	Kampala:	
Coming	back	to	your	question	of	entrepreneurship,	I	know	there	is	a	question	of	risk	
taking	 ...	 That	 this	person	 is	not	afraid	of	 introducing	 something	new	 into	business,	
you	 get?	 And	 I	 think	 purely	 that’s	 the	 characteristic	 of	 an	 entrepreneur	 that	 every	
time	he	improves.	Every	time	he	improves.	Because	of	the	dynamics	of	demands	and	
supplies,	 the	 forces	 of	 demand	 and	 supply.	 So	 if	 this	 person	 is	 truly,	 truly	 an	
entrepreneur,	you	will	see	some	of	these	things	happening	on	his	farm	or	in	whatever	
business	he	is	doing.	But	if	someone	is	doing	it	because	there	is	no	option,	he	will	tell	
you	 I	have	done	 it	 for	5	 years	but	he	 is	doing	 the	 same	 thing	over	 the	years.	Now,	
that’s	the	difference	between	an	entrepreneur	and	someone	doing	it	for	fun	or	as	a	
hobby	 (…)	 yeah,	 that’s	what	 I	 was	 saying.	 So	 the	 element	 of	 competitiveness,	 of	 a	
competitiveness	mind	is	very	typical	of	an	entrepreneur.	90	
 
4.5.3	THE	PATHWAY	TO	CHANGE	
In	this	section	I	explore	the	envisioned	strategies	of	the	various	development	organizations,	
as	 they	transpire	 from	practitioners’	narratives.	Within	the	framework	of	 theory	of	change,	
this	part	of	the	analysis	entails	the	understanding	of	the	tools	and	tactics	that	constitute	the	
practical	enactment	of	 the	development	 schemes.	 It	 is	determinant	 in	defining	 the	 type	of	
development	approach	 that	each	agency	operationalizes	 for	 their	 vision	 for	 change.	 In	 the	
section	below	I	aim	to	outline	the	conceptualizations	of	the	organizations’	pathway	to	change	
through	an	analysis	of	the	narratives.		
	
4.5.3A	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	PATHWAY	TO	CHANGE	–	ALL	
																																																						
90	This	intervie	was	carried	out	on	21/01/2017	
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A	number	of	themes	emerged	from	the	inductive	coding	of	the	interviews	with	development	
actors.	 	 Table	 10	 lists	 the	 most	 frequent,	 while	 Figure	 16	 reports	 their	 frequency.	 The	
strategies	 that	 were	 most	 frequently	 mentioned	 were	 ‘capacity	 building’	 and	 ‘mindset	
change’.	 ‘Market	 linkages’	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 second-favourite	 development	 tool;	
‘organizing’	 and	 ‘agricultural	 inputs’	 were	 almost	 equally	 popular.	 The	 funding	 of	 farmers	
through	start-up	capital	was	only	envisioned	as	a	minor	development	tool.	
Funding	 Capacity	
building	
Organizing		 Mindset	
change	
Market	
linkages	
Ag.	inputs	
Providing	a	
start-up	
capital	
directly	to	
farmers	or	
groups	of	
farmers.	
Training,	
capacity	
building,	
accountancy,	
business	
models.	
Organizing	
youths	into	
groups	or	
(in)formal	
cooperatives.	
Change	
towards	a	
business	
oriented	
agricultural	
enterprise,	
therefore	
turning	
youths	into	
agripreneurs.	
Getting	
youths	in	
touch	with	
(inter)national	
private	sector	
actors.	
Technology,	
mechanization,	
seeds,	
chemicals.		
TABLE	10.	CONCEPTUALISATION	OF	PATHWAY	TO	CHANGE	(THEMES)	
	
	
FIGURE	16.	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	PATHWAY	TO	CHANGE	
11.8
82.3
47.1
82.3
58.8
47.1
ALL	DEVELOPMENT	ORGANIZATIONS	(17)
Conceptualization	of	pathway	to	change
Funding Capacity	building Organizing Mindset	change Market	linkages Ag.	Inputs
	 156	
However,	 when	 dividing	 such	 results	 between	 the	 responses	 of	 national	 and	 international	
development	agencies,	quite	substantial	differences	emerge	(Figure	17).	The	most	significant	
difference	 seems	 to	 concern	 funding	 and	 organization,	 which	 was	 not	 considered	 as	 a	
relevant	pathway	by	 international	organizations	as	much	as	 it	was	by	national	ones.	While	
capacity	building	and	mindset	change	were	equally	important	both	among	international	and	
among	 national	 development	 agencies,	 they	 were	 both	 significantly	 more	 important	 for	
national	organizations	than	 international	ones.	The	provision	and	 investment	 in	agricultural	
inputs	 was	 considered	 slightly	 more	 important	 by	 national	 than	 by	 international	
organizations.		
	
	
FIGURE	17.	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	PATHWAY	TO	CHANGE	–	INTERNATIONAL	VS	NATIONAL	ORGANIZATIONS	
The	differentiation	 in	 the	popularity	of	 some	development	 tools	and	strategies	over	others	
between	national	and	international	agencies	suggests	that	there	is	a	variety	of	approaches	to	
the	 operationalization	 of	 visions	 for	 development	 change.	 I	 will	 explore	 the	 different	
approaches	in	the	next	section.	 In	the	remaining	of	this	section	I	will	analyse	the	narratives	
that	were	emerging	for	each	of	these	themes.		
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4.5.3B	FUNDING	
The	 theme	 of	 funding	 was	 mentioned	 as	 a	 strategy	 for	 change	 only	 by	 two	 national	
development	agencies,	namely	the	two	Ministries	I	approached.		 At	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture,	 a	 civil	 servant	 in	 managerial	 position	 explained	 that	 the	 rationale	 behind	 the	
provision	 of	 start-up	 capital	 is	 that	 of	 empowering	 youths	 to	 be	more	 productive	 in	 their	
agricultural	 business:	 “And	 also	 within	 the	 strategy	 we	 are	 coming	 up	 with,	 there	 is	 an	
element	of	giving	youth	capital;	start-up	capital	or	giving	them	equipment	to	start	engaging	
in	production.	That	is	what	we	are	talking	about.	That	is	the	[agricultural]	production	part	of	
it”.	91		While	one	 regional	 implementer	of	 the	Youth	 Livelihood	Programme	 (YLP)	explained	
the	practicalities	of	their	strategy:	“The	fund	is	always	given,	if	you	are	given	a	fund	to	utilize	
within	one	year	and	you	refund	the	money,	 that	one	will	be	without	any	 interest,	but	now	
when	you	enter	into	the	second	year	without	paying	back	the	money,	that	is	when	they	give	
them	five	percent	[interest	rates].”	
These	practical	aspects,	which	may	seem	straightforward	microcredit	strategies,	have	been	
originating	crucial	misunderstandings	with	the	beneficiaries	of	the	programme	because	rural	
development	 programmes	 providing	 financial	 assistance	 were	 until	 now	 on	 a	 grant	 basis:	
“That’s	why	you	see	at	the	moment	we	are	finding	difficulties	to	recover	the	money”	–	told	
me	 the	 same	 YLP	 implementer.	 However,	 the	 trouble	 recovering	 the	 capital	 invested	 in	
groups	 of	 agripreneurs	was	 not	 only	 originating	 from	 a	 naive	misunderstanding	 about	 the	
terms	 and	 conditions	 attached	 to	 the	 fund:	 there	 are	 very	political	 strings	 attached	 to	 the	
implementation	 of	 this	 strategy.	 As	 I	 found	 out	 later	 during	 my	 interviews	 with	 young	
beneficiaries	of	the	YLP,	funding	was	often	distributed	in	times	of	elections	(especially	in	the	
Central	and	Western	regions).	However,	a	civil	servant	in	managerial	position	at	the	Ministry	
of	 Agriculture92	–	 reflecting	 on	 the	 YLP	 –	 went	 even	 further	 with	 his	 hypothesis	 on	 the	
political	mandates	of	funding	agripreneurs:		
What	I	am	saying	is	that,	like	youth	livelihood	program,	the	aim	was	to	give	the	money	
to	the	youth	 in	terms	of	capital,	 I	mean	 in	terms	of	capital	or	train	them,	give	them	
																																																						
91	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	13/02/2017,	with	a	civil	servant	who	asked	to	remain	anonymous.		
92	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	06/02/2017	
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skills	and	then	give	them	equipment	and	then	they	pay	for	what	they	have	got	within	
a	specified	period	of	time.	But	then	you	find	that	 if	 it	 is	politicized	and	they	say	“no	
this	 thing	 is	 free”,	 you	 know	 there	 are	 some	 politicians	 that	 go	 around,	 even	 if	
government	programs	are	well	intended,	they	take	it	the	other	way.	They	say,	no,	no,	
don’t	 pay,	 this	 is	 what	 the	 government	 has	 just	 given	 you…	 No,	 it	 should	 not	 be	
politicized.	 Bad	 politics	 [i.e.	 corruption]	 that’s	 what	 I	 mean.	 It	 must	 have	 a	
government	way	and	everybody’s	will	because	it	is	like	a	loan,	once	they	get	it;	they	
have	to	pay	it	back.	It’s	like	a	revolving	fund.	93 
It	 is	 interesting	 to	 notice	 how	 the	 respondent	 strikes	 an	 association	 between	 government	
resources	and	free	(political)	money:	the	previous	programmes	investing	in	agriculture	were	
indeed	on	a	grant	basis	(“free	money”),	and	thus	known	to	have	been	exploited	for	corrupt	
political	purposes.	The	idea	of	the	“revolving	fund”,	which	would	jeopardize	corrupt	attempts	
at	abusing	grants	for	farmers,	is	not	welcome	by	some	civil	servants	doing	“bad	politics”.		
	
4.5.3C	CAPACITY	BUILDING	
Interestingly,	 capacity	building	was	a	particularly	popular	 tool	 among	 the	 international	 and	
national	 development	 agencies	 alike.	 At	 a	 grass	 root	 national	 agency,	 I	 was	 told	 that	 the	
capacity	building	concerned	mainly	financial	skills:	“so	now,	we	are	building	capacity	in	terms	
of	 them	knowing	okay,	 in	 terms	of	business	plans,	 in	 terms	of	 financial	management,	 they	
don’t	have	financial	systems	so	you	find	they	just	write	that	today	I	have	bought	this”.	94	
In	any	case,	it	 is	clear	that	the	skills	which	are	acquired	through	capacity	building	strategies	
are	specifically	focusing	on	technical	agricultural	business,	as	highlighted	by	the	manager	of	
the	 SKY	 programme,	 a	 Dutch	 funded	 programme	 for	 youths	 in	 agribusiness	 in	 Uganda,	
implemented	by	 an	 Italian	NGO:	 “well	we	designed	model	within	 the	 system	 that	 is	 called	
earn	 as	 you	 learn	 so	 as	 they	 learn,	 as	 they	 are	 getting	 skilled,	 they	 are	 also	 earning	
money…And	 this	money	 is	 then	 kept	 by	 the	 agribusiness	 and	 at	 the	 end	 its	 dispatched	 to	
																																																						
93	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	13/02/2017,	with	a	civil	servant	who	asked	to	remain	anonymous.		
94	The	development	actor	I	interviewed	expressly	asked	to	remain	anonymous.	This	interview	was	
carried	out	on	23/01/2017		
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each	 and	 they	 can	 use	 it	 as	 a	 start-up.”	 The	 model	 here	 described	 with	 the	 appealing	
narrative	of	a	“win-win”	situation	sheds	 light	on	an	 important	 factor	of	capacity	building:	 it	
serves	the	private	sector	hiring	or	providing	the	training	as	much	as	the	‘beneficiary’.	In	fact,	
the	 beneficiary	 of	 capacity	 building	 is	 formed	 to	 develop	 those	 specific	 skills	 that	 are	
functional	 to	 agribusiness	 private	 sector	 company.	 At	 the	 African	 Development	 Bank,	
capacity	building	was	described	in	terms	of	“incubation”:	“the	programme	is	mainly	focusing	
on	 capacity	 building	 for	 the	 youth	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 incubation,	 changing	 their	mindset	 and	
designing	projects	that	they	are	interested	in	and	linking	them	to	financing	[opportunities]”95.	
The	“incubation	of	youths”	 through	capacity	building	 is	 reminiscent	of	 the	social	gardening	
described	 by	 Scott	 (1998,	 p.	 346),	 in	 which	 the	 ‘objects’	 of	 development	 programmes	
become	standardized	human	subjects	“uniform	in	their	needs	and	even	interchangeable	(…)	
they	have	none	of	the	particular,	situated,	and	contextual	attributes	that	one	would	expect	of	
any	population”.		
Moreover,	 the	 functionalism	 of	 the	 capacity	 building	 is	 common	 also	 to	 development	
agencies	that	were	not	directly	working	with	market	 linkages.	So	a	regional	 implementer	of	
the	YLP	explained	to	me	that:	“First	of	all	these	youths	are	always,	before	we	give	them	the	
funding,	 they	 are	 always	 given	 training…	we	 get	 their	 leaders,	 chairman	 of	 the	 group,	 the	
secretary	and	the	treasurer	of	 the	group	to	go	for	some	training.	We	train	them	on	record	
keeping,	 we	 train	 them	 on	 group	 dynamics,	 then	 also	 we	 train	 them	 on	 procurement	
processes.”96	As	it	emerges	from	this	account,	the	capacity	building	is	also	necessary	for	the	
Ministry	 to	 be	 able	 to	 recover	 the	money	 invested:	 having	 trained	 the	 youths	 on	 how	 to	
manage	their	loan,	they	expect	to	be	more	assured	of	retrieving	the	sum.		
	
4.5.3D	ORGANIZING	
This	 strategy	 was	 considered	 relevant	 by	 all	 development	 agencies,	 but	 particularly	 the	
national	 ones.	 This	 strategy	 entails	 both	 the	 gathering	 of	 youths	 into	 business	 groups	 or	
cooperatives,	 as	 the	 formalization	 (subject	 to	 taxation)	 or	 registration	of	 the	 group	 (in	 the	
record	books	of	the	local	authorities).	From	the	narratives,	it	emerges	that	the	organizing	of	
																																																						
95	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	17/01/2017	
96	This	interview	was	carried	out	at	the	regional	offices	in	Gulu	on	07/04/2017	
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youths	 into	 groups	 has	 a	 direct	 link	 to	 the	 viability	 and	 productivity	 of	 the	 business,	 as	
explained	 by	 a	 development	 actor	 from	 a	 grass-root	 farmers’	 organization	 (who	 asked	 to	
remain	anonymous):		
Now	 we	 are	 strengthening	 them	 and	 growing	 their	 capacity	 into	 business	 entities	
which	 are	 cooperatives	 and	 companies.	 So	 they	 aren’t	 registered	 either,	 currently,	
most	of	them	are	community	based…Now	we	are	building	the	capacity	such	that	they	
can	 now	move	 from	 a	 non-profit	 orientation	 to	 a	 business	 orientation	 and	we	 are	
going	 to	do	 that	 into	cooperatives	 so	 these	groups	 that	we	are	working	with	under	
this	project,	we	are	now	building	their	capacity	so	that	they	go	into	cooperative	which	
is	a	business	entity	according	to	Uganda,	or	form	companies.97	
The	 respondent	 associates	 the	business	mentality	of	 the	 agripreneurs	 in	 the	business	with	
the	 organization	 into	 cooperatives	 –	 and	 even	 the	 very	 formation	 of	 the	 cooperative	 is	
subject	to	capacity	building.	In	fact,	it	seems	that	the	group	formation	is	a	component	of	the	
same	strategy	as	capacity-building	itself,	as	it	leads	to	same	objective	of	adopting	a	business	
mind-set	change	and	acquiring	skills	to	perform	productively	in	their	agribusiness.	
	
4.5.3E	MINDSET	CHANGE	
Mindset	 change	 was	 together	 with	 ‘capacity	 building’	 the	 most	 popular	 strategy	 for	
development,	 particularly	 among	 national	 development	 agencies.	 The	 ideology	 implied	 by	
this	 strategy	 is	 loaded	 with	moral	 values	 –	 the	 right	 values	 –	 which	 are	 envisioned	 to	 be	
necessary	 to	 promote	 change.	 Within	 this	 discourse,	 development	 is	 considered	 as	
modernization;	and	 is	 the	adoption	of	 the	““right”	values,	namely,	 those	held	by	 the	white	
minority	(...)	those	embodied	in	the	ideal	of	the	cultivated	European”	(Escobar,	2012,	p.	43).	
Development	is	a	form	of	socio-economic	engineering	upon	the	tabula-	rasa	of	non-places	of	
a	 generic	 underdeveloped	 country	 –	 to	be	developed	 according	 to	 constructed	 systems	of	
development	 knowledge.	 The	 ‘right	 values’	 are	 systematized	 in	 truth	 regimes	 which	 “(...)	
represent	the	Third	World	as	a	child	in	need	of	adult	guidance”	–	a	sort	of	‘secular	theory	of	
salvation’	(ibid:	30)	that	infantilize	the	global	south.		
																																																						
97	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	19/01/2017	
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One	Chief	of	Party	at	‘Feed	the	Future’	insisted	that	it	really	boils	down	to	adopting	the	right	
behaviour	towards	agriculture	to	make	it	an	income-generating	business:		
In	 that	way,	 you	 first	need	 to	 talk	 to	 them,	 it’s	 a	behaviour	 change	 thing.	As	 I	 said,	
motivation	is	by	greed.	If	they	are	aware	that	they	will	make	10000	dollars	a	year	even	
irrespective	of	what	age	I	am,	I	will	do	anything	to	make	ten	thousand	dollars.	So	age	
is	not	a	barrier	for	the	youth.	We	need	18	to	35.	It’s	a	concept	mindset	change	that	
we	must	make	money.	and	that	is	the	drive98.		
At	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	I	was	told	by	a	civil	servant	in	managerial	position	that	having	
the	right	business	mindset	entails	a	radically	different	approach	than	subsistence	agriculture,	
to	the	extent	that:	“that’s	where	they	get	their	income	but	now	we	are	saying	that:	can	you	
now	deliberately	grow	it	as	an	income	generating	[activity]?	You	eat	little	but	you	grow	with	a	
mind	of	saying	that	you	are	growing	to	sell”.	In	the	words	of	the	respondent,	agribusiness	is	
prioritized	even	over	food	security.		
	
4.5.3F	MARKET	LINKAGES	
Particularly	 dear	 to	 international	 development	 agencies,	 this	 strategy	 for	 change	 implies	 a	
belief	 in	 the	 power	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 drive	 development	 change	 –	 within	 what	 is	
described	to	be	a	clearly	neoliberal	development	paradigm.	At	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	the	
director	 of	 a	 department	 explained	 that	 they	 adopt	 the	 strategy	 of	 “linking	 them	 to	 the	
market,	to	the	other	value	chain	actors;	like	seed	and	input,	dealers	then	may	be	if	there	is	a	
mechanization	unit	which	 is	hiring	out.	(…)	That’s	what	we	are	talking	about	and	we	link	to	
the	 traders”.	99	And	 again,	 the	 CEO	 of	 a	 Ugandan	 service	 provision	 company,	 AKORION,	
collaborating	with	a	bilateral	donor,	made	the	role	of	the	private	sector	was	made	clear:	“one	
of	the	systems	which	we	use	is	called	a	market	driven	system.	What	we	mean…	like	we	are	
private	market	people	right,	so	I	am	driven	by	what	the	market	wants”100.	On	the	one	hand	
the	agripreneurs	are	linked-up	to	market	actors	to	develop	their	agribusiness	further.	On	the	
other	hand	it	is	the	market	itself	to	determine	–	through	their	linkage	to	the	agripreneurs	–	
																																																						
98	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	19/01/2017	
99	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	27/01/2017	at	the	headquarters	in	Entebbe.	
100	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	19/01/2017	
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the	 direction	 of	 the	 development	 of	 agribusiness:	 the	 one	 is	 profiting	 from	 the	 other.	 	 It	
becomes	 clear	 than	 that	 development	 is	 also	 strictly	 tied	 to	 the	 dynamics	 of	 supply	 and	
demand,	as	explained	by	a	Chief	of	Party	at	‘Feed	the	Future’:		
I	think	is	about	change	to	improve	what	aspects	of	that	framework	but	not	necessarily	
any	longer	applicable	to	the	reality	of	the	business	and	because	markets	are	dynamic;	
…private	sector	if	there	is	something	that	knows	how	to	do	is	they	know	how	to	adopt	
the	 conditions	 of	 the	market.	 That’s	 what	 supply	 and	 demand	 is	 all	 about,	 it’s	 the	
ability	to	really	see,	you	know,	based	on	those	markets,	how	does	your	business	need	
to	 adapt?	 So,	market	 trends	 dictate	 how	 opportunities	 happen	 and	 that’s	why	 you	
want	 to	 have	 a	 voice	 and	 say	 “hey,	 let’s	 go	 at	 this	 together,	 policy	 makers	 and	
economic	 clusters”.	 This	 is	where	we	 need	 government	 to	 invest	 time,	 research	 to	
assist	to	facilitate	this	to	happen.	And	you	know,	things	like	incentives	that	promote,	
develop	private	sector	that	way	work	better	when	the	design	of	which	incentive	takes	
into	account	precisely	these	needs.		
From	this	fragment	of	the	interview,	it	becomes	clear	that	the	incentive	of	market	linkages	is	
a	 strategy	 to	 operationalize	 the	 vision	 for	 change	 which	 foresees	 the	 engagement	 of	 the	
agricultural	 sector	 in	a	 (global)	neoliberal	 economy.	 It	 seems	 that	 the	 role	of	development	
agencies	 (in	 this	 narrative,	 including	 the	 basic	 functions	 of	 the	 government	 itself)	 is	 to	
promote	 the	wellbeing	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 –	whereby	 agripreneurs	 should	 be	 trained	 to	
adapt	to.	The	respondent	foresees	a	collaboration	of	development	stakeholders	to	adopt	the	
same	development	approach:	a	market-driven	development	strategy	 to	boost	agribusiness.	
In	fact,	in	his	vision,	it	is	a	radical	change	of	development	framework	–	with	a	strong	belief	in	
the	power	of	private	sector.		
	
	
4.5.3G	AGRICULTURAL	INPUTS	
A	rather	technical	strategy	for	change,	this	category	particularly	refers	to	the	tools	necessary	
to	make	agriculture	‘modern’	–	as	described	in	the	second	category	analysed	in	the	section	
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on	 the	 ‘vision	 for	change’.	The	 framework	 in	which	 the	agricultural	 inputs	were	promoted,	
were	mostly	business	oriented,	as	explained	the	CEO	of	AKORION101:		
You	can	start	with	the	farmer,	provide	them	the	right	seed,	train	them	how	to	plant,	
do	spray	for	them,	provide	them	basically	production	services	to	farmers	so	that	you	
can	 continue	 getting	 continuous	 income	 throughout	 the	 value	 chain	 or	 even	 the	
season.	So	one	of	the	characteristics	is	like	really	business	oriented.	 
The	 agricultural	 inputs	 referred	 to	 in	 this	 category	 are,	 first	 of	 all,	 technologies	 and	
machineries,	which	would	make	agriculture	attractive	for	Ugandan	youths	–	as	stated	by	the	
professor	at	the	Makerere	College	of	Agricultural	and	Environmental	Sciences,	reflecting	on	
the	Strategy	for	Youths	he	was	elaborating	with	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture:		
So	 that	was	 another	 perspective	 altogether.	 And	 I	 think	 it’s	 one	 of	 the	 reason	why	
most	 of	 them	 are	 detesting	 agriculture.	 So	 one	 thing	 we	 are	 pushing	 for	 is	
mechanization.	 All	 people	 who	 love	 agriculture	 in	 this	 country	 will	 talk	 about	
mechanization	because	that’s	 the	way	to	go…You	cannot	attract	 the	youth	with	 the	
hoe.	They	wouldn’t.	102		
More	explicitly,	the	mechanization	which	is	seen	as	necessary	strategy	for	the	modernization	
of	the	agricultural	sector,	include	a	list	of	technical	elements,	mentioned	by	a	respondent	in	a	
grass-root	national	organization	(who	asked	to	remain	anonymous):		
That	comes	with	like	access	to	finance	as	I	said,	we	are	guaranteed	a	market	through	
contracts,	 so	 we	 are	 the	 ones	 looking	 for	 the	 different	 buyers	 such	 that	 these	
members	 can	 produce	 and	 have	 markets	 but	 they	 need	 things	 related	 to	
mechanization.	 Tractors,	 irrigation	 systems,	 agricultural	 insurance,	 now	 if	 we	 get	
some	people	who	can	ensure	these	farmers	and	off	take	some	of	these	risks,	so	now,	
that	agro	entrepreneur	in	future	we	want	is	that	person	who	has	the	right	behaviour	
as	far	as	business	is	concerned,	the	right	attitude,	a	business	mind,	the	right	skills,	the	
right	 knowledge,	 the	 right	 values	 and	 is	 surrounded	 by	 resources	 in	 terms	 of	 if	 he	
																																																						
101	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	19/01/2017	
102	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	25/01/2017	
	 164	
need	 the	machines,	he	has	 the	machinery,	 if	 it	 is	 irrigation,	he	 is	not	depending	on	
rain	because	now	they	are	being	struck	by	drought.	103 
As	 it	 emerges	 from	 this	 account,	 the	 provision	 or	 support	 of	 agricultural	 inputs	 for	
agribusiness	is	a	development	realm	of	technical	support	–	and	very	much	market	oriented.	
The	very	future	of	the	agribusiness	depends	–	together	with	the	right	knowledge	and	skills	–	
on	 the	 capability	 of	 adopting	 the	 right	 inputs	 for	 agribusiness.	 At	 BRAC,	 an	 international	
private	sector	development	agency,	this	rationale	became	clear:	“if	you	buy	seeds	from	here,	
and	how	do	you	sell	them,	whom	do	you	sell	them	to	how	to	target	clients,	at	what	price	can	
you	offer	the	seeds,	so	that	they,	they	don’t	really	charge	the	farmers	higher	prices	so	that	
they	if	they	charge	them	higher	prices,	they	can	escape.	Farmers	can	go	to	other	shops”.	In	
this	way,	agricultural	 inputs	allow	agripreneurs	 to	earn	more	–	and	 thereby	be	 ‘successful’	
according	to	the	neoliberal	definition	of	success.		
	
4.5.4	TARGETING	
A	question	that	remains	un-answered	is:	who	is	going	to	be	the	beneficiary	and	implementer	
of	 the	 development	 efforts	 described	 within	 the	 theories	 of	 change	 of	 the	 development	
agencies	 I	 interviewed?	 It	 seems	 clear,	 also	 considering	 the	 prompting	 of	 my	 questions	
(regarding	development	programmes	for	youths	in	agribusiness),	that	the	target	is	youth	(see	
Figure	 18)	 –	while	 and	 only	 the	minority	 of	 respondents	 thought	 it	 should	 be	 a	 structural	
investment	in	the	agricultural	sector.		
																																																						
103	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	19/01/2017	
	 165	
	
FIGURE	18.	TARGETING	SECTOR	OF	THE	THEORIES	OF	CHANGE	
	
Why	focus	on	the	youths	(the	unemployed)	themselves?	According	to	respondents,	targeting	
youths	 is	 a	 strategy	 relying	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 youths	 are	 intrinsically	 innovative	 and	
energetic	–	and	therefore	can	play	the	role	of	change	agents	and	drivers	of	economic	growth.	
As	a	development	actor	working	at	AgriProFocus	in	Kampala	told	me:		
we	have	considered	youth	as	the	priority	and	so	they	are	on	the	list	of	the	top	agenda	
for,	for	our	strategic	plan.	So,	 in	our	strategic	plan,	we	have	prioritized	youth	as	the	
most	 innovative	 and	 energetic	 group	 of	 people	 that	 can	 be	 the	 change	 agents	 and	
drivers	of	economic	transformation	especially	in	the	agri-,	the	agrifood	sector.	So,	we	
prioritize	youth	effective	2017-2022	in	our	strategic	plan.		
Having	demarcated	the	rationale	for	targeting	the	development	efforts	towards	youths,	the	
question	 remains	 whether	 the	 programmes	 potentially	 target	 the	 whole	 share	 of	 the	
population	between	18	and	35	(broadest	definition	of	youths,	 including	all	age	brackets)	or	
only	 a	 part	 of	 it.	 I	 encountered	 both	 possibilities	 in	 the	 targeting	 approaches	 of	 the	
development	 agencies	 I	 have	 interviewed	 (Table	 11),	 although	 most	 organizations	 used	 a	
selected	approach	(Figure	19):		
88% 
12% 
ALL	DEV	ORGANISATIONS
Target	of	dev.	programmes
Youth Ag.	Sector
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Targeting	ALL	 Targeting	SELECTED	
Blanket	 approach	 –	 ideally	 reaching	 all	
possible	interested	youths,	currently	in	or	out	
of	agribusiness.	
Targeting	 a	 designated	 number	 of	 youths	
who	 are	 interested	 and/or	 respond	 to	 given	
requirements	 –	 often	 already	 engaged	 in	
agribusiness.	
TABLE	11.	TARGETING	YOUTHS	(RATIONALES)	
	
	
FIGURE	19.	TARGETING	STRATEGY	OF	DEVELOPMENT	PROGRAMMES	
At	AgriProFocus,	the	approach	of	targeting	selected	youth,	was	explained	to	me	as	having	a	
market-oriented	rationale:		
…the	 idea	 is	 that	you	target	 those	youths	who	already	have	been	active	either	with	
land	 in	the	production,	or	 in	the	marketing	or	 in	the	value	addition.	 It’s	not	 like	you	
are	trying	to	get	more	youths	who	are	doing	other	things	maybe	subsistence	farming	
or	whatever	else	to	do	agribusiness.	You	are	focusing	on	those	who	are	already	doing	
it.	yeah,	to	do	it	better…we	are	identifying,	we	are	focusing	at	least	from	18	to	35	age	
bracket	and	then	youth	who	are	already	motivated,	who	already	appreciate	that	they	
can	do,	they	can	make	it.	104	
The	goal	of	this	agency	is	supporting	those	youths	who	are	already	in	the	agribusiness	sector	
to	 develop	 the	 business	 further.	 The	 selection	 requirements	 are	 thus	 strictly	 bond	 to	 the	
rationale	behind	 the	vision	 for	change	of	 the	organization	–	agricultural	 commercialization.		
																																																						
104	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	21/02/2017	
23% 
77% 
ALL	DEV.	ORGANISATIONS
Targeting
targeting	all targeting	selected
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At	a	multilateral	development	agency,	I	was	told	a	similar	strategy	–	investing	in	few,	selected	
agripreneurs	 –	with	 the	 purpose	 of	 championing	 the	 ones	who	 are	 already	 successful	 and	
through	 their	 empowerment	 expect	 a	 trickle-down	 effect	 on	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 society,	 as	 a	
development	actor	at	FAO	explained:	“see	how	best	I	can	support	them	and	help	use	those	
people	 to	 change	 the	 others.	 (…)	 Even	 if	 they	 are	 just	 20%,	 I	 use	 them	 to	 become	 game	
changers	 in	 society.	 Empower	 them,	 train	 them,	 give	 them	 the	necessary	 capacity,	 expose	
them	and	use	 them	 to	be	game	changers	of	 the	 rest	of	 the	 country”.	105		The	 trickle-down	
effect	was	really	perceived	to	be	a	promising	trick:	“If	you	become	a	successful	entrepreneur	
and	you	employ	ten	people,	wow!”106.	
In	 contrast,	 government	 ministries	 did	 not	 target	 selected	 groups.	 At	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture	this	approach	was	explained	to	me	by	one	of	the	principal	economists:		
Respondent:	but	now	 this	 time	 ‘round,	we	want	 to	 target	 the	youth.	 You	know	 the	
youth	are	scattered	all	over,	they	are	not	in	a	specific	part	of	the	value	chain,	they	are	
scattered	and	you	know	they	are	 just	disguising	because	of	the	resources	which	are	
required	 in	 this.	 Now,	 the	 focus	 is	 empowering	 the	 youth	 to	 empower	 them	 to	
become	agri-business	 leaders,	to	carry	out	activities	of	agri-business	along	the	value	
chain.	 This	 time	 ‘round,	 it’s	 not	 focusing	 on	 those	 successful	 people	 but	 we	 are	
looking	 at	 people	 who	 are	 willing	 and	 able	 to	 take	 activities	 along	 the	 value	 chain	
which	are	 the	youth	 in	particular…	our	population,	70%	are	youth,	young	people	so	
you	need	to	empower	them	because	if	you	don’t	empower	them	at	this	age.	 
Me:	So	the	idea	is	to	empower	the	majority? 	
Respondent:	Yes	the	majority	which	are	the	youth	specifically	107 
 
The	rationale	is	rather	different:	targeting	all	the	youth	who	are	willing	and	able,	the	majority	
of	the	population	in	working	age	–	assuming	they	only	need	to	be	empowered	with	start-up	
capital,	to	unlock	the	potential	of	Ugandan	agribusiness.	This	approach	also	entails	targeting	
																																																						
105	This	respondent,	responsible	for	the	coordination	and	development	of	policies	for	the	support	of	
Ugandan	youths,	explicitly	asked	to	remain	anonymous,	therefore	I	cannot	further	specify	what	his	
position	was.	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	20/01/2017	
106	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	23/01/2017	
107	This	interview	was	carried	out	on	06/02/2017	
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the	 youth	 as	 a	 separate	 social	 category,	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 become	 a	 generation	 of	
agribusiness	leaders.	In	fact,	this	targeting	strategy	does	not	focus	on	supporting	value-chain	
specific	agribusiness	activities,	but	rather	assumes	an	intrinsic	capacity	of	the	youths	to	make	
agribusiness	successful,	provided	they	are	empowered	with	start-up	capital.		
4.5.5	CLUSTERING	DIFFERENT	APPROACHES	
There	 are	 different	 approaches	 to	 solve	 the	 development	 problem,	 as	 emerges	 from	 the	
theory	 of	 change	 analysis	 outlined	 above.	 Different	 strategies	 have	 emerged,	 with	 an	
interesting	differentiation	between	national	 and	 international	development	agencies.	 From	
the	analysis	of	the	pathway	to	change,	there	seems	to	be	a	substantial	difference	between	
agencies	 targeting	 selected	 youths	 or	 all	 of	 them,	 and	 those	 providing	 funding	 or	 rather	
market	 linkages.	 Here	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 identify	 two	 approaches:	 one	 that	 is	 more	 private-
sector	drive	and	oriented,	and	another	that	is	driven	by	the	public	sector.	In	the	table	below	
(Table	12),	I	have	summarized	the	characteristics	of	the	two	development	approaches:	
Private-sector	(PS)	approach	 Public	sector	approach	
• Selected	(few)	number	of	
agripreneurs	
• Working	with	groups	or	individuals	
• Sampling:	mobilization	through	(PS)	
company	structures	
• Implementation	through	(PS)	
company	
• Providing:	market	linkages,	inputs	
(seeds,	chemicals),	training/capacity	
building	and	ready	market	
• Getting	potentially	all	Ugandan	
youths	on	board	
• Working	with	groups	
• Sampling:	project-based	application	
through	government	structures	
• Implementation	through	
government	structures	
• Providing	start-up	capital	
TABLE	12.	DEVELOPMENT	APPROACHES	(PRIVATE	SECTOR	VS	PUBLIC)	
	
The	figure	below	(Figure	20)	gives	an	indication	of	the	development	approaches	adopted	by	
the	 17	 development	 organizations	 I	 have	 interacted	 with,	 where	 the	 category	 ‘other’	
comprises	 agencies	 adopting	 in-between	 approaches.	 The	 distribution	 of	 the	 agencies	 per	
approach	shows	a	homogeneously	spread	sampling	of	the	agencies.		
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FIGURE	20.	SHARES	OF	DEVELOPMENT	AGENCIES	PER	APPROACH	(SAMPLING)	
Taking	a	closer	look	at	the	distribution	of	national	and	international	organizations	sheds	light	
on	 interesting	 trends	 in	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 agencies.	 Of	 the	 organisations	 that	 had	
adopted	a	private-sector	driven	approach,	the	wide	majority	(83%)	were	international.	Of	the	
agencies	 that	had	chosen	a	public-sector	approach,	 the	majority	 (60%)	were	Ugandan.	The	
organisations	 that	 had	 adopted	 a	 mixed	 approach	 (in	 the	 category	 ‘other’),	 were	 equally	
national	and	international.	
	
	
FIGURE	 21.	 DISTRIBUTION	OF	 DEVELOPMENT	 AGENCIES,	 DIVIDED	 BETWEEN	 NATIONAL	 AND	 INTERNATIONAL,	
PER	DEVELOPMENT	APPROACH	(SAMPLING)	
The	preference	of	international	development	agencies	for	a	private-sector	oriented	approach	
confirms	 the	general	 shift	 in	 the	 international	development	cooperation	 from	aid	 to	 trade,	
which	was	mentioned	in	section	4.4b	concerning	the	vision	for	change.		
29.40% 35.30% 35.30% 
PUBLIC	SECTOR PRIVATE-SECTOR	DRIVEN OTHER
Distribution	of	dev.	agencies	per	
approach
All	agencies
83% 
40% 50% 17% 
60% 50% 
PRIVATE-SECTOR	DRIVEN PUBLIC	SECTOR OTHER
Distribution	of	dev.	agencies,	
international	vs	national
International National
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4.5.6	ON	PAPER:	THE	DEVELOPMENT	POLICIES	FOR	YOUTHS	IN	AGRIBUSINESS	
This	 section	 is	 aimed	 to	 verify	 that	 the	 views	 expressed	 by	 development	 practitioners	
reflected	 the	 views	 of	 their	 agencies.	 These	 policies	 papers	 do	 not	 constitute	my	 primary	
data.	As	the	main	goal	of	the	analysis	was	to	verify	the	representativeness	of	the	theories	of	
change	 that	 emerged	 from	 the	 interviews	 with	 development	 practitioners,	 I	 adopted	 the	
same	 analytical	 tool	 of	 theory	 of	 change	 described	 above.	 I	 analysed	 the	 narratives	 in	 the	
policy	documents	with	axial	 coding	on	Atlas.ti,	 using	 specific	 categories	of	discourse	which	
had	emerged	in	the	analysis	of	the	interviews.		
For	 each	 category,	 which	 was	 a	 step	 in	 the	 ToC	 analytical	 framework,	 I	 explored	 the	
narratives	responding	to	the	codes	that	more	strongly	emerged	from	the	ToC	analysis	of	the	
interviews	 (Table	13).	 In	 fact,	 I	wanted	to	double-check	each	the	representativeness	of	 the	
responses	emerging	from	the	interviews	for	each	code.		
Development	problem	 Vision	for	change	 Pathway	to	change	 Targeting	
Unemployment		 Economic	growth	 Funding	 Targeting	all	
Demography		 Agricultural	
modernization	
Capacity	building	 Targeting	
selected	
Food	Security	 	 Organizing	 	
Stability		 	 Mindset	change	 	
Other	 	 Marketing	 	
	 	 Agricultural	inputs	 	
TABLE	13.	CODES	THAT	EMERGED	FROM	THE	TOC	ANALYSIS	OF	THE	INTERVIEWS	
Below,	I	portray	an	overview	of	the	theories	of	change	of	the	development	organisations	as	
they	emerge	 from	the	narrative	analysis	of	a	 selected	number	of	policy	papers	around	 the	
theme	 of	 youths	 in	 agribusiness.	 The	 documents	 I	 analysed	 were	 selected	 for	 the	
representativeness	of	the	peculiar	approach,	namely	where	the	public	versus	private-sector	
driven	 approaches	 stand	 out	 more	 clearly.	 More	 importantly,	 these	 policies	 are	 the	
framework	of	those	programmes	which	implementation	I	have	evaluated	(see	chapter	6).	As	
for	 the	 public	 sector,	 I	 have	 compiled	 a	 list	 of	 5	 development	 policies,	 strategic	 plans	 and	
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report	which	feature	the	government	theory	of	change	(ToC)	for	the	country	as	a	whole;	the	
ToC	of	the	Ministry	of	Gender	for	what	concerns	youth	policies	(namely,	the	Youth	Livelihood	
Programme,	YLP)	and	the	ToC	of	the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	for	what	entails	the	development	
strategy	 for	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 and	 the	 role	 youths	 should	 play	 in	 it.	 Regarding	 the	
development	policy	framework	for	programmes	which	are	more	driven	and	focused	on	the	
role	 of	 the	 private	 sector,	 I	 focused	 on	 the	 USAID	 programme	 ‘Feed	 the	 Future’	 and	 the	
Dutch-funded	 SKY	project	 implemented	by	 the	 Italian	NGO	AVSI.	 The	only	 exception	being	
the	document	of	Youth	Watch	2012,	which	I	selected	mostly	because	of	the	overview	it	gives	
on	the	specificities	of	the	young	share	of	the	Ugandan	population.		
Just	 to	 clarify	 the	 ordering	 of	 public	 policies,	 let	 me	 refer	 to	 the	 Census	 (	 UBOS,	 Uganda	
Bureau	 of	 Statistics,	 2014,	 p.	 5)	 as	 it	 states	 the	 hierarchy	 and	 logic	 of	 the	 public	
administration	system	guiding	the	development	efforts	of	the	Ugandan	public	institutions:		
Uganda’s	economy	 is	guided	by	the	National	Development	Plan.	The	country	 is	now	
implementing	 her	 second	National	 Development	 plan	 (NDP	 II)	which	 is	 designed	 to	
propel	 the	 economy	 towards	middle	 income	 status	 by	 2020	 in	 line	with	 the	 Vision	
2040.	 The	 NDP	 is	 implemented	 through	 Sector	 Investment	 Plans	 (SIPs),	 Local	
Government	 Development	 Plans	 (LGDPs),	 Annual	 work	 plans	 and	 Budgets	 of	
Ministries,	Departments	and	Agencies	(MDAs).	The	NDP	II	also	seeks	to	leverage	the	
International	and	Regional	Frameworks	such	as	Africa	Agenda	2063	and	the	Post	2015	
Development	Agenda	to	exploit	growth	opportunities.	
Below	 (Table	 14)	 is	 a	 list	 of	 the	policy	 briefs,	 strategies	 and	 reports	 I	 have	 analysed	 –	 and	
which	I	generally	refer	to	as	policy	briefs	or	documents:		
Sector	 Organisation	and	
programme		
Policy	papers	
Public	sector	 Ministry	of	Gender,	Labor	
and	Social	Development	-	
Youth	Livelihood	Programme		
1. YLP	Periodic	update	on	progress	in	
implementation	–	31	August	2017	
2. Second	National	Development	Plan	
(NDPII)	–	2015/16	–	2019/20	
3. National	Population	and	Housing	
Census	–	2014	Main	Report	
4. Uganda	Vision	2040	–	approved	in	
2007	
Ministry	of	Agriculture,	 5. Agriculture	Sector	Strategic	Plan	
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Animal	Industries	and	
Fisheries	
2015/16	–	2019/20	–	April	2016	
Private-sector	
driven	
USAID	–	Feed	the	Future,	
Youth	Leadership	in	
Agriculture	Activities		
6. Feed	the	Future,	2016	PROGRESS	
REPORT	-	Growing	Prosperity	for	a	
Food-Secure	Future	
7. Youth	and	Agriculture	in	Uganda:	
An	Assessment.	Combining	
agriculture	improvements	and	
youth	development	shows	promise	
for	both.	October	2014	
AVSI	–	SKY	project,	funded	
by	the	Dutch	Embassy	
8. Presentation	for	Dutch	Embassy:	
Skilling	Youths	for	Employment	in	
Agribusiness	(SKY)	-	A	Private	Public	
Partnership	approach	in	skilling	and	
job	creation	in	Uganda	
9. AVSI	Foundation	proposal	to	The	
Embassy	of	the	Kingdom	of	
Netherlands	for	funding	the	Skilling	
Youth	for	Employment	in	
Agribusiness	(SKY)	–	November	
2015	
BRAC	&	MasterCard	
Foundation	
10. Youth	Watch	2012	–	Problem	or	
Promise?	Harnessing	Youth	
Potential	in	Uganda	
TABLE	14.	POLICY	BRIEFS,	STRATEGIES	AND	REPORTS	
Below	 I	 report	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 codes	 for	 each	 ToC	 category,	 some	 emphasizing	 the	
consistency	 of	 ToC	 narratives	 of	 development	 practitioners	 and	 policy	 papers,	 and	 some	
(minority)	 which	 showed	 some	 degree	 of	 variation.	 As	 for	 the	 narrative	 analysis	 of	 the	
interviews,	the	categories	and	codes	were	not	used	as	mutually-exclusive	classifications,	but	
are	 rather	 observed	 as	 importance	 and	 attention	 given	 to	 certain	 topics	 (codes	within	 the	
categories).		
	
4.6.1	DEVELOPMENT	PROBLEM	
The	 development	 problem	 has	 been	 framed	 in	 a	more	 extensive	 and	 detailed	 way	 in	 the	
policy	documents	than	in	the	interviews	–	but	strikingly	reflect	a	consistency	with	the	visions	
of	 the	development	actors.	Although	 I	have	not	developed	 the	analysis	of	 the	policies	and	
guidelines	of	all	 the	development	organisations	 I	encountered	 in	the	field,	 I	 report	below	a	
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comparison	between	the	trends	in	the	answers	of	development	practitioners	and	the	framing	
of	the	development	problem	in	the	10	policy	documents	I	have	analysed.	This	comparison	is	
meant	as	an	indication	of	the	consistency	I	wanted	to	investigate:	it	should	not	be	treated	as	
an	absolute	 result	 in	 itself	but	 rather	as	a	 suggestion	 that	 the	opinions	of	my	 interviewees	
were	generally	consistent	with	the	views	expressed	in	the	policy	frameworks.		
	
FIGURE	22.	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	DEV.	PROBLEM	(INTERVIEWS	VS	PAPERS)	
As	 exemplified	 in	 the	 figure	 above	 (Figure	 22),	 there	 is	 a	 substantial	 consistency	 in	 the	
narratives	of	 development	practitioners	 and	 their	 organizations	 as	with	what	 concerns	 the	
conceptualization	of	the	development	problem.	The	major	discrepancy	regards	the	category	
‘other’,	which	mainly	 refers	 to	 the	 lack	of	 skills	and	adequate	education	of	youths	and	 the	
economic	condition	of	Uganda	as	a	‘least	developed	country’:	more	attention	to	these	issues	
was	given	in	the	policy	papers	I	analysed	than	in	the	interviews	I	recorded.	The	same	goes	for	
‘stability’	and	‘food	security’,	which	were	granted	greater	attention	 in	policy	papers	than	in	
the	 interviews.	 This	 could	 be	 explained	 as	 a	 variation	 that	 originates	 from	 the	 broader	
spectrum	of	possible	conceptualization	of	the	development	problems	of	Uganda,	particularly	
considering	the	fact	that	the	government	policies	guiding	the	implementation	of	the	YLP	are	
broader	than	main	concerns	about	youths	and	agribusiness.			
80
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The	 issue	of	youth	unemployment	was	described	as	a	burning	development	 issue	 in	all	 the	
policy	briefs	I	have	analysed,	with	a	rhetoric	similar	to	the	one	used	in	this	fragment	from	the	
USAID	assessment	on	Youth	and	Agriculture	in	Uganda	(Butler	&	Kebba,	2014,	p.	7):	
It	 is	clear	from	all	available	data	that	Ugandan	youth	are	struggling	to	transition	into	
the	 formal	 workforce,	 with	 the	 labour	 market	 able	 to	 absorb	 only	 80,000	 new	
workforce	entrants	out	of	 the	400,000	youth	entering	the	 labour	market	each	year.	
Weak	 demand	 for	 workers,	 coupled	 with	 a	 lack	 of	 access	 to	 finance	 or	 to	 other	
resources	such	as	land,	provides	youth	with	very	few	pathways	to	enter	formal	work,	
either	at	an	existing	workplace	or	a	start-up	enterprise	of	their	own	making.		
The	 text	 is	 underpinned	 with	 references	 to	 numeric	 facts	 and	 figures	 and	 resonates	 as	
assertive	and	sound.		
	
4.6.2	VISION	FOR	CHANGE	
In	regards	to	the	vision	for	change,	there	was	again	a	strong	consistency	between	the	views	
expressed	by	the	development	practitioners	I	interviewed	and	those	expressed	in	the	policy	
documents	I	analysed.	In	fact,	economic	growth	and	agricultural	modernization	were	clearly	
stated	in	the	documents	I	examined	as	the	main	goals	of	development	attention.		
Possibly	 the	 brief	 that	 had	most	 ambitious	 development	 goals	 was	 the	 Vision	 2040	 (GoU,	
Government	 of	 Uganda,	 2007,	 p.	 IV),	 which	 “is	 conceptualized	 around	 strengthening	 the	
fundamentals	of	 the	economy	to	harness	the	abundant	opportunities	around	the	country”.	
More	specifically,	as	with	what	concerns	the	agricultural	sector,	the	same	policy	brief	(ibid,	p.	
45)	states	that:	
102.	Uganda	aspires	to	transform	the	agriculture	sector	from	subsistence	farming	to	
commercial	 agriculture.	 This	 will	 make	 agriculture	 profitable,	 competitive	 and	
sustainable	 to	provide	 food	and	 income	security	 to	all	 the	people	of	Uganda.	 It	will	
also	 create	 employment	 opportunities	 along	 the	 entire	 commodity	 value	 chain	 of	
production,	processing	and	marketing.	
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The	 Vision	 2040	 was	 really	 intended	 to	 be	 a	 guiding	 principle	 and	 framework	 for	 all	
development	 activities,	 both	 for	 the	 public	 sector	 as	 for	 (inter)national	 development	
agencies,	and	therefore	maintained	a	rhetoric	that	allows	for	the	broad	scope	of	the	brief.		
Curiously,	the	issue	of	employment	(particularly	of	youths)	was	mentioned	as	a	development	
goal	 in	 itself	 –	 while	 in	 the	 interviews	 it	 emerged	 more	 as	 a	 development	 problem	
(unemployment)	to	be	solved,	rather	than	being	framed	as	an	 ideal	vision	for	the	future	of	
Uganda.	However,	for	how	strongly	emphasized	in	the	policy	documents,	 it	was	referred	to	
as	 instrumental	 to	 the	 economic	 growth	 of	 the	 country.	 Either	 way,	 employment	 was	
mentioned	in	development	policies	of	both	national	and	international	agencies.		
	
4.6.3	PATHWAY	TO	CHANGE	
The	 analysis	 of	 the	 10	 development	 policies	 I	 selected	 has	 highlighted	 a	 certain	 level	 of	
discrepancy	between	the	interviews	and	the	documents	(Figure	23).		
	
FIGURE	23.	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	PATHWAY	TO	CHANGE	(INTERVIEWS	VS	PAPERS)	
While	‘capacity	building’,	‘organizing’	and	‘agricultural	inputs’	have	been	reported	with	rather	
coherent	 consistency	 in	 both	 datasets,	 other	 categories	 were	 talked	 about	 with	 different	
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levels	 of	 importance.	 However,	 as	 for	 ‘funding’,	 it	 mainly	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 over-
representation	of	public	sector	policies,	which	are	the	development	agencies	investing	in	this	
development	tool;	on	the	contrary	the	sample	of	interviews	had	a	majority	of	development	
practitioners	from	non-public	organizations,	which	preferred	other	pathways	to	change.	The	
same	 goes	 for	 the	 category	 of	 ‘market	 linkages’:	 this	 tool	 was	 preferred	 by	 non-public	
development	 agencies,	 which	were	 under-represented	 in	 the	 sample	 of	 policy	 documents	
analysed	(in	comparison	with	the	sample	of	interviews).		
The	 YLP	 reminds	 us	 both	 of	 the	 vision	 for	 change	 as	 of	 the	 pathway	 to	 obtain	 such	
development	objectives	in	clear	and	ambitious	tones:		
The	Programme	Development	Objective	(PDO)	of	YLP	is	to	empower	the	target	youth	
in	Uganda	 to	 harness	 their	 socio-economic	 potential	 and	 increase	 self-employment	
opportunities	and	income	levels.	
(i)	Specific	Objectives	
–	To	provide	youth	with	marketable	vocational	skills	and	tool	kits	for	self-employment	
and	job	creation.	
–	 To	 provide	 financial	 support	 to	 enable	 the	 youth	 establish	 Income	 Generating	
Activities	(IGAs).	
–	To	provide	the	youth	with	entrepreneurship	and	life	skills	as	an	integral	part	of	their	
livelihoods.	
–	 To	provide	 youth	with	 relevant	 knowledge	and	 information	 for	 attitudinal	 change	
(positive	mindset	change).	(Ministry	of	Gender,	2017,	p.	3)	
	
In	this	passage,	several	development	tools	are	mentioned:	firstly	‘capacity	building’	(through	
the	 teaching	 of	 ‘marketable	 skills’);	 then	 ‘funding’	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 the	 generation	 of	 ‘income	
generating	activities’	(i.e.	economic	growth);	and	lastly	the	building	of	‘life	skills’	for	youths	to	
be	able	to	change	their	attitudes	towards	a	positive	mindset	–	which	would	supposedly	help	
them	towards	employment.		
Interestingly,	 the	development	 tool	of	 ‘capacity	building’	 is	 linked	 in	 the	USAID	assessment	
on	Youth	in	Agriculture	(Butler	&	Kebba,	2014,	p.	54)	as	a	set	of	skills	that	would	allow	youths	
to	‘be	their	own	boss’	and	thereby	become	‘agripreneurs’:		
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Basic	business	skills	training	–	“what	you	need	to	know	to	be	your	own	boss”	–	could	
be	 offered	 as	 an	 option,	 and	 ought	 to	 be	 a	 significant	menu	 option,	 coupled	 with	
mentoring	 and	 advisement.	 This	 is	 the	 “agripreneur”	 option.	 There	 will	 be	
opportunities	arising	from	the	connection	to	value	chain	operations	for	young	people	
to	 form	 their	 own	 enterprises.	 They	 will	 need	 skills,	 advice	 and	 mentoring,	 and	
guidance	in	basic	business	strategies.		
The	most	problematic	discrepancy	between	the	 two	datasets	concerns	a	 ‘mindset	change’.	
Attitude,	behaviour,	and	mindset	were	given	in	policy	documents	far	less	importance	than	in	
the	 interviews.	 I	 expect	 that	 this	 is	 to	 be	 related	 to	 the	 active	 and	 grounded	 role	
development	 practitioners	 played:	 the	 interaction	 and	 experience	with	 youths	might	 have	
triggered	 the	 elaboration	 of	 ‘mindset	 change’	 as	 a	 development	 tool	 which	 could	 not	 be	
valued	 in	 policy	 briefs	 due	 to	 the	 more	 abstract	 than	 experience-informed	 nature	 of	 the	
context.		
Moreover,	 an	 important	 concept	 has	 emerged	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 policy	 documents:	
institutional	 change,	 described	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 necessity	 to	 adequate	 the	 institutional	
structures,	practices	and	attitudes	of	practitioners	to	the	development	goals	set	in	the	ToC.	
This	 concept	 had	not	 so	 prominently	 emerged	 from	 the	 interviews,	 and	 therefore	 has	 not	
been	highlighted	in	the	narrative	analysis.	The	policy	briefs	by	USAID,	AVSI,	the	NDPII	and	the	
Vision	 2040	 in	 particular	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 institutional	 change.	 The	 latest	
document	 (GoU,	Government	of	Uganda,	2007,	p.	112),	 for	example,	discusses	the	 issue	 in	
these	terms:		
Over	 the	 Vision	 period,	 government	 shall	 adopt	 the	 business	 approach	 for	 public	
service	delivery	where	efficiency,	effectiveness	and	economy	will	be	the	main	basis	of	
decision	making.	This	will	include	high	quality	public	services,	efficient	civil	service	and	
independence	 from	 political	 interference,	 quality	 of	 policy	 formulation	 and	
implementation,	 and	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 Government’s	 commitment	 to	 such	
policies.	 All	 public	 services	 shall	 be	 available	 to	 all	 Ugandans	 without	 any	 form	 of	
discrimination.	
Interestingly,	the	government	efficiency	and	broad	institutional	change	seems	to	be	related	
to	a	general	shift	towards	a	‘business	approach	for	public	service	delivery’.	This	institutional	
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change	towards	more	of	a	corporate	management	of	the	res	publica	is	referred	to	in	Mosse	
(2013,	p.	228-237)	as	a	neoliberal	development	that	puts	“business	at	the	centre,	governing	
at	the	periphery”.		
	
4.6.4	TARGETING	
As	for	targeting,	the	analysis	of	development	policies	confirmed	the	trends	of	public	sector	
organisations	to	target	the	whole	social	group	of	youths	(mainly	the	unemployed	youths)	and	
non-public	 sector	 organisations	 to	 be	 focusing	 on	 a	 more	 selected	 number	 of	 youths	
(particularly	 the	SKY	project).	 For	example,	 the	YLP	 (Ministry	of	Gender,	2017,	p.	3)	 report	
states	 that:	 “The	 Youth	 Livelihood	 Programme	 (YLP)	 is	 Government	 of	 Uganda	 Rolling	
Programme,	 targeting	 the	 unemployed	 and	 poor	 youth	 in	 the	 country.	 It	 was	 designed	 in	
response	to	the	high	unemployment	rate	and	poverty	level	among	the	youth	in	the	country.”	
	
4.6.5	DISCUSSION	
The	 analysis	 of	 the	 10	 policy	 briefs	 enriches	 but	 does	 not	 alter	 the	 ToC	 that	 has	 emerged	
from	 the	narrative	 analysis	 of	 the	 interviews	with	development	 actors.	 In	 fact,	while	 there	
were	some	discrepancies,	 there	 is	a	broad	 level	of	general	 consistency	between	 interviews	
and	documents.	A	peculiar	aspect	of	the	narratives	emerging	from	the	policy	briefs	concerns	
the	rhetoric	used	in	the	expression	of	rather	vague	arguments:		
The	 intermediate	 benefits	 arising	 out	 the	 YLP	 include	 the	 following:	 (i)	 Youth	
Empowerment:	 The	 greater	 involvement	 of	 the	 Youth	 in	mobilization,	 sensitization,	
prioritization	 and	 planning	 for	 their	 needs,	 implementation	 and	 monitoring	 and	
evaluation	 of	 Programme	 activities	 has	 created	 a	 sense	 of	 empowerment	 and	
confidence	to	take	charge	of	their	destiny.	
This	extract	of	the	YLP	report	on	progress	implementation	(Ministry	of	Gender,	2017,	p.	10)	is	
an	emblematic	example	of	collection	of	 fuzzy	words	–	mainly	development	 jargon	–	 	which	
refer	 to	 little	concrete.	Although	 this	 rhetoric	was	not	a	prerogative	of	public	 sector	policy	
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briefs,	 it	might	have	emerged	more	prominently	 in	government	documents	because	of	 the	
all-encompassing	nature	of	 their	scope.	Another	example	of	such	vague	expressions	comes	
from	the	Vision	2040	(GoU,	Government	of	Uganda,	2007,	p.	45)	:		
101.	The	opportunity	for	value	addition	through	agro	processing	is	enormous.	This	will	
enhance	 Uganda’s	 competitiveness	 on	 the	 world	 market,	 boost	 foreign	 exchange	
earnings	 and	 employment.	 It	 can	 also	 reduce	 wastage,	 enhance	 food	 security,	
improve	 livelihoods	 for	 low-income	 groups	 and	 empower	 disadvantaged	 groups	 of	
society	like	rural	women,	youth	and	the	disabled.	
Interestingly,	 in	 this	 fragment	 the	youths	are	 clearly	depicted	as	being	part	of	 the	broader	
social	category	of	disadvantaged	people	to	be	empowered	and	thereby	achieving	a	list	of	not	
better	specified	objectives:	global	economic	competitiveness,	foreign	exchange,	food	security	
etc.		
	
4.8	CONCLUSION	&	DISCUSSION	
As	 emerges	 from	 the	 narrative	 analysis	 described	 above,	 there	 are	 different	 patterns	
characterizing	 the	 development	 trend	 around	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 in	 Uganda.	 These	
patterns	 highlight	 how	 the	 development	 organizations	 adopt	 strategies	 for	 youth	 in	
agribusiness	 –	 thereby	 answering	part	 of	 the	 research	question	 I	 set	 out	 to	 answer	 in	 this	
chapter.	For	the	sake	of	the	analysis	of	their	narratives,	I	have	structured	my	investigation	of	
the	‘how’	through	the	three	phases	of	the	TOC.		
As	 for	 the	 conceptualization	 of	 the	 development	 problem,	 there	 appear	 to	 be	 an	 array	 of	
concepts	 emerging	 from	 the	development	 actors’	 narratives,	which	 follow	different	 trends	
depending	 whether	 the	 actor	 is	 affiliated	 to	 a	 national	 or	 international	 organization.	
Altogether,	 the	 development	 problem	 is	 described	 in	 terms	 of	 youth	 unemployment	 and	
demographic	 preponderance	 of	 youths	 (the	 so-called	 ‘youth	 bulge’).	 However,	 youth	
unemployment	seems	to	be	considered	much	more	of	a	problem	by	national	development	
agencies	than	international	ones,	who	are	more	concerned	about	the	‘youth	bulge’.		
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When	 setting	 out	 to	 envisioning	 the	 ideal	 outcomes	 of	 their	 development	 efforts,	
development	practitioners	describe	their	vision	for	change	in	terms	of	economic	growth	and	
agricultural	modernization.	About	 the	 vision	 for	 change,	 I	 did	not	 encounter	 any	particular	
trend	differentiating	national	from	international	organizations.	Significantly,	the	development	
goals	 of	 the	 organizations	 were	 not	 diversified	 according	 to	 the	 definition	 of	 the	
development	problem.		
Instead,	when	describing	the	best	strategies	for	operationalizing	their	vision	for	change	and	
tackle	 the	 development	 problem,	 a	 considerable	 variation	 emerged	 again:	 while	 mindset	
change	 and	 capacity	 building	 emerged	 predominantly	 for	 both	 national	 and	 international	
organizations,	they	were	both	significantly	more	important	for	national	than	for	international	
agencies.	 Moreover,	 another	 important	 difference	 was	 that	 directly	 funding	 youth	 was	
considered	 as	 viable	 strategy	by	 national	 organizations,	 but	 not	 by	 international	 ones.	 The	
narratives	concerning	the	pathway	to	change	were	set	in	a	rather	‘technicalizing’	tone,	where	
development	change	seems	 to	be	 largely	dependent	on	 the	adoption	of	 the	 right	business	
skills	and	mentality,	plus	the	implementation	of	modern	agricultural	technologies	and	inputs.	
Despite	aligning	the	analysis	of	the	development	narratives	in	the	three	phases	of	TOC,	there	
seems	 to	 be	 quite	 a	 dissonance	 between	 the	 conceptualizations	 of	 the	 three	 phases,	 as	
elaborated	by	the	development	actors.		
Besides	the	differences	between	national	and	international	development	organizations,	two	
different	development	approaches	were	identified	as	strategies	for	change.	The	first	being	a	
primarily	 public	 approach,	 adopted	 largely	 by	 national	 (governmental)	 institutions,	 the	
second	being	private-sector	driven	and	adopted	more	by	international	institutions.	While	the	
goal	 of	 both	 development	 approaches	 is	 that	 of	 modernizing	 the	 agricultural	 sector	 and	
lifting	the	economy	to	middle-income	status,	the	operationalization	was	rather	different:	the	
first	would	invest	in	creating	a	new	generation	of	organized	agripreneurs	by	supporting	their	
business	 plan	 with	 an	 investment	 capital;	 the	 second	 would	 focus	 on	 connecting	 private-
sector	 driven	 market	 opportunities	 to	 a	 selected	 number	 of	 youths,	 to	 promote	 their	
business	 skills	 to	 supply	 the	 market	 demand.	 The	 private-sector	 driven	 development	
approach	seems	to	be	particularly	symptomatic	of	the	shift	from	aid	to	trade,	which	is	more	
general	 to	 the	 international	 development	 cooperation	 (Westen	 &	 Zoomers,	 2014).	Mosse	
(2013,	 p.	 228)	 describes	 this	 shift	 as	 putting	 “business	 at	 the	 center,	 governing	 at	 the	
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periphery”	–	thereby	strengthening	the	depoliticizing	force	 identified	by	Ferguson	(2014)	 in	
the	‘90s	in	his	aidnography	of	the	development	industry	in	Lesotho.		
Whatever	 the	 differences	 and	 trends	 in	 the	 approaches	 to	 development	 efforts,	 a	 clearly	
neoliberal	 pattern	emerged.	 The	development	problem	was	 identified	 as	 a	 structural	 issue	
that	 combines	 the	 skew	 demographic	 dividend	 with	 high	 youth	 unemployment	 rates.	
However,	the	strategy	to	target	such	issues	would	lay	the	responsibility	of	change	with	those	
most	affected	by	the	development	issue:	the	youths	themselves.	This	also	explains	the	severe	
tones	 in	 which	 youths	 are	 talked	 about	 (see	 previous	 chapter)	 in	 development	 discourse:	
either	 blamed	 for	 being	 lazy,	 with	 an	 entitlement	 mentality	 that	 dooms	 them	 to	 missing	
business	opportunities	 in	agribusiness;	or	praises	them	for	being	the	drivers	of	change,	the	
future	of	agriculture	–	the	very	champions	and	hope	of	Uganda.	This	development	trend	that	
shifts	 the	 attention	 from	unemployment	 to	 the	unemployed	 (the	 youths),	 recalls	 the	 shift,	
already	 identified	by	Mosse	(2010,	 in	Pallotti	&	Zamponi,	2014,	p.	45),	 from	poverty	to	the	
poor.		
Moreover,	 this	 shift	 of	 attention	 to	 the	 youths	 as	 beneficiaries	 and	 implementers	 of	
development	change	pathologizes	those	among	the	youths	who	fail	to	become	agripreneurs,	
while	praising	the	successful	ones	as	being	the	champions	and	drivers	of	change.	This	trend	
in	 international	 development	 had	 been	 identified	 by	 Ferguson	 (2014),	 with	 reference	 to	
poverty	 and	 the	 poor	 –	 which	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 development	 industry	 are	 indeed	
pathologized	and	depoliticized.	As	Rap	(2006,	p.	1303)	recalls:		
Ferguson	shows	that	 the	 framing	of	development	 interventions	 in	a	 technical	policy	
discourse	 explains	why	 ‘many	 projects	 fail	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 stated	 objectives	while	
being	more	successful	in	terms	of	unstated	agendas’	(Gasper,	1996a:	166).	It	works	as	
part	 of	 a	 two-sided	 process:	 the	 ideological	 effect	 of	 such	 a	 discourse	 –	
depoliticisation	 –	 disguises	 its	 institutional	 effects,	 that	 is	 the	 expansion	 of	
bureaucratic	power	(Ferguson,	1990).	
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“The	ears	will	never	be	higher	than	the	head”	–	Acholi	proverb		
	
5.1	INTRODUCTION		
The	Ugandan	population	has	grown	six-fold	since	the	‘50s	(UNFPA,	United	Nations	Population	
Fund,	2011).	According	to	the	United	Nations	Population	Fund	(UNFPA),	in	2011,	78%,	of	the	
Ugandan	population	was	under	30	years	of	age,	with	the	perspective	of	a	steady	increase	of	
this	percentage	as	the	population	continues	to	grow.	In	2014,	the	Ugandan	Census	recorded	
that	22.5%	of	the	population	was	in	the	youth	category	(18-30)	recognized	by	the	Ugandan	
Constitution.	 With	 an	 increasingly	 young	 population,	 the	 government	 and	 international	
development	agencies	have	in	the	last	5-10	years	focused	their	development	efforts	on	this	
social	category.		
As	described	in	the	previous	chapter,	development	efforts	are	targeting	youth	with	different	
strategies	and	approaches,	to	boost	their	employability	 in	agribusiness.	Despite	the	process	
of	urbanization,	the	majority	of	the	youth	still	 live	 in	rural	areas	and	the	majority	of	youths	
are	 engaged	 in	 agricultural	 activities,	 either	 for	 subsistence	 or	 business.	 As	 mentioned	 in	
earlier	chapters,	I	sampled	to	youths	as	a	social	group	comprehended	between	18	and	35	–	
the	widest	range	adopted	by	development	agencies.	However,	defining	and	identifying	their	
characteristics,	capacities	and	constraints	of	such	a	broad	social	group	remains	a	challenging	
enterprise	that	scholars	are	just	starting	to	attend.	There	are	56	different	ethnic	groups	living	
in	 Uganda	 (National	 Youth	 Policy,	 2001).	 Besides	 the	 ethnic	 variety,	 youths	 include	 both	
males	 and	 females,	 illiterates	 and	 highly	 educated	 farmers,	 experienced	 agripreneurs	 and	
simple	subsistence	farmers.	What	is	the	use	of	the	analytical	category	of	‘youth’	if	it	refers	to	
the	 majority	 of	 the	 population	 in	 such	 a	 heterogeneous	 country?	 How	 can	 youths’	
heterogeneity	 be	 systematised?	 How	 do	 the	 youths	 define	 themselves	 and	 how	 do	 they	
experience	the	engagement	in	agribusiness?		
In	 this	chapter,	 I	explore	 the	meaning	and	making	of	youth	as	a	social	category	 in	Uganda.	
Using	a	qualitative	approach,	I	study	youth	from	the	perspective	of	youths	themselves	–	as	it	
emerges	from	their	narratives,	and	from	my	participant	observation	during	fieldwork	in	four	
sub	regions	of	Uganda.	I	investigate	youth	as	a	concept,	social	category,	identity	and	status.	
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Furthermore,	 I	 look	 at	 youth	 as	 object	 and	 subject	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 the	 recent	
development	 trend	 around	 youth	 in	 agribusiness.	 By	 doing	 this,	 I	 try	 to	 give	 an	 empirical	
answer	to	the	second	(sub)	research	question	of	this	study:	who	are	the	youths	 in	Uganda,	
and	how	do	they	experience	engagement	in	agribusiness?	
This	chapter	addresses	the	definitional	problem	of	youths	in	Uganda.	Given	that	the	majority	
of	 the	 Ugandan	 population	 is	 under	 30	 years	 of	 age,	 development	 programmes	 targeting	
youth	 are	 addressing	 a	 wide	 share	 of	 the	 population	 –	 leaving	 development	 actors	 and	
scholars	 with	 the	 issue	 of	 approaching	 an	 extremely	 heterogeneous	 social	 group.	 This	
chapter	 offers	 a	 youthnography	 –	 an	 ethnographic	 description	 of	 the	 youth’s	 identity,	
aspirations	 and	 experiences	 in	 agribusiness,	 in	 and	 out	 of	 development	 schemes.	 I	 hereby	
attempt	a	systematisation	of	the	heterogeneity	of	factors	making	the	youths	such	a	diverse	
social	category,	as	it	emerged	from	the	ethnographic	data	I	collected	throughout	the	country.		
The	 chapter	will	 first	 (section	5.2)	 explore	 the	 issue	defining	 youths	 through	 the	 academic	
debate	 and	 discussions	 among	 development	 actors,	 showing	 how	 ‘youth’	 remains	 a	
controversial	and	fuzzy	social	category.	In	section	5.3,	I	provide	a	brief	overview	of	the	data	I	
have	collected	from	interviews	with	youth	themselves.	In	this	section	I	will	also	introduce	the	
heterogeneity	 factors,	 which	 all	 emerged	 from	 the	 qualitative	 analysis	 of	 my	 data	 –	 as	
recurrent	 codes	or	determinant	 factors	emerging	 from	my	observations	 in	 the	 field.	 These	
factors,	that	emerged	from	an	inductive	process	of	analysis,	were	indicative	of	the	traits	that	
determined	 youths’	 identity	 and	 their	 experience	 of	 engagement	 in	 agribusiness.	 In	 the	
section	5.4,	I	systemize	the	heterogeneity	factors	making	up	three	main	dimensions	in	which	
youths	are	embedded.	These	dimensions,	territorial,	socio-cultural	and	value	chain,	emerged	
from	the	analysis	of	my	data	as	meta-categories	of	the	heterogeneity	factors.	In	this	section,	I	
analyse	the	data	related	to	each	of	the	three	dimensions.	Before	coming	to	the	conclusion,	I	
make	an	overview	(section	5.5)	of	the	dynamics	and	relations	playing	out	around	the	youths.	
Here,	 I	 show	the	complexity	and	messiness	of	 the	relations	 in	which	youths	are	embedded	
when	engaging	in	agribusiness	development.		
	
	
	 185	
5.2	YOUTH:	A	CONTENDED	AND	HETEROGENEOUS	SOCIAL	CATEGORY	
Over	the	last	decades	the	studies	on	African	youths	have	increasingly	grown	in	number	and	
popularity	(Sumberg,	Anyidoho,	Leavy,	te	Lintelo,	&	Wellard,	2012),	in	large	part	because	the	
demographic	 growth	 in	most	African	nations.	 The	 analytical	 tools	 elaborated	by	 social	 and	
development	 studies	make	 us	 aware	 that	 approaching	 this	 social	 category	 is	 an	 extremely	
delicate	endeavour.	Christiansen	et	al	(2006,	p.	11)	argue	that	
In	studying	young	people	we	must,	in	other	words,	see	youth	as	both	social	being	and	
social	becoming:	as	a	position	in	movement	(Vigh	2003;	2006).	Youth	is	both	a	social	
position	which	is	internally	and	externally	shaped	and	constructed,	as	well	as	part	of	a	
larger	societal	and	generational	process,	a	state	of	becoming.	We	need	thus	to	look	at	
the	 ways	 youth	 are	 positioned	 in	 society	 and	 the	 ways	 they	 seek	 to	 position	
themselves	in	society,	to	illuminate	the	ways	the	category	of	youths	is	socio-politically	
constructed,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ways	 young	 people	 construct	 counter-positions	 and	
definitions.	
According	to	Van	Dijk	et	al	(2011)	youth	can	be	studied	as	a	phenomenon,	as	a	category	and	
as	 an	 ideology:	 as	 a	 phenomenon,	 it	 refers	 to	 the	 booming	 demography	 of	 most	 African	
countries;	as	a	category,	it	indicates	a	phase	of	‘becoming’	from	childhood	to	adulthood;	and	
recently	 as	 an	 ideology,	 “Under	 the	 current	 dispensation	 of	 donor	 funding,	 relief	
programmes	and	 international	aid,	 these	 [development]	discussions	have	made	the	 ‘youth’	
the	 major	 beneficiary	 of	 what	 these	 policies	 offer	 and	 imply.	 (…)	 If	 the	 donor-	 ideology	
prescribes	 youthfulness	 for	 societal	 and	 developmental	 relevance,	 it	 will	 then	 dictate	
practice.”	 (2011,	 p.	 1).	 Framing	 the	 academic	 debate	 around	 youth	 is	 a	 heated	 and	 ever-
unfinished	dispute.	As	a	 consequence	of	 the	magnitude	of	 the	demographic	phenomenon,	
youth	has	become	the	object	of	 increased	development	attention.	The	study	of	youths	has	
become	an	increasingly	politicized	topic.		
Paradoxically,	 the	very	 fact	 that	youths	have	been	 framed	as	an	age-range,	puts	 them	 in	a	
marginal	 and	 liminal	 position	 in	 society.	 Their	 precarious	 condition	 of	 unemployment,	 has	
extended	 the	 period	 before	 youth	 are	 able	 to	 attain	 adulthood	 through	 economic	 status.	
Youth,	 which	 has	 traditionally	 been	 a	 brief,	 liminal,	 phase	 of	 passage	 (Aime	 &	 Pietropolli	
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Charmet,	 2014)	 has	 become	 an	 extended	 condition	 of	 ‘waithood’	 (Sommers,	 2015,	 p.	 13).	
Sommers	(2015,	p.	65)	argues	that:	“Attaining	and	retaining	adulthood	is	the	most	crucially	
overlooked	 issue	 in	Africa.	As	Honwana	has	highlighted,	 “Youth	are	 the	majority	of	Africa’s	
population,	but	they	have	been	pushed	to	the	margins	of	their	societies	and	live	 in	a	 limbo	
between	childhood	and	adulthood”	(2012:	165)”.		
As	 I	will	 explain	 in	more	 details	 in	 the	 sections	 below,	 I	 found	 that	 attaining	 the	 status	 of	
adulthood	was	one	of	the	most	crucial	aspirations	for	young	men	I	interviewed,	also	driving	
their	ambitions	in	and	beyond	agribusiness.	In	several	contexts,	the	social	status	of	youth	is	
associated	 to	 personal	 and	 economic	 irresponsibility	 –	 an	 uncertain	 state	where	 especially	
young	males	want	to	get	out	of.	On	the	contrary,	proving	to	be	adult	is	related	to	(relative)	
economic	success	as	much	as	it	is	to	personal	and	business	planning.	The	passage	from	youth	
to	adult	social	status	is	thus	not	bond	to	age,	but	rather	dependent	on	personal	and	material	
achievements.	Moreover,	particularly	for	male	youths,	the	achievement	of	the	adult	status	is	
also	 related	 to	 social	 inclusion	 in	 the	 ethnic	 group	 as	 men.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Bagishu	 men	
(Eastern	 sub-region	 around	 Mbale),	 this	 passage	 would	 be	 consolidated	 by	 the	 ritual	 of	
circumcision	–	which	would	determine	both	the	attainment	of	adulthood	and	manhood,	and	
full-fledged	belonging	to	the	ethnic	group.	As	Alex,	a	fruit	vendor	at	the	central	food	market	
in	Kampala,	originally	from	Mbale,	explained	to	me:		
Me:	And	other	than	circumcision,	what	are	other	things	that	can	contribute	to	making	
someone	mature,	like	a	proper	man?	
Alex:		Of	course	now,	we	have	this	way,	now	like	me,	I	am	not	at	school	as	I	told	you.	
now	like	 I’m	25	years.	But	what	have	you	done?	You	have	what?	Are	you	planning?	
Eh?	That	is	the	way.	They	can	show	you	someone	that,	yea,	you	are	mature	enough,	
you	are	planning?	What	have	you	done?	For	example,	now	like	in,	as	I	told	you	that	I	
did	a	nursery,	I	did,	I	did	eh,	my	project	of	the	nursery	bedding	[he	had	cultivated	and	
traded	coffee	seedlings	in	Mbale,	years	back,	as	first	business].	From	nursery	bedding,	
I	used	to	pay	some	school	fees	[for	himself	and	siblings],	I	could	afford	to	eat	at	school	
and	 I	 bought	 my	 three	 cows.	 That	 one	 can	 show	 that	 someone	 [has	 achieved	
economic	 independence],	eh?	This	guy	 is	mature!	 Instead	of	getting	money,	you	go	
and	 enjoy	 with	 your	 friends,	 drinking,	 what,	 without	 doing	 anything.	 As	 you	 said,	
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when	 you	 get	 10000	 [Ugandan	 shillings],	 do	 you	 save	 [it]?	 you	 eat	 some,	 you	 save	
some	for	future,	for	tomorrow.	There,	someone	can	say	that	this	guy,	or	this	 lady	is	
mature	enough.	A	grown	up.108	
Because	 of	 the	 precarious	 economic	 environment	 in	which	most	Ugandan	 youths	 live,	 the	
attainment	 of	 adulthood	 through	 economic	 success	 is	 a	 precarious.	 In	 line	with	 Sommers,	
such	social	transformation	is	closely	connected	to	social	instability:	where	the	attainment	of	
adulthood	 follows	 the	achievement	of	 social	 status	and	economic	 success,	 “defining	young	
people	as	youth,	in	Africa	and	many	other	world	regions,	must	entail	more	than	an	age	range	
or	 a	 culturally	 delineated	 transformation	 period”	 (2015,	 p.	 14).	 Nonetheless,	 most	
development	agencies	work	with	a	youth	definition	determined	by	age	boundaries,	although	
there	is	no	agreement	on	what	the	age	ranges	should	be	(Table	15).		
Organization	 Definition	
of	youth	
Ugandan	
Constitution109	
18	–	30		
UN110	 15	–	24		
AU111	 15	–	35		
WB112	 15	–	24		
USAID113	 10	–	29		
TABLE	15.	DEFINITION	OF	YOUTHS	BY	DEV.	ORGANIZATION	
However,	 given	 the	 broad	 share	 of	 the	 Ugandan	 population	 falling	 under	 the	 category	 of	
youth,	it	is	hard	to	underestimate	the	great	heterogeneity.	In	2001	the	first,	rather	loose	and	
																																																						
108	Extract	from	interview	with	Alex,	on	5/05/2017	in	Kampala.		
109	National	Youth	Policy:	
http://www.youthpolicy.org/national/Uganda_2001_National_Youth_Policy.pdf		
110	UN	Youth	Definition:	http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/youth/fact-sheets/youth-
definition.pdf		
111	African	Youth	Charter:	http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/african_youth_charter_2006.pdf		
112	WB	youth	policy:	
http://www.youthpolicy.org/mappings/internationalyouthsector/directory/actors/worldbank/		
113	USAID	Youth	Development	Policy	
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/Youth_in_Development_Policy_0.pdf		
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non-binding	National	Youth	Policy	(MGLSD,	2001)	was	published	in	Uganda,	recognizing	the	
socio-cultural	diversity	of	the	group	the	policy	was	targeting:		
Uganda	 being	 a	 multi-ethnic	 country	 with	 56	 different	 ethnic	 groups	 has	 so	 many	
divergent	beliefs	and	practices.	These	include	issues	of	early	non-consensual	marriage	
where	 over	 50%	 of	 Ugandan	 women	 marry	 before	 18	 years,	 while	 their	 male	
counterparts	 marry	 at	 23	 years.	 Other	 negative	 practices	 include	 wife	
inheritance/sharing	 or	 replacement,	 Female	 Genital	 Mutilation,	 with	 associated	
rituals	and	culture	that	teaches	females	submissiveness	rather	than	assertiveness.	 
The	 urban	 youth	 are	 also	 experiencing	 a	 lot	 of	 influence	 from	 Western	 culture	
through	the	media	and	are	continuously	and	inappropriately	exposed	to	pornographic	
materials.	 This	 coupled	 with	 changing	 family	 structures,	 disruptions	 etc.	 challenge	
traditional	control	on	behaviours	of	youth.	This	 leaves	them	in	a	generation	with	no	
clear	 cultural	 identity	 or	 values	 often	 conflicting	 with	 society	 and	 established	
structures.	 
Furthermore	 the	 youth	 in	 nomadic	 and	 pastoral	 communities	 experience	 unique	
conditions	such	as	lack	of	education	and	health	facilities	and	engage	in	cattle	rustling	
which	warrant	special	consideration114.	 
From	 this	 short	 article	 a	 number	 of	 themes	 emerge	 as	 defining	 the	 diversity	 of	 the	 young	
population	 in	 Uganda:	 ethnicity,	 “beliefs	 and	 practices”,	 marriage	 practices,	 gender	 and	
adulthood	related	rites	of	passage,	rural/urban	diversity	 in	socio-cultural	practices,	evolving	
identity	and	values,	accessibility	to	facilities	and	education.		
As	discussed	by	Van	Dijk	et	al	(2011,	p.	4),	there	is	a	heated	academic	debate	regarding	the	
definitional	boundaries	of	youth:		
…the	 question	 of	 how	 we	 can	 make	 sure	 that	 we	 do	 not	 superimpose	 Western	
categories	of	social	analysis,	which	may	become	meaningless	in	the	particular	cultural	
or	 historical	 setting.	 Does	 African	 youth	 exist	 at	 all	 and	 in	 whose	 hands	 rests	 the	
conceptual	 invention	 here?	 Or	 are	 we	 exoticising	 African	 youth	 if	 we	 assume	 that	
																																																						
114	MINISTRY	OF	GENDER,	2001,	article	2.8,	p.	8	
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matters	must	be	different	in	Africa,	compared	to	the	West	or	Asia	(…)	when	it	comes	
to	 such	 delimitations	 and	 demarcations?	 (…)	 Social	 science	 studies	 often	 followed	
these	‘emic’	categorisations,	sometimes	naively,	believing	that	the	emic115	is	the	royal	
road	 to	 the	 truth.	 Yet	 in	 addition	 to	 this,	 the	 missionary	 endeavour,	 the	 colonial	
apparatus	 and	 the	 independent	 nation-states	 all	 put	 in	 place	 systems	 of	 education	
that	to	a	large	extent	were	capable	of	capturing	youth	and	which	therefore	operated	
on	the	basis	of	ideas	of	what	youth	is.		
In	the	following	of	this	chapter,	I	will	attempt	a	systematic	analysis	of	the	factors	contributing	
to	shape	Ugandan	youths’	identity	and	agribusiness	experiences	–	for	the	complex,	dynamic	
and	heterogeneous	socio-economic	group	they	are.		
	
5.3	STUDYING	HETEROGENEITY	
In	this	section	 I	briefly	summarise	the	ethnographic	methods	through	which	 I	collected	the	
data	on	Uganda	youths.	Moreover,	I	will	make	an	overview	of	the	main	traits	that	emerged	
from	the	qualitative	analysis	of	the	interviews	with	youths.		
Before	 starting	 the	 extensive	 fieldwork	 with	 youths,	 I	 had	 travelled	 through	 the	 country	
during	two	pilot	field	trips:	I	was	aware	of	the	diverse	socio-cultural,	economic	and	ecologic	
scenarios	I	was	going	to	encounter	 in	the	different	sub-regions.	 In	fact,	 it	was	precisely	this	
diversity,	 together	 with	 the	 awareness	 I	 had	 built	 up	 through	 literature	 review	 –	 that	
convinced	me	to	focus	my	research	in	four	different	locations116:	I	was	puzzled	as	to	how	the	
theories	 of	 change	 of	 the	 development	 actors	 I	 had	 interviewed	 would	 have	 been	
implemented	 in	 such	 diverse	 contexts.	 Altogether,	 I	 have	 conducted	 110	 semi-structured	
interviews	in	four	locations:	
	
																																																						
115	‘Emic’	 is,	 in	 anthropological	 terms,	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 subject,	 while	 ‘etic’	 is	 the	
perspective	of	the	observer.		
116	I	have	elaborated	the	justification	of	the	four	fieldwork	locations	in	the	methods	chapter.	
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Period	 Location	 Activity	
March	–	April	2017	 Gulu	 29	 semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 young	
agro-entrepreneurs	
March	&	May	2017	 Kampala	 26	 semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 young	
agro-entrepreneurs	
May	–	June	2017	 Mbarara	 25	 semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 young	
agro-entrepreneurs	
June	2017	 Mbale	 30	 semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 young	
agro-entrepreneurs	
TABLE	16.	TIMETABLE	MULTI-SITED	FIELDWORK	WITH	YOUTHS	
I	 have	 studied	 youths’	 heterogeneity	 with	 qualitative	 methods,	 analysing	 the	 interviews	
collected	 through	 coding.	 In	 this	 process,	 a	 number	 of	 factors	 emerged	 as	 being	 most	
influential	 in	 determining	 youths’	 heterogeneity	 of	 identity	 and	 agribusiness	 practices.	 I	
describe	 such	heterogeneity	 factors	 in	 section	5.3.1	below,	 summarising	 the	main	 traits	of	
these	factors.	These	factors,	which	emerged	from	the	coding	of	the	interviews,	are	categories	
grouping	 the	 most	 recurrent	 codes,	 or	 determinant	 aspects	 I	 have	 recorded	 through	
participant	observation	and	comparison	of	data	across	the	regions	of	multi-sited	fieldwork.		
Later	 in	 this	 chapter,	 I	 will	 further	 explore	 their	 traits	 as	 they	 emerge	 from	 empirical	
ethnographic	data.		
	5.3.1	HETEROGENEITY	FACTORS		
Heterogeneity	factors	 Explanation	
1. Family	background	 Crucial	 in	 shaping	 youths’	 identity,	 aspirations	 and	 success	 in	
agribusiness	 was	 the	 family	 in	 which	 the	 youth	 was	 born.	 I	
encountered	 youths	 who,	 with	 pride,	 took	 over	 their	 family	
enterprise,	 and	 others	 whom	 had	 been	 penalised	 by	 their	
parents	for	being	 last	born.	By	family	background	I	refer	to	the	
extended	 family	 including	 grandparents,	 aunts	 and	 uncles,	
grandchildren	 and	 female	 in-laws.	 In	 most	 instances,	 I	
encountered	patriarchal	 families	where	 assets	 and	 status	were	
inherited	 patri-lineally	 and	married	 women	 would	 live	 in	 their	
husband’s	 ancestral	 land.	 	 Exceptions	 were	 made	 when	 the	
eldest	member	 of	 the	 family	was	 a	woman,	 in	which	 case	 she	
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would	be	making	decisions	about	agribusiness,	 inheritance	and	
marriages.		
There	are	several	components	forming	factor:	a)	the	social	class	
and	status	of	 the	family,	b)	 it’s	economic	status	and	ownership	
of	land,	and	c)	the	availability	of	the	family	to	support	its	youths	
in	agribusiness	enterprising.		
2. Gender	 Gender	is	certainly	a	defining	trait	of	one’s	identity,	particularly	
so	 in	 the	 liminal	 phase	 of	 youth:	 the	 capacity	 to	 obtain	
adulthood	 was	 shaped	 by	 the	 cultural	 norms	 and	 values	
attributed	 to	 youths’	 sex.	 In	 fact,	 the	 socio-cultural	 and	
economic	 requirements	 for	 the	 attainment	 of	 adulthood	 (and	
thus	 exit	 the	 social	 category	 of	 youth)	 were	 radically	 different	
for	 men	 and	 women.	 Men	 would	 be	 required	 to	 gain	 social	
status	 through	economic	 success:	 acquiring	manhood	 is	 in	 fact	
strictly	 linked	 to	 economic	 realization,	 assuming	 the	 latter	 can	
be	obtained	when	a	youth	 is	mature	enough	to	make	sensitive	
economic	 choices.	 In	 most	 cases	 I	 encountered,	 this	 status	
would	be	sealed	by	a	rite	of	passage	which	confirmed	its	social	
recognition	(e.g.	circumcision).	Because	of	the	financial	pressure	
to	 the	 achievement	 of	 adulthood,	 male	 youths	 I	 spoke	 were	
particularly	 eager	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 quick	 returns	 of	 their	
agribusiness	 to	 exit	 youth	 and	 enter	manhood.	 	 Female	 youth	
would	be	 less	bond	to	economic	status	 for	 the	achievement	of	
adulthood.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 they	 would	 exit	 the	 category	 of	
youth	 when	 they	 would	 get	 married	 and/or	 have	 children.	
However,	economic	power	of	women	was	generally	perceived	as	
a	threat	to	both	the	patriarchal	power	distribution	in	the	family,	
and	to	the	fragile	status	of	men	as	adults.		
Moreover,	 for	 women,	 marital	 relationship	 radically	 impacted	
their	 identity	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 shape	 their	 careers	 in	
agribusiness:	 only	 the	 few	who	were	 lucky	 enough	 to	marry	 a	
permissive	husband	would	be	allowed	to	work,	spend	long	hours	
out	 of	 home	 and	 potentially	 earn	 a	 higher	 financial	 and	 social	
status	then	their	spouse.		
3. Age	 For	 this	 research,	 I	 have	 adopted	 a	 very	 broad	 age	 range	 for	
youths,	 from	18	 to	35,	a	definition	which	would	 include	all	 the	
definitions	of	the	development	organisations	I	have	interviewed.	
However,	there	was	a	great	variation	between	the	younger	and	
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older	informants	in	this	category.	Such	variety	mainly	depended	
on:	a)	youths’	ability	to	access	assets	(the	elder	ones	would	have	
more	 chance	 of	 inheriting	 from	 their	 parents,	 and	would	 have	
greater	 chances	 of	 accessing	 financial	 services)	 b)	 aspirations	
and	 planning	 (the	 younger	 ones	 would	 focus	 more	 on	
agribusiness	 activities	 that	 would	 give	 quick	 returns	 like	
horticulture	 and	 service	 provision,	 while	 the	 elder	 ones	would	
aim	 at	 more	 ambitious	 agribusiness);	 	 c)	 knowledge	 and	 skills	
also	greatly	differed	according	to	the	experience	gained.		
4. Values	&	norms	in	
agriculture	
There	 was	 great	 variation	 in	 the	 meanings	 attributed	 to	 the	
agricultural	 enterprises,	 which	 could	 be	 considered	 anything	
from	 a	 forced-choice	 functional	 to	 subsistence,	 to	 a	 major	
ambition	for	entrepreneurial	business.	In	fact,	while	the	majority	
of	 the	 Ugandan	 population	 is	 engaged	 in	 agriculture,	 this	 is	
mostly	 subsistence	 agriculture	 rather	 than	 commercial	
agribusiness.	 Values	 and	 norms	 attributed	 to	 agricultural	
activities	also	greatly	varied	in	the	different	sub-regions	where	I	
conducted	fieldwork.		
5. Ethnicity	 Ethnicity	was	 a	 socio-cultural	 trait	which	 youths	often	 referred	
to	 in	 defining	 their	 identity	 (as	 youth)	 and	 their	 activities	 (in	
agribusiness).	It	was	a	crucial	factor	influencing	both	criteria	for	
attainment	 of	 adulthood	 status	 and	 in	 shaping	 the	 values	 and	
norms	attributed	to	agribusiness.		I	here	refer	to	the	concept	of	
ethnicity	 as	 a	 socio-cultural	 category	 comprising	 a	 shared	 and	
dynamic	 system	 of	 norms	 and	 values	 for	 social	 interaction,	
identity	 and	 belonging	 to	 a	 community	 of	 people	 sharing	
language	and	traditions.	The	recent,	post-independence	history	
has	 sclerotized	 ethnic	 differences,	 particularly	 in	 the	 North	 –	
where	Acholi	people	suffered	a	long	civil	war	–	and	in	the	South-
West,	where	Museveni	has	favoured	the	Banyankole	people	for	
political	 reasons.	 Baganda	 people	 in	 the	 Central	 region,	 which	
are	the	largest	ethnic	group	in	Uganda	had	been	favoured	by	the	
British	 colonial	 political	 system	 and	 are	 recently	 claiming	
recognition.	 During	 the	 period	 of	 my	 fieldwork	 I	 have	 often	
heard	 concerns	 about	 the	 violent	 clashes	 that	 occurred	 in	
November	 2016	 in	 the	 district	 of	 Kasese,	 when	 the	 police	
repressed	the	Rwenzururu	movement	for	independence	of	their	
kingdom.		
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6. Politics	 The	development	of	an	agribusiness,	involving	the	management	
and	 competition	 for	 resources	 such	 as	 land	 and	 financial	
services,	 became	 increasingly	 politicised	 as	 development	
agencies	 have	 dedicated	 increasing	 budgets	 and	 policy	
attention.	Beyond	the	national	politics,	which	was	a	theme	that	
emerged	relatively	seldom	during	the	interviews,	my	informants	
often	 referred	 to	 the	 way	 in	 which	 local	 level	 politics	 had	 an	
important	 impact	 on	 the	 development	 of	 their	 agribusiness.	 In	
particular,	 the	 majority	 of	 my	 informants	 lamented	 the	
corruption	of	public	structures,	and	the	discriminatory	practices	
favouring	 Banyankole	 people	 for	 positions	 of	 power	 within	
institutions.			
7. Ecosystem	 The	geography	of	Uganda	is	very	diverse,	comprising	a	variety	of	
ecosystems	 throughout	 the	 country	 –	 which	 naturally	 has	 an	
important	impact	on	the	agricultural	activities.	In	the	North,	the	
weather	 can	 be	 pretty	 extreme,	 with	 two	 very	 dry	 and	 hot	
seasons	and	two	tropical	 rainy	seasons;	 the	major	value	chains	
are	 grains.	 The	 Central	 region	 also	 has	 two	 dry	 and	 two	 rainy	
season	 but	 are	 more	 temperate;	 besides	 the	 major	 trading	
activities	 in	 Kampala	 (main	 market	 hub	 of	 the	 country),	 the	
major	 value	 chains	 are	 horticulture	 and	 animal	 husbandry	
(piggery,	 goats	 and	 chicken	 rearing).	 In	 the	 South-West,	 also	
known	as	 the	 land	of	milk	 and	honey	 for	 its	 fertility,	 there	 the	
two	dry	and	two	rainy	seasons	are	temperate	and	influenced	by	
the	 hilly	 ecosystem	 that	 favours	 the	 cultivation	 of	 tea	 and	
coffee,	 which	 is	 done	 mostly	 on	 large	 scale.	 The	 majority	 of	
people	 are	 engaged	 either	 in	 cattle	 rearing	 and	 dairy	 (in	 the	
lower	 plateaus	 around	 Mbarara)	 or	 in	 horticulture	 (mainly	
matooke	 and	 fruits)	 and	 animal	 husbandry.	 The	 ecosystem	 of	
the	 Eastern	 region	 around	Mbale	 is	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 the	
presence	 of	 the	 mount	 Elgon:	 on	 the	 slopes	 of	 the	 mountain	
coffee	 is	 the	 main	 agribusiness,	 while	 around	 Mbale	 the	
ecosystem	is	ideal	for	horticulture.		
8. Belonging	(to	
environment)	
I	 refer	 to	 belonging	 to	 the	 environment	 as	 the	 territorial	
dimension	of	ethnicity,	where	bonding	to	ancestral	 land	and	its	
agribusiness	 traditions	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	
identity	 and	 career	 of	 youths.	 This	 feeling	 of	 belonging	 was	
strong	 for	 the	majority	of	my	 informants,	particularly	 for	 those	
living	in	rural	areas.	It	was	crucially	important	for	the	ambitions	
of	the	youths,	and	for	their	commitment	to	 investing	 into	their	
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agribusiness.		However,	it	was	not	a	condition	necessary	for	the	
realisation	 of	 the	 agribusiness,	 in	 fact	 in	 Kampala	 were	 living	
people	who	were	eradicated	from	their	ancestral	land	and	were	
economically	successful	in	their	business.		
9. Urban/rural		 The	urban	or	 rural	 context	 in	which	my	 informants	were	 living	
had	an	important	impact	on	the	type	of	business	they	would	get	
involved,	 but	 also	 influenced	 their	 accessibility	 to	 market	 and	
marketing	information.		Urban	contexts	were	characterised	by	a	
higher	 exposition	 to	 technological	 and	 marketing	 innovations,	
but	 greater	 difficulty	 to	 access	 land.	 On	 the	 contrary	 rural	
contexts	 offered	 more	 availability	 of	 land,	 and	 agribusiness	
enterprises	were	more	strongly	embed	in	family	context	(either	
as	 family	 business	 or	 as	 inheritance	 of	 ancestral	 land).	 It	 was	
striking	 to	 observe	 how	 multicultural	 was	 Kampala	 in	
comparison	to	the	rest	of	the	country,	where	particularly	in	rural	
areas	 there	 was	 more	 homogeneity	 in	 terms	 of	 ethnicity	 and	
language.			
10. Proximity	to	
market	
When	confronting	 the	agribusiness	experiences	of	 the	youths	 I	
interviewed,	 proximity	 to	 the	 market	 (local	 village	 market,	
regional	 or	 central	 Kampala	 hub)	 impacted	 the	 profitability	 of	
the	 agribusiness,	 for	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 farmers	 to	 bypass	
middlemen.	The	only	exception	was	constituted	by	cooperatives	
in	the	South-west	of	the	country,	which	had	built	such	a	strong	
bargaining	 power	 to	 constitute	 a	 market	 in	 itself,	 where	 the	
buyer	would	go	to	get	supply.			
11. Identity	(worker	or	
entrepreneur)	
There	 was	 quite	 an	 important	 difference	 among	 the	 youths	 I	
interviewed,	 between	 those	 who	 regarded	 themselves	 as	
workers	 or	 (subsistence)	 farmers	 and	 those	 who	 considered	
themselves	as	being	agripreneurs.	Their	identification	with	their	
profession	 widely	 differed	 also	 within	 the	 same	 environment,	
development	scheme,	value	chain,	and	even	work	group.		
12. Embeddedness	in	
value	chain	
The	 intensity	 of	 the	 attachment	 to	 a	 specific	 value	 chain	 was	
very	 different	 for	my	 informants:	 some	 of	 them	were	 entirely	
devoted	to	one	value	chain,	while	other	would	switch	according	
to	market	prices	without	specialising.	I	encountered	youths	who	
were	strongly	rooted	in	the	value	chain	of	their	agribusiness,	to	
the	 point	 that	 their	 own	 identity	 and	 social	 status	was	 tied	 to	
their	success	in	their	agribusiness	in	that	specific	sector;	this	was	
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particularly	 true	 for	 Bahima	 people	 with	 cattle	 rearing.	 I	 also	
encountered	youths	who	had	been	working	 in	different	sectors	
and	even	chunks	of	the	value	chain	–	from	transport	to	service	
provision	to	production	of	various	agricultural	produce.		
13. Aspirations	in/out	
agribusiness	
The	 commitment	 of	 youths	 to	 agribusiness	 differed	 greatly	
depending	 on	 their	 aspirations:	 for	 some	 of	 my	 informants	
agricultural	 activities	 were	 a	 forced-choice,	 as	 they	 had	 no	
alternative	 career	 paths,	 while	 for	 others	 it	 was	 a	 deliberate	
choice	and	great	ambition	to	be	successful	 in	their	agribusiness	
(and	not	another).	
TABLE	17.	HETEROGENEITY	FACTORS	
	
5.4	EMBEDDING	HETEROGENEITY	
“Stop	calling	me	a	youth!	 I’ve	been	circumcised!”	Alex	tells	me.	Alex	 is	a	25	years	old	fruits	
vendor	at	Nakasero	central	market	 in	Kampala,	who	hailing	 from	the	Eastern	sub-region	of	
Mbale.	 Sitting	 on	 a	 pile	 of	 fruit	 boxes	 in	 what	 can	 be	 considered	 the	 busiest	 spot	 of	 the	
capital,	 I	had	been	interviewing	Alex	about	his	career	and	aspirations,	as	a	youth.	Observed	
by	tens	of	pairs	of	inquisitive	eyes,	Alex	felt	he	should	make	his	identity	as	an	adult	clear	to	
me	and	the	indiscrete	passers:	he	had	obtained	a	social	status	which	would	be	insulting	not	
to	 recognize,	 a	 status	marked	 on	 his	 body	 in	 one	 of	 the	most	 harsh	 and	 diffused	 rites	 of	
passage	in	Eastern	Uganda.	Without	the	blink	of	an	eye,	later	on	the	same	morning	he	asked	
me	for	advice	on	how	to	access	a	youth	development	project.	Puzzled	by	what	to	me	was	a	
contradiction,	and	about	to	jump	to	the	conclusion	that	Alex	was	not	a	reliable	informant,	I	
later	 came	 to	 realize	 that	 the	Ugandans	 I	 interacted	with	 did	 not	 see	 any	 inconsistency	 in	
identifying	with	different	social	categories.	Belonging	to	the	category	of	youth	was	perceived	
as	much	as	transitory	phase,	as	a	situational	and	interchangeable	identity.		
Interviewing	 young	 (18-35)	 Ugandans	 throughout	 the	 country	 allowed	 me	 to	 develop	 an	
overview	of	the	diverse	ways	in	which	young	people	defined	themselves	in	different	settings.	
There	were	 different	 factors	 and	 circumstances	 that	 had	 an	 influence	 in	 their	 perceptions	
and	 strategically	 positioning	 in	 the	 scale	 from	 childhood	 to	 adulthood.	 Youth	 is	 indeed	 a	
liminal	phase	of	transition,	but	also	an	 iterative	process	that	can	be	redefined	and	undone.	
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Not	only	diverse	circumstances,	but	social	contexts,	and	sociocultural	environment	played	a	
role	 in	 the	 identification	 and	 definition	 of	 youth,	 but	 also	 defined	 and	was	 defined	 by	 the	
ways	in	which	agricultural	business	was	experienced.	
Importantly,	in	contrast	to	definitions	used	by	development	actors,	identification	as	a	youth	
was	not	necessarily	bond	to	an	age	range:	Stephen,	a	34	years	old	dairy	farmer,	married	with	
children,	 was	 not	 only	 proudly	 identifying	 himself	 as	 a	 youth,	 but	 even	 advocating	 for	 a	
political	standing	up	of	a	new	generation	of	leaders	–	in	and	outside	of	agricultural	business:		
We	have	peace	so	I	think	it’s	also	upon	us,	the	youth,	the	new	generation,	to	fight	for	
our	rights	and	to	fight	for	transformation.	We	shouldn’t	sit	and	think	some	people	will	
come	 from	 abroad	 and	 do	 it	 for	 us.	 (…)[But]	We	 can’t	 have	 a	 voice	 when	 we	 are	
scattered.	We	have	to	get	an	organized	group	that	unites	us	and	we	start	that	voice.	
Once	that	voice	is	heard,	even	the	president	will	change.	Because	we	are	the	owners	
of	this	country	tomorrow.	These	politicians	are	going	away;	they	are	getting	old.	 So,	
we	who	are	coming	in…	are	we	trained?	are	we	capable	of	taking	over?	In	whatever	
sector,	 leave	alone	agriculture,	 in	other	 sectors	 so	we	need…	the	youth	need	 to	be	
organized	and	we	have	to	organize	ourselves	first.117		
Interestingly,	Stephen	refers	to	youths	as	the	new	generation	of	political-economic	 leaders,	
embracing	a	narrative	of	youth	as	the	future	of	the	nation:	a	social	category	not	only	of	great	
prestige,	 but	 also	 of	 great	 responsibility.	 In	 fact,	 youth	 in	 Uganda	means	 anything	 from	 a	
denigrating	social	status	of	someone	who	is	not	yet	a	man,	to	a	political	category	of	crucial	
importance	to	the	future	of	the	nation.		
In	 fact,	 the	 specific	 ways	 in	 which	 youth	 engaged	 and	 gave	 meaning	 to	 their	 agricultural	
enterprises	 was	 as	 diverse	 as	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 the	 subjects	 involved.	 Methorst	 et	 al	
(2017,	p.	1)	argue	that:	
Diversity	or	heterogeneity	in	farming	is,	as	many	studies	have	shown	over	the	past	25	
years,	 one	 of	 the	main	 features	 of	 farm	 development.	 Heterogeneity	 in	 farming	 is	
likely	 to	 affect	 the	 pathways	 in	 farm	 development	 strategies	 towards	 more	
																																																						
117	Extract	from	an	interview	at	Stephen’s	dairy	cooperative	in	South-West	Uganda,	1st	June	2017.	
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sustainable	 food	 production	 systems.	 (…)	 In	 farm	 development,	 the	 farmer	 both	
reacts	 to	 and	enacts	 the	 context,	whilst	 adapting	 to	 changes	 and	perceived	 threats	
and	opportunities.	The	decisions	made	by	the	farmer	will	structure	farming	practices	
and	the	relation	between	the	farm	and	its	context. 
Likewise,	the	heterogeneity	of	farmers	has	an	influence	as	much	on	the	decisions	made	for	
the	 development	 of	 the	 agribusiness	 as	 it	 does	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 way	 in	 which	
development	 schemes	 unfold	 on	 the	 ground.	 I	 argue	 that	 heterogeneity	 impacts	 the	
outcome	of	development	programmes	as	much	as	development	programmes	 influence	the	
identities	and	meanings	in/of	farming	activities.		
Below,	 I	 identify	 and	describe	 the	 factors	 and	qualities	of	 the	heterogeneity	 characterising	
the	young	Ugandans	I	have	interviewed.	These	are	valid	for	all	the	youths	I	have	interviewed,	
although	 some	 factors	 played	 a	 stronger	 role	 for	 certain	 youths	 than	 for	 others.	
Systematising	the	heterogeneity	by	analysing	its	factors	is	a	process	that	required	a	selection	
(and	 thereby	 a	 simplification)	 of	 all	 the	 possible	 features	 and	 influences	 of	 diversity.	 This	
analytical	 process	 is	 grounded	on	 the	qualitative	 coding	of	 the	 interviews	with	 youths,	 but	
also	on	the	participant	observations	I	have	made	while	on	the	field.		
Three	main	themes	emerged	from	the	analysis	of	the	interviews	and	the	observations	I	have	
made	 on	 the	 ground:	 territorial	 embeddedness,	 socio-cultural	 embeddedness	 and	 value	
chain	embeddedness.	These	three	dimensions	had	great	influence	in	shaping	the	identity	of	
the	youths,	and	in	determining	their	engagement	in	agribusiness.	Later	on,	I	will	analyse	the	
ways	 in	 which	 such	 themes	 also	 interact	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 development	
programmes.	Such	themes	are	analysed	here	in	 light	of	the	concept	of	embeddedness	as	 it	
has	been	re-elaborated	by	Methorst	et	al	(2017,	p.	3):	“embeddedness	can	best	be	viewed	as	
a	dynamic	process	that	can	vary	and	is	subject	to	management	choices.	The	dynamic	process	
approach	places	the	emphasis	on	the	agency	of	an	actor	in	making	choices	in	relation	to	the	
context	 in	which	 the	 actor	 operates”.	 Embeddedness	 as	 a	 concept	 referring	 to	 a	 dynamic	
process	can	best	be	used	in	its	verb	form	embedding.	Drawing	from	the	work	of	Hess	(2004),	
Methorst	 et	 al	 elaborate	 on	 three	 dimensions	 of	 the	 process	 of	 embedding:	 societal	
embedding,	network	embedding	and	territorial	embedding:		
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The	 societal	 embedding	 is	 re-conceptualised	 as	 the	 socio-cultural	 relations	 of	 the	
farmer,	 asking	 how	 farmers	 view	 themselves	 as	 a	 farmer	 and	 with	 which	 values,	
norms,	 and	 ‘culture’	 of	 farming	 a	 farmer	 identifies	 him	 or	 herself.	 The	 network	
embedding	is	re-conceptualised	as	the	value	chain	relations,	asking	which	value	chain	
the	 farm	 is	 a	part	of	or	 linked	 to,	 or	which	networks	or	 spheres	of	 influence	affect	
farm	 development.	 The	 territorial	 embedding	 is	 re-conceptualised	 as	 the	 resource	
relations	of	the	farm,	asking	about	the	origin	of	the	resources	for	farm	production.	
The	re-conceptualisation	of	 the	authors	helps	 to	 frame	the	 themes	 that	emerged	 from	the	
analysis	 of	 the	 data	 I	 collected	 among	 Ugandan	 youths.	 As	 I	 minor	 change	 to	 their	
conceptualization,	I	will	refer	more	specifically	to	value-chain	embedding	instead	of	network	
embedding,	and	more	precisely	about	socio-cultural	embedding	instead	of	social	embedding.	
Interestingly	 in	 fact,	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 my	 data,	 there	 emerged	 to	 be	 the	 same	 three	
dimensions	of	embedding	characterizing	youths’	 identity	and	experience	 in	agribusiness	 (in	
and	 out	 of	 development	 schemes).	 Moreover,	 the	 positioning	 of	 youths	 within	 a	 specific	
context	is	also	object	of	arguments	of	van	Dijk	et	al	(2011,	p.	5),	where	they	argue	that:	
As	social	science	in	Africa	has	moved	away	from	conceptualising	youth	only	in	terms	
of	time	–	a	passage	through	the	generations	–	and	has	included	the	notion	of	space	–	
not	when	one	is	youth	but	also	where	one	is	youth	–	the	‘situational’	exploration	of	
youth	 has	 at	 least	 allowed	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 looking	 at	 space	 and	 place	 as	 new	
modes	 of	 understanding.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 youth	 as	 emphasising	 the	
‘situational’	it	has	also	turned	into	the	‘locational’	dimensions.		
Drawing	from	this	theoretical	framework,	I	have	proceeded	to	systematizing	the	data	I	have	
collected	into	three	dimensions	–		abstract	categorizations	of	the	various	factors	of	diversity	
emerging	 from	 my	 data118.	 These	 factors	 have,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 systematic	 analysis	 of	
heterogeneity,	 been	 distributed	 among	 the	 dimensions	 of	 embedding.	 However,	 the	
observation	 of	 realities	 of	 youths	 and	 the	 interaction	 of	 all	 the	 diversity	 factors	 show	 that	
																																																						
118	I	 am	 aware	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 a	 vivid	 debate	 within	 social	 geography	 regarding	
spatiality,	 territoriality	 and	 environmental	 embeddedness.	 It	 would	 be	 a	 promising	 line	 of	
research	to	explore	these	dimensions	to	a	wider	extent,	yet	it	is	not	the	focus	of	my	research.		
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these	dimensions	interrelate	and	overlap	and	are	not	mutually	exclusive.	In	the	figure	below,	
I	 illustrate	 the	clustering	of	 the	diversity	 factors	among	 the	above-described	dimensions	of	
embedding.		
5.4.1	CLUSTERING	EMBEDDING	DIMENSIONS	AND	HETEROGENEITY	FACTORS	
	
	
FIGURE	24.	CLUSTERING	EMBEDDING	DIMENSIONS	AND	HETEROGENEITY	FACTORS	
As	it	is	exemplified	in	the	figure	above,	and	as	transpires	from	the	data	I	have	collected,	the	
multitude	of	factors	contributing	to	the	heterogeneity	of	the	youths	can	be	categorised	in	the	
three	 dimensions	 of	 embedding.	 However,	 the	 factors	 are	 in	 a	 dynamic	 relation	with	 one	
another,	 and	 the	 intensity	 of	 their	 influence	 on	 youths’	 identities	 and	 agribusiness	
experiences	can	vary.		
5.4.2	TERRITORIAL	EMBEDDING		
Exploring	 the	 definition	 and	 identity	 of	 youths	 in	 agribusiness,	 and	 the	 meaning	 and	
experience	of	 their	 farming	activities	 throughout	4	different	sub-regions	 in	Uganda,	 I	 could	
appreciate	how	the	contextual	specificities	of	the	environment	had	particular	impact	on	the	
youths	and	their	agribusiness.		The	ecosystem	and	agricultural	traditions	were	very	context-
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specific,	as	much	as	the	perception	of	belonging	to	the	territory	was	articulated	in	a	variety	of	
different	 ways	 and	 intensity.	 Moreover,	 the	 politics	 and	 history	 of	 the	 sub-regions	 were	
crucial	 in	 influencing	 youths’	 perception	 and	 interaction	 with	 agribusiness	 stakeholders,	
constraints,	possibilities	and	ambitions.		
This	dimension	was	particularly	determinant	 in	differentiating	 the	experiences	of	 youths	 in	
agribusiness,	and	their	identity.	In	fact,	due	to	the	regional	disparity	in	terms	of	development	
of	history,	infrastructures	(roads,	schools,	health	facilities),	climate	and	markets	(see	chapter	
3)	–	this	dimension	was	very	influential	also	of	the	socio-cultural	and	value-chain	dimensions.		
	
5.4.2A	NORTH	–	GULU	SUB-REGION	
The	northern	sub-region	around	Gulu	is	a	dry	and	torrid	one,	with	two	main	rain	seasons	and	
two	dry	ones.	 I	have	conducted	fieldwork	 in	the	districts	of	Gulu,	Pader	and	Amuru.	All	the	
informants	I	have	interviewed	belonged	to	the	Acholi	ethnic	group.		
With	regards	to	agriculture,	this	sub-region	mostly	produces	grains	–	the	most	resistant	crop	
to	the	extreme	weather	conditions	of	this	ecosystem.	However,	agribusiness	is	an	enterprise	
that	 requires	 investment,	and	thus	 implies	some	sort	of	 trust	 in	 the	 future.	Because	of	 the	
prolonged	insecurity	of	living	in	camps	and	under	the	constant	threat	of	violence	of	civil	war,	
trust	was	certainly	a	shaky	ground	for	the	establishment	of	a	business.	The	proximity	to	the	
South-Sudanese	 border	 also	 had	 a	 strong	 influence	 in	 the	 marketing	 of	 local	 agricultural	
produce	and	the	trading	business.	In	fact,	particularly	for	people	living	close	to	the	border	in	
Atiak,	selling	and	trading	produce	over	the	border	was	quite	a	lucrative	business.			
I	arrived	in	Gulu	for	the	first	time	in	the	beginning	of	2017,	30	years	after	the	sanguinary	civil	
war	 was	 initiated	 by	 the	 Lord’s	 Resistance	 Army’s	 (LRA)	 insurgency.	 The	 youths	 had	 lived	
most	of	their	lives	in	a	territory	affected	by	conflict,	eradicated	from	ancestral	land,	living	in	
camps.	Every	 single	person	 I	 spoke	 to	while	on	 the	 field	around	Gulu	had	 lost	at	 least	one	
family	member	 during	 the	 civil	war,	 and	most	 of	 them	had	 returned	 to	 their	 own	 land	 or	
village	since	5	–	10	years,	after	having	lived	in	camps	or	hiding	in	Gulu	town	for	decades.	As	
all	of	the	lives	of	youths	I	spoke	to	had	been	affected	by	conflict.	They	had	also	been	affected	
by	 conspicuous	 flows	 of	 humanitarian	 and	 later	 development	 aid.	 Local	 civil	 servants	 and	
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development	 actors	 often	 complained	 about	 the	 ‘entitlement	 mentality’	 of	 farmers:	
participating	 in	 governmental	 and/or	 international	 development	 programmes	 was	 for	 the	
majority	of	my	informants	one	of	the	livelihood	strategies.		
Historically,	 the	 northern	 region	 around	 Gulu	 has	 been	 supporting	 the	 opposition	 parties	
against	 the	current	NRM	regime.	This	political	opposition	 is	 rooted	 in	ethnical	 rivalries	 that	
have	 been	 strengthened	 after	 the	 conflict.	 Acholi	 people	 often	 express	 feelings	 of	
discrimination,	 particularly	 by	 Baganda	 people	 from	 central	 region	 and	 Banyankole	 people	
from	the	South-West119.	Francis,	a	26	years	old	student	at	the	University	in	Gulu	told	me	how	
he	had	spent	part	of	his	education	period	in	Kampala,	but	that	he	would	have	never	want	to	
return	 to	 live	 there	as	he	would	 feel	discriminated	by	Baganda:	“when	 I	was	 there	 I	would	
always	get	to	pay	higher	prices…If	I	went	to	the	market,	I	would	pay	two	or	three	times	more	
for	a	pair	of	trousers	than	any	other	Baganda.	Life	there	is	not	good	for	us”.120		The	other	way	
around,	some	of	the	Baganda	friends	 I	had	asked	about	the	tense	relationships	with	Acholi	
people,	expressed	that	they	could	not	trust	them	after	the	prolonged	violence	and	massacres	
of	the	civil	war:	“They	have	been	killing	each	other	for	so	long,	why	did	they	do	that?	Also,	
they	 are	 probably	 traumatized…	 how	 can	 you	 trust	 them	 after	 what	 they	 have	 gone	
through?”.		
A	 feeling	of	belonging	 to	 the	 territory	was	strongly	bonding	my	 informants	around	Gulu	 to	
their	ancestral	land,	to	the	extent	that	they	didn’t	feel	their	land	could	be	sold,	yet	land	was	
often	cause	of	 fierce	 land-related	conflicts.	 In	March	2017,	 I	asked	Clementine,	a	 lady	who	
was	old	enough	to	have	witnessed	 independence,	but	who	was	not	sure	of	her	age,	about	
the	 possibility	 of	 buying	 and	 selling	 ancestral	 land:	 “it	 cannot	 happen	 –	 if	 someone	would	
want	to	sell	land,	there	would	start	a	rebellion”.			
	
	
																																																						
119	I	have	recorded	these	feelings	of	discrimination	in	my	fieldnotes	from	Gulu,	on	31/03/2017,	from	
informal	conversations	I	had	with	3	young	Acholi	who	had	lived	in	Kampala	while	studying,	and	had	
returned	to	Gulu	because	they	felt	unwelcomed	and	discriminated,	and	were	unable	to	find	a	job	in	
the	capital.	This	issue	of	discrimination	was	also	confirmed	by	my	interpreter	Cathy,	an	Acholi	lady	
who	had	been	living	in	Kampala	for	decades,	and	felt	threatened	and	discriminated.			
120	This	conversation	took	place	in	an	informal	setting,	at	a	cafè	in	Gulu,	in	April	2017.		
	 202	
5.4.2B	EAST	–	MBALE	SUB-REGION	
In	the	eastern	sub-region	I	conducted	fieldwork	in	the	district	of	Mbale,	Sironko	and	Bududa,	
on	the	slopes	of	mount	Elgon.	The	majority	of	the	informants	belonged	to	the	Bagishu	ethnic	
group,	as	this	area	is	socio-culturally	quite	homogeneous.	The	agricultural	business	revolves	
around	horticultural	and	coffee	production,	on	the	slopes	of	the	mountain.	Older	famers	who	
are	 landowners,	 however,	 dominate	 coffee	production.121	Therefore	 I	 focused	my	 research	
on	the	horticultural	value	chain.		
I	visited	 this	 region	when	the	rainy	season	had	 just	ended,	and	 it	was	as	green	as	 it	gets	–	
with	 idyllic	 tropical	 landscapes	 and	 breath-taking	 views	 over	 the	 fertile	 plain,	 cultivated	 in	
regular,	 small	 patches	 and	 orchards.	 I	 had	 left	 the	 congested	 streets	 and	 hectic	 life	 of	
Kampala:	 Mbale	 felt	 like	 a	 sleepy	 far-west	 destination,	 as	 much	 as	 its	 people	 seemed	
discreet.	 I	 wanted	 to	 reach	 the	 core	 of	 the	 horticultural	 activities	 of	 the	 region,	 so	 I	 was	
directed	to	the	wholesale	market	in	Kamu.		
I	 arrived	 in	 Kamu	 at	 7	 in	 the	morning,	 after	we	had	 been	 climbing	 up	mount	 Elgon	on	 an	
unpaved,	tortuous	road	that	was	made	more	for	donkeys	than	for	cars.	I	was	looking	forward	
to	getting	out	of	the	car	to	give	my	stomach	some	fresh	air,	and	there	I	found	myself	amid	
one	of	the	most	vivid	markets	I	had	visited.	I	was	late!	–		I	was	told	–	“people	get	here	to	start	
trading	when	the	sun	is	rising,	around	4	or	5	am!”.	Cabbage,	tomatoes,	onions	and	potatoes	
in	 great	 quantities,	 strictly	 divided	 along	 the	 road	 by	 produce:	 I	 was	 told	 there	 was	 a	
hierarchy	of	social	status	in	the	production	and	trading	of	the	horticultural	produce.	Farmers	
would	 climb	 up	 the	 ranking	 from	 potatoes	 to	 cabbages,	 and	 would	 reach	 a	 higher	 status	
when	they	could	afford	buying	a	cow	or	even	purchasing	land	for	coffee	production	–	which	
was	 seen	 as	 the	most	 valuable	 (and	 profitable).	 Another	 important	 trait	 distinguishing	 the	
social	status	of	farmers	was	the	amount	of	time	they	had	been	working	on	the	market:	the	
newcomers	were	relegated	to	a	position	of	service	provision,	while	the	veterans	were	trading	
																																																						
121On	16/02/2017	I	conducted	a	long	interview	with	Charles,	the	old	head	of	a	family	of	coffee	
producers;	his	sons	and	daughters	took	part	in	the	interview	as	well.	They	reported	how	young	
generations	were	not	able	to	work	in	this	value	chain	because	of	the	long-term	investment	necessary	
for	a	coffee	plantation,	and	the	difficulty	in	accessing	large	plots	of	property	land.	This	was	confirmed	
also	by	IITA	experts	in	this	sector,	during	various	conversations	both	in	Kampala	and	during	the	trip	to	
Mbale.			
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their	produce	–	the	highest	position	was	taken	by	those	who	owned	a	shop	along	the	road.	
Interestingly,	 the	 socio-cultural	 norms	 ordering	 the	market	 hierarchies	 and	 practices	were	
strictly	intertwined	with	business	experience	and	embeddedness	in	the	value	chain	networks.		
The	proximity	 to	 the	 Kenyan	border	 had	made	 the	population	 acquainted	 to	 transnational	
trading	as	much	as	movement	of	people,	both	ways.	In	fact,	there	was	a	strong	perception	of	
the	 region	 beyond	 the	 boundary	 dividing	 the	 mountain	 in	 two,	 and	 several	 of	 my	 (male)	
informants	had	been	in	Kenya	to	attend	some	business,	work	for	a	period,	or	visit	a	relative.	
Generally,	the	majority	of	my	informants	showed	a	rather	strong	feeling	of	belonging	to	their	
ancestral	 land.	This	emerged	 in	 several	 interviews	with	both	males	and	 female	 informants,	
but	particularly	during	an	 incidental	episode	 in	which	 I	 found	myself	 in	 the	midst	of	a	 land	
conflict.		I	was	directed	to	a	remote	area	in	Sironko	district,	where	I	was	to	meet	a	group	of	
youths	engaged	 in	the	governmental	Youth	Livelihood	Programme.	Accidentally,	a	group	of	
angry	men	on	the	road	mistook	our	car	for	that	of	the	district	authorities	–	which	they	were	
expecting	to	come	and	redraw	the	boundaries	of	the	national	park,	to	their	loss.	Thinking	we	
were	the	cause	of	their	loss,	they	directed	us	towards	an	ambush	they	had	prepared.	Luckily	
my	translator	had	smelled	the	danger	and	decided	to	take	a	right,	towards	the	other	side	of	
the	 valley:	 once	 on	 the	 other	 side	 we	 could	 see	 and	 hear	 how	 the	 car	 of	 the	 district	
authorities	was	ambuscaded.	The	day	after,	 the	 local	newspapers	 reported	a	 small	 conflict	
between	stout	mountain	people	and	the	authorities	–	no	one	had	 lost	 their	 lives.	At	a	safe	
distance	from	the	ambush,	I	interviewed	a	group	of	young	men	that	had	observed	the	scene	
with	us,	explaining	how	the	tensions	with	authorities	had	escalated	in	the	past	months.	“This	
is	our	land,	our	ancestors	are	buried	here	–	they	cannot	take	it	away	from	us.	If	they	take	it	
from	us,	it’s	like	taking	the	food	from	our	mouths.	(…)	If	they	[the	park	people]	enter	peoples	
land	 it	 means	 fighting…we	 are	 ready	 to	 die	 with	 them!”	 told	 me	 Amidou	 during	 the	
interview122.	 With	 this	 blunt	 statement,	 Amidou	 was	 reinforcing	 his	 arguments	 about	 the	
injustice	of	 the	 land	 conflict	 –	 tensions	 that	had	been	ongoing	 since	1993	when	Museveni	
had	distributed	 land,	 but	 then	 reclaimed	 it	 a	 decade	 after.	 Amidou,	 in	 his	 thirties,	 had	 sat	
with	 me,	 the	 translator	 and	 the	 driver	 and	 a	 bunch	 of	 other	 furious	 men	 discussing	 the	
politics	 of	 land	 ownership,	 analysing	 corruption	 at	 district	 level	 up	 until	 the	 injustices	
																																																						
122	Extract	of	fieldnotes,	trip	to	Sironko	on	13/06/2018.	
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perpetrated	at	national	level	by	politicians	and	police	men.	Land,	belonging	and	agricultural	
production	proved	once	more	to	be	a	heated	political	arena.			
5.4.2C	CENTRAL	–	KAMPALA	SUB-REGION	
I	 concentrated	 my	 fieldwork	 in	 this	 region	 on	 the	 urban	 district	 of	 Kampala	 and	 the	
neighbouring	district	of	Wakiso.	Although	I	had	been	traveling	around	the	country,	I	was	new	
to	the	environment:	 I	had	spent	the	 first	 two	months	of	my	fieldwork	 in	Kampala,	as	 I	was	
carrying	out	interviews	with	development	actors.	Yet	the	feverish	and	hectic	life	of	Kampala	
started	to	get	me	only	after	I	started	interviewing	its	youths:	the	population	of	capital	and	its	
surroundings	is	indeed	a	very	young.	While	the	urban	population	keeps	on	growing	as	effect	
of	 the	 steady	 rural-urban	migration,	 the	 number	 of	 people	 populating	 the	 city	 also	 varies	
incredibly	from	the	night	to	the	day:	it	is	estimated123	that	almost	half	of	its	population	lives	
in	 the	 outskirts	 of	 the	 city,	 commuting	 daily.	 I	 encountered	 a	 substantial	 variety	 in	 the	
ethnical	 background	 of	 the	 people	 I	 have	 interviewed	 in	 the	 Central	 region,	 defining	 this	
territory	 as	 a	 melting	 pot	 of	 socio-cultural	 traditions.	 The	 issue	 of	 rural-urban	 migration	
concerns	 the	 local	 authorities	 as	much	 as	 development	 actors,	 incentivizing	 the	 strategies	
that	 focus	 on	 employment	 creation	 in	 rural	 areas.	 Youths	 who	 moved	 to	 Kampala	 from	
elsewhere	refer	 to	their	homeland	as	 ‘the	village’	–	whatever	the	 location	and	size	of	 their	
hometown:	Kampala	is	somehow	perceived	to	be	an	island	of	‘modernity’	and	opportunities.		
During	 an	 interview	 with	 two	 youths	 engaged	 in	 the	 Youth	 Livelihood	 Programme	 with	 a	
piggery	 project,	 in	 the	outskirts	 of	 Kampala,	 I	 asked	Henry	what	made	him	move	 from	his	
village	in	the	West	to	Kampala:		
Me:		And	why	did	you	decide	to	move	in	2010?		what	was	the	decision	that	made	you	
move	here?	
Henry:				The	decision?	
Me:				Yes,	was	it	for	the	job,	was	it	for	love,	was	it	for…you	wanted	to	change?	
Henry:		 it	was	just	for	the	job.	Because	I	had	completed	schooling,	so	I	had	to	move	
around	[to	find	employment]	
																																																						
123	This	data	was	reported	by	the	Dutch	Embassy	on	13/11/2017;	article	accessed	on	26/09/2018	on:	
https://www.government.nl/documents/media-articles/2017/11/13/tackling-traffic-jams-and-air-
pollution-in-kampala	
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Dorah:	 		You	know	for	us	we	have	a	saying	that	 if	you	want	to	die	rich	you	move	to	
Kampala	
Me:				I	didn’t	know	
Henry:		Money	is	raised	from	Kampala	then	you	go	back	to	the	village	with	sugar	and	
bread	
Me:	ok.	Repeat	it	one	more	time?		
Dorah:	If	you	want	to	die	rich,	you	have	to	come	to	Kampala.	You	have	to	leave	the	
village124	
	
I	was	aware	that	Kampala	was	perceived	to	be	an	environment	offering	more	employment	
opportunities	 than	 the	 countryside,	 and	 indeed	 I	 found	 that	 such	 perceptions	 to	 be	 so	
explicitly	rooted	in	common	sense.	Besides	education,	may	be	the	major	driver	of	rural-urban	
migration	is	indeed	the	belief	that	through	living	the	hard	city	life,	youths	can	achieve	success	
–	and	with	it,	adulthood.			
The	major	agricultural	production	around	Kampala	is	horticulture	(and	floriculture),	followed	
by	 animals	 rearing	 (mainly	 pigs	 and	 chicken).	 This	 involves	 different	 types	 of	 production	 –	
from	 the	 most	 technologically	 advanced	 greenhouses	 systems	 producing	 mainly	 for	 the	
export	market	and	restaurants	in	the	capital,	to	small-scale	production	for	the	main	markets	
downtown.	I	have	found	that	although	the	majority	of	my	informants	in	the	capital	would	not	
want	 to	move	 anywhere	 else	 in	 the	 country,	 their	 attachment	 to	 the	 territory	was	mostly	
related	to	their	perceived	work	opportunities	than	to	the	land	itself.	On	the	contrary,	in	the	
rural	areas	where	I	had	conducted	fieldwork,	my	informants	were	attached	to	their	ancestral	
land	and	ideally	would	not	want	to	move.		
During	the	time	I	spent	in	Kampala	I	came	to	realise	how	citizens	are	very	sophisticated	about	
the	 national	 and	 local	 politics,	 keeping	 up	 to	 date	 with	 several	 newspapers	 and	 radio	
programmes	daily.	Politics	is	a	major	topic	of	conversation	–	mostly	resulting	in	a	frustrated	
laughter:	 in	 informal	 chats	 corruption	 is	 a	 given,	 discrimination	 in	 resources	 distribution	 is	
reinforcing	 ethnic	 divisions,	 while	 long-yearned	 change	 seems	 long	 to	 come.	 My	 young	
informants	were	well	aware	of	these	dynamics,	yet	a	resigned,	apathetic	attitude	permeated	
																																																						
124		extract	from	a	group	discussion	with	Dorah,	Henry	and	Joyce	(translator)	in	Kampala	on	4/05/2017	
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our	conversations	about	the	possibility	of	political	change.	They	were	born	under	the	current	
regime,	 and	 testified	 the	 widespread	 presence	 of	 intelligence	 reporting	 on	 non-compliant	
political	 activities:	 chit-chats	 and	 informal	 complaints	 don’t	 get	 anyone	 into	 troubles,	 but	
political	action	is	repressed.		
As	I	left	the	country	in	summer	2017,	new	hopes	had	risen	about	the	election	as	member	of	
parliament	of	Robert	Kyagulangyi	Ssentamu,	a	business	man	and	musician,	known	under	the	
stage	 name	 of	 Bobi	Wine.	 Representing	 a	 local	 constituency	 in	Wakiso	District,	 Bobi	Wine	
was	 seen	 to	 bring	 the	 wind	 of	 change	 he	 had	 been	 singing	 about	 into	 the	 parliament:	
outspokenly	supporting	the	opposition,	during	2016	election	he	had	released	a	song	calling	
for	 change:	 “When	 the	 going	 gets	 tough,	 the	 tough	 must	 get	 going,	 especially	 when	 our	
leaders	have	become	misleaders	and	mentors	have	become	 tormentors,	when	 freedom	of	
expression	becomes	a	target	of	suppression	opposition	becomes	our	position.” 125			
The	song	was	banned,	but	he	had	already	became	a	role	model	for	the	youths,	and	his	public	
figure	had	been	recognized	by	foreign	and	Ugandan	institutions	for	being	a	positive	example	
to	 the	 next	 generations.	 In	 an	 interview	 for	 the	 local	 newspaper	 ‘Daily	 Monitor’,	 he	 told	
about	his	 farm	and	stressed	the	 importance	of	producing	one’s	own	food,	and	encouraged	
Ugandan	youths	 to	do	 the	same:	“Your	parents	educated	you	with	money	 from	the	 farms.	
Why	 can’t	 you	 go	 back	 and	 do	 some	 farming?	 That’s	 where	 real	 money	 is,	 not	 the	 air-
conditioned	offices	and	sports	betting	halls.	But	still,	we	also	have	to	blame	the	government	
for	neglecting	the	youth”.	126	
After	leading	heated	protests	against	the	unpopular	social	media	tax127	in	summer	2018,	Bobi	
Wine	was	again	at	the	centre	of	 international	attention	in	August	and	September	2018.	His	
life	was	attempted	by	 the	military	 forces	 in	Arua	after	a	political	 rally,	when	his	driver	was	
																																																						
125	The	full	original	video	of	the	song	from	2016	can	be	found	on	YouTube:	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nBiEhk_CVjw	While	another	version	of	the	video	was	released	
later,	reporting	news	on	political	repression	of	journalists	and	openly	supporting	the	opposition	
leader,	Kizza	Besigye.		
126	Daily	Monitor,	18/03/2016:	http://www.monitor.co.ug/artsculture/Entertainment/Bobi-Wine-s--
Situka--song-epitomises-his-resilient-persona/812796-3121740-4p46fkz/index.html		
127	This	news	was	reported	on	national	and	international	level.	BBC	article	from	11/07/2018	accessed	
on	26/09/2018:	https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-44798627	
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mistakenly	 shot	dead.	He	was	arrested	and	 tortured	 in	prison128,	and	only	weeks	 later	was	
allowed	 to	 fly	 to	 the	 USA	 for	 specialised	medical	 treatments.	 During	 those	 heated	weeks,	
protests	were	 brutally	 repressed	 in	 Kampala,	 as	 Bobi	Wine’s	 supporters	 called	 for	 political	
change.	 As	 the	 socio-political	 situation	 in	 Kampala	 remains	 tense,	 youths	 have	 hopes	 that	
Bobi	Wine	will	be	able	to	succeed	to	Museveni.		
	
5.4.2D	SOUTH-WEST	–	MBARARA	SUB-REGION		
I	conducted	fieldwork	in	the	districts	of	Mbarara,	Kiruhura,	Sheema,	Ntungamo	and	Bushenyi.	
This	sub-region	is	known	in	Uganda	as	‘the	land	of	milk	and	honey’.	In	fact,	it	is	a	particularly	
fertile	and	green	 land,	where	 there	are	 strong	agricultural	 traditions,	mainly	dairy	 farming,	
coffee	and	matooke.	However,	the	majority	of	the	young	population	engaged	in	agricultural	
business	 is	 involved	 in	 horticulture	 and	 animal	 rearing	 (pigs	 and	 goats),	 or	 in	 dairy	
cooperatives.	While	the	population	is	generally	known	to	belong	to	the	Ankole	ethnic	group,	
there	are	important	differences	between	Bahima	and	Bairu	peoples129.			
In	 fact,	 the	 most	 striking	 example	 of	 ethnic	 tensions	 and	 embeddedness	 of	 agricultural	
practices	in	ethnic-bond	cultures	and	traditions	was	located	in	the	south-western	sub-region,	
between	Bahima	and	Bairu.	My	informants	reported	different	and	contrasting	historical	and	
cultural	 justifications	of	 the	differences	and	tensions	between	the	two	ethnic	groups.	 In	an	
interview	with	 the	 community	 leader	 of	 the	 village	 in	 Sheema	where	 I	was	 staying,1	I	 was	
given	the	perspective	of	the	Bairu:		
Janet:	 In	 the	 ‘40s	and	 ‘50s	 this	 tribe	of	Bahima,	 the	 cattle	 keepers,	did	not	 like	 the	
crop	farmers,	the	Bairu	
Me:	But	is	there	a	relation	between	the	Bahima	or	the	Bairu	and	the	Bahutu	and	the	
Batutsi?															`	
Janet:	History	says	so,	that	the	Bahima	and	the	Batutsi	originated	from	Somalia	
Me:	so	the	Bahima	and	the	Batutsi…	
																																																						
128	BBC	news	report	from	25/08/2018,	accessed	on	26/09/2018:		https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-45298650	
129	For	a	detailed	historical	and	social	analysis	of	this	ethnic	question,	see	the	methods	chapter.	
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Janet:	…Are	 the	 same	except	 that	one	group	went	 to	Rwanda	and	 the	other	 group	
went	to	Ankole	but	they	all	came	from	Somalia.	And	then	the	Bairu	came	from	Congo		
(…)	
Me:	But	while	their	[Bahima	and	Bairu]	look	is	different,	their	language	is	the	same!		
Janet:	 They	 say	 we	 are	 all	 Bantu,	 but	 you	 speak	 the	 language,	 these	 Batutsi	 and	
Bahima	speak	the	language	where	they	go.	Where	they	immigrated	to,	eh,	but	they,	
when	you	see	their	looks,	is	different.	
(…)	
Me:	 That’s	 something	 that	 is	 confusing	 for	 me	 because	 I	 thought	 I	 come	 to	 west	
region,	it’s	all	Banyankole	
Janet:	yeah,	we	are	Banyankole	but	we	have	different	cultures	
(…)	
Me:	so	is	the	difference	in	culture	related	to	the	different	habits	of	agriculturalists	and	
pastoralists?	
Janet:	I	think	different	habits.	Because	you	say	the	Bahima	were	not	eating	solid	food	
they	used	to	depend	on	milk	(…)	they	don’t	like	eating	solid	food	
(…)	
Me:	so	they	were	not	interested	in	cultivating?	
Janet:	 yeah,	 but	 these	 days	 they	 are	 trying	 to	 cultivate.	 Now	 they	 have	 banana	
plantations	 but	 they	 themselves	 can’t	 dig.	 So	 the	 Bairu	 help	 them	 to	 cultivate.	 A	
Muhima	woman	will	never	cultivate…	
Another	 important	 consideration	 to	 be	made	 about	 the	 territorial	 identity	 of	 this	 country	
regards	its	politics:	Museveni,	who	is	originally	from	this	area	is	perceived	to	favour	this	sub-
region.130	The	 infrastructures	 in	this	area	are	noticeably	(though	relatively)	more	developed	
than	the	rest	of	the	country,	with	the	exception	of	Kampala.	Ugandans	from	the	rest	of	the	
country	 assume	people	 from	 the	 south-west	 are	better	off,	 but	my	 informants	 in	Kiruhura	
complained	that	it	is	not	the	case:		
Me:	So	you	have	a	good	road	but	no	electricity?	
																																																						
130	More	specifically,	Museveni	is	from	Kiruhura	district,	which	is	mainly	inhabited	by	Bahima	people.	
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Isaac:	 Electricity	 is	 powered,	 it’s	 going	 to	 the	 president’s	 place	 but	 hasn’t	 been	
channelled	here	yet.	
Me:	But	if	he’s	the	president,	why	doesn’t	he	provide	for	his	people?	
Isaac:	 That	 is	 always	 in	 people’s	minds,	 but	 it	 depends	what	 he	 can	 do…	 he	 could	
provide,	but	he	doesn’t.	It	doesn’t	work	this	way	
(…)		
Alice:	You	think	Museveni	is	coming	from	Kiruhura,	so	every	Kiruhura	people	[Bahima]	
are	rich.	Museveni	could	supply	money…but	we	have	never	seen	Museveni	with	our	
eyes.131	
Interestingly,	 the	 development	 programmes	 implemented	 in	 this	 sub-region	were	 sensibly	
less	 than	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 Uganda:	 in	 the	 North	 of	 the	 country	 the	 highest	 number	 of	
development	activities	is	recorded	and	in	the	South	West	the	lowest.		However,	I	have	found	
that	my	informants	could	rely	on	a	strong	support	network	constituted	by	members	of	their	
extended	 family.	More	 than	 in	 other	 regions,	 family	 constituted	 a	 springboard	 for	 youths’	
agribusiness,	possibly	because	family	enterprises	were	also	in	a	better	economic	position	to	
offer	start-up	help.		
	
5.4.3	SOCIO-CULTURAL	EMBEDDING		
Besides	the	dimensions	of	territorial	and	socio-cultural	embedding	is	the	factor	of	values	and	
norms	in	agricultural	practices:	this	factor	strongly	emerged	across	all	the	interviews	I	carried	
out,	 although	 it	 indirectly	 arose	 from	 the	analysis	 of	 the	narratives	 and	observation	of	 the	
agribusiness	 practices.	 In	 fact,	 youths	 seemed	 to	 give	 very	 disparate	 meanings	 to	 their	
agricultural	activities.	Engagement	in	dairy	farming	in	the	South-west	was	a	crucial	feature	of	
acquiring	 a	 respectable	 social	 status	 for	 the	 bahima	 ethnic	 group;	 in	 the	 East,	men	would	
need	 to	 obtain	 economic	 independence	 through	 their	 business	 to	 even	 being	 considered	
																																																						
131	extract	from	a	group	discussion	with	three	members	(two	young	men	and	one	older	lady	in	the	
management	position)	of	a	dairy	cooperative	in	Kiruhura,	on	30/05/2017.		
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men	 and	 bagishu	 (see	 below);	 for	 some	 youths,	 particularly	 in	 the	 North,	 the	 agricultural	
activities	are	strictly	bond	to	the	well-being	of	their	extended	family,	and	thus	is	not	felt	as	an	
individual	enterprise.		
In	 fact,	 the	experience	of	youths	 in	agribusiness	was	 influenced	by	the	belonging	to	one	or	
another	 ethnic	 group.	 The	 clearest	 example	 comes	 from	 the	 south-west	 of	 the	 country,	
where	there	was	a	strong	identification	of	the	ethnic	group	with	the	type	of	agricultural	value	
chain.	Bahima	–	historically	the	same	ethnic	group	as	the	Tutsi	of	Rwanda,	have	a	particular	
bond	with	the	dairy	sector,	while	the	Bairu	–	historically	belonging	to	the	ethnic	group	of	the	
Hutu	 of	 Rwanda,	 are	 more	 inclined	 to	 agricultural	 activities,	 mostly	 matooke,	 coffee	 and	
horticultural	 production.	 While	 Bairu	 have	 long	 been	 owners	 of	 land,	 Bahima	 had	 been	
nomadic	 until	 the	 late	 ‘80s,	 when	 president	 Museveni	 allocated	 land	 and	 enforced	 a	
schooling	policy.	During	 a	 group	discussion132	in	 Kiruhura,	 young	dairy	 farmers,	 all	 Bahima,	
explained	to	me:		
Peter:	“It’s	like	this:	we	are	all	Banyankole	but	we	have	different	clans…”	
Isaacs:	“Banyankole	is	a	tribe,	then	Bahima	are	cattle	keepers”	
Alice:	“then	the	Bairu	are	farmers”	
Isaacs:	“Only	after	Bahima	started	going	to	school	[after	they	settled,	in	the	late	‘80s],	
they	 learned	 from	 each	 other,	 so	 the	 Bahima	 can	 also	 grow	 crops,	 Bairu	 can	 have	
cattle”.		
Interestingly,	 the	development	programmes	 in	 this	 region	 reflected	 the	propensity	of	 such	
deeply	rooted	agricultural	cultures.		
As	 with	 regards	 to	 ethnic	 identity	 and	 adulthood,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 gender	 component	 –	
which	 clearly	 emerged	 in	 the	eastern	 region.	 Properly	becoming	a	mugishu	man	 is	quite	 a	
tricky	 business:	 in	 fact,	 ethnic	 belonging	 is	 not	 a	 given	 identity	 that	 comes	with	 birth	 but	
rather	a	status	that	has	to	be	earned	and	socially	recognised.	There	is,	properly	speaking,	no	
category	of	youths	but	only	a	passage	from	childhood	to	adulthood.	A	young	mugishu	man	is	
not	 properly	 recognized	 as	 retaining	 the	 ethnic	 ‘mugishu’	 identity	 until	 he’s	 considered	
																																																						
132	extract	from	a	group	discussion	with	three	members	(two	young	men	and	one	older	lady	in	the	
management	position)	of	a	dairy	cooperative	in	Kiruhura,	on	30/05/2017.		
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mature	 enough	 to	be	 circumcised	–	 among	others	 factors	 of	 ‘maturity’	 considered,	 having	
achieved	economic	 independence.	This	usually	happens	around	 the	 twenties,	 in	a	majestic	
public	ceremony	that	lasts	three	days	and	involves	the	whole	community.	During	this	rite	of	
passage	 young	 men	 obtain	 both	 the	 adulthood	 status	 and	 their	 manhood	 status.	 On	 the	
contrary,	mugishu	women	do	not	need	to	undergo	any	rite	of	passage,	as	their	adulthood	is	
obtained	with	marriage	 and	pregnancy	 –	 thereby	 entirely	 detached	 from	 their	maturity	 or	
economic	status.	
Discrimination	of	women,	especially	in	land	ownership	and	agribusiness	entrepreneurship,	is	
a	painfully	problematic	issue	throughout	the	country.	In	fact,	it	is	often	the	case	that	women	
are	 held	 in	 a	 subordinated	 position	 in	 household	 relations,	 by	 means	 of	 distribution	 of	
resources	 and	 responsibilities	 that	 keep	women	 in	 a	 position	 of	 dependence.	 Because	 the	
attainment	 of	 adulthood	 (and	 thereby,	manhood)	 for	 young	men	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	 their	
economic	 status,	 the	 economic	 status	 of	 women	 in	 the	 family	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 threat:	
women	should	not	be	the	bread	winners	of	the	household,	else	the	social	status	of	men	is	at	
risk.		
While	the	development	schemes	I	have	followed	up	on	were	sensitive	to	gender	equity	in	the	
implementation	of	their	programmes,	this	often	didn’t	go	beyond	the	inclusion	of	women’s	
quota	in	the	number	of	participants.	The	majority	of	women	I	interviewed	who	were	involved	
in	development	 schemes	 reported	 that	 they	had	 to	hand	 in	 their	 salary	 to	 their	husbands,	
many	 testified	 that	 some	 of	 their	 colleagues	 had	 to	 stop	working	 because	 their	 husbands	
were	beating	them.	The	majority	of	the	successful	women	agripreneurs	I	encountered	lived	
in	Kampala	and	were	either	single	or	divorced.	Only	a	 few	were	able	to	retain	a	balance	 in	
their	marriage.	
Another	feature	complicating	the	gender	relations	is	polygyny	–	which	was	more	widespread	
in	the	regions	I	visited	out	of	Kampala.	Just	as	a	general	precaution	I	had	been	holding	on	the	
white	lie	that	I	was	married,	which	in	most	cases	did	not	prevent	my	informants	to	encourage	
me	to	marry	again	with	one	of	their	relatives.	In	such	cases,	I	would	ask	whether	it	was	also	
allowed	for	women	to	have	multiple	husbands	–	to	which	they	would	reply	that	 in	fact	 it	 is	
only	allowed	for	men	to	marry	multiple	times:	besides	jealousy,	this	socio-cultural	norm	had	
	 212	
to	 do	 with	 the	 responsibilities	 attached	 to	manhood,	 who	 would	 have	 to	 provide	 for	 the	
wives:		
Joyce	 [translator]:	 what	 about	 your	 country,	 is	 there	 jealousy	 or	 why	 do	 you	 only	
marry	once?	
Me:	yeah.	We	don’t	have	many	wives	and	many	husbands,	we	only	have	one	-	one.	
Peter:		one,	one?	Due	to	lack	of	land?	or	is	it	a	government	policy?	What	is	it?	
Me:	it’s	a	cultural	thing.	Yeah,	what	about	you,	are	you	planning	to	marry	again?	
Peter:	yes,	if	I	have	enough	resources	
Me:	if	you	have,	you	have	to	have	a	what?	
Peter:	 if	 you	have	enough	 resources	 like	money,	 or	 cows,	 or	 assets	 you	 can	marry,	
there	is	no	problem.	
	(…)	
Me:	wow.	What	is	the	maximum	[number	of	wives]	that	you	ever	heard	of?	
Isaac:	there	is	no	maximum	
	
Gender	norms	regulating	relations	and	the	possibility	to	marry	multiple	times	is	related	to	the	
fact	that	men	are	the	perceived	bread	winners	of	the	household,	and	therefore	their	capacity	
to	provide	for	more	than	one	wife	is	related	to	their	socio-economic	status.		
It	 is	 important	 to	consider	 that	within	 the	broad	age	category	of	youth	 that	 I	have	worked	
with	–	between	18	and	35	–	there	was	a	great	diversity	between	the	younger	and	the	older	
ones.	 In	 fact,	 the	 younger	 ones	 were	 coming	 out	 of	 school	 and	 had	 little	 experience	 in	
agribusiness	compared	to	the	older	youths.	Needless	to	say,	perhaps	the	divergence	 in	the	
levels	 of	 education	 and	 experience	which	 are	 necessarily	 bond	 to	 age.	While	 some	 of	 the	
older	youths	were	already	considered	by	their	family	and	peers	as	adults,	others	were	still	in	
the	uncertain	position	of	 youths	–	 struggling	 to	 exit	 it	 by	means	of	 socio-economic	 status.	
Therefore,	their	aspirations	were	different,	as	much	as	their	accessibility	to	financial	assets	is	
more	likely	for	older	youths	(see	Figure	25).		
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FIGURE	25.	YOUTHS'	ACCESSIBILITY	TO	FINANCIAL	SERVICES133	
Besides	 the	 access	 to	 financial	 services,	 the	 younger	 youths	 would	 have	 a	 harder	 time	
accessing	land.	In	fact,	older	youths	were	more	likely	to	have	inherited	land	from	their	family,	
either	after	their	father’s	passing,	or	in	correspondence	with	marriage.	As	with	the	passing	on	
of	ancestral	land	to	(male)	youths,	the	factor	of	age	would	intersect	with	that	of	the	family’s	
socio-economic	status.		
In	fact,	another	 important	factor	emerging	from	the	 interviews	with	youths	throughout	the	
country	 is	 the	 family	background:	while	 the	ethnicity	may	affect	 the	broader	 socio-cultural	
environment,	 the	 family	 has	 proved	 to	 have	 a	 strong	 impact	 not	 only	 in	 the	 definition	 of	
youth	identity	and	status,	but	also	for	youths’	engagement	and	success	in	agribusiness.	The	
most	 direct	 impact	 of	 the	 family	 background	 is	 that	 of	 the	 socio-economic	 class,	 offering	
youths	a	more	or	less	advantaged	start	of	their	career.		
	
	
	
																																																						
133 	Source:	 Uganda	 National	 Panel	 Service	 2013/2014,	 elaborated	 by	 Economic	 Policy	
Research	Centre,	courtesy	of	dr	Mildred	Barungi	
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5.4.4	VALUE	CHAIN	EMBEDDING	
I	 have	 approached	 the	 sampling	 of	my	 informants	 in	 a	 rather	 loose	way,	 by	 adopting	 the	
definitions	and	targeting	strategies	of	the	development	programmes	which	implementation	I	
have	 evaluated.	 In	 fact,	 the	 youths	 (18-35)	 were	 mostly	 defined	 as	 ‘agripreneurs’	 for	 the	
mere	 commercial	 attitude	 they	 held	 towards	 their	 agribusiness:	 anyone	 who	 was	 doing	
agribusiness	for	the	purpose	of	earning	an	 income	out	of	 it	–	and	not	solely	as	subsistence	
strategy	 –	 was	 considered	 by	 most	 development	 agencies	 an	 agripreneur.	 However,	
throughout	the	four	sub-regions	where	 I	have	conducted	fieldwork	 I	have	encountered	the	
most	 diverse	 attitudes	 towards	 agribusiness,	 among	 the	 same	 youths	 aiming	 at	 earning	 a	
living	out	of	agriculture.	As	part	of	my	interview	guidelines,	I	ask	each	interviewee	their	own	
definition	of	their	identity	as	farmers	or	agripreneurs.	While	in	the	East	sub-region,	Cathy	–	a	
single	mother	 in	her	 thirties,	engaged	 in	a	private-sector	driven	programme	–	explained	 to	
me	that	there	is	a	substantial	difference	between	farmers	and	agribusiness-men	or	women:		
Cathy:	 	 Yeah	 doing	 something…now	 like	 growing	 pumpkins	 you	 have	 to	 have	 that	
passion	 and	 say	 I	 love	 these	 pumpkins,	 I	 have	 to	 every	 evening	 you	 go	 there	 and	
check	on	them,	you	have	that	love	for	the	for	something	so	that	it	also,	because	if	you	
don’t	have	love	for	it	[you	won’t	manage]	
Me:	Yeah,	but	then	a	business	man	or	woman	does	not	have	love	for	what	they	grow?	
Cathy:	They	just	grow	it	for	money.	
In	fact,	for	the	majority	of	my	respondents,	the	main	criteria	for	distinguishing	farmers	from	
agripreneurs	was	whether	they	were	farming	for	subsistence	(possibly	also	including	earning	
a	 little	 income	 from	 cash	 crops)	 or	 as	 a	 business	 activity	 that	 requires	 dedication	 to	 the	
management	 of	 a	 development	 plan	 and	 accountancy.	 	 Moreover,	 those	 youths	 who	
consider	 themselves	 as	 agripreneurs	 would	 not	 necessarily	 be	 involved	 in	 the	 production	
section	of	the	value	chain,	and	would	aim	at	pursuing	their	career	within	agribusiness,	while	
	 215	
others	would	simply	use	the	opportunities	agribusiness	offers	to	step	out	of	agriculture	into	
another	sector	(a	widespread	aspiration	regarded	the	tertiary	sector134).			
Youths	who	were	located	in	proximity	to	the	market	were	mostly	more	deeply	embedded	in	
the	value	chain	network:	they	had	a	wider	network	of	people	involved	in	different	activities	
along	 the	 value	 chain,	 thereby	 being	 exposed	 to	 more	 updated	 knowledge	 about	
technologies,	 prices	 and	 opportunities.	 In	 fact,	 while	 this	 was	 particularly	 evident	 in	 the	
comparison	between	youths	in	and	away	from	Kampala,	also	in	rural	contexts	the	youths	that	
were	living	closer	to	the	market	had	stronger	connections	and	positions	in	their	agribusiness	
relations	 along	 the	 value	 chain.	 Depending	 on	 the	 value	 chain,	 youths	were	 able	 to	make	
higher	profits	out	of	their	business	in	rural	or	urban	markets	–	or	in	the	trading	of	products:	
what	 mattered	 was	 their	 ability	 to	 play	 with	 the	 latest	 marketing	 information,	 but	 also	
activating	the	right	connections	to	make	the	best	of	business	opportunities.	On	the	contrary	
those	who	were	living	in	more	remote	areas	and	were	not	very	embedded	in	the	value	chain	
relations	of	their	crop,	were	to	rely	on	second-hand	information,	on	middle	men	and	ended	
up	profiting	less	than	their	colleagues	close	to	the	market.	 Interestingly,	this	factor	seemed	
to	 play	 an	 even	 stronger	 role	 than	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 youths	 were	 engaged	 in	 a	
development	scheme.	
Particularly	influencing	youths’	identity	and	aspirations	in	agribusiness	was	their	residence	in	
rural	or	urban	contexts.	As	Burgess	and	Burton	argue:		
What	 is	 perhaps	more	 obvious	 now	 is	 that,	 as	 young	 people	 in	 Africa	migrated	 in	
greater	numbers	to	towns	and	cities,	their	immersion	in	a	new	world	of	urban	tastes,	
sounds,	and	stimuli,	and	new	encounters	with	diverse	peoples	and	conditions	led	to	
relative	anonymity	and	often	a	process	of	personal	 reinvention	and	 the	embrace	of	
new	identities.	(2010,	p.	1)	
While	the	author	make	a	general	statement	about	African	youths,	this	was	certainly	accurate	
for	the	youths	I	encounter	in	and	away	from	Kampala.	Being	resident	in	the	capital,	but	also	
in	 bigger	 urban	 centres	 like	 Mbarara,	 Gulu	 or	 Mbale	 required	 my	 informants	 to	 attain	 a	
																																																						
134	There	is	a	higher	social	status	associated	with	jobs	that	do	not	require	physical	efforts.	As	it	was	
reported	by	several	of	my	informants,	a	common	ambition	of	farmers	was	to	be	able	to	open	a	shop	–	
as,	the	case	of	Carlos	and	Scovia,	whom	I	interviewed	in	Parabongo	(Gulu)	on30/03/2017.	
	 216	
different	 attitude	 than	 they	would	 hold	 in	 the	 village	where	 they	were	 coming	 from.	 The	
urban	lifestyle	would	push	youths	towards	other	priorities	and	status	symbols	–	but	also,	as	
Sommers	 (2015)	 argued,	 gave	 youths	 an	 escape	 from	 the	 community	 pressures	 for	 the	
attainment	 of	 adulthood.	 	 This	 was	 particularly	 true	 for	 women	 among	 the	 youths,	 who	
would	have	a	higher	chance	of	pursuing	an	 independent	career	outside	of	 their	household	
duties.		
	
5.5	YOUTH	IN	DEVELOPMENT	IN	ACTION	
After	 having	 observed	 the	way	 in	which	 youths	went	 about	 their	 agribusiness	 activities,	 in	
and	 out	 of	 development	 schemes	 –	 I	 came	 to	 realise	 that	 the	 reality	 in	 which	 they	 were	
embedded	was	more	complex	and	dynamic	than	I	had	expected	as	I	approached	the	field.	As	
I	argued	in	the	paragraphs	above,	there	emerged	to	be	the	three	major	dimensions	in	which	
youths	were	embedded,	each	containing	a	number	of	factors	of	heterogeneity.	Considering	
the	 various	 degrees	 to	 which	 each	 of	 the	 factors	 of	 heterogeneity	 were	 playing	 a	 role	 in	
shaping	youths’	agribusiness	experiences,	it	becomes	evident	that	youths	were	embedded	in	
a	complex	network	of	relations.	The	complexity	and	multiplicity	of	relations	in	which	youths	
were	 embedded	 problematizes	 the	 perspective	 that	 opposes	 the	 social	 group	 of	 youth	 to	
that	of	development	practitioners.		
Scholars	 (Escobar,	 2012)	 (Murray	 Li,	 2007)	 (Scott	 J.	 ,	 1998)	 (Rottenburg,	 2009)	 analysing	
development	processes,	on	the	contrary,	often	portray	a	dualistic	opposition	of	development	
practitioners	 and	 the	 groups	 of	 their	 programmes.	 In	 the	 following	 chapter,	 I	 further	
problematize	this	framework	of	analysis.	On	the	contrary,	from	my	observations	in	the	field	I	
observed	how	youths	were	embedded	 in	an	 intricate	web	of	relations	with	each	other	and	
with	various	development	and	social	actors.	In	Table	18,	I	listed	the	18	types	of	social	actors	
with	 whom	 youths	 were	 to	 some	 extent	 related,	 directly	 or	 indirectly,	 while	 involved	 in	
development	schemes.		
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Actors	 Explanation	
1. Youths	 Within	 the	broad	age	 range	comprising	both	males	and	 females	
between	 18	 and	 35;	 working	 as	 individuals,	 in	 groups	 or	
cooperatives.		
2. Multilateral	 Donors	 engaged	 in	 supporting	 youths’	 engagement	 in	
agribusiness	were,	in	my	research,	the	African	Development	Bank	
and	FAO	
3. Bilateral	 Donors	 engaged	 in	 supporting	 youths’	 engagement	 in	
agribusiness	were,	in	my	research,	USAID	and	the	Dutch	Embassy	
–	 but	 I	 am	 aware	 that	 other	 embassies	 were	 also	 involved	 in	
related	programmes.		
4. Ugandan	
Government	
Within	 the	 frame	 of	 this	 research,	 it	 comprised	 mainly	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Gender,	 Labour	 and	 Social	 Development	 and	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Agriculture,	 Fisheries	 and	 Animal	 Industries.	 At	 a	
broader	 level,	 the	central	Ugandan	government	was	 responsible	
for	the	elaboration	of	national	youths	and	agribusiness	strategies	
which	would	server	as	guidelines	for	international	donors.	
5. Local	
Government	
District	 authorities,	 local	 councils,	 sub-country	 and	 parish	
authorities.		
6. Implementers	 Extension	providers	–	mostly	at	 the	 level	of	district	authorities	–	
but	also	contracted	development	agencies	 (NGOs):	 in	 this	 case	 I	
refer	to	the	specific	individuals		
7. NGO’s	 Within	my	 research,	 I	 have	 interacted	 with	 a	 number	 of	 actors	
working	 for	 the	 following	 NGO’s	 which	 were	 implementing	
bilateral	 development	 programmes	 (mainly	 for	 the	 Dutch	
embassy):	ICCO,	AVSI,	ZOA	
8. Research	 Next	 to	 institutes	 carrying	 out	 research	 for	 development	 (for	
example,	IITA),	the	Makerere	University	was	playing	an	important	
role	 in	advising	the	ministries	 in	the	elaboration	of	development	
policies.	
9. Media	 In	Uganda	the	media	which	are	reaching	out	to	most	people	were	
the	newspapers	The	New	Vision	and	the	Daily	Monitor,	together	
with	 radio	 programmes.	 All	 of	 these	 played	 a	 role	 in	
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mainstreaming	 youths	 engagement	 in	 agribusiness:	 for	 example	
the	 New	 Vision	 had	 a	 competition	 programme	 for	 the	 best	
farmer,	funded	by	the	Dutch	Embassy.		
10. Associations	 (Grassroot)	farmers’	associations,	unions,	both	governmental	and	
non-governmental.		
11. Private	sector	 Small,	 medium	 or	 large	 size	 private	 enterprises	 or	 companies	
offering	input	or	output	markets	to	the	youths.	
12. Banks	 Financial	 institutions	 offering	 loans	 to	 individuals	 or	 groups	 of	
youths	within	or	out	of	development	programmes.	 I	hereby	also	
refer	to	two	banks,	Mastercard	Foundation	and	Triodos	(through	
Brac	 foundation),	 who	 were	 implementing	 their	 own	
development	programmes	for	youths.		
13. Education	 Primary	 or	 secondary	 schools,	 incubation	 centres,	 courses	 and	
degrees	which	were	attended	by	my	young	informants.	
14. Service	providers	 These	 include	 middle	 men,	 transport	 providers,	 owners	 of	
machineries	 (tractors	 etc.)	 providing	 seasonal	 services,	 input	
(chemicals	etc.)	retailers.	
15. Market	 The	market	 itself	 is,	 besides	 a	 physical	 place,	 a	 space	 for	 social	
interaction	 and	 economic	 transactions:	 the	 people	 rotating	
around	 it	 contribute	 to	 shaping,	 with	 their	 relations	 and	
interaction,	the	dynamic	environment	that	constitutes	the	testing	
ground	of	youths’	agribusiness,	and	often	times	the	place	where	
they	build	their	professional	figure.		
16. Peers	 Other	 youths,	 also	 out	 of	 agribusiness,	 who	 contributing	 in	
consolidating	socio-cultural	values	and	norms.			
17. Family	 By	family	I	refer	to	the	broad	extended	family	comprising	various	
generations	 running	 down	 the	 patrilineal	 kin	 structures.	
Oftentimes	the	youths	I	interacted	with	had	been	raised	by	other	
relatives	than	their	parents.		
18. Community	
leaders	
These	 key	 figures	 –	 usually	 the	 elders	 in	 the	 community	 –	 	 are	
important	 in	 giving	 an	 imprint	 to	 the	 socio-cultural	 identity	 of	
youths,	 but	 also	 shaping	 their	 ambitions	 in	 and	 out	 of	
agribusiness.	
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TABLE	18.	TYPES	OF	SOCIAL	ACTORS	IN	RELATION	WITH	YOUTHS	
The	 extent	 to	 which	 these	 relations	 were	 direct,	 intense,	 or	 determinant	 for	 youths’	
engagement	in	agribusiness	varied	considerably	in	relation	to	the	three	dimensions	analysed	
above.	For	instance,	community	leaders	and	family	background	had	a	stronger	impact	in	rural	
areas,	 while	 in	 urban	 contexts	 the	 proximity	 to	 the	 market	 and	 exposure	 to	 media	 and	
market	actors	was	more	determinant.	However,	it	was	not	the	core	purpose	of	my	research	
and	 analysis	 to	 map	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relations	 between	 youths	 and	 social	 actors	 in	
agribusiness	development,	nonetheless	 I	was	struck	by	 the	messiness	of	 it	all.	 In	 the	 figure	
below	(Figure	26)	 I	outline	the	messiness	and	 intricacy	of	the	relations,	showing	how	some	
actors	were	directly	related	among	each	other	and	only	indirectly	to	the	youths	(for	instance,	
Ugandan	government	and	multilateral	donors).		
	
	
FIGURE	 26.	 MAPPING	 OF	 THE	 NETWORK	 OF	 ACTORS	 INVOLVED	 IN	 SHAPING	 YOUTHS’	 IDENTITY	 AND	
AGRIBUSINESS	
	
The	various	social,	political	and	economic	factors	contributing	to	shape	youths’	agribusiness	
experience	 were	 heavily	 affecting	 both	 their	 identity	 as	 youths	 as	 their	 approach	 and	
aspirations	 in	 agribusiness.	 The	 success	 of	 their	 agribusiness	 depended	 on	 institutional	
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development	 actors	 as	 much	 as	 on	 many	 other	 actors,	 institutions	 and	 organisations.	
Observing	the	way	in	which	these	actors	were	contributing	to	shape	youths’	reality,	I	realised	
the	 framework	with	which	 I	had	approached	the	 fieldwork	was	not	exhaustive.	 In	 line	with	
the	theoretical	framework	(see	chapter	2)	I	had	built	up,	I	had	planned	to	study	the	relation	
between	 youths	 on	 the	 one	 side	 and	 development	 actors	 on	 the	 other,	 their	 respective	
narratives,	 theories	 of	 change	 and	 experiences.	 However,	 this	 dualistic	 framing	 of	 the	
development	reality	did	not	prove	to	be	accurately	corresponding	to	the	phenomenology	of	
development	in	action	on	the	ground.	Where	by	development	in	action	I	refer	to	the	actual	
practices	 and	 relations	 involved	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 development	 schemes,	with	 the	
above	mapping	(figure	5.3)	also	refer	to	the	broad	web	of	relations	the	youths	are	embedded	
in	order	to	be	able	to	carry	out	their	agribusiness	activities.		
	
5.6	CONCLUSION	
I	set	up	the	fieldwork	research	throughout	the	country	with	the	ambition	of	understanding	
who	were	 the	 youths	 engaged	 in	 development	 programmes,	 and	 how	 their	 experience	 in	
agribusiness	 shaped	 up	 in	 their	 respective	 socio-cultural,	 political,	 economic	 and	 ecologic	
environments.	 In	 fact,	 from	 the	 literature	 review	 and	 pilot	 field	 trips	 I	 had	 carried	 out,	 I	
observed	 an	 important	 heterogeneity	 characterising	 the	 social	 category	 of	 youths	 –	 as	 in	
Uganda	the	majority	of	the	population	is	‘young’.	As	Methorst	et	al	(2017,	p.	1)	argued:		
Diversity	cannot	be	explained	in	full	by	‘external’	structural	factors	such	as	‘markets’,	
‘technology’,	 or	 ‘nature’	 [1,5,6].	 Farmers	 make	 decisions	 about	 the	 everyday	
management	of	their	farm	as	well	as	strategic	decisions	about	farm	development.	The	
practices	 resulting	 from	 these	 strategic	 decisions	 in	 turn	 affect	 the	 perceived	
opportunities	 and	 new	 strategic	 decisions.	 In	 this	 iterative	 process	 of	 strategic	
decision-making	in	farm	development,	the	farmer	tries	to	anticipate	and	balance	the	
effect	 of	 developments	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 farm	with	 the	 needs	 and	 aims	 of	 the	
family	farm.	
In	 line	 with	 the	 authors,	 I	 have	 encountered	 three	 main	 dimensions	 clustering	 the	
heterogeneity	 of	 the	 Ugandan	 youths:	 my	 informants	 were	 embedded	 in	 territory,	
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sociocultural	and	value	chain	environments.	Within	these	dimensions,	I	identified	18	factors	
contributing	 to	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 my	 informants.	 The	 interaction	 of	 these	 factors	
contributed	 in	 shaping	 the	 different	 traits	 making	 youths	 the	 diverse	 social	 category	 they	
constitute.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 such	 dimensions	 and	 heterogeneity	 factors	were	 interacting	
with	each	other	 in	a	dynamic	way	–	making	the	agribusiness	experience	of	youths	an	ever-
evolving	process	that	point	out	to	the	vibrant	reality	of	their	identity	and	business	activities.		
Through	 such	 analysis	 I	 could	 identify	 the	 social	 and	 institutional	 actors	 that	 embody	 the	
processual	 and	dynamic	agribusiness	 reality	 in	which	 youths	are	embedded,	 and	 I	mapped	
such	relations	in	Figure	26.		
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6.1	INTRODUCTION	
The	previous	chapters	have	investigated	the	narratives	of	two	groups	of	development	actors:	
development	 practitioners	 and	 youths.	 I	 explored	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 development	
practitioners	and	recipients	constructed	their	discourse	around	youth	in	agribusiness.	On	the	
one	 hand,	 development	 practitioners	 constructed	 a	 variegated	 development	 discourse	
resulting	 in	 different	 theories	 of	 change,	 and	 thus	 developing	 a	 diverse	 of	 development	
approaches.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 given	 a	 variety	 of	 heterogeneity	 factors,	 young	 farmers	
constructed	 a	 diverse	 range	 of	 narratives	 and	 definitions	 of	 youth	 and	 agribusiness.	While	
both	 youths	 and	 development	 practitioners	 were	 aiming	 to	 engage	 youth	 in	 agribusiness,	
their	narratives	indicated	they	had	different	understandings	of	what	youth	and	agribusiness	
actually	 mean,	 as	 well	 as	 what	 youths’	 needs	 actually	 are.	 How	 this	 mismatch	 affects	
development	outcomes	is	the	first	object	of	study	of	this	chapter.		
The	second	objective	 is	 to	analyse	the	actual	 implementation	of	development	programmes	
for	 youths	 in	 agribusiness	 in	 Uganda.	 Through	 an	 examination	 of	 the	 youths’	 and	
practitioners’	 perceptions	 of	 the	 programmes	 practices,	 I	 come	 to	 an	 observation	 of	 how	
‘youth’	is	constructed	as	a	knowledge	category	and	‘driving	metaphor’	for	development	and	
political	contention.		
The	academic	debate	 in	development	studies	has	 focused	 its	attention	on	different	 sets	of	
issues	in	development,	its	politics	and	power	relations,	effectiveness,	ideology	and	mandates.	
These	studies	have	operated	with	analytical	categories	borrowed	from	a	Foucauldian	study	of	
power:	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 the	 development	 practitioners	 with	 their	 dominant	 discourse	 –	
produced	 and	 reproduced	 (and	 sometimes	 contested)	 through	 the	 agency	 of	 the	 social	
actors	working	in	the	‘development	 industry’,	and	on	the	other	the	development	recipients	
with	 their	 own	 narratives	 and	 agency	 –	 more	 often	 than	 not	 contesting	 the	 dominant	
development	discourse	enforced	on	them.	My	own	research	has	been	operationalized	within	
these	analytical	categories:	where	the	first	chapter	explores	the	production	and	reproduction	
of	 the	 development	 practitioners’	 discourse	 around	 youth	 in	 agribusiness,	 the	 second	
analyses	the	variety	of	narratives	and	experiences	of	youths	themselves	–	highlighting	their	
heterogeneity.	With	this	chapter	I	bring	together	the	study	of	top	and	bottom	dimensions	of	
this	 development	 trend	 in	 the	 analysis	 of	 development	 practices	 on	 the	 ground	 –	 to	
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understand	how	the	mismatch	affects	 the	development	outcomes.	Through	 the	analysis	of	
such	outcomes,	 in	the	very	process	of	programmes	 implementation,	 I	observe	the	tensions	
between	perceptions,	 incentives	and	political	agendas.	In	this	way,	I	provide	insights	on	the	
unfolding,	flaws	and	strengths	of	the	recent	development	trend	on	youth	 in	agribusiness	 in	
Uganda.		
This	chapter	is	divided	in	nine	sections,	before	coming	to	a	conclusion.	I	will	start	by	giving	an	
outline	 of	 the	 research	 methods	 (section	 6.2)	 I	 have	 used,	 describing	 the	 phases	 of	 the	
ethnographic	research,	between	2017	and	2018,	 that	constitute	the	empirical	basis	 for	 the	
analysis	 for	 this	 chapter.	With	 section	 6.3,	 I	 start	 the	 analysis	with	 a	 comparative	 analysis	
elaborated	 in	 the	 previous	 empirical	 chapter:	 I	 confront	 the	 narratives	 and	 practices	 of	
development	practitioners	and	youths,	around	their	perceptions	of	youth,	agribusiness	and	
development	 programmes.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 also	 briefly	 compare	 the	 development	
approaches	of	public-sector	programmes	versus	private-sector	driven	ones,	as	 intended	by	
the	development	practitioners	and	perceived	by	the	youths.	In	the	section	6.4	I	make	an	in-
depth	analysis	of	the	implementation	of	the	programmes.	I	analyse	the	social	impact	of	the	
programmes,	exploring	 the	perceptions	of	 the	programmes	 from	the	point	of	view	of	both	
youths,	 their	 main	 constraints.	 As	 part	 of	 this	 section,	 I	 also	 examine	 the	 heterogeneous	
outcomes	of	 the	development	programmes	which	 implementation	 I	 have	observed	on	 the	
ground.	 In	 section	 6.5,	 I	 discuss	 how	 the	 perceptions	 of	 the	 programmes	 reveal	 that	 they	
contribute	to	‘rendering	technical’	the	needs	of	youths,	who	are	reduced	to	a	social	category	
that	responds	to	the	agendas	of	development	organisations.	I	continue	on	this	line	of	analysis	
in	 the	 sixth	 section,	where	 I	 analyse	 the	political	 agenda	behind	 some	of	 the	development	
programmes,	 and	 the	 instrumentality	 of	 the	 social	 category	of	 youth,	 despite	being	 a	 very	
broad	 and	 vague	 category	 due	 to	 its	 heterogeneity.	 In	 section	 6.7,	 I	 describe	 the	ways	 in	
which	some	of	the	programmes	I	have	observed	manage	to	adapt	to	the	heterogeneity	of	the	
needs	 and	 capacities	 of	 youths.	 In	 the	 eight	 section	 I	 describe	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 various	
development	 practitioners,	who	 have	 different	 stakes	 and	 incentives	 in	 the	 administration	
and	implementation	of	the	programmes,	negotiate	among	each	other	–	often	changing	(and	
frustrating)	the	initial	outset	of	the	programmes.	In	section	6.9,	I	analyse	the	observation	of	
the	case	of	a	development	project	 for	 youth	 in	agribusiness,	which	has	been	 frustrated	by	
strenuous	negotiations	and	corruption	of	the	parties	involved.	In	the	last	section,	I	draw	the	
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conclusions	 of	 the	 analysis	 of	 narratives	 of	 the	 various	 development	 actors	 involved,	 the	
practices	of	implementation	and	their	perceptions.		
	
6.2	METHODS		
In	this	chapter,	I	analyse	ethnographic	data	that	I	collected	during	extensive	fieldwork	across	
Uganda	 in	2017,	as	well	as	during	a	 follow-up	fieldtrip	to	Kampala	that	 I	carried	out	during	
the	month	of	May	2018.	The	motives	 for	 returning	 to	 the	 field	were	 two-fold.	On	 the	one	
hand,	 returning	 to	 the	 field	 offered	 the	 opportunity	 to	 validate	 my	 conclusions	 on	 the	
development	agencies’	theories	of	change	and	approaches,	during	 interviews	and	feedback	
sessions.	On	the	other,	 it	offered	me	the	opportunity	 to	 investigate	 the	reasons	why	 there	
was	a	mismatch	between	the	narratives	of	development	practitioners	and	recipients.		
During	the	first	phase,	I	focused	mainly	on	identifying	the	two	the	narratives.	The	purpose	of	
this	chapter,	and	my	subsequent	fieldwork	was	to	analyse	and	explain	the	mismatch	between	
different	sets	of	development	narratives	and	practices	–	as	exemplified	 in	 the	 figure	below	
(Figure	27).		By	development	practices,	I	mean	the	actual	activities	that	involve	development	
actors	–	both	at	the	top	and	bottom	–	as	a	development	programme	unfolds	from	design	to	
implementation	 and	 outcome:	 these	 include	 formal	 and	 informal	 meetings,	 evaluations,	
extension	 services,	 consultations	 and	 actual	 agronomic	 and	 business	 activities	 within	 the	
framework	 of	 the	 programme	 or	 project.	 This	 definition	 is	 functional	 to	 my	 analysis:	 in	
addition	to	an	analysis	of	the	mismatch	between	development	practitioners’	narratives	and	
practices	and	 those	on	 the	ground,	 I	 also	explore	gap	between	development	programmes’	
narrative	elaboration	and	their	implementation	in	practice.		
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FIGURE	27.	EXEMPLIFICATION	OF	THE	MISMATCHES	IN	DEVELOPMENT	PROGRAMMES	
Moreover,	 in	 this	 chapter	 I	 analyse	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 development	 programmes	
supporting	youths	in	agribusiness	through	the	examination	of	the	participant	observations	on	
the	ground	(which	I	carried	out	in	2017).	During	multiple	fieldtrips	throughout	the	country,	I	
had	 the	 opportunity	 of	 observing	 how	 development	 practitioners	 implemented	 the	
programmes,	how	they	interacted	with	youths,	and	how	youths	perceived	these	practices.		
The	data	for	the	analysis	of	adaptation	and	negotiations	include	interviews	with	development	
practitioners	 and	 youths	 I	 had	 previously	 met	 during	 extensive	 fieldwork,	 in	 addition	 to	
observations	 of	 meetings	 and	 high-level	 negotiations	 among	 development	 practitioners.	 I	
carried	out	such	observations	in	a	partially	new	setting,	among	two	groups	of	practitioners:	
one	in	the	process	of	setting	up	a	pilot	project	for	youth	engagement	in	agribusiness,	and	one	
agribusiness	development	platform	for	public-private	partnership	(PPP).		
	
6.3	 DEVELOPMENT	 PRACTITIONERS	 AND	 YOUTHS:	 CONFRONTING	
NARRATIVES	
The	 previous	 chapters	 offered	 an	 in-depth	 analysis	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 development	
practitioners	 and	 youths	 understand	 and	 perceive	 the	 programmes	 engaging	 youths	 in	
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agribusiness.	In	this	section,	I	summarise	the	results	from	previous	chapters,	by	confronting	
their	narratives	(Table	19).	The	summarised	perspectives	in	the	table	below	are	based	on	the	
ethnographic	data	collected	during	fieldwork	in	2017.			
	
6.3.1	NARRATIVES		
Themes	 Development	practitioners	 Youths	
Expectations	from	
development	
programmes	
-	Create	the	enabling	
environment	for	youths’	
engagement	in	agribusiness	
-	Achieve	gainful	employment	in	
agribusiness	
Who	are	the	youths?		 -	Age	bracket	ranging	15-	or	
18-	to	-30	or	-35,	male	and	
female.	
-	Social	category	constituting	
the	target	of	development	
programmes:	youths	are	
seen	as	both	the	bearers	of	
the	problem	of	
unemployment	as	they	are	
the	agents	of	change,	
through	agribusiness.	
-	Youths	are	different	
throughout	the	country,	but	
they	are	mostly	targeted	
with	homogeneous	
programmes.		
-	Youth	is	primarily	a	socio-
cultural	category	between	
childhood	and	adulthood,	not	
necessarily	and	contextually	
bond	to	an	age	bracket.	
-	Meanings	and	belonging	to	
this	category	are	radically	
different	for	males	and	females.	
-	There	are	a	number	of	
heterogeneity	factors	defining	
youth	in	relation	to	their	
agribusiness	activities,	and	
these	are	related	to	three	
dimensions	of	embedding:	
socio-cultural,	territorial	and	
value-chain.		
	
What	are	the	youths’	
problems,	preventing	
them	from	engagement	
in	agribusiness?	
-	Youths	are	unemployed	and	
don’t	have	the	
entrepreneurial	mindset	and	
assets	to	start	their	own	
agribusiness.			
-	Youths	lack	land,	access	to	
financial	services,	training	
and	information	
-	Youths	struggle	to	earn	
rewarding	income	from	
agricultural	activities	because	of	
technical,	economic	and	
political	constraints	–	which	
vary	depending	on	the	three	
dimensions	of	embedding:	
quality	agricultural	inputs,		
What	is	agribusiness?	 -	Agribusiness	is	not	for	
subsistence	but	for	self-
-	Agribusiness	is	not	agriculture	
for	subsistence	but	for	income	
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employment,	with	the	
supposed	trickle-down	effect	
of	generating	employment.	It	
is	thus	radically	different	
from	subsistence	agriculture.		
-	Agribusiness	is	modern	
agriculture,	which	can	
contribute	to	making	Uganda	
a	middle-income	country.		
generation,	thus	it	is	a	rupture	
with	the	older	generation’s	
understanding	of	agriculture.		
-	Agribusiness	is	perceived	as	
the	way	out	from	the	youth	
category	into	adulthood.	
What	is	needed	to	
improve	agribusiness?		
-	Capacity	building:	including	
training,	entrepreneurship	
skills	development,	extension	
services,	accountancy	and	
management		
-	Access	to	financial	services	
and	land	
-	Input	and	output	markets:	
quality	inputs	(chemicals,	
machineries),	and	ready	
markets	for	their	produce	or	
value	addition	
-	Access	to	financial	services	
TABLE	19.	COMPARING	NARRATIVES	OF	YOUTHS	AND	DEV.	PRACTITIONERS	
	
6.4	IMPLEMENTATION		
Besides	 the	above-mentioned	disparities	 in	narratives,	 I	have	also	observed	 tensions	 in	 the	
implementation	phase.	Throughout	the	multi-sited	fieldwork,	I	have	observed	various	stages	
of	 implementation	of	development	programmes	both	 in	 the	public	as	 in	 the	private-sector	
driven	approaches.	For	the	majority	of	the	field	visits,	I	moved	independently	(with	driver	and	
interpreter),	 I	 was	 also	 able	 to	 conduct	 some	 participant	 observations	 of	 field	 visits	 with	
development	practitioners.	Visiting	agribusiness	enterprises,	mostly	in	occasion	of	monitoring	
and	 evaluation	 visits,	 was	 particularly	 interesting	 to	 observe	 the	 interaction	 between	
development	 practitioners	 and	 youths.	 These	 observations	 revealed	 different	 ranges	 of	
discrepancy	between	their	perceptions	of	the	programmes	and	what	they	were	intended	to	
deliver.	I	have	encountered	heterogeneity	also	in	the	success	and	limits	of	the	programmes,	
not	only	because	of	their	efficiency,	but	also	because	each	had	a	different	working	definition	
of	 success.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	examine	 the	complex	and	diverse	dynamics	 I	have	observed	 in	
the	phase	of	 implementation,	 exploring	 the	 impact	 of	 the	programmes	on	 the	 local	 socio-
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economic	realities,	interaction	between	the	actors,	their	perceptions	of	the	programmes,	and	
the	success	and	limits	of	the	programmes.		
The	 analysis	 of	 the	 implementation	 phase	 is	 particularly	 important,	 after	 having	 examined	
the	narratives,	 for	 two	reasons:	on	 the	one	hand	 the	 functionalistic	assumption	 that	policy	
discourse	 simply	 needs	 to	 be	 ‘translated’	 into	 practice	 appears	 to	 be	 more	 complex	 and	
problematic	when	paying	due	attention	to	the	relations	and	practices	on	the	ground.	On	the	
other	hand,	implementation	is	as	crucial	as	production	of	narratives	for	the	construction	of	a	
development	discourse	through	practices.	As	Mosse	(2004,	p.	640)	observed:	
Despite	 the	 enormous	 energy	 devoted	 to	 generating	 the	 right	 policy	 models,	
however,	there	 is	surprisingly	 little	attention	paid	to	the	relationship	between	these	
models	and	the	practices	and	events	that	they	are	expected	to	generate	or	legitimize	
in	 particular	 contexts.	 (…)	 	 At	 best,	 the	 relationship	 between	 policy	 and	 practice	 is	
understood	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 unintended	 ‘gap’	 between	 theory	 and	 practice,	 to	 be	
reduced	by	better	policy	more	effectively	implemented.		
The	‘unintended	gap’	between	policies	and	their	outcomes	are	the	object	of	study	of	Mosse,	
who	 analyses	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 British	 farming	 project	 in	 India	 in	 which	 he	
participated	 as	 development	 practitioner.	His	 analysis	 (2004,	 p.	 653)	 lead	 him	 to	 conclude	
that	however	‘good’	the	policies	guiding	the	project,	they	could	not	be	implemented	due	to	
the	organisation’s	interests	to	remain	in	the	development	business:	“It	was	increasingly	clear	
that	project	practices	were	 shaped	 less	and	 less	by	 the	 formal	goals	 (of	policy/design)	and	
more	and	more	by	the	organization’s	‘system	goals’	that	revolved	around	the	preservation	of	
rules	 and	 administrative	 order”.	 Interestingly,	 my	 very	 first	 participant	 observation	 of	 an	
agribusiness	programme	implementation	quickly	drew	me	to	the	same	conclusion.	
The	first	field	trip	I	have	conducted	out	of	Kampala	was	to	Gulu,	as	I	joined	a	monitoring	and	
evaluation	 trip	 of	 a	 large	 bilateral	 agency	 that	 asked	 to	 remain	 anonymous.	 I	 was	 quite	
excited:	 I	 was	 going	 to	 the	 ‘real	 field’	 –	 the	 agricultural	 one.	 I	 was	 going	 to	 observe	 the	
unfolding	of	 a	 strongly	private	 sector-driven	and	oriented	 scheme	 that	 linked	medium	and	
large	scale	agribusiness	to	groups	of	farmers.	These	farmers,	who	development	practitioners	
from	 the	 agency	 called	 ‘agripreneurs’,	 would	 be	working	 in	 out-grower	 schemes	 (contract	
farming)	 for	 the	 agribusiness	 companies.	 I	 went	 along	 with	 a	 Chief	 of	 Party	 of	 the	
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programme,	who	illustrated	his	strategy:	“We	plan	a	quick-in	and	quick-out:	we	are	not	going	
to	be	there	forever,	and	these	guys	need	to	be	doing	their	business	without	us.	We	are	just	
facilitating”135.	 In	his	narrative,	 the	 facilitation	of	market	 linkages	between	different	parties	
was	 bluntly	 expressed	 as	 “they	 don’t	 see	 the	market	 opportunities”.	 In	 fact,	much	 of	 the	
activities	 the	 development	 agency	was	 implementing	 on	 the	 ground	were	 oriented	 to	 the	
education	of	farmers	to	become	agripreneurs,	and	“change	their	mindset”.	In	fact,	the	role	of	
development	practitioners	I	observed	in-action	was	that	of	mentoring	and	training.		
Besides	 the	 Chief	 of	 Party,	 I	 was	 traveling	 with	 two	 communications	 officers	 and	 one	
implementer	based	in	Gulu.	 I	was	excited	to	see	how	they	would	operate,	observe	the	way	
they	 talked	 about	 the	 programme	 and	 agripreneurs,	 and	 finally	 find	 out	 who	 these	
agripreneurs	 were	 according	 to	 them.	 However,	 the	 first	 participant	 observation	 as	 we	
arrived	at	the	local	offices	had	been	rather	shocking:	at	the	debriefing	meeting	with	the	rest	
of	the	team,	the	Chief	of	Party	explained	to	the	communication	specialists:	
we	are	here	to	collect	success	stories,	high	 level	stories	with	pictures…They	have	to	
be	impact-stories,	we	have	to	convince	the	current	administration	keep	funding	this	
project,	 otherwise	 we	 can	 all	 go	 home!	 Guys,	 we	 are	 here	 to	 make	 business!	We	
make	money	out	of	this,	it’s	our	job.	We	need	to	get	new	contracts	for	development	
projects!	We’re	making	money	out	of	this	by	helping	others	making	business…	so	let’s	
collect	our	success	stories	and	go	back	to	Kampala136.		
This	statement	was	an	explicit	positioning	of	the	role	the	development	practitioners	would	be	
playing	 on	 the	 ground:	working	 for	 themselves	 to	 remain	 in	 the	 business	 of	 the	 Ugandan	
development	industry,	while	at	the	same	time	facilitating	agribusiness	for	young	farmers.	The	
implementation	of	the	programme,	and	it	monitoring	and	evaluation,	were	instrumental	for	
the	 preservation	 of	 the	 development	 agency	 position	 as	 professional	 actors	 in	 the	 field	 of	
agribusiness	development.	This	 finding	may	not	be	surprising	nor	 revealing	of	 the	 inherent	
system	flaws	of	the	‘development	industry’,	but	highlights	how	the	implementation	phase	as	
an	object	of	study	is	more	than	the	measurement	of	the	‘gap	between	policies	and	practices’.	
																																																						
135	Extract	from	an	informal	conversation	in	the	car,	on	the	way	from	Kampala	to	Gulu,	on	7/02/2017.	
136	Extract	from	an	observation	I	made	in	the	offices	of	the	organization,	in	Gulu,	on	7/02/2017	–	
which	I	noted	in	my	fieldnotes.	Emphasis	added	by	author.	
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In	line	with	Mosse	(2004,	p.	655),	it	seems	that	“Policy	may	not	generate	events,	but	it	helps	
stabilize	the	interpretation	of	events”.		
The	Chief	of	Party	was	determined	to	demonstrate	the	social	 impact	of	 the	programme,	 in	
terms	of	creation	of	agribusiness	opportunities	for	youths	in	Gulu	as	a	necessary	justification	
for	 the	 programme’s	 existence.	 Particularly	 during	 times	 of	 budget	 cuts,	 the	 role	 of	
communication	officers	in	this	endeavour	was	crucial	in	the	assessment	of	the	programme’s	
impact.	As	in	the	case	of	Mosse’s	DIFID	project	in	India	(2004,	p.	659),	“The	project	never	did	
clarify	 the	 instrumentality	 of	 its	 model,	 instead	 it	 focused	 on	 demonstrating	 impact.	
Significantly,	 the	series	of	detailed	 impact	assessment	studies	 that	 followed	(and	 in	which	 I	
was	involved)	demonstrated	that	the	project	was	perceived	by	villagers	as	having	a	significant	
positive	economic	and	social	impact”.	
	
6.4.1	SOCIAL	IMPACT	OF	THE	PROGRAMMES		
Besides	 the	 development	 organisations’	 question	 of	 the	 economic	 improvement,	
development	programmes	have	a	 variety	of	different	 social	 impacts	on	 the	 individuals	 and	
communities	 involved	 in	 the	 schemes.	 Given	 the	 fact	 that	 since	 independence	 western	
development	organisations	have	been	supporting	agribusiness	with	different	approaches,	 it	
is	hard	 to	 isolate	 the	 impact	of	a	 single	programme.	 In	 some	regions	more	 (North)	 than	 in	
others	(South-West),	my	informants	had	been	engaged	in	several	development	programmes	
for	 agribusiness	 before	 the	 scheme	 I	 was	 interviewing	 them	 about.	 The	 study	 of	
implementation	of	programmes	targeting	the	social	group	of	youth,	which	is	relatively	recent	
target,	 has	 the	 advantage	 of	 showing	 the	 impact	 of	 a	 single,	 isolated	 programme.	 At	 the	
same	time,	most	of	the	programmes	I	have	followed	up	on	in	the	four	different	regions	had	
been	running	for	a	relatively	short	period	of	time	(minimum	of	6	months	to	maximum	of	2	
years),	and	thus	made	it	sometimes	difficult	to	assess	their	impact.		
Nonetheless,	my	interviews	with	participants	revealed	several	flaws	in	the	programmes.	The	
establishment	 of	 a	 development	 programme	 catalyses	 both	 social	 and	 economic	
transformation	 in	 the	 community	 –	 whether	 the	 scheme	 involves	 single	 individuals	 or	
multiple	members	of	the	family.	It	is	precisely	the	external	input	of	economic	possibilities	for	
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transformation	that	can	provoke	a	misbalance	in	the	community.	In	fact,	social	dynamics	are	
generally	 structured	around	economic	 status.	 The	 case	of	Acholi	 communities	 in	 the	north	
are	 emblematic	 of	 the	 important	 transformation	 that	 the	 engagement	 in	 a	 private-sector	
development	scheme	had	brought.		
During	my	first	visit	in	the	area	together	with	the	Chief	of	Party	and	communication	officers,	I	
came	 in	 touch	with	one	of	 the	 farmers,	Robert,	who	had	been	enrolled	both	as	seeds	out-
grower	for	the	seed	company,	as	for	the	extension	service	provider	for	the	company.	Robert	
was	 considered	 a	 success	 case,	 and	 had	 become	 a	 role	 model	 for	 other	 youths	 –	 and	 a	
flagship	case	for	the	programme.	He	had	directly	been	trained	by	the	bilateral	development	
agency,	 and	 linked	 up	 to	 the	 seed	 company	who,	 through	 him,	 would	 reach	 out	 to	more	
farmers	to	be	contracted.	Farmers	in	the	scheme,	were	given	improved	seeds	together	with	
the	necessary	chemicals	by	the	company	itself,	and	were	in	charge	of	multiplying	the	seeds	
on	their	land.	Robert	had	gained	both	an	improved	income	from	the	seed	multiplication,	as	
much	 as	 a	 higher	 social	 status	 as	 focal	 point	 for	 the	members	 of	 the	 community	 he	 was	
mentoring	 as	 trainer	 and	extension-service	provider.	 Friends	 and	 family	members	 from	his	
community	would	look	up	to	him	as	the	one	who	had	brought	a	new	opportunity	for	income	
generation.	He	had	catalysed	the	formation	of	a	social	group	around	renovated	ties	–	based	
on	 a	 principle	 of	 entitlement	 through	 age.	 They	would	meet	 to	 discuss	 their	 business	 and	
strategies	and	advice	each	other	on	agricultural	practices.	However,	the	most	crucial	aspect	
for	them	was	the	ability,	as	youth,	to	obtain	the	economic	status	that	would	allow	them	to	
enter	adulthood.	In	fact,	the	improved	income	of	a	number	of	youths	in	the	community	had	
drawn	to	them	both	the	responsibility	and	honour	of	the	social	status	of	bread	winners.	The	
development	programme	had	therefore	offered	a	paradoxical	possibility	for	the	youths	–	as	
such	–		to	overcome	their	status	as	youths	and	enter	adulthood.		
The	 attention	 that	 the	 community	 paid	 to	 Robert	 and	 his	 fellow	 young/adult	 agripreneurs	
however,	 was	 not	 only	 positive.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 their	 economic	 success	 also	 triggered	
jealousy.	 Robert	 introduced	me	 to	 his	 friend	Carlos,	who	 received	me	 in	 his	 home	not	 far	
from	 Robert’s	 household.	 Carlos	 and	 his	 wife	 Scovia	 had	 joined	 the	 seeds	 multiplication	
project	since	 little	more	than	a	year	and	had	already	gained	sufficiently	to	open	up	a	small	
store	in	the	village	located	on	the	main	road.	They	worked	there	in	turns,	made	a	relatively	
considerable	profit,	and	substantially	improved	their	income	and	social	status.	Scovia	told	me	
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how	 this	 improvement	 had	 made	 their	 parents	 happy	 for	 them,	 yet	 she	 had	 observed	 a	
change	 in	 the	 behaviour	 of	 her	 neighbours.	 She	 explained	 how	 they	 would	 not	 greet	 her	
anymore,	“they	are	jealous”	–	she	said,	with	much	concern	and	anxiety.	I	understood	that	the	
sudden	economic	improvement	distressed	her	relations	and	asked	her	whether	paradoxically	
such	 improvement	had	negative	effects,	too.	She	answered	“yeah,	 it	 is	now	becoming	a	bit	
difficult,	if…	That	is	why	we	don’t	want	to	stay	in	this	kind	of	house	[straw	hut]	when	we	are	
fearing	 that	when	we	 are	 not	 home,	 you	 can	 even	 see…	We	 can	 even	 find	our	 house	has	
been	burnt.	That	is	why	we	fear	to	stay	in	that	kind	of	house”.	In	fact	she	was	fearing	what	
she	 had	 seen	 happening	 to	 another	 neighbour,	 whose	 house	 had	 been	 burned	 down	 by	
jealous	neighbours.	These	facts	were	later	confirmed	by	other	farmers	in	the	community. 
I	recorded	similar	events	of	jealousy	in	other	socio-cultural	contexts	and	other	regions,	where	
the	 accumulation	of	 capital	 in	 the	hands	of	 individuals	 or	 agribusiness	 groups	had	 created	
inequality	in	the	community,	and	provoked	theft	or	even	damage	of	the	yields137.	The	social	
impact	 of	 development	 schemes	 is	 an	 economic	 trigger,	with	 important	 consequences	 for	
the	balance	of	resource	distribution	and	social	status.	
	
6.4.2	PERCEPTIONS	OF	DEVELOPMENT	PROGRAMMES	ON	THE	GROUND	
Perceptions	of	development	programmes	are	extremely	variegated	and	can	be	summarised	
along	three	key	dimensions:	first,	the	difference	of	perspectives	of	youths	and	development	
practitioners;	second,	 the	strong	 influence	of	regional	differences	 in	the	 implementation	of	
the	 programmes	 (also	 the	 same	 ones);	 finally,	 the	 difference	 of	 development	 approaches:	
private	sector	driven	and/or	oriented,	or	public	sector	schemes.		
	
	
	
																																																						
137	I	recorded	such	events	in	group	discussions	in	Atiak,	at	the	border	with	South	Sudan,	on	
3/04/2017,	and	also	the	next	day	by	the	treasurer	of	the	YLP	group	in	Odek,	who	wanted	to	remain	
anonymous.	
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6.4.2A	THE	YOUTHS	
Participants	 in	 the	 development	 programmes	 I	 have	 observed	 perceived	 development	
schemes	 as	 transitory	 economic	 opportunities.	 Informants	 who	 had	 not	 taken	 part	 in	
development	schemes	before	had	heard	of	programmes	of	different	kinds	from	their	social	
networks.	Either	way,	participation	in	development	programmes	was	mostly	perceived	as	an	
opportunity	to	improve	agribusiness	income	–	although	with	the	awareness	of	the	transient	
nature	 of	 such	 opportunity.	 When	 asking	 them	 about	 their	 previous	 experiences	 with	
development	 initiatives,	 they	 would	 mention	 participation	 in	 the	 most	 disparate	 range	 of	
activities,	 more	 or	 less	 related	 to	 agribusiness:	 from	 the	 distribution	 of	 seedlings	 and	
calves138,	 to	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 saving	 groups139,	 women’s	 self-help	 groups140,	 or	 sporadic	
experiences	with	cooperatives141	and	contract	farming.		
Around	 Gulu	 in	 particular,	 I	 found	 that	 the	 post-conflict	 peace-building	 and	 development	
programmes	 had	marked	 farmers’	 perception	 of	 the	 relatively	 new	 programmes	 targeting	
youth	in	agribusiness:	the	fact	that	they	were	accustomed	to	receiving	humanitarian	aid,	had	
developed	 an	 attitude	 of	 entitlement	 in	 many	 of	 my	 informants 142 .	 Development	
programmes	were	perceived	 as	providing	 temporary	 relief	 from	a	 (structural)	 poverty	 that	
set	 them	 in	 an	 underprivileged	 position	 in	 comparison	 to	 other	 regions,	 and	 especially	 in	
comparison	with	whites.	Receiving	aid	seemed	a	form	of	compensation	in	the	eyes	of	many	
of	my	Acholi	informants.	Nevertheless,	I	was	told	several	instances	of	programmes	that	had	
failed	to	bring	tangible	nor	lasting	benefits.	Because	of	the	precarious	and	temporary	nature	
																																																						
138	As	reported	by	Michael	in	Parabongo	(North),	on	30/03/2017	
139	As	reported	by	Lydia	in	Mbale,	on	21/06/2017	
140	As	reported	by	Joy	in	Sheema	(western),	on	27/05/2017		
141	I	found	two	examples	in	the	dairy	sectors,	in	Kiruhura	(western),	one	on	30/05/2017	and	one	the	
day	after.		
142	Off-record,	when	I	had	completed	my	interviews,	it	happened	in	several	instances	that	informants	
expected	to	benefit	either	directly	or	indirectly	from	the	collaboration	with	me	–	despite	explaining	
upfront	that	I	was	a	student	conducting	independent	research.	In	particular,	on	30/03/2017	in	
Parabongo	(north),	Clementine	asked	me	whether	I	was	going	to	help	her	and	her	family	with	hand-
outs.	Also	the	interviews	I	conducted	in	Odek	(north)	on	4/04/2017	with	members	of	the	YLP	group	
framed	the	presence	of	several	other	programmes	in	the	past	(mostly	related	to	post-conflict	relief)	in	
terms	of	‘help’.		
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of	 development	 programmes,	 farmers	 would	 welcome	 them	 like	 discounts	 in	 the	
supermarket.		
Besides	 such	 disillusioned	 perceptions	 of	 development	 programmes,	 my	 informants	 also	
reported	how	they	had	benefitted	from	previous	or	present	programmes:	as	springboards	for	
their	agribusiness,	they	had	navigated	opportunities	to	capitalize	on	their	income.	Perceived	
improvement	was	often	measured	with	the	ability	to	buy	a	cow	or	build	a	bricks	home.	Those	
who	were	more	positive	about	development	programmes	reported	having	learned	business	
skills	 and	having	 established	 an	 agribusiness	 of	 their	 own	–	 leaving	 subsistence	 agriculture	
behind	 for	a	more	commercial	one.	As	a	matter	of	 fact,	 the	 transition	 from	subsistence	 to	
commercial	 agriculture	 emerged	 as	 generalizable	 threshold	 of	 success	 for	 my	 informants	
throughout	 the	 country,	 thus	 taking	 the	 risk	 of	 positioning	 income	 generation	 above	 food	
security.	However,	the	majority	of	those	who	were	indeed	able	to	capitalize	on	the	transitory	
opportunities	 that	 development	 programmes	 offered,	 were	 youths	 who	 had	 the	 personal	
qualities	of	an	entrepreneur.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	in	my	experience,	a	key	factor	for	youths	to	
benefit	 from	a	development	scheme	was	an	entrepreneurial	personality	or	character	–	and	
therefore	a	very	arbitrary	and	personal	quality.	This	personal	trait	was	so	determinant	that	I	
could	 notice	 how	 some	 of	 the	 most	 successful	 agripreneurs	 were	 not	 even	 part	 of	 any	
development	scheme	(see	section	below	on	control	group).		
Moreover,	 since	 the	 programmes	 were	 stressing	 the	 educational	 component,	 they	 were	
perceived	by	youths	as	learning	opportunities.	In	a	context	in	which	education	is	seen	as	exit	
route	 from	 poverty,	 my	 informants	 highly	 valued	 the	 training	 and	 capacity	 building	 of	
programmes.	 In	 fact,	 one	 of	 the	 recurrent	 complaints	 concerned	 the	 lack	 of	 training	 and	
extension	 services	 –	 mostly	 regarding	 public	 sector	 institutions.	 However,	 the	 transient	
nature	of	programmes	partially	hindered	the	commitment	of	youth	to	the	learning	trajectory.	
Programmes	 that	 were	 giving	 out	 certificates	 of	 participation	 were	 seen	 as	 providing	 a	
sustainable	service,	since	the	certificate	could	be	invested	for	future	employment.	However,	
the	 fact	 that	 development	 agencies	would	 become	providers	 of	 such	 educational	 services,	
made	 youths	 identify	 development	 programmes	 targeting	 them	 as	 even	 more	 of	 an	
ephemeral	 yet	essential	process.	 Training	 in	agribusiness	 skills	had	 somehow	 turned	 into	a	
necessary	 commodity	 for	 youths	 to	 profit	 from	 in	 their	 pathway	 towards	 commercial	
agriculture.	
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Perhaps	the	most	surprising	effect	of	development	schemes	for	youths	was	their	impact	on	
the	 socialisation	 of	 agribusiness	 colleagues	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 age.	 Programmes	 would	
catalyse	the	gathering	of	men	and	women	within	a	given	age	range,	who	in	most	cases	would	
undergo	a	training	process	before	continuing	with	their	agribusiness	as	partners	within	one	
common	enterprise	or	as	colleagues	 in	 individual	enterprises.	Either	way,	their	cooperation	
was	 crucial	 at	 least	 for	marketing	purposes,	 and	 in	most	 cases	 also	 for	 learning	 from	each	
other.	 The	majority	 of	 the	 programmes	 I	 have	 observed	 included	 a	 gender	 quota	 in	 their	
strategy,	 to	ensure	women’s	participation	 in	agribusiness.	However,	more	often	than	not,	 I	
have	observed	how	women	 in	 the	newly	 formed	youth	groups	were	discriminated	by	 their	
male	 colleagues	 or	 by	 their	 very	 husbands	 at	 home.	 Although	 it	 was	 not	 always	 openly	
discussed,	 I	 observed	 that	 in	 the	majority	 of	 youth	 groups	 the	 economic	 independence	 of	
women	seemed	to	be	perceived	as	problematic143.	Particularly	but	not	exclusively	in	remote	
rural	areas	in	the	eastern	and	southern	regions,	women	are	relegated	to	household	activities	
and	are	mostly	not	entitled	to	retaining	their	own	finances.	Their	engagement	in	agribusiness	
enterprises,	particularly	 in	collaboration	(or	competition)	with	men,	 is	perceived	as	a	threat	
to	the	gendered	relations	within	the	household	and	community	at	large.	
This	 issue,	 which	 had	 emerged	 during	 interviews	 and	 informal	 conversations	 –	 is	
unfortunately	 common	 knowledge	 in	 Uganda.	 It	 was	 explained	 to	 me	 very	 clearly	 by	
Immaculate,	 the	manager	of	 a	 large	 flower-cuttings	enterprise	 in	 the	outskirts	of	Kampala.	
She	was	supervising	the	work	of	hundreds	of	women	in	the	enterprise	–	in	both	the	branch	in	
Kampala	and	 in	the	West-Nile	region;	she	was	the	point	of	reference	for	all	 the	 ladies	who	
had	 compliances	 –	 either	 work-	 or	 home-	 related.	 I	 visited	 her	 several	 times,	 and	 on	 16	
March	 2017,	 we	 discussed	 the	 difficulties	 that	 women	 had,	 paradoxically,	 due	 to	 their	
empowered	economic	status.	When	I	asked	her	what	were	the	consequences	for	the	female	
employees,	who	became	the	breadwinners,	she	told	me:		
																																																						
143	On	International	Women’s	Day,	8/03/2017,	in	Kampala,	I	interviewed	Sharon	–	the	successful	CEO	
of	an	agribusiness	enterprise.	She	told	me	how	she	was	finding	it	hard	to	get	married,	because	she	
was	so	‘empowered’.	She	reported:	“And	also	you	know	that	most	of	the	successful	women,	they	are	
either	widows	or	they	have	separated	with	their	husbands	or	they	have,	we	don’t	have	divorced	now,	
it	is	not	so	much	pronounced	but	they	have	probably	separated	with	their	husbands	or	their	
husbands	are	fully	involved	in	the	business”.	On	15/03/2017,	also	in	Kampala,	Joyce	told	me	she	was	
facing	the	same	struggles	to	find	a	husband,	because	of	her	successful	financial	status.		
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Immaculate:	Like	when	they	are	here	they	are	working	for	their	families	so	when	they	
reach	home	of	course	they	are	women	as	you	said	and	as	we	saw	and	in	the	African	
setting,	a	woman	is	always	kept	low.	And	when	you	are	kept	low,	even	you	may	not	
be	participating	 in	using	 your	own	 salary	 to	develop	a	 family	 so	 you	 find	 that	 even	
when	 the	 person	 has	 learnt	 and	 you	 see	 you	 are	 the	 one	 supporting	 the	 family	 a	
hundred	percent,	you	are	not	supposed	to	say	that	“I	am	a	bread	winner”.	There	 is	
that	hindrance…	
Me:	I	have	heard	that	a	lot.	Yeah	
(…)		
Me:	 so	 women	 are	 working,	 they	 take	 money	 home,	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 people	
here…Do	you	 think	 they	are	able	administer	 their	own	money	or	 they	bring	money	
and	they	give	it	to?	
Immaculate:	 They	 are	 not	 able,	 some	 are	 able,	 and	 others	 are	 not.	 The	 biggest	
percentage	are	not	able.	
	
Moreover,	I	have	recorded	several	instances	in	which	women	were	beaten	and	forced	to	quit	
their	jobs	within	contract	farming	development	schemes,	while	the	championing	of	individual	
female	agripreneurs	had	led	to	sexual	harassment	of	a	couple	of	my	informants144.	The	social	
prominence	 that	 women	 would	 obtain	 with	 economic	 status	 was	 like	 a	 revolution	 in	 the	
patriarchal	and	 sexist	 social	 contexts,	 and	 therefore	 forcefully	 repressed	by	males	who	 felt	
their	status	was	threatened.		
																																																						
144	I	recorded	these	events	around	Kampala,	by	3	managers	(ladies)	in	two	large	horticultural	
enterprises,	who	were	in	touch	with	female	employees	–	on	16	and	17/03/2017.	Moreover,	Joyce,	on	
10/03/2017	had	told	me	how	an	acquaintance	from	her	region,	in	the	south-west,	got	her	hand	
chopped	by	her	husband	for	having	dared	to	sell	some	of	the	goats	she	had	bought	with	her	own	
money	–	but	he	considered	to	be	his	own:	
Joyce:	When	the	husband	came	home,	asked	“where	are	the	goats?”	She	said	“I	sold	them	to	
Mwesigwa’s	son”	and	then	the	man	cut	her.	They	said	he	asked	for	money,	money	or	goats,	
bring	money	or	goats.	The	woman	I	think	wanted	to	pay	for	fees	for	the	children…	
Me:	So,	the	man	cut	her	
I:	But	he	really	chopped	the	hand?	
Joyce:	It	almost	went	off	because	for	a	villager	to	move	from	Sheema	[south-west	region]	to	
come	to	Mulago	[hospital]	for	treatment	in	Kampala,	it	has	to	be	serious…	
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This	became	particularly	clear	during	a	visit	I	paid	to	project	in	the	north,	were	youths	out	of	
school	(already	from	the	age	of	15)	were	trained	to	operate	tractors.	As	I	was	discussing	the	
project’s	strategy	to	include	women	in	the	training	for	tractors	operating,	Barbara145	walked	
in.	A	20-something	years	old	girl,	wearing	a	bright	yellow	dress,	she	appeared	proud	of	the	
leading	 position	 she	 held	 in	 the	 project:	 from	 being	 an	 apprentice,	 she	 was	 now	 herself	
training	other	youths.	She	told	us	how	she	enjoyed	driving	tractors,	fighting	the	Acholi	socio-
cultural	stereotypes	around	women,	not	supposed	to	be	doing	this	kind	of	 job.	She	bluntly	
stated	“I	can	do	what	men	can	do”	–	as	she	was	explaining	that	in	the	beginning	members	of	
the	community	wouldn’t	believe	that	she	and	her	colleagues	were	actually	females!	In	fact,	it	
was	 unheard	 of	 women	 to	wear	 trousers,	 let	 alone	 driving	 a	 tractor	 bigger	 than	 the	 huts	
where	people	lived	in.	In	fact,	they	were	encouraged	by	the	(Australian)	project	managers	to	
wear	trousers	for	the	practical	reason	of	operating	tractors	–	and	they	were,	for	this	simple	
reason,	 assumed	 to	 be	men	 by	 community	members.	 Barbara	 was	 upset	 by	 the	 fact	 that	
rather	 than	 challenging	 their	 own	 stereotypes	 about	what	women	 can	 do,	 her	 community	
questioned	her	gender.	Therefore,	she	insisted	she	wanted	to	stick	to	her	traditional	women	
clothes,	“to	show	that	you	don’t	have	to	be	even	like	a	man	to	do	that	work”.	However,	such	
‘revolutionary’	act	of	challenging	the	local	gender	roles,	did	not	pass	unpunished:	later	on,	I	
learned	that	Barbara	had	experienced	sexual	harassment	when	she	was	working	as	a	tractor	
operator	in	a	large	agribusiness.	Unfortunately,	this	is	far	from	being	an	isolated	case,	and	I	
have	encountered	several	women	 that	had	 to	give	up	on	 their	married	 life	 to	pursue	 their	
career	in	agribusiness	–	either	through	divorce,	or	simply	remaining	unmarried.	
This	 discrimination,	 and	 the	 perceived	 negative	 impact	 of	 programmes	 supporting	women	
participation,	would	also	partially	explain	 the	 fact	 that	 the	majority	of	my	 informants	were	
males,	 despite	 my	 efforts	 to	 achieve	 a	 gender	 balance	 in	 the	 sampling	 phase.	 The	 social	
impact	of	a	development	programme	targeting	youths	with	a	quota	for	female	participation	
was	rather	disrupted.	I	encountered	several	instances	in	which	groups	of	youths	were	already	
formed	before	joining	the	development	scheme,	as	saving	groups	(known	as	SACCO,	Saving	
And	 Credit	 Cooperative).	 Besides	 few	 gender-mixed	 saving	 groups,	 the	majority	 of	 cases	 I	
observed	where	women	were	included	were	women-only	groups:	this	would	allow	them	to	
																																																						
145	I	use	a	fictitious	name,	as	much	as	I	was	asked	to	keep	the	anonymity	of	the	tractors	training	
project	and	the	bilateral	programme	which	was	financially	supporting	it.	
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retain	 economic	 independence	 and	 capitalize	 on	 their	 profit	 (either	 for	 agribusiness,	 kids’	
education	or	personal	purposes)	without	having	to	hand	in	their	finances	to	their	husbands.	
Besides	 this	 gender	 issue,	 members	 of	 saving	 groups	 were	 not	 gathering	 with	 any	 other	
criteria	 than	 the	 purpose	 of	 saving,	 and	 when	 turning	 to	 a	 development	 scheme	 the	 age	
benchmark	 felt	as	artificial.	 In	 fact,	 I	have	observed	how	the	majority	of	my	 informants	did	
not	share	the	awareness	of	belonging	to	a	specific	social	category	for	fitting	an	age	bracket.	
Other	 socio-cultural	 and	 economic	 categories	were	 perceived	 as	 being	more	 determinant,	
such	 as	 gender,	 economic	 and	 social	 status,	 ethnic	 group,	 were	 perceived	 as	 being	more	
determinant.	
	
6.4.2B	MAIN	CONSTRAINTS	TO	YOUTHS’	ENGAGEMENT	IN	AGRIBUSINESS		
Throughout	my	interviews	with	youth	informants,	I	systematically	asked	my	informants	about	
what	 they	 thought	 need	 improvement	 in	 the	 development	 programmes	 they	 were	
participating	it.	Besides	the	contingent	necessities	such	as	agricultural	machinery	and	quality	
input	 (seeds	 and	 chemicals),	 the	 issues	 that	 youths	 reported	 as	 having	 the	most	 negative	
impact	on	their	agribusiness	were	problems	that	lay	beyond	the	possibilities	of	programmes:	
namely	financial	capital,	access	to	land	and	climate	change.		
The	main	issue	that	was	reported	was	the	ability	to	access	financial.	In	fact,	interest	rates	of	
financial	 institutions	 that	 are	 not	 collaborating	 with	 development	 programmes	 or	 the	
government	are	extremely	high	 (fluctuating	around	20%),	and	thus	 inaccessible.	Moreover,	
accessibility	 to	 financial	 services	 is	 particularly	 difficult	 for	 younger	 youths,	 who	 have	 no	
collaterals	 to	 show	 as	 guarantee	 for	 their	 loans.	 This	 issue	 was	 confirmed	 by	 dr	 Mildred	
Barungi,	who	conducted	a	 large	survey	 in	2013	 for	 the	Economic	Policy	Research	Centre146	
(Figure	28,	below).			
	
	
																																																						
146	The	Economic	Policy	Research	Centre	is	part	of	the	Uganda	National	Panel	Service.		
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FIGURE	28.	YOUTHS'	ACCESSIBILITY	TO	FINANCIAL	SERVICES	
As	for	accessibility	to	financial	services,	the	youngest	among	the	youth	were	having	a	harder	
time	 accessing	 land.	 Land	 is	mostly	 inherited	 patrilineally,	 therefore	 access	 to	 land	 affects	
female	 even	 more	 than	 male	 youths.	 However,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 land	 is	 a	 minimum	
requisite	 for	 agribusiness,	 is	 yet	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 any	 short-term	 development	
programme.	In	fact,	as	outlined	in	the	first	chapter,	the	issue	of	land	tenureship	reform	is	a	
complex	issue	that	remains	unsolved	since	decades.	The	possibility	to	address	this	issue	lays	
within	the	responsibility	of	the	government,	yet	no	serious	attempts	have	been	made147.	
Respondents	 also	 point	 to	 challenges	 related	 to	 climate	 change.	 Unpredictable	 rain	 fall,	
together	 with	 a	 stable	 increase	 of	 temperatures	 had	 impaired	 yields	 productivity	 and	
exacerbated	 pests	 and	 diseases.	 Seasons	 were	 perceived	 to	 have	 blurred,	 jeopardizing	
traditional	 knowledge	 on	 agricultural	 techniques.	 These	 issues	 in	 turn	made	 farmers	 even	
more	reliable	on	the	support	of	development	programmes.		
																																																						
147	In	April	2018,	there	was	a	rather	science-fiction	proposal	to	use	blockchain	technology	to	regulate	
the	cadaster,	as	reported	in	the	news	after	an	international	conference	to	which	Museveni	
enthusiastically	participated.	The	New	Vision	reports	an	article,	accessed	on	24/09/2018	on:	
https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1476564/transform-uganda-land-registries-
blockchain-technology			
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For	example,	after	hearing	how	the	area	around	Gulu	had	been	suffering	from	irregular	rain	
fall	for	the	past	two	or	three	seasons,	I	asked	Robert148	and	his	mother	Clementine	how	their	
engagement	 in	 agriculture	 had	 changed.	 Clementine	 answered,	 and	 her	 son	 Robert	
translated	for	me:		
Robert:	so	what	changed	the	weather	like	this,	the	rain	is	not	coming?	
Clementine:	we	don't	know	God’s	will	
Robert:	maybe	because	of	the	trees	that	are	not	there.	
Clementine:	this	rain,	back	then	in	this	month	it	would	have	rained...but	now	it’s	gone	
like	it's	the	dry	season.	
Robert:	it	has	been	two	years	that	the	rain	keeps	disturbing	us	like	this.	
Clementine:	you	plant	rice	like	this,	the	sun	comes	and	dries	everything.	
Climate	change	was	an	issue	perceived	by	most	farmers	and	agripreneurs,	regardless	of	their	
age.	On	 the	 contrary,	 issues	 such	 as	 accessibility	 to	 financial	 services	 and	 land	were	more	
youth-specific.		
	
6.4.2C	DEVELOPMENT	PRACTITIONERS	
As	 I	 will	 describe	 in	 the	 sections	 below	 (negotiation,	 adaptation	 and	 in	 the	 case	 study	
analysis),	 development	 practitioners	 on	 the	 ground	 would	 have	 to	 undergo	 a	 consistent	
amount	 of	 adjustments	 to	 implement	 the	 programmes	 as	 they	 had	 elaborated	 in	 theory.	
Much	of	these	adjustments	were	driven	by	specific,	contextual	characteristics	of	the	regional	
agribusiness	 market,	 and	 in	 some	 instances	 on	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 private	 sector	
partners.	 However,	 in	 the	 encounter	 with	 the	 youths,	 their	 perceptions,	 narratives	 and	
practices	were	shaped	by	the	concrete	reality	of	the	individual	youths	–	who	mostly	did	not	
correspond	to	the	ideal	archetype	of	youth	envisioned	before	implementation.	In	fact,	I	have	
observed	how	 there	was	 a	 substantial	 difference	 in	 the	perception	of	 the	 youths	 (and	 the	
narratives	around	them)	depending	on	the	degree	of	engagement	of	 the	practitioners	with	
operations	on	the	ground.	In	fact,	practitioners	working	mainly	from	headquarters	office	had	
a	 more	 general	 and	 abstract	 perception	 of	 youths,	 with	 a	 superficial	 knowledge	 of	 the	
																																																						
148	Group	leader	for	a	private-sector	driven	programme	in	Gulu,	interview	extract	from	30/03/2017.	
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specific	 characteristics,	 needs	 and	 capacities	 of	 the	 target	 groups	 in	 the	 different	 socio-
cultural,	regional	contexts.		
Interestingly,	 development	 practitioners	 that	 were	 either	 observing	 (monitoring	 and	
evaluating)	 or	 directly	 implementing	 a	 programme	 on	 the	 ground,	 had	 a	 very	 ambiguous	
perspective	 on	 the	 youths	 involved	 in	 their	 scheme.	 Sometimes	 youths	were	 perceived	 as	
being	victims	of	poverty,	precious	potential	to	be	“unlocked”	for	a	“brighter	future”,	while	at	
times	they	were	described	as	“stubborn”	or	unwilling	to	adopt	their	development	strategies	
or	knowledge149,150.		
In	 February	 2017,	 I	 observed	 how	 a	 development	 practitioner	 from	 a	 private-sector	
programme151	monitored	the	progress	of	a	small	enterprise	in	Nwoya,	a	couple	of	hours	drive	
from	Gulu.	Denis,	I	was	told	on	the	way	there,	was	their	most	successful	agripreneur:	he	had	
set	 up	 a	 business	 from	 scratch,	 and	 now	 had	 set	 up	 an	 agri-school	 to	 train	 other	 youths	
within	their	scheme.	He	was	a	“role	model”	for	the	youths	in	the	area,	because	he	was	the	
living	 testimony	that	“there	 is	money	to	be	made	 in	agribusiness!”.	Yet	when	we	sat	down	
with	him	in	the	back	of	his	office	I	could	see	how	the	interaction	between	the	development	
practitioner	and	Denis	revealed	a	skewed	relation:	Denis	was	holding	a	reverential	posture,	
looking	 down	 on	 the	 ground	 and	 twisting	 his	 fingers,	 as	 he	 was	 asking	 for	 advice	 on	 the	
training	of	young	farmers	on	his	demonstration-farm.	On	the	other	hand,	the	development	
practitioner	was	 questioning	 his	 decisions,	 asking	why	 and	how	he	had	not	 yet	 completed	
																																																						
149	Such	polarized	perception	of	development	‘subjects’	was	also	recorded	by	Mosse	(2004,	p.	652)	in	
a	British	programme	he	had	been	working	on	in	India.	
150	The	narrative	of	‘unlocking	youths’	potential’	for	a	brighter	future	was	reported	by	the	most	
optimistic	development	practitioners	within	the	Ministry	of	Gender	I	interviewed	on	20/01/2017,	at	
the	Ministry	of	Agriculture	on	27/01/2018,	and	International	NGOs	on	13/03/2017	and	21/02/2017;	
but	also	reported	in	the	news,	as	titles	the	New	Vision	article:	“Unlocking	youth	potential	imperative	
in	transforming	Uganda”,	consulted	on	24/09/2018:	
	https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1458529/unlocking-potential-youth-imperative-
transforming-country	
The	counter-narrative	depicting	youths	with	a	negative	tone	was	also	recorded	in	several	instances,	
both	in	Ugandan	and	international	agencies.	For	example,	on	20/01/2017,	at	FAO	headquarters	in	
Kampala,	I	heard	the	concerns	of	an	anonymous	development	practitioner	saying	that	youths	were	
“sitting	idle,	doing	nothing	and	they	get	into	the	political	arena	because	of	unemployment	–	youth	
unemployment	rates	are	dangerous	because	they	can	harm	the	stability	of	the	country”.		
151	The	organisation	expressly	asked	to	remain	anonymous	
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some	bureaucratic	procedures	to	show	for	his	trainings,	complaining	about	his	administration	
and	pushing	him	to	justify	himself.	I	felt	so	uncomfortable	that	I	left	the	room.	Later	on	the	
practitioner	conducting	the	evaluation	explained	to	me	how	he	saw	his	role	as	mentor	–	“you	
have	to	keep	on	pushing	them!	There’s	money	to	be	made,	you	know,	but	they	don’t	see	the	
market	opportunities	so	we	have	to	create	the	market	linkages.”152		
	
6.4.2D	MISMATCH	IN	PERCEPTIONS		
Importantly,	 a	 mismatch	 in	 practice	 did	 not	 only	 emerge	 between	 the	 two	 groups	 of	
development	 actors,	 but	 also	 among	 the	 actors	 within	 them.	 The	 enactment	 of	 a	
development	policy	involves	several	development	actors	from	the	elaboration	of	a	theory	of	
change,	to	the	design,	implementation	and	outcome	of	the	programme.	Reflecting	the	reality	
of	 ‘Aidland’	 (Mosse,	 2011),	 the	 data	 I	 collected	 on	 the	 interactions	 among	 development	
practitioners	 also	 shows	 that	 the	process	 of	 designing	 and	 implementing	programmes	 and	
projects	 frustrated	 the	 outcomes.	 In	 fact,	 such	 process	 involves	 the	 cooperation	 among	
parties	that	have	different	understandings	of	the	development	problem	and	how	it	should	be	
tackled,	but	also	different	 interests	and	 incentives.	Taking	a	closer	 look	at	 the	practices	 ‘at	
the	 top’	 over	 a	 period	 of	 time	 of	 roughly	 one	 year	 (spring	 2017	 to	 spring	 2018),	 I	 have	
observed	how	the	programme	changes	over	time.	To	exemplify	and	attempt	an	explanation	
of	how	such	mismatch	emerges,	later	in	this	chapter	I	will	examine	one	example	at	length,	as	
to	explore	all	the	dynamics	involved	from	elaboration	of	a	theory	of	change	to	the	outcomes.		
As	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 youths,	 I	 recorded	 a	 sensible	 variety	 in	 youths’	 perceptions	 of	 the	
programmes	I	have	evaluated	throughout	the	country.	The	country-wide	public	programme,	
the	 most	 homogeneous	 approach,	 still	 resulted	 in	 very	 different	 outcomes	 for	 several	
reasons:	politics	at	 local	 level	played	an	 important	role	 in	the	 interaction	with	communities	
on	the	ground,	particularly	in	favouring	NRM	supporters153.		
																																																						
152	This	observation	and	conversation	took	place	during	a	monitoring	and	evaluation	visit	on	
8/02/2017	in	Nwoya,	northern	region.		
153	In	section	6.4.3a	I	analyse	these	issues	in	depth.		
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Moreover,	the	financial	incentive	was	capitalized	differently,	according	to	the	heterogeneity	
factors	 outlined	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 Youths	 that	 were	 well	 connected	 in	 their	 value	
chains	networks	and	received	land	and	support	from	families	were	better	off	than	those	who	
needed	to	rent	land	and	start	the	enterprise	anew.	Territorial	and	socio-cultural	embedding	–	
particularly	factors	such	as	the	ecosystem	and	norms	and	values	in	agribusiness	–	also	played	
a	crucial	role	in	diversifying	throughout	the	outcomes	of	both	development	approaches.	This	
was	 particularly	 true	 for	 the	 different	 private-sector	 driven	 programmes,	 because	 of	 the	
slightly	 different	 approaches	 of	 the	 programmes	 (for	 instance,	 some	 programmes	 were	
offering	 stronger	 marketing	 connections	 while	 others	 were	 structured	 as	 out-grower	
scheme),	but	mainly	because	the	strategy	of	the	programmes	was	capitalizing	on	assets	and	
qualities	 that	 were	 not	 distributed	 homogeneously	 among	 the	 youths.	 For	 instance,	 only	
some	 of	 the	 youths	 were	 able	 to	 become	 out-growers,	 depending	 on	 whether	 they	 had	
access	to	land.	This	socio-economic	factor	was	unequally	distributed	across	the	country.		
The	 heterogeneity	 of	 youths,	 in	 fact,	 emerged	 as	 a	major	 factor	 shaping	 the	 outcomes	 of	
programmes.	For	example,	in	a	conversation	with	Trust	Birungi,	an	agribusiness	man	working	
as	 service	 provider	 for	 AKORION,	 I	 asked	 him	 what	 he	 thought	 were	 the	 most	 relevant	
features	defining	youths	as	a	diverse	social	group.	He	stressed	that	the	contextual	differences	
where	determined	by	 the	 socio-economic	 status	of	 the	 youths	 and	 their	 family,	 telling	me	
that:		
there	are	 the	underprivileged,	who	don’t	have	a	perception	of	development	as	 if	 it	
was	 in	 their	 hands	 to	 change	 –	 they	 expect	 help	 to	 come	 from	 the	 development	
programmes,	so	when	they’re	targeted	in	terms	of	entrepreneurship	there	is	a	clash	
with	 the	 programme’s	 design;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 the	 non-underprivileged	 have	more	
questions	 about	 the	 programme’s	 potential	 benefit	 for	 them	 –	 engaging	 with	
questions	such	as	‘how	can	the	programme	benefit	me	for	my	purposes?’154.		
Trust	 related	 this	 economic-class	 difference	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 those	 better	 off	 could	 afford	
taking	more	risks.	In	addition,	they	were	more	likely	to	have	their	own	resources	for	starting	
up.	The	combination	of	these	two	factors	enabled	an	entrepreneurial	mindset.		
																																																						
154	Extract	from	an	interview	with	Trust	in	Kampala,	on	23/05/2018	
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Importantly,	these	socio-economic	disparities	map	up	with	regional	and	ethnic	groups.	Trust	
argued,	for	example,	that	“For	instance,	in	Mbarara,	people	have	bigger	farms	(for	example	
10	acres)	and	are	thus	able	to	diversify	 the	value	chains	 in	which	they	engage,	getting	 into	
several	businesses	at	the	same	time	–	but	those	who	have	less	than	1	acre	will	invest	in	food	
crops	for	subsistence.”	Inevitably,	discrimination	as	side	effect	of	homogeneous	development	
approaches	 to	diverse	socio-economic	contexts,	also	unfolded	along	regional	disparities.	At	
AKORION,	 for	 example,	 they	 found	 that	 it	 was	 easier	 to	 have	 relationships	 with	 affluent	
groups	in	the	South-West.	According	to	Trust,	these	farmers	would	ask	to	become	partners	
of	AKORION,	rather	than	clients.	Alternatively,	farmer	groups	in	the	North,	near	Gulu	would	
ask:	“Can	you	help	my	farmers?	Can	you	subsidise	this	or	that?”.		
Moreover,	 he	 added	 that	 there	 was	 a	 cultural	 reason,	 besides	 the	 socio-economic	 ones,	
contributing	 to	 the	 major	 difference	 between	 North	 and	 South-West	 –	 both	 in	 the	
agribusiness	mentality	and	relation	with	development	partners.	As	 it	was	also	confirmed	by	
other	development	practitioners155,	he	stressed	that	the	handouts	people	 in	the	North	had	
been	receiving	after	the	war	had	influenced	northerners’	‘entitlement	mentality’	(see	section	
6.4.2a).	Furthermore,	he	stressed	that	 in	the	North	agribusiness	 is	 influenced	by	“a	cultural	
mentality:	 land	holding	is	communal,	so	it’s	more	of	a	socialist,	 less	capitalist	mentality.	For	
example,	if	the	community	decides	they’re	going	to	plant	millet,	but	one	entrepreneur	who	
sees	potential	and	wants	to	plant	simsim	[sesame]	–	he	cannot	decide	on	the	land	use!	While	
in	 the	 South-West	 the	 individual	 can	 decide	 on	 the	 value	 chain	which	 can	 generate	more	
returns:	it’s	individual	choices,	together	with	a	stronger	support	of	the	family.”156		
	
	
																																																						
155	This	argument	was	made	also	by	development	practitioners	I	interviewed	in	Kampala	in	an	
international	NGO	on	23/01/2017	and	at	the	Ministry	of	Gender	on	10/04/2017.	
156	This	argument	was	also	made	by	a	development	practitioner	in	an	international	NGO	on	
25/05/2018,	and	confirmed	by	conversations	I	had	with	agricultural	experts	at	IITA,	during	the	follow	
up	field	trip	in	May	2018.	
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6.4.3	HETEROGENEOUS	OUTCOMES	AND	LIMITS	OF	THE	PROGRAMMES		
The	 evaluation	 of	 the	 ‘success’	 of	 heterogeneous	 programmes	 supporting	 youth	 in	
agribusiness	 in	Uganda	 is	a	complex	and	at	 the	same	time	somehow	arbitrary	 task.	 In	 fact,	
the	programmes	I	have	observed	on	the	ground	differed	in	their	approach	(public	vs	private-
sector	driven),	institutional	structure,	donor	funding	and	incentives.	Ministerial	programmes	
were	guided	by	the	National	Development	Plan	II	(NDPII),	and	worked	in	the	political	interest	
of	 the	 government	 to	 show	 for	 their	 commitment	 to	 tackle	 youths’	 employment	 issues.	
Programmes	 from	bilateral	 organisations	were	 only	 to	 some	extent	 bond	 to	 governmental	
guidelines,	and	rather	responded	to	the	incentives	of	their	own	home	agency,	in	the	interest	
of	 obtaining	 funding	 for	 yet	 new	 development	 projects.	 Grassroot	 Ugandan	 organisations	
instead,	 worked	 to	 lobby	 their	 position	 in	 policy	 making	 and	 to	 strengthen	 their	 visibility	
within	government	structures.		
Predictably,	such	heterogeneity	was	also	reflected	in	the	programmes’	definitions	of	success,	
which	were	as	disparate.	With	 the	observation	of	programmes’	 implementation,	 I	 came	 to	
realise	 that	 there	was	 a	 discrepancy	 between	 programmes’	 definitions	 of	 success	 and	 the	
organisations’	theories	of	change.	For	instance,	the	ministerial	Youth	Livelihood	Programme	
aimed,	 on	 paper	 and	 in	 the	 practitioners’	 narratives	 of	 their	 theory	 of	 change,	 to	 boost	
employability	of	youth	in	productive	agribusiness.	However,	in	practice,	the	programme	was	
considered	 successful	when	 the	 loans	 that	 had	 been	 disbursed	 to	 youth	 groups	 had	 been	
restored,	 thereby	 fuelling	a	 revolving	 fund	 for	district	authorities	 to	 re-invest	 in	new	youth	
groups.	 During	 the	 last	 follow-up	 field	 trip	 to	 Kampala,	 I	 met	 several	 practitioners	 at	 the	
Ministry	of	Gender,	who	had	evaluated	the	programme	one	year	after	my	observation	in	the	
field.	They	insisted	on	the	success	of	the	programme,	since	they	had	financed	youth	groups	
who	had	managed	to	repay	their	loans.	On	the	contrary,	while	in	the	field	in	the	south-west	
region,	young	participants	 in	the	programme	reported	their	disappointment	 in	the	scheme:	
despite	having	repaid	the	 loan,	they	said	they	had	not	 improved	their	situation	but	 instead	
contributed	to	enriching	corrupt	civil	servants.	Repayment	of	the	loans	was,	in	the	instances	I	
observed,	not	synonymous	of	‘success’	for	the	youths.	In	fact,	as	Mosse	(2004,	p.	662)	argues	
“‘success’	and	‘failure’	are	policy-oriented	judgements	that	obscure	project	effects”.			
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Oftentimes	 private-sector	 programmes	 funded	 by	 international	 agencies	 needed	 to	
demonstrate	their	success	 in	terms	of	number	of	youths	they	had	engaged	 in	agribusiness.	
Their	impact	was	measured	as	training	of	a	certain	amount	(their	specific	target)	of	youths	in	
agribusiness	 skills,	 or	 their	 engagement	 in	 contract	 farming.	 Strikingly,	 the	 success	 of	 the	
programmes	which	 implementation	 I	observed	on	the	ground,	was	relative	to	their	specific	
programmatic	 definitions	 of	 objectives,	 that	would	 respond	 to	 their	 structural	 incentives	 –	
while	their	theories	of	change	aimed	at	economic	growth	and	agricultural	modernization	for	
youth	 employability.	 This	 mirrors	 Mosse’s	 (2004)	 finding	 that	 the	 very	 selection	 of	
participants	 in	a	development	 scheme	 tended	 to	 facilitate	a	biased	 selection	of	 those	who	
already	possessed	the	qualities	and	skills	they	were	to	be	taught.	 
Moreover,	 the	regional	differences	 I	outlined	 in	 the	previous	chapters	played	an	 important	
role	in	diversifying	the	range	of	‘meanings	of	success’.	Because	each	region	had	its	territorial,	
socio-cultural	 specificities	 (see	 chapter	 on	 youthnography),	 and	 because	 there	 was	 great	
variety	 in	 the	 value	 chain	 in	 which	 youth	 were	 venturing,	 the	 success	 of	 the	 agribusiness	
enterprises	was	contextual.	For	instance,	the	same	private	sector	driven	approach,	in	which	
the	development	agency	constitutes	the	 link	between	groups	of	 farmers	and	private	sector	
companies,	 had	 very	 different	 outcomes	 in	 the	 north	 then	 in	 the	 southwest.	 In	 the	 north,	
farmers	would	multiply	 improved	seeds	for	a	company	that	constituted	both	the	 input	and	
output	market:	 i.e.	 providing	 the	 seeds	 and	 chemicals	 and	 buying	 the	 end	 product.	 In	 the	
south-west,	dairy	 farmers,	working	 in	 cooperatives,	would	be	provided	 the	machinery	 (e.g.	
cooler)	to	collect	milk	by	the	same	private	sector	company	who	would	buy	the	milk.	 In	the	
case	of	seeds	multiplication,	farmers	would	earn	higher	 incomes	but	commit	their	 land	use	
for	non-food	crops,	where	market	was	(nearly)	exclusively	constitute	by	the	company,	risking	
a	 position	 of	 dependency	 for	 the	 marketing	 of	 their	 produce.	 In	 case	 of	 the	 dairy	
cooperatives,	farmers	would	actually	gain	a	stronger	bargaining	power	in	prices	negotiation,	
thanks	to	the	consolidation	of	the	cooperative,	and	thanks	to	the	broader	market	of	the	dairy	
sector	(with	multiple	buyers).		
A	common	characteristic	to	all	programmes,	throughout	the	country,	was	the	perception,	on	
the	 side	of	 the	youth,	of	 the	programmes	as	 transient	and	not	durable.	 The	 impact	of	 the	
programmes	 engaging	 youth	 was	 thus	 that	 of	 creating	 a	 momentum	 of	 attention	 for	 the	
cause	 of	 youth	 unemployment,	 with	 the	 cynical	 understanding	 that	 it	 was	 a	 temporary	
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opportunity.	 Since	 the	 majority	 of	 my	 informants	 had	 already	 experienced	multiple	 other	
development	programmes,	they	knew	how	to	surf	the	trend	around	youth	agribusiness	but	
were	concerned	about	the	sustainability	of	 the	change	the	programmes	promised	to	bring.	
During	fieldwork	in	the	north,	I	 interviewed	a	23-years	old	member	of	a	youth	group	in	the	
Youth	 Livelihood	 Programme,	 who	 had	 participated	 in	 international	 development	 and	
humanitarian	 programmes	 before.	 He	 expressed	 his	 concern,	 when	 I	 asked	 him	 how	 he	
viewed	the	various	development	organisations	active	in	the	territory:		
Yeah	so	they	don’t	implement	what	they	intend	to	do.	So	they	only	implement	half	of	
it	 leaving	other	 [objectives	unimplemented].	So	they	 just	do	things	 just	 to	complete	
may	be	the	project	period	and	other	things	so	they	only	look	at	the	sustainability	of	
the	 project	 to	 the	 community.	 I	 don’t	 have	 a	 problem	 with	 the	 donors	 but	 the	
implementers	here,	the	social	workers	and	the	rest.157	
His	concern	was	with	 the	capacity	of	development	practitioners	on	the	ground	rather	 than	
with	 the	good	 intentions	of	 the	programme,	 as	he	 later	 lamented	 the	 corruption	 that	was	
frustrating	 the	 potential	 impact	 for	 the	 communities.	 Elsewhere	 in	 the	 same	 region,	 I	 had	
observed	several	sign	posts	of	past	programmes	and	organisations	that	had	been	operative	
on	the	ground,	engaging	various	social	groups	–	women,	victims	of	the	war,	smallholders	and	
now	youths.	In	general	complaints,	lamented	the	water	pumps	that	broke	down	shortly	after	
the	development	agencies	left,	or	the	useless	provision	of	banana	suckers	or	coffee	seedlings	
from	 the	 government	 –	 “they	 only	 come	 around	 here	 [hinting	 at	 the	 remote	 rural	 areas]	
when	it’s	time	to	harvest	votes”,	I	was	told	during	the	same	interview.		
	
6.4.3A	PUBLIC	SECTOR	APPROACH	-	YOUTH	LIVELIHOOD	PROGRAMME		
The	 aim	 of	 the	 programme,	 enforced	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Gender,	 Labour	 and	 Social	
Development,	 is	that	of	supporting	groups	of	youths	mainly	with	a	start-up	capital	(loan)	to	
start	or	scale	their	agribusiness.	The	implementation	involved	a	long	bureaucratic	procedure	
which	would	 foresee	 youths’	 groups	 application	 for	 funding	 to	 the	 local	 authorities,	which	
																																																						
157	Extract	from	an	interview	in	Odek,	province	of	Gulu,	on	8/04/2017,	the	responded	wished	to	
remain	anonymous.		
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would	pass	 it	 to	 regional	 authorities	 and	 then	 to	 the	ministry	of	Gender	 in	Kampala.	Once	
granted	the	loan,	youths	would	receive	one-time	training	for	agricultural	and	business	skills	
from	 local	 authorities.	 During	 the	 first	 fieldwork	 there	 were	 widespread	 controversies	
between	government	authorities	and	youths	about	the	repayment	of	the	loans,	while	during	
the	follow-up	I	was	reassured	by	civil	servants	that	the	majority	of	funds	had	been	recovered.	
Practices	of	implementation	included	the	training	of	youths	at	the	beginning	of	the	projects,	
and	 sensitization	 campaigns	 launched	 by	 the	 Ministry	 to	 recover	 funds.	 While	 the	
programme’s	 definition	 of	 success	 is	 the	 engagement	 of	 as	 many	 youths	 as	 possible	 in	
profitable	agribusiness,	the	actual	measure	of	success	was	the	repayment	of	the	loans	(with	
little	or	no	follow-up	on	the	ground).	
Through	 fieldwork,	 it	 became	 clear	 that,	 although	 both	 practitioners	 and	 youths	 had	 the	
same	 goal	 (youths’	 employment	 in	 agribusiness)	 they	 defined	 very	 differently	 the	 key	
concepts,	 procedures	 and	 practices	 of	 implementation.	 Throughout	 the	 country,	 youths	
lamented	corruption	of	 civil	 servants	 involved	 in	 the	programme	and	 lack	of	quality	 inputs	
and	extension	 services.	 In	 general,	 the	 loans	were	misunderstood	 for	 hand-outs	 and	often	
referred	to	as	‘political	money’,	namely	bribery	of	their	votes.	An	emblematic	example	of	this	
practice,	which	 tied	 the	 loan	of	 the	programme	 to	 the	elections’	 agenda,	 emerged	 in	May	
2017,	as	I	interviewed	Dorah,	a	member	of	a	group	within	the	Youth	Livelihood	Programme	
(YLP)	in	the	outskirts	of	Kampala:		
Me:	When	did	you	get	together	for	the	first	time?	
Dorah:	The	first	 time,	 it	was	2016,	around	January	[a	month	before	the	presidential	
elections]	
Me:	Ok.	How	did	you	decide	to	get	together?	What	were	the	main	reasons	why	you	
wanted	to	work	together	as	a	group?	
Dorah:	As	a	group,	no,	we	started	with,	remember	by	2016,	we	had	started	organizing	
for	 elections,	 primaries,	 NRM	 [National	 Resistance	 Movement]	 whatever...	 So,	 we	
were	a	group,	they	were	looking	for	votes	of	our	councillor.	So	as	a	group,	we	were	
around	 15	 youths.	 So,	 during	 that	 process,	 we	 said	 but	 the	 election,	 after	 the	
elections	 what	 are	 we	 going	 to	 do	 so	 that	 we	 keep	 our	 group	 together?	 So	 we	
decided	to…we	started,	we	decided	to	start	with	poultry	as	a	community	work	 that	
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could	keep	us	together	still	even	after	the	elections	so	from	there	we	started	working	
as	a	group,	till	we	got	that	program	of	YLP	to	apply	for	the	money	of	the	youth	
	
Dorah	and	her	colleagues	expected	that	 the	 local	councillor	wanted	youths’	votes,	bringing	
funding	opportunities	along	with	the	presidential	elections.	They	decided	to	capitalize	on	this	
opportunity	 and	 joined	 the	 YLP,	 facilitated	 by	 the	 councillor.	 While	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 this	
episode	shows	how	buying	votes	is	assumed	to	be	the	custom,	on	the	other	it	also	showed	
how	youth	in	this	context	were	aware	that	their	vote	counted.		
Beyond	this	instance,	I	have	encountered	several	other	YLP	members	who	–	often	off	record	
–	would	confirm	that	it	was	perceived	as	being	a	governmental	programme	institutionalising	
the	 custom	 of	 distributing	 “political	 money”.	 Since	 this	 form	 of	 public	 development	 was	
experienced	as	being	highly	political,	there	was	much	confusion	as	how	the	loan	system	was	
supposed	to	work.	In	fact,	I	was	told	that	during	previous	elections	or	other	campaigns,	civil	
servants	distributed	handouts	or	in-kind	goods,	so	the	loan	system	was	not	welcomed.		
On	a	positive	note,	 the	procedures	 for	 the	 implementation	of	 this	programme	secured	 the	
ownership	 of	 the	 projects.	 In	 fact,	 the	 spontaneous	 application	 of	 groups	 of	 youths	 for	
funding	of	their	agribusiness	allowed	them	to	invest	in	the	enterprise	and	value	chain	which	
was	most	relevant	to	them.	Moreover,	securing	the	means	for	their	enterprise,	and	thereby	
income,	 allowed	 youths	 that	 were	 successful	 in	 obtaining	 the	 grant	 to	 gain	 higher	 social	
status	 –	 therefore	 exiting	 the	 local	 cultural	 category	 of	 youth	 into	 adulthood.	 Perhaps	 the	
most	successful	example	of	YLP	groups	was	the	one	I	encountered	in	Gulu	–	more	precisely	
Odek,	 the	 village	 of	 birth	 of	 Joseph	 Cony.	 Working	 together	 in	 the	 YLP	 group	 enterprise	
allowed	 youths	 to	 strengthen	 previously	 distressed	 social	 relations.	 Besides	 repaying	 the	
loan,	 they	 were	 able	 to	 capitalise	 on	 the	 profits	 to	 set	 up	 a	 saving	 group	 –	 allowing	 for	
resilience	in	times	of	poor	yields.	Moreover,	they	would	often	meet	up	even	when	they	did	
not	need	to	talk	business:	 they	had	set	up	an	amateur	theatre	 in	which	they	re-elaborated	
social	issues	such	as	alcohol	abuse	or	domestic	violence.		
In	cases	in	which	the	groups	were	not	as	successful	in	setting	up	a	collective	agribusiness,	the	
loan	 system	 generated	 financial	 debts.	 While	 in	 Mbale	 in	 June,	 Hassan	 told	 me	
(euphemistically):	 “the	 Youth	 Livelihood	 Programme	 has	 helped	 to	 get	 simple	 things	 like	
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soap,	kerosene	and	doing	small	business	and	the	 family	gets	what	 to	eat.		Generally,	 it	has	
not	been	bad.	But	now	 the	yields	have	not	been	good	because	 changes	 in	 seasons,	 so	we	
have	some	debts.”158	In	fact,	Hassan	was	pointing	to	the	fact	that	without	sufficient	training	
and	experience	in	managing	capital,	external	issues	such	as	changes	in	the	weather	not	only	
damaged	 their	productivity,	 but	 also	put	 them	 in	 tricky	 financial	 debts	–	having	 invested	a	
higher	sum	than	they	were	used	to.		
	
6.4.3B	PRIVATE	SECTOR	APPROACH		
The	 programmes	 I	 have	 evaluated	 were	 mainly	 aiming	 at	 linking	 individuals	 or	 groups	 of	
agripreneurs	 to	private-sector	companies	 that	would	enable	youths	 to	scale	 their	business,	
also	by	facilitating	access	to	financial	services	(by	providing	collaterals).		The	implementation	
involved	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 consortia	 of	 youths	 and	 directing	 their	 agronomic	 activities	
towards	 the	business	model	 set-up	by	 the	private	 sector.	Practices	 for	 the	 implementation	
entailed	mainly	 facilitating	market	 linkages,	 access	 to	 input	 (machinery	and	chemicals)	 and	
output	markets	(selling	their	produce),	training	and	capacity	building.	Besides	the	agricultural	
skills,	 youths	would	be	 trained	 in	 developing	 an	 agripreneurial	mentality	 and	management	
and	accountancy	skills.	Different	development	agencies	had	different	definitions	of	 success	
(training	a	given	number	of	youths,	constituting	or	strengthening	cooperatives,	employment	
in	 out-grower	 schemes)	 –	 but	 all	 shared	 the	 same	 focus	 on	 the	 economic	 interests	 of	 the	
private	sector	company,	who	would	have	to	benefit	either	in	terms	of	production,	labour	or	
marketing	for	their	input	and	services.	
Despite	the	context-specific	regional	variety,	youths	engaged	in	these	programmes	generally	
reported	 to	 be	 earning	 higher	 incomes	 than	 before,	mainly	 thanks	 to	 the	 connection	with	
ready	markets	(often	the	company	itself)	for	their	produce.	For	instance,	John	from	Gulu	told	
me:		
At	first,	the	level	of	production	was	a	bit	low	but	due	to	the	NGO	coming	to	facilitate	
farmers	 by	 giving	 them	 training	 and	 facilitating	 them	with	 some	 other	 inputs,	 and	
																																																						
158	Extract	from	an	interview	with	Hassan,	member	of	a	YLP	group	in	Mbale,	on	14/06/2017	
	 252	
taking	 them	 to	 some	other	outside	 companies	who	buy	 goods	 from	here,	made	us	
gain	some	capital	out	of	it,	out	of	the	produce	we	normally	get	from	the	garden.	159	
In	this	extract,	John	points	at	some	of	the	most	valued	aspects	of	private	sector	approaches	–	
namely	the	specialized	agribusiness	skills	training	and	the	input	provision.	Both	were	seen	as	
opportunities	 to	 capitalise	 on	 agricultural	 enterprises	 and	 move	 from	 subsistence	 to	
commercial	agriculture.		
In	fact,	youths	appreciated	private	sector	driven	programmes	because	they	provided,	besides	
the	 inputs	 (seeds,	 chemicals),	 also	 the	 output	 market.	 In	 Mbale,	 Richard	 explained	 what	
made	him	satisfied	about	the	programme	(which	asked	to	remain	anonymous)	he	had	joined	
as	contract	pumpkin	farmer:	“They	give	you	seeds	and	that	the	end	of	it	all	they	are	going	to	
buy	the	produce.”160	Richard	contrasted	this	to	the	YLP	program	where	it	“was	good	to	give	a	
lot	of	money”	but	since	it	was	a	loan,	there	was	no	security	of	being	able	to	capitalise	on	it,	
thereby	running	the	risk	of	frustrating	the	possibility	of	improvement.	
However,	the	contract-farming	scheme	implied	that	youth	were	attracted	to	the	programme	
as	a	way	of	securing	a	job,	rather	than	boosting	their	entrepreneurship.	In	fact,	their	capacity	
to	continue	in	the	sector	or	value	chain	in	which	they	were	trained	strictly	depended	on	the	
marketability	of	 the	produce	beyond	the	company	 in	 the	scheme.	 In	 fact,	as	 in	 the	case	of	
pumpkins	or	improved	seeds,	often	the	value	chains	in	which	the	private	sector	was	investing	
were	 not	 marketable	 beyond	 the	 company	 itself.	 I	 found	 an	 interesting	 exception	 in	 the	
south-west	region,	where	the	programmes	were	investing	in	value	chains	which	were	rooted	
in	the	local	agribusiness	culture	(dairy).	Not	only	where	the	youths	facilitated	in	accessing	the	
dairy	 business,	 but	 they	 were	 not	 in	 a	 unidirectional	 relation	 with	 a	 single	 private	 sector	
company.	
Therefore,	the	resilience	of	the	agribusiness	and	the	capacity	for	spill	over	depended	on	the	
value	 chain.	 The	 best	 example	 in	 this	 sense	 was	 an	 SNV	 project,	 funded	 by	 the	 Dutch	
																																																						
159	John	is	a	fictitious	name,	since	he	asked	to	remain	anonymous	–	interviewed	in	Gulu	on	8/04/2017		
160	Richard	was	interviewed	in	the	outskirts	of	Mbale	on	15/06/2017.	Emphasis	added	by	author.		
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Embassy,	 in	the	south-west	region.161		The	project	had	capitalized	on	the	dairy	value	chain,	
supporting	 cooperatives	by	 linking	 them	with	private	 sector	 companies	 that	would	provide	
machinery	 and	 buy	 the	 milk.	 SNV	 was	 responsible	 for	 the	 training	 of	 youths	 within	 the	
cooperative,	and	for	providing	collaterals	for	loans	–	where	necessary.	The	fact	that	the	dairy	
sector	 is	 strongly	 embedded	 in	 the	 socio-cultural	 and	 economic	 dimensions	 of	 the	 region	
made	 it	possible	 for	youths	 in	the	programme	to	capitalize	on	the	profits	derived	from	the	
scheme,	 and	 include	 growing	 numbers	 of	 members	 in	 the	 cooperatives	 and	 even	 set	 up	
saving	 schemes.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 growing	 number	 of	 members,	 respondents	
reported	 that	 cooperatives	were	 strengthened	 and	with	 it	 also	 their	 capacity	 to	 negotiate	
better	deals	with	the	dairy	industry162.		
Moreover,	as	argued	in	section	6.4.2a,	the	programmes	were	perceived	as	transient	business	
opportunities	and	were	not	considered	as	sustainable	frameworks	to	support	their	business.	
In	 fact,	 youths	 had	 seen	 a	 variety	 of	 international	 organisations	 coming	 and	 going,	 and	
lamented	the	brevity	of	their	programmes.	
	
6.4.3C	CONTROL	GROUP		
The	 control	 group	 was	 a	 very	 heterogeneous	 sample	 of	 youths,	 not	 only	 because	 of	 the	
heterogeneity	 factors	 I	 mentioned	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 but	 also	 because	 such	 factors	
emerged	 more	 strongly	 than	 in	 the	 other	 groups	 of	 youths	 I	 interviewed.	 This	 happened	
because	 of	 two	 combined	 reasons.	 One,	 the	 broad	 sampling	 category	 of	 ‘youth	 in	
agribusiness’	allowed	me	to	collect	interviews	with	youths	from	all	walks	of	life.	Two,	youth	
who	were	 gathered	 in	 groups	 within	 development	 schemes	 had	more	 in	 common	 among	
themselves	 than	 random	 youngsters	 in	 agribusiness.	 In	 fact,	 for	 the	 youths	 within	 the	
development	 schemes	 the	 bias	 of	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 development	 organization	 played	 a	
homogenizing	role.		
																																																						
161SNV’s	TIDE	project	in	Uganda,	website	accessed	on	2/09/2018:		
http://www.snv.org/project/inclusive-dairy-enterprise-tide	
162	This	emerged	both	from	the	interview	I	conducted	with	members	of	a	cooperative	in	a	remote	
village	in	Kiruhura	(south-west	region),	on	30/05/2017,	as	from	the	interview	with	the	director	of	a	
cooperative	in	Sanga	(south-west	region)	on	1/06/2017	
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Therefore,	 I	 met	 youths	 –	 both	 male	 and	 female	 –	 who	 barely	 earned	 an	 income	 from	
(partially)	 commercial	 agriculture,	 but	 did	 not	 see	 nor	 aspire	 a	 future	 in	 agribusiness,	 and	
others	 who	 had	 left	 well-paid	 white	 collar	 jobs	 to	 venture	 into	 agribusiness	 as	 profitable	
enterprise	and	desirable	career.	Both	fit	the	definition	of	young	(18-35)	agripreneur	(earning	
income	from	commercial	non-food	crops	production),	although	for	the	one,	agribusiness	is	a	
forced-choice,	and	for	the	other	an	aspiration	and	career	path.		
Interestingly,	 the	most	 successful	 ones	 –	 in	 terms	of	 economic	profit	 and	 satisfaction	with	
their	 career	 –	 had	 not	 benefitted	 from	 development	 schemes	 to	 start	 their	 enterprise.	 In	
their	cases,	other	factors	were	playing	an	important	role:	firstly,	the	arbitrary	component	of	
their	 entrepreneurial	 mindset	 and	 personality;	 secondly,	 their	 family	 and	 economic	
background,	which	 in	most	 cases	allowed	 them	 to	 study	 till	 university	 level	 –	as	education	
was	 in	 fact	 a	 third	 determinant	 factor.	 The	majority	 of	 youths	 in	 the	 control	 group	 of	my	
informants	 were	working	 individually	 rather	 than	 as	 groups.	 This	 was	 certainly	 due	 to	my	
sampling,	which	did	not	 target	 youths	working	 in	 cooperatives	 or	 organized	 groups	 since	 I	
had	 learnt	 that	 group-enterprises	 were	 not	 representative	 of	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 social	
category	of	‘youths	in	agribusiness’.	In	fact,	besides	some	highly	organized	value	chains	such	
as	 dairy,	 young	 agripreneurs	 joined	 forces	 only	 in	 the	 phase	 of	 bulking	 produce	 for	
transportation.			
As	for	this	group,	it	can	be	deduced	that	factors	such	as	socio-cultural	context	and	economic	
background	played	a	 crucial	 role.	Moreover,	 these	 factors	had	even	more	 impact	 than	 the	
development	programmes	had	for	youths	participating.			
	
6.5	RENDERING	TECHNICAL163		
Considering	the	perceptions	that	youths	had	of	the	programmes,	and	those	of	practitioners	
about	the	practical	 implementation	of	the	programmes,	 it	can	be	 inferred	that	there	was	a	
discrepancy	 in	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 impact	 of	 the	 programmes.		
																																																						
163	I	borrow	the	concept	of	‘rendering	technical’	from	the	analysis	of	development	implementation	in	
Malaysia	of	Murray	Li	(2007).	
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Moreover,	 it	 appears	 that	 while	 for	 development	 practitioners	 the	 implementation	 of	
programmes	was	a	 technical	matter	 that	was	restricted	to	agribusiness	practices	and	skills,	
the	agribusiness	experiences	of	youths	were	a	complex	matter	that	encompassed	their	whole	
socio-cultural	and	economic	world.	In	fact,	as	shown	by	the	case	of	successful	agripreneurs	in	
the	control	group,	the	heterogeneity	factors	described	in	the	previous	chapter	were	crucial.	
On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 approach	 of	 practitioners	 was	 partial	 –	 limited	 to	 few	 aspects	 of	
agribusiness	–	such	as	business	skills,	market	and	finances,	namely	their	notions	of	success.	
This	 is	clear	 in	 the	prominent	role	given	by	practitioners	 to	the	concept	of	 ‘mindset’	 in	 the	
implementation	 of	 programmes.	Mindset	 was	 discussed	 as	 a	 skill	 that	 could	 be	 taught;	 a	
personal	trait	to	be	developed	through	capacity	building.	Mindset	was	a	commodity	that	the	
programmes	claimed	to	provide,	as	a	service	for	youths,	and	at	the	same	time	depicted	as	a	
key	 to	 success	 in	 agribusiness.	 As	 a	 commodity,	mindset	was	 something	 that	most	 youths	
lacked	and	could	be	provided.	As	a	consequence,	youths’	poverty	or	unemployment	becomes	
a	 condition	 that	 depends	 on	 the	 personal,	 individual	 capabilities	 of	 farmers	 to	 turn	 into	
agripreneurs.	 By	 giving	 the	 responsibility	 of	 coming	 out	 of	 poverty	 to	 the	 individual,	 the	
structural	 adjustments	 that	 would	 be	 responsibility	 of	 the	 government	 –	 such	 as	
infrastructure,	 industrialization	 –	 are	 depoliticized.	 Rather,	 the	 focus	 of	 development	
programmes	lay	with	the	skills	that	youths	can	learn	to	turn	from	subsistence	to	commercial	
agriculture,	 with	 the	 support	 of	 public	 or	 private-sector	 schemes.	 	 The	 solution	 to	 youth	
unemployment	 is	 to	 become	 an	 agripreneur164.	 Similar	 to	 Mosse	 (2004,	 p.	 649-650),	 I	
observed	the	commodification	of	a	personal	trait	such	as	the	‘entrepreneurial	mindset’.		
Within	such	discourse,	I	observed	during	fieldwork,	the	projects’	ability	to	provide	youths	the	
skills	to	escape	unemployment,	justified	the	need	for	programmes	implementation	and	thus	
the	 fuelling	of	 the	development	 industry	around	youth	 in	agribusiness.	 In	other	words,	 the	
way	 in	 which	 youths	 needs	 (for	 an	 entrepreneurial	 mindset	 and	 skills),	 justified	 the	
organisations	 role	 as	 mentors.	 It	 reinforced	 the	 development	 practitioners	 position	 as	
(technical)	experts	in	the	field	of	agribusiness	and	youths	mentoring.	As	Mosse	(2004,	p.	652)	
concludes:	 “These	 factors	 shaped	 the	 style	 of	 project	 practice	 (tight	 schedules,	 targets,	
																																																						
164	As	explained	in	the	first	empirical	chapter,	the	aidnography,	the	focus	on	mindset	change	and	
agirpreneurship	was	stressed	by	the	majority	of	the	development	organisations.		
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subsidies)	 and	 the	 type	 of	 project	 relationships	 (patron–client,	 employer–employee)	 that	
emerged”.		
Perhaps	 the	most	 striking	observation	 to	be	made	about	 the	 implementation	phase	of	 the	
programmes	and	youths’	perceptions	of	them,	is	that	the	very	targeting	of	youths	as	a	social	
category	was	experienced	as	arbitrary.	The	variety	of	heterogeneity	factors	described	in	the	
previous	chapter	were	 in	 fact	not	only	a	cause	 for	problematizing	 this	 social	 category,	but,	
alone,	determinant	 factors	 for	youths	 to	succeed	or	not	 in	agribusiness.	 	Youths,	 thus,	had	
become	 the	 ‘collective	 subject’	 to	 which	 Murray	 Li	 (2007,	 p.	 132)	 referred,	 as	 necessary	
target	of	development	efforts:	
Through	 its	program	for	community	development,	 the	project	proposed	to	create	a	
new	 collective	 subject,	 a	 community	 that	would	 assess,	 plan,	 reach	 consensus,	 and	
think	of	population	and	natural	 resources	as	entities	 to	be	managed.	The	proposed	
technique	for	creating	this	subject	was	to	guide	villagers	through	a	carefully	crafted	
sequence	 of	 activities:	 participatory	 assessment	 of	 community	 resources,	 problem	
analysis,	 preparation	 of	 development	 proposals,	 application	 for	 funding	 under	 the	
official	 budget	 planning	 process,	monitoring,	 and	 evaluation	 of	 outcomes.	 The	 plan	
referred	frequently	to	participation,	but	how	villagers	would	participate	and	to	what	
ends	was	predefined.		
However,	the	targeting	of	the	social	category	of	youth	was	not	only	functional	to	the	fuelling	
of	the	development	industry	–	but	had	also	a	political	significance,	particularly	for	Ugandan	
organisations	 (both	 governmental	 and	 grassroot).	 I	will	 explore	 the	 political	 aspects	 of	 the	
development	programmes	for	youth	in	the	section	below.		
	
6.6	POLITICS	IN	CONTENTION		
The	attention	my	informants	received	by	development	agencies	for	the	sake	of	being	young,	
felt	 arbitrary	 to	 all	 those	 who	 did	 not	 see	 the	 (political)	 potential	 of	 leveraging	 the	
momentum	for	their	own	benefits.	In	a	few	cases,	young	agripreneurs	had	a	full	awareness	of	
the	political	and	economic	leverage	they	had	for	being	part	of	a	demographic	majority.	These	
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cases	stood	out	for	being	the	exception165.	Khamutima,	a	coffee	farmer	from	the	west	who	
moved	 to	 Kampala	 for	 his	 studies,	 organised	 a	 youth	 network	 (YOFCHAN	 –	 the	 Young	
Farmers	Champions	Network)	of	farmers	to	lobby	for	youths	inclusion	in	policy	making	at	the	
Ministries,	 FAO	 and	 other	 bilateral	 organisations;	 Joyce,	 crucial	 informant	 and	 friend	 in	
Kampala,	 advocated	 for	 young	women	 in	 agribusiness	 at	 forums	 in	 East	 Africa;	 Stephen,	 a	
dairy	farmer	in	the	Western	region	and	director	of	a	dairy	cooperative,	is	trying	to	halt	rural-
urban	migration	by	sensitizing	youth	to	form	coalitions.	
Stephen	 explained	 how	 together	 with	 some	 other	members	 of	 the	 cooperative,	 they	 had	
submitted	a	project	to	an	international	NGO	to	support	the	formation	of	a	youth	council:		
Stephen:	 For	 us	 we	 had	 a	 proposal	 to	 [the	 international	 NGO	 who	 wished	 to	 remain	
anonymous]	but	they	didn’t	like	it,	they	never	took	it	up,	we	wanted	to	form	youth	councils.	
Youth	councils,	we	manage	them	as	youth,	we	sensitize	other	youths	who	are	in	towns,	we	
start	setting	up	conferences	in	towns,	let’s	say	in	Kampala,	you	organize	the	youth,	you	call	
youths	from	Kampala,	take	them	to	Sheraton	Hotel	you	talk	to	them,	tell	them	people,	why	
are	you	stuck	in	towns,	come	back	to	Villages,	let’s	go	and	do	farming.	(…)	Let’s	come	back	to	
here	 [Western	 region	of	Kiruhura]	 then	 if	we	have	an	organized	group,	also	we	can	 talk	of	
such	problems	of	land.	A	youth	is	willing	to	come	back	to	the	village	but	he	doesn’t	have	own	
land.	We	can	as	a	group	petition.	(…)	If	we	have	a	voice,	we	can	push.	Even,	we	can	push	for	
laws	if	we	have	one	voice.	That	is	if	we	have	an	organization	or	a	platform	that	can	petition	
even	up	top	parliament	for	laws	to	be	changed	and	they	favour	the	youth	who	are	trying	to	
go	into	farming.	
Me:	Okay,	I	think	that	there	is	already	a	youth	council	in	the	parliament	in	Kampala	
Stephen:	 One,	 representing	 the	 whole	 youth	 in	Western	 Uganda.	 He	 [head	 of	 the	
youth	council]	 is	 just	 there	 to	eat	money	 [i.e.	corruption].	He	can’t	stand	alone	and	
fight	for	our	rights.	We	need	organizations	that	can	support	youths.	
																																																						
165	In	chronological	order:	Khamutima,	whom	I	interviewed	in	Kampala	on	2/02/2017;	Joyce,	whom	I	
interviewed	in	Kampala	on	10/03/2017;	Stephen,	from	the	south	west	region,	whom	I	interviewed	on	
1/06/2017;	a	young	civil	servant	who	will	remain	anonymous,	whom	I	interviewed	in	Mbale	on	
14/06/2017.	I	will	give	more	details	on	these	informants	through	this	section.	
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Stephen	was	motivated	to	constitute	a	youth	network	not	only	for	agribusiness	purposes,	but	
also	because	the	old	generation	of	politicians	“must	go	–	it’s	our	time	to	take	the	lead	of	the	
country”.	However,	 the	organisation	of	 youths	 into	political	 groups	was	not	welcomed	not	
only	by	international	NGOs,	but	especially	by	the	government.		
When	in	Mbale,	I	have	a	long	conversation	with	a	young	exponent	of	the	district	authorities	–	
who	asked	to	remain	anonymous.	 In	the	beginning	of	the	conversation	he	was	reluctant	to	
share	his	 thoughts	with	me	and	gave	me	a	politically	correct	account	of	 the	motivations	of	
the	 government	 to	 invest	 in	 youths	 in	 agribusiness:	 he	 explained	 that	 Museveni	 was	
supporting	the	youths	because	they	otherwise	would	remain	idle	and	be	a	threat	to	national	
security.	He	himself	had	voted	for	Museveni,	but	argued	that	since	youths	are	the	majority	of	
the	population,	they	should	be	given	more	space	in	politics.	Until	that	moment,	youths	were	
organized	 in	 the	National	Youth	Council,	with	 representatives	 from	each	district	–	and	had	
nominal	 authority	 in	 the	 parliament.	 I	 report	 from	 the	 fieldnotes	 of	 14th	 June	 2017,	 my	
surprise	when	he	finally	took	confidence	to	explain	the	real	political	stakes	for	government	to	
engage	youths	in	development	programmes:		
When	 I	 switch	 off	 the	 recorder166,	 the	 real	 interview	 starts	 –	 the	 narrative	 totally	
changes.	The	first	time	he	voted	for	NRM	because	he	was	grateful	for	the	long-term	
peace	that	this	president	had	brought	to	the	country.	But	afterwards	he	realized	he	
didn’t	 really	 have	 another	 option	 –	 if	 he	 wanted	 to	 stay	 in	 politics	 and	 pursue	 his	
career.	He	gives	the	example	of	a	friend	of	him	who	was	also	involved	in	politics	as	a	
youth	representative	and	decided	to	stand	up	for	the	opposition	and	was	cut	off	the	
political	system.	[He	explained	that]	When	it’s	election	time	he	gets	money	from	the	
party	to	distribute	and	make	sure	that	the	youth	votes	NRM.	Around	those	times	the	
local	politicians	and	the	national	politici	who	come	from	this	area	[Mbale]	come	and	
distribute	sachets	of	waragi	 [local	gin]	 to	get	people	drunk	and	make	them	vote	for	
Museveni.	He	admits	that	he’s	actually	 just	waiting	for	the	president	to	die.	He	also	
tells	me	how	 in	 the	beginning	he	 really	believed	 that	Museveni	had	a	good	agenda	
and	could	make	a	difference	for	Uganda,	but	that	now	the	people	around	him	are	too	
																																																						
166	He	allowed	me	to	make	reference	to	the	information	he	gave	me,	provided	he	would	remain	
anonymous.	
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corrupt	 and	 “eat	 the	money”	which	 is	meant	 to	 go	 for	 the	 people	 on	 the	 ground.	
What	scares	me	is	what	he	tells	me	about	the	amount	of	intelligence	that	is	hired	by	
the	government	to	be	informed	about	the	local	dynamics:	they	are	around	at	parish	
and	 village	 level,	 as	 much	 as	 in	 towns	 and	 within	 district	 authorities.	 Even	 those	
baganda	men	that	live	in	Mbale	and	sell	groundnuts	on	the	streets,	they	are	actually	
believed	to	be	intelligence	people	controlling	the	movement	and	activities	of	people.	
If	someone	starts	advocating	for	the	opposition,	s/he	will	be	immediately	reported	so	
that	will	be	jailed	or	at	least	their	career	jeopardized.	He	gives	me	an	example:	he	had	
once	organised	a	youth	group	around	Mbale,	and	the	day	they	had	an	assembly	to	set	
the	 constitution	 “people	 from	 KLA”	 (meaning	 from	 NRM)	 came	 unexpectedly	 and	
uninvited,	saying	that	he	would	be	jailed	if	he	wouldn’t	accept	the	bribe	and	convince	
the	 youth	 group	 to	 vote	 for	NRM.	 (…)	 “Either	 you	 remain	 poor	 and	 you	 keep	 your	
political	opinions,	or	if	you	make	progress	and	have	success	it	means	you	support	the	
government”	(otherwise	they	don’t	allow	you	to	be	successful).		
The	strong	control	the	government	was	holding	on	youth	groups	and	organisations,	both	the	
agricultural	 and	 the	 political	 ones,	 showed	 how	 the	 support	 of	 youths	 was	 a	 controlled	
empowerment.	Even	more	so,	the	organisation	of	a	large	portion	of	the	population	in	groups	
facilitated	 the	 penetration	 of	 government	 structures	 among	 the	 electorate.	 In	 this	 way,	 it	
appears	 that	 the	 investment	 in	 the	social	category	of	youths	–	a	 fuzzy	knowledge	category	
with	little	explanatory	nor	descriptive	significance	–	resemblances	what	Mosse	(2004,	p.	650-
651)	refers	to	as	“‘mobilising	metaphor’	(Porter,	1995)	—	could	mean	many	things	to	many	
people,	and	allowed	a	multiplication	of	criteria	of	success.”		
Rather	 than	 arguing	 that	 there	 is	 a	 premeditated	 causality	 in	 the	 support	 of	 youths	 in	
agribusiness	 for	 the	 actual	 purpose	 of	 electorate	 control	 –	 I	 argue	 with	 Mosse	 that	
‘mobilising	metaphors’	(such	as	youth)	are	part	of	the	organizations’	exigencies	to	maintain	
relations	 through	 development	 interventions.	 These	 metaphors	 are	 thus	 constructed	 as	
much	through	the	narratives	as	through	the	practices	of	implementation.		
I	do	not	hold	 that	 there	 is	a	programmatic	 intention	 in	constructing	metaphors,	but	 rather	
they	emerge	 in	 the	process	 through	which	 the	discourse	around	development	emerges.	 In	
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fact,	 as	 I	 explain	 below,	 there	 are	 processes	 of	 adaptation	 and	 negotiation	 of	 the	
development	programmes.	
	
6.7	ADAPTATION	
In	 my	 fieldwork,	 I	 observed	 how	 some	 programmes	 evolved	 over	 time,	 from	 their	
formulation	 to	 their	 implementations	 and	 outcomes.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 delve	 into	 the	
observations	 of	 how	 programmes	 (the	 few	 ones	which	 structures	 allowed	 for	 flexibility	 in	
implementation)	changed	to	adapt	to	the	heterogeneity	they	encountered	on	the	ground.	I	
refer	 to	adaptation	as	 the	 (positive)	process	by	which	a	given	development	programme	or	
project	 comes	 to	 terms	 with	 the	 reality	 on	 the	 ground,	 thereby	 adjusting	 strategies	 and	
means	to	fit	the	sociocultural,	economic	and	value	chain	context.	In	practice,	this	adaptation	
entails	a	change	in	the	implementation	of	the	project	to	adjust	to	the	heterogeneity	factors	
characterising	youths	and	their	needs	and	capacities	in	agribusiness.			
Adaption	is	a	process	that	is	particularly	influenced	by	the	agency	and	resistance	exercised	by	
development	recipients,	and	has	the	effect	of	modifying	the	modus	operandi	of	a	programme	
or	 project.	 This	 process	 can	 be	 described	 as	 a	 youths’	 demand-driven	 change	 in	 the	
implementation	 and	 even	 design	 of	 the	 development	 programme	 or	 project.	 While	 this	
process	 is	most	 evident	 in	 the	 implementation	 phase,	 it	 has	 effects	 on	 the	 outcomes	 of	 a	
development	programme	or	project	–	and	might	(in	few	cases)	influence	the	re-designing	of	
a	programme	to	fit	contextual	specificities.		
In	Uganda,	I	observed	that	the	programme	and	projects	that	seem	to	be	the	most	adaptive	
were	either	 small	 in	 scale	 (in	 terms	of	budget	and	 target	 regions	and	youths),	or	had	 little	
strings	 with	 their	 donors	 (namely,	 they	 had	 a	 relatively	 wide	 range	 of	 flexibility	 in	 the	
implementation).	 These	 two	 factors	 appeared	 to	 allowed	 development	 practitioners	 the	
necessary	 flexibility	 to	 adjust	 their	 strategies	 to	 fit	 reality	 on	 the	 ground.	On	 the	 contrary,	
programmes	which	involved	many	parties	had	to	negotiate	and	compromise	their	strategies	
(see	section	6.8	below	on	negotiations)	to	meet	other	practitioners’	priorities	and	interests.	
Negotiation	 and	 adaptation	 are	 not	 necessarily	 opposed	 to	 each	 other,	 since	 programmes	
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which	 had	 to	 negotiate	 strategies	 and	 priorities	with	 several	 parties	would	 still	 be	 able	 to	
exercise	flexibility	to	adapt	to	specific	local	agribusiness	contexts.		
While	I	have	encountered	different	degrees	of	adaptation	of	programmes	to	local	contexts,	
only	 few	of	 the	programmes	 I	 have	evaluated	on	 the	 ground	 could	 actually	 be	 considered	
adaptive	 to	 the	 heterogeneity	 characterizing	 youths.	 Besides	 experiences	 such	 as	 that	 of	
Trust	in	AKORION,	mentioned	above	–	which	was	selecting	the	groups	of	youths	and	regions	
where	they	could	build	on	existing	assets	and	“entrepreneurial	mentality”	–	another	example	
was	 that	 of	 the	Dutch-funded	 SKY	programme,	 implemented	by	 the	 Italian	NGO	AVSI.	 The	
programme	manager,	Samuele	Otim	Rizzo,	explained	to	me	how	the	programme	accounted	
for	 youths’	 heterogeneity:	 he	 explained	 that	 their	 approach	 was	 focusing	 on	 individual	
characteristics	and	aspirations	of	 the	youths:	“not	all	of	 them	have	the	mindset	to	become	
entrepreneurs,	each	youth	is	different”.	The	programme	had	developed	selection	criteria	for	
the	beneficiaries,	which	would	also	 include	qualitative	aspects	besides	hard	criteria	 like	age	
and	gender.	Development	practitioners	in	the	selection	process	would,	for	example,	consider	
what	the	youths’	interests	are,	the	specific	value	chains	they	were	already	engaged	in	–	and	
then	 they	 would	 invest	 in	 that	 specific	 sector,	 enabling	 to	 grow	 the	 existing	 start-ups.	 I	
insisted	 asking	 about	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 –	 in	 the	 implementation	 phase	 –	 the	
programme	 had	 adapted	 to	 the	 different	 socio-cultural	 contexts	 and	 to	 all	 the	 individual	
specificities	he	mentioned.	He	explained	that	one	of	the	main	traits	of	SKY	was	its	flexibility,	
which	sometimes	also	brings	them	in	a	difficult	position	with	the	donors:	“it’s	hard	to	justify	
why	some	youth	gets	more	start-up	capital	or	 input	than	others	–	and	that	really	has	to	do	
with	his	or	her	capacities	to	capitalize	and	scale	their	business”.		
Besides	 adapting	 to	 the	 individual	 potential	 to	 capitalize	 on	 development	 investments,	
adaptation	 also	 adjusts	 the	 programme	 to	 the	 territorial	 differences	 between	 Ugandan	
regions.	Reportedly,	development	practitioners	saw	the	greatest	degree	of	regional	disparity	
when	comparing	the	Northern	region	–	which	has	been	affected	by	war	for	decades	–	to	the	
South-Western	 region	 –	 which	 has	 been	 privileged	 by	 the	 president.	 “We	 cannot	 do	 a	
replication	 of	 the	 same	 approach	 in	 all	 regions.”	 –	 stresses	 one	 of	 the	 implementers	 of	
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Agrivalue’s 167 	agribusiness	 accelerator	 project.	 And	 he	 continues	 explaining	 what	 he	
recognizes	to	be	the	three	major	features	that	diversify	Uganda’s	regions:		
Well	I	think	there	are	three	main	territorial	differences:	first	of	all	language,	you	know	
in	 Uganda	 we	 have	 so	 many	 different	 languages,	 you	 may	 find	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
translate	 the	 same	 message	 everywhere.	 Then	 tribalism…all	 the	 different	 ethnic	
groups,	they	have	different	cultures,	 if	you	think	of	the	North	and	the	West	you	see	
they	have	very	different	ways	of	life.	And	then	education:	in	the	North	the	education	
level	is	poorer	because	of	the	war	they	had	for	20	years.		
While	the	three	factors	this	development	practitioner	has	mentioned	might	be	a	subjective	
perception,	what	is	clear	is	that	his	programme	would	take	those	into	account	to	adapt	their	
development	strategies	to	the	contextual	differences.	Later	in	the	interview,	he	also	stressed	
how	 through	 the	 process	 of	 adaptation	 to	 regional	 variety	 the	 development	 project	 itself	
changed:	“Of	course	we	have	an	idea	of	what	we	want,	but	we	don’t	know	what	will	actually	
work	–	we	are	willing	to	bend	and	fit	the	complexities	of	the	regions	where	we	are	going	to	
work.	
Despite	stressing	that	heterogeneity	was	more	of	an	individual	trait	or	socio-economic	asset	
that	favoured	or	hindered	agricultural	entrepreneurship	–	also	Samuele	also	admitted	there	
were	general	regional	specificities:		
Acholi	 [North]	people	are	warriors	–	we	know	 that,	 it	 takes	much	more	convincing.	
And	 the	Karamojong	 [North-East]	 are	warriors	 and	pastoralists.	 So	we	have	 to	 take	
into	 account	 the	 aspirations	 of	 the	 youths,	 but	 also	 the	motivation	 of	 their	 family.	
Family	support	 is	more	 important	 in	the	north	than	 it	 is	 in	the	south,	 [in	the	North]	
they	need	to	be	encouraged	and	sustained	more	than	in	the	south	–	where	they	are	
more	 independent:	 [in	 the	South]	 they	 rely	on	 the	social	 safety	net	 for	 the	start-up	
but	then	it’s	an	individual	agribusiness.	In	the	south,	there	seems	to	be	more	respect	
for	individual	enterprises	flourishing	–	they	capitalise	on	their	resources.	In	the	north,	
there’s	the	mentality	that	it’s	better	to	be	equal	than	to	have	few	successful	–	there	
																																																						
167	See	case	study	below	
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also	 is	 more	 jealousy	 than	 in	 the	 south.	 For	 example	 if	 someone	 starts	 a	 wood	
plantation,	they	go	and	burn	their	trees!		
This	account	was	reinforcing	some	of	the	perceptions	I	had	also	recorded	during	my	previous	
fieldwork:	 I	 had	 observed	 how	 land	 tenure	 and	 socio-cultural	 structures	 were	 strongly	
intertwined,	 as	 much	 as	 they	 were	 influencing	 the	 agribusiness	 practices	 (see	 previous	
chapter).	Therefore,	I	asked	Samuele	how	they	needed	to	adapt	to	all	these	differences	that	
he	had	mentioned:	he	explained	that	of	the	four	focus	points	of	their	programme,	needed	to	
be	emphasized	in	the	north	and	left	behind	in	the	south:		
1)	Agri-skills	necessary	to	develop	a	business	development	plan	was	more	necessary	
in	the	north	than	in	the	south,	as	much	as	2)	life	skills	–	which	fill	in	the	psycho-social	
dimension	 of	 the	 individual;	 but	 particularly	 the	 3)	 entrepreneurship	 skills	
development	was	seen	as	being	alien	to	northerners’	approach	to	agribusiness,	and	
thus	 required	 a	 stronger	 capacity	 building	 investment,	 while	 in	 the	 west	 farmers	
would	have	more	of	an	agribusiness	mentality	which	didn’t	require	AVSI	to	invest	too	
much	in	entrepreneurship	training;	4)	gender	was	reported	to	be	more	of	a	problem	
in	the	north	than	in	the	south;	in	particular,	the	issue	of	gender	inequality	was	tackled	
with	an	household	approach,	to	sensitize	men	as	much	as	women	of	the	importance	
of	women’	engagement	in	agribusiness.		
Samuele	 reported	 how	 the	 programme	 was	 adapting	 to	 the	 different	 regional	 needs,	 as	
much	 as	 to	 the	 individual	 assets	 and	 aspirations:	 in	 his	 view,	 flexibility	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	
contextual	 specificities	was	 their	 key	 to	 achieving	 their	 programme	 goals.	 By	 stressing	 the	
ways	 in	which	 the	 programme	was	 adapting	 to	 heterogeneous	 groups	 of	 youths,	 Samuele	
also	 indicated	 that	 the	 programme	 had	 changed	 from	 the	 time	 of	 its	 design,	 two	 years	
before.	 In	 fact,	he	also	mentioned	that	 the	programme	had	started	out	 too	ambitious,	and	
that	some	of	the	outputs	will	not	be	achieved.	The	choices	on	which	outputs	were	to	be	left	
behind,	had	been	made	in	agreement	with	the	Dutch	embassy	–	where	I	perceived	that	the	
word	agreement	was	actually	referring	to	negotiations	about	both	sides’	priorities.		
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6.8	NEGOTIATION		
I	was	sitting	at	a	round	table	in	an	air-conditioned	office	–	one	of	those	buildings	you	could	
spot	 from	 afar,	 on	 top	 of	 Nakasero	 hill	 in	 Kampala	 –	 amid	 diplomats,	 business	 men	 and	
women,	 civil	 servants	 and	 development	 practitioners	 working	 for	 NGOs.	 The	 agenda	
ambitiously	 announced	 we	 were	 to	 discuss	 the	 launch	 of	 the	 Belgian	 platform	 for	
agribusiness	 and	 thereby	 also	 the	 future	 of	 the	 Belgian-Ugandan	 cooperation.	 Facing	 the	
undeniable	challenge	 if	a	decreasing	budget	 for	development,	 the	Belgian	Embassy	had	set	
up	this	“stakeholders	platform”	to	counteract	fragmentation	of	aid	among	too	many	actors.		
The	 Belgian	 ambassador	 opened	 the	 meeting	 with	 a	 round	 of	 introductions,	 and	 then	
proceeded	to	presenting	the	viable	strategies	–	all	pointing	towards	an	‘aid	to	trade’	policy:	
the	embassy	would	promote	private-public-partnerships,	support	Ugandan	entrepreneurship	
and	“open	the	doors	for	Belgian	private	sector	companies	who	want	to	come	to	do	business	
in	 Uganda”.	 Strategizing	 partnerships	 with	 the	 private	 sector	 was	 an	 approach	 that	 the	
ambassador	recognized	to	be	similar	to	that	of	the	Dutch	Embassy,	“and	certainly	we	want	to	
partner	up	with	our	Dutch	colleagues	and	join	forces”.	As	for	the	meeting	itself,	the	theme	of	
the	cooperation	between	private	and	public	sector	meant	that	a	fierce	negotiation	unfolded	
between	 traditional	 development	 actors	 from	 NGOs,	 the	 Embassy	 representatives,	 and	
business	men	and	women.		
As	a	matter	of	 fact,	 the	topic	of	 the	support	of	agribusiness	entitled	the	representatives	of	
private	 sector	 to	 set	 the	 agenda	 of	 what	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	 priority	 for	 them,	 while	 other	
development	 partners	 appeared	 to	 be	 playing	 a	 corollary	 and	 supportive	 role.	 Part	 of	
negotiations	were	played	around	the	responsibility	for	training	youths	for	agribusiness	agri-	
and	 soft	 skills	 such	 as	 accountability	 and	 business	 planning:	 actors	 from	 private	 sector	
companies	 insisted	 it	 was	 not	 their	 responsibility	 to	 provide	 training,	 while	 NGO	 workers	
argued	 they	 had	 other	mandates	 than	 training	 youths	 to	 suit	 private	 sector	 labour	 needs.	
While	the	latter	stressed	the	programmes	they	were	bond	to	implement	did	not	leave	them	
with	sufficient	 flexibility	 to	adjust	 to	market	demands,	business	men	and	women	 lamented	
they	could	not	do	all	the	development	work	on	their	own.	Belgian	civil	servants	stressed	they	
had	set	mandates	from	Brussels	that	pushed	them	to	invest	in	education,	human	rights	and	
partnership	and	support	with	the	private	sector,	while	the	business	men	and	women	at	the	
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round	 table	 sighted	 and	 rebutted	 that	 it	 was	 time	 to	 be	 pragmatic:	 the	 Embassy	 should	
facilitate	financial	frameworks	for	business	development,	and	invest	in	opportunities	that	the	
private	sector	was	ready	to	take.	Eventually,	the	result	was	an	agreement	that	the	Embassy	
would	 be	 mapping	 private	 sector	 needs	 and	 facilitating	 interaction	 with	 financial	 and	
Ugandan	 governmental	 institutions,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 private	 sector	 would	 take	 up	 social	
responsibility	 towards	 Embassy’s	 target	 groups	 (mainly	 women	 and	 youths)	 in	 their	
agribusinesses,	with	the	support	of	NGOs.	The	purpose	of	setting	up	a	platform	of	different	
development	stakeholders	was	finalized.		
It	was	 particularly	 interesting	 to	 observe	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 interaction,	 for	 it	 reflected	 the	
Embassy’s	prioritization	of	the	private	sector	interests	and	the	business	side	of	development	
cooperation.	Such	dynamics	were	indicative	of	the	contemporary	trend	described	by	Mosse	
(2013,	p.	239)	as	the	positioning	of	business	at	the	centre	and	governing	at	the	periphery	for	
the	 implementation	of	programmes	that	enforce	a	 ‘Bottom	of	 the	Pyramid’	capitalism.	The	
development	agencies	were	strong	of	their	expertise	in	“making	markets	work	for	the	poor”	
but	were	in	the	position	in	which	they	often	had	to	justify	their	inability	to	adjust	to	market	
trends	and	needs.		
While	at	first	sight	the	tuning	of	development	practitioners	into	a	common	agenda	could	be	
considered	an	 important	effort	 towards	 cooperation	and	maximisation	of	 efforts,	 it	 should	
also	be	taken	into	consideration	that	it	meant	important	compromises	–	and	veiled	different	
incentives.	As	Mosse	(2004,	p.	664)	describes	the	process	through	which	policies	come	to	be	
shaped	 as	 a	 discourse	 that	 reinforces	 itself,	 he	 stresses	 how	 its	 flaws	 lay	 precisely	 in	 the	
interactions,	incentives	and	negotiations:		
Practices	and	events	are	too	obviously	shaped	by	the	logic	and	demands	of	institutional	
relations	(and	incentives).	Indeed,	during	the	‘implementation	phase’	all	the	diverse	and	
contradictory	 interests	that	were	enrolled	 in	the	framing	of	an	ambiguous	policy	model	
and	 project	 design,	 all	 the	 contests	 and	 contra-	 dictions	 that	 are	 embedded	 in	 policy	
texts,	are	brought	to	life	and	replayed.	(…)	So,	while	the	coherence	of	design	unravels	in	
the	 practical	 unfolding	 of	 a	 project,	 everybody	 is	 particularly	 concerned	 with	 making,	
protecting,	elaborating	and	promoting	models	with	the	power	to	organize	authoritative	
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interpretations,	 concealing	 operational	 realities,	 re-enforcing	 given	models	 and	 limiting	
institutional	learning. 	
Moreover,	 as	 many	 development	 practitioners	 have	 testified	 during	 the	 last	 follow-up	
fieldtrip,	 the	 development	 trend	 around	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 in	 Uganda	 is	 gaining	
momentum:	while	a	plethora	of	(governmental	and	international)	guidelines,	strategies	and	
recommendations	are	spreading,	donor	and	private	sector	budgets	increasingly	invest	in	this	
issue.	 As	 the	 scale	 and	 dimension	 of	 interests	 and	 investments	 in	 the	 theme	 of	 youth	 in	
agribusiness	 has	 been	 growing	 in	 the	 past	 few	 years	 in	 Uganda,	 more	 and	 diverse	
development	practitioners	are	involved.	The	growth	of	the	attention	and	resources	dedicated	
to	 this	 issue	 have	 ambivalent	 consequences:	 development	 agencies	 develop	 different	
expertise	and	strategies,	but	the	growing	scale	and	number	of	programmes	jeopardizes	the	
ability	 to	 maintain	 flexibility	 to	 adapt	 to	 heterogeneity	 on	 the	 ground.	 Diversity	 within	
development	 cooperation,	 in	 combination	with	 a	 steady	growth	of	development	 resources	
and	incentives	for	the	specific	theme	of	youth	engagement	in	agribusiness	creates	ambiguity	
and	risks	to	frustrate	outcomes.	As	the	development	trend	grows	to	become	a	multi-million,	
multi-stakeholders	 industry,	 it	 sustains	 development	 of	 knowledge	 and	 expertise,	 but	 also	
fragments	 and	 multiplies	 efforts	 to	 please	 (too)	 many	 parties.	 As	 Ferguson	 (2014,	 p.	 19)	
argues:	“A	structure	always	reproduces	itself	through	a	process,	and	through	a	struggle;	and	
the	sense	of	a	structure,	Willis	shows	[Paul	Willis’	Marxist	analysis	of	reproducing	structures	
through	 ‘education’168],	 can	 only	 be	 grasped	 through	 that	 sometimes	 surprising	 and	 ironic	
process,	and	never	by	merely	labelling	the	structure	with	the	name	of	those	whose	interests	
it	serves.”	
During	 a	 long	 conversation	with	 a	 lady	working	 for	 a	 private	 sector-oriented	 development	
agency	 (who	asked	 to	 remain	anonymous),	 she	often	 referred	 to	 the	negotiations	 that	 she	
had	to	undergo	with	private	sector	partners	and	with	the	local	governments.	I	prompted	her	
to	elaborate	on	this	theme,	asking	to	what	extent	she	had	seen	her	development	programme	
had	changed	through	negotiations	she	referred	to	–	and	she	boldly	replied:	“Are	you	kidding?	
It’s	 ALL	 about	 negotiation!”.	 In	 particular,	 since	 her	 agency	was	 providing	market	 linkages	
with	private	sector	companies	 in	agribusiness,	the	 implementation	of	their	programme	had	
																																																						
168	Learning	to	Labour:	How	Working	Class	Kids	Get	Working	Class	Jobs	–	1981.		
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changed	 in	 different	 regions	 –	 according	 to	 the	 value	 chains	 and	 market	 dynamics	 the	
programme	 was	 engaging	 with.	 While	 in	 the	 design	 phase	 of	 the	 programme	 she	 had	
theoretically	 considered	 all	 factors	 the	 programmes	 should	 be	 tackling	 to	 “unlock	 market	
system	change”	–	during	the	implementation	phase	her	ambitious	planning	came	to	face	the	
reality	 and	 interests	of	 partners	 in	development.	 Specifically,	 the	private	 sector	 companies	
were	 responsible	 for	 the	 actual	 market	 change,	 were	 also	 determining	 the	 shifts	 in	 the	
programme:	“all	development	 ideas	depend	on	 the	market!	Actually,	on	 the	private	 sector	
partner”.	Through	negotiations	with	development	partners,	but	also	through	the	adaptation	
to	market	opportunities,	the	development	programme	changes.		
	
6.9	‘EMPOWER	YOUTH’	–	A	FAILED	PROGRAMME	
‘Empower	Youth’169	is	a	relatively	small	development	project,	a	project	of	the	Development	
Bank	 –	 under	 a	 broader	 continent	 wide	 programme.	 It	 is	 co-financed	 by	 two	multilateral	
donors,	and	the	budget	is	channelled	through	a	Ugandan	Ministry,	administered	by	an	NGO	
which	 in	 turn	 has	 contracted	 ‘Agrivalue’,	 an	 agribusiness	 accelerator.	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	
three-year	 project	 was	 to	 pilot	 a	 strategy	 to	 support	 young	 agripreneurs	 and	 scale	 their	
agribusiness	 in	 four	Ugandan	regions.	On	the	basis	of	 these	results,	 the	Development	Bank	
would	adjust	a	larger	strategy	for	a	wider	and	longer-term	programme	in	Uganda.	As	the	pilot	
project	was	still	setting	out	its	initial	steps,	and	was	yet	to	develop	a	strategy	–	the	manager	
had	 been	 seeking	 empirically	 sound	 scientific	 evidence	 to	 guide	 their	 approach.	 In	 this	
contingency	and	as	a	 researcher	on	 the	 theme	of	youth	 in	agribusiness	within	 IITA	–	 I	was	
able	 to	 engage	 with	 Agrivalue’s	 development	 practitioners	 and	 study	 a	 stretch	 of	 their	
experience	in	setting	up	the	project.	
On	 a	 Wednesday	 afternoon	 in	 May	 2018	 Agrivalue’s	 programme	 director,	 programme	
manager	and	communication	officer	came	to	ask	IITA	advice	on	the	implementation	of	their	
Empower	Youth	scheme:	I	had	the	pleasure	to	attend	and	get	a	sense	of	the	politics	involved	
																																																						
169	Under	express	request	of	my	informants,	I	have	substituted	the	all	names	of	development	agencies	
and	practitioners	to	ensure	anonymity.		
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in	the	interaction	between	donors,	Ministry,	coordinating	NGO,	contractor	and	youths	–	who	
all	had	different	priorities	and	were	pushing	for	different	agendas.	The	room	for	manoeuvre	
and	negotiation	among	the	parties	was	quite	spacious:	the	regions	and	budgeting	had	been	
determined	 by	 the	 Ministry,	 while	 Agrivalue	 was	 entitled	 to	 develop	 the	 agribusiness	
incubation	strategy	in	agreement	with	the	supervising	NGO.	Moreover,	 I	could	see	how	the	
project,	which	officially	started	in	January	2018,	had	already	changed	some	of	the	traits	that	
were	 agreed	 upon	 during	 the	 first	 agreements.	 For	 instance,	 although	 the	 Ministry	 had	
insisted	 in	 investing	 in	 irrigation	 techniques,	 Agrivalue	 had	 selected	 value	 chains	 such	 as	
beekeeping	 and	 fruits	 processing	 which	 did	 not	 foresee	 irrigation	 but	 other	 agricultural	
technologies.				
This	 meeting	 unfolds	 as	 a	 mating	 dance	 between	 the	 representatives	 of	 the	 two	
organisations:	 stressing	 on	 the	 qualities	 of	 each	 other,	 and	 on	 the	 reasons	why	 they	may	
need	 each	 other.	 They	 speak	 in	 turns,	 alternating	 jokes,	 lessons	 learnt	 from	 the	 field,	
anecdotes	 about	 the	 poor	 functioning	 of	 the	 state	 institutions.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	mating-
meeting	 it	 was	 clear	 to	 the	 two	 directors	 that	 they	 were	 going	 to	 collaborate	 in	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 programme	 –	 using	 the	 agronomic	 knowledge	 of	 the	 research	
institute	to	inform	the	implementation	techniques	of	the	agribusiness	accelerator.	As	for	me	
–	 I	was	 allowed	 to	 interview	 and	 follow	 operations	 in	 exchange	 for	 ‘expert	 advice’	 on	 the	
‘best	strategies	to	engage	youths’.		
A	 few	 days	 later	 I	 interviewed	 the	 project	manager,	 and	 asked	 how	 the	 project	 had	 been	
evolving:		
We	have	an	 idea	of	how	things	should	go,	but	 it	might	change.	For	example,	 in	 the	
project	 proposal	 for	 the	ministry	we	wrote	 that	we	wanted	 to	 use	 online	 tools	 for	
mentorship	of	the	youths	in	the	hubs	in	the	various	regions.	But	then	we	did	a	field	
visit	and	we	realised	that	there	was	barely	any	internet	connection:	the	proposal	we	
submitted	 to	 the	Ministry	won’t	work!	 So	 how	 should	we	mentor	 the	 youths?	We	
then	thought	of	taking	trained	mentors	from	Kampala	to	the	local	hubs.	But	then	we	
realised	that	wouldn’t	work	either	because	of	a	number	of	factors:	first	of	all	language	
–	the	mentors	from	here	wouldn’t	speak	the	local	languages	of	the	youths!	Secondly,	
the	youths	would	listen	more	to	the	local	community	leaders,	the	people	they	know	
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and	 trust	 in	 their	 environment.	 They	 would	 not	 establish	 a	 connection	 with	 the	
mentors	we	would	send.	So	what	we	did	was	to	get	in	touch	with	local	mentors	and	
trainers	 from	 within	 the	 community.	 The	 mentors	 should	 be	 teaching	 hands-on	
knowledge	 about	 the	 daily	 running	 of	 the	 business	 –	 as	 they	 themselves	 had	 their	
business	they	could	accompany	the	youths	in	the	process.		
There	 are	 several	 aspects	 of	 the	 development	 enactment	 process	 that	 emerge	 from	 this	
account.	Firstly,	the	development	project	had	changed	over	time	–	despite	it	was,	at	the	time	
of	the	 interview,	only	4	months	old.	Regardless	of	the	proposal	that	had	been	approved	by	
the	 Ministry,	 the	 project	 needed	 to	 adjust	 to	 unforeseen	 traits	 of	 youths’	 reality	 on	 the	
ground,	for	two	reasons:	the	hard	fact	of	youths’	lack	of	accessibility	to	internet	connection,	
but	also	the	capacity	of	extension	services	to	approach	them	effectively.	The	fact	that	they	
had	not	thought	of	these	issues	upfront	was	a	revealing	yet	problematic	aspect:	it	reflects	a	
top-down	approach	that	was	not	grounded	on	empirical	evidence	of	the	needs	and	capacities	
of	youths	on	the	ground.	By	choosing	a	different	strategy,	however,	the	project	is	adapted	to	
the	reality	on	the	ground:	not	only	the	local	language	is	necessary	in	communication,	but	also	
the	trust	 relations	with	the	community	 leaders	 is	perceived	by	the	programme	manager	as	
important	strategies	for	the	implementation	of	the	programme.		
While	the	programme	manager	reflected	on	the	ways	in	which	they	had	been	adjusting	the	
project	to	youths’	reality	–	I	was	also	able	to	observe	how	such	process	unfolded:	I	attended	
a	meeting	 in	which	 Agrivalue	 discussed	 beekeeping	 business	 strategies	with	 one	 potential	
‘local	mentor’.	Agrivalue	had	selected	beekeeping	as	a	suitable	business	for	one	of	the	sub-
regions	 they	 were	 going	 to	 implement	 their	 agribusiness	 incubation	 project,	 and	 had	
requested	a	 representative	of	 the	biggest	private	 sector	 in	 the	honey	business	 to	 come	 to	
Kampala	and	discuss	a	 strategy	 to	work	 together.	The	private	 sector	company	would	be	 in	
charge	of	the	training	of	the	youths	selected	by	Agrivalue	to	be	part	of	the	scheme	–	and	the	
two	parties	needed	to	negotiate	the	time	frame	and	conditions	for	such	training:	Agrivalue	
had	already	allocated	budget	and	amount	of	days	 in	their	planning,	coming	 in	tension	with	
the	honey	company’s	 intention	 to	 follow	Ministerial	guidelines	 for	beekeeping.	They	 finally	
found	 a	 compromise,	 and	 moved	 on	 to	 discussing	 the	 profit	 margin	 the	 honey	 company	
would	be	allowed	to	keep	from	collecting	honey	produced	by	youths.		
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Unfortunately,	such	negotiations	with	the	private	sector	partner	would	have	been	frustrated	
by	negotiations	at	a	higher	level,	between	Agrivalue,	Ministry	and	coordinating	NGO.	Despite	
having	sensed	that	there	were	tensions	in	their	relations,	I	had	not	expected	to	observe	how	
their	 interaction	 could	 cause	a	drastic	 change	of	perspectives	 for	 the	project.	 It	 came	as	a	
cold	shower	on	meeting	in	which	we	were	supposed	to	discuss	the	implementation	strategy.		
I	arrived	at	a	meeting	where	I	was	to	discuss	the	implementation	strategy	for	the	pilot	project	
in	one	of	the	four	target	regions	and	found	there	is	a	lot	of	trepidation:	whispered	half-words	
about	“big	changes”,	and	bad-terms	relations	with	the	Ministry,	and	“the	way	forward”	were	
on	the	mouth	of	everyone	sitting	at	the	round	table.	 I	understand	half	of	what	 is	going	on,	
but	 I	 also	 understand	 it	 was	 not	 the	 right	 moment	 to	 ask	 questions.	 Finally,	 the	 project	
director,	 Sarah,	 sat	 down	 with	 me	 and	 gave	 me	 a	 short	 overview	 about	 what	 had	 been	
discussed	 before	my	 arrival.	 She	 explained	 that	 ‘something	 happened’	 and	 that	 she	 is	 not	
anymore	willing	to	go	along	the	ineffective	cooperation	with	the	Ministry.		
Sarah	 explained	 that	 “corruption	 is	 just	 too	much	 –	 they	 don’t	 work	 towards	 an	 effective	
implementation	 of	 this	 project,	 they	 just	want	 to	 get	 as	much	 profit	 as	 possible	 from	 the	
fund,	and	don’t	allow	me	to	get	any	closer	 to	 the	donors.	 I	wanted	to	report	all	of	what	 is	
happening	along	the	structure,	because	they	[donors]	are	unaware	of	the	mismanagement	of	
their	 money.”	 I	 perceived	 how	 disappointment	 and	 desolation	 had	 already	 left	 space	 for	
anger	and	frustration.	“I’m	withdrawing	–	I	don’t	want	to	be	part	of	this	system	even	if	this	
means	 that	 the	programme	 is	not	proceeding	with	us.	 I’m	going	 to	do	 this	myself	–	 I	have	
learnt	 from	the	past	months	and	seen	opportunities	 to	make	a	business	model	of	 this.	 I’m	
just	looking	for	funding	to	get	started.”		
Sarah	had	already	told	me	in	several	instances	how	the	relation	with	the	government	parties	
was	problematic,	slow	and	inefficient	–	and	how	she	was	not	going	to	comply	with	a	number	
of	 their	 demands,	 which	 she	 thought	 didn’t	 make	 any	 sense	 (in	 terms	 of	 business	
opportunities	 for	 the	 agribusiness	 hubs).	 But	 this	 was	 the	 first	 instance	 I	 had	 ever	 heard	
where	the	relation	was	so	bad	that	it	would	break	the	deal.	I	was	surprised	by	how	easily	a	
project	 that	 was	 supposedly	 grounded	 as	 a	 strong	 operation,	 in	 the	 collaboration	 with	
multiple	development	parties	 could	 crumble	 for	 the	decision	of	 one	of	 them.	At	 the	 same	
time,	it	was	an	indication	of	the	nature	of	negotiations	among	the	parties	involved.		
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6.10	CONCLUSION:	EXPLAINING	THE	MISMATCH		
Wary	of	a	body	of	literature	that,	in	the	past	decades,	has	focused	its	attention	on	the	power	
dynamics	between	‘top’	and	‘down’,	and	the	gap	that	such	dynamics	trigger	–	I	have	explored	
the	 gap	 between	 policies	 and	 practices	 in	 my	 own	 field	 of	 development	 study.	 Bringing	
together	the	analysis	carried	out	in	the	previous	chapters,	I	have	here	confronted	the	results	
of	 development	 practitioners	 and	 youths’	 narratives	 and	 practices.	 Furthermore,	 I	 have	
examined	 the	 dynamics	 on	 the	 ground	 as	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 programmes	 bring	
together	 youths’	 and	 development	 practitioners’	 narratives	 and	 practices.	 This	 chapter	
explores	the	tensions	between	and	within	two	groups	of	development	actors	–	practitioners	
and	 recipients	 –	 to	 understand	 whether,	 how	 and	 why	 a	mismatch	 between	 policies	 and	
practices	 emerges	 in	 the	 unfolding	 of	 the	 recent	 development	 trend	 around	 youth	 in	
agribusiness.	 It	argues	 that	such	gap	can	be	explained	 through	an	analysis	of	 the	dynamics	
within	 the	development	 ‘top’	 and	 ‘bottom’.	On	 the	one	hand	 the	 issues	of	 adaptation	and	
negotiation	that	emerge	from	the	analysis	of	implementation	practices	at	the	‘top’	(namely,	
among	 development	 practitioners).	 On	 the	 other,	 the	 variety	 of	 outcomes	 of	 the	
programmes	 on	 the	 ground,	 which	 were	 influenced	 by	 the	 heterogeneity	 factors	
characterising	youths	in	their	specific	cultural	and	socio-economic	contexts.	
The	 perceptions	 of	 youths	 and	 practitioners	 of	 the	 implementation	 of	 programmes	 reveal	
how	the	outcomes	of	programmes	are	more	than	the	translation	of	policies	into	practices.	In	
fact,	through	implementation,	the	significance	of	the	social	category	of	youth	emerges	for	its	
power	 as	 a	 driving	 metaphor.	 Different	 development	 organisations,	 according	 to	 their	
internal	 incentives	and	political	agenda,	have	a	stake	 in	the	 ‘use’	of	the	metaphor	of	youth	
beyond	the	declared	 intentions	of	the	programmes.	Naturally,	 I	do	not	disregard	the	socio-
economic	 reasons	 for	 paying	 attention	 to	 the	 social	 category	 of	 youth.	 However,	 the	
construction	of	a	discourse	around	it	mobilises	and	reinforces	power	relations.		
While	the	demographic	boom	in	Uganda	is	an	objective	reason	of	concern,	the	targeting	of	
the	youths	themselves	as	a	social	category	–	rather	than	the	structural	factors	contributing	to	
their	unemployment	–	remains	unjustified.	There	is	an	overlooked	need	for	structural	market	
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system	 change,	 such	 as	 the	 investment	 in	 other	 sectors	 than	 agriculture,	 or	 the	 lack	 of	
infrastructures	and	legislations	that	would	allow	for	employability	of	the	Ugandan	population	
(among	 which,	 the	 young	 generations).	 Despite	 these	 tangible	 deficiencies,	 the	 focus	 of	
development	 programmes	 lay	 on	 youths.	 Besides	 the	 social	 impact	 of	 these	 programmes,	
there	are	social	and	political	consequences:	for	instance,	as	I	argued	above,	the	creation	of	a	
scrutinized	 social	 category	 that	 allows	 the	 government	 to	 control	 the	 electorate,	 or	
international	development	agencies	to	provide	commodified	development	services.			
Furthermore,	 I	 have	 compared	 the	 narratives	 and	 practices	 of	 the	 two	 groups	 of	
development	actors:	development	practitioners	and	youths.	From	this	comparative	analysis,	
a	 mismatch	 emerges	 between	 the	 two	 groups’	 narratives	 and	 practices.	 How	 could	 this	
mismatch	 be	 explained?	 I	 found	 that	 the	 social	 category	 of	 youth	 (18-35),	 being	 so	
heterogeneous,	 was	misleading	 of	 the	 programmes	 –	 often	 targeting	 homogeneously	 (yet	
with	 different	 development	 approaches)	 young	 farmers	 with	 different	 capacities	 and	
constraints.		
Few	development	programmes	and	projects	manage	to	adapt	to	the	heterogeneous	reality	
of	 youths	 on	 the	 ground:	 most	 programmes	 do	 not	 need	 to	 engage	 in	 negotiations	 with	
multiple	 parties.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 those	 programmes	 that	 involve	 bigger	 budgets,	 little	
flexibility	and	a	 range	of	several	development	partners	 to	conciliate	–	 run	the	risk	of	being	
stuck	 in	development	negotiations.	 I	have	analysed	how	development	programmes	 fiercely	
negotiated	 both	 at	 formal	 round-table	 discussions	 as	 in	 informal	 interactions.	 As	 Mosse	
(Mosse,	 2004,	 p.	 663)	 explains,	 it	 is	 not	 an	 inherent	 quality	 of	 ‘good	 policies’	 to	 be	
unimplementable,		
Or,	 rather	 than	 ‘unimplementable’,	 we	 should	 say	 that	 policy	 goals	 come	 into	
contradiction	with	other	institutional	or	‘system	goals’	(Latour,	1996:	92)	such	that	policy	
models	 are	 poor	 guides	 to	 understanding	 the	 practices,	 events	 and	 effects	 of	
development	actors,	which	are	shaped	by	the	relationships	and	interests	and	cultures	of	
specific	organizational	settings.		
As	I	have	shown	through	the	analysis	of	the	case	study,	relationships,	interests,	and	cultures	
of	 organizational	 settings,	when	 brought	 together	 at	 the	 negotiation	 table,	 can	 hinder	 the	
unfolding	of	the	project	to	the	point	of	making	it	collapse.		
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While	my	analysis	 is	 certainly	partial	 and	only	 considers	 selected	development	practices,	 it	
does	allude	 to	 the	 importance	of	 studying	power	dynamics	and	 relations	at	 the	same	 time	
between	and	within	groups	of	development	actors.	Development	studies	have	explained	the	
power	dynamics	between	top	and	bottom	within	a	dualistic	understanding	of	development	
as	 a	 structure	 that	 is	 formed,	 embodied,	 reproduced	 and	 enforced	 through	 agency.		
However,	for	as	much	as	this	paradigm	helps	understand	the	dynamics	between	and	within	
these	 development	 categories,	 it	 does	 not	 explain	 how	 development	 programmes	 evolve	
from	design	to	implementation	and	outcome	–	sometimes	failing	along	the	way.	My	analysis	
suggests	 that	 it	 is	 the	 study	of	 both	dynamics	between	and	within	 these	 categories	at	 the	
same	 time	 that	 allow	 us	 to	 explain	 outcomes	 and	 the	 mismatch	 between	 policies	 and	
practices.	 	 In	 fact,	 my	 data	 show	 that	 there	 is	 such	 ‘messiness’	 in	 the	 way	 development	
unfolds,	that	it	indicates	that	development	does	not	unfold	as	a	structure	enforced	onto	the	
social	 reality	 of	 recipients,	 but	 rather	 as	 a	 dialectic	 process,	 emerging	 property,	 that	 is	
created	through	all	the	narratives	and	practices	of	all	development	actors.		
The	 ‘messiness’	of	 the	unfolding	process	of	programmes	 implementation,	has	nevertheless	
concrete	impacts	on	the	ground.	These	impacts,	which	I	have	analysed	separately	for	each	of	
the	development	approaches,	reinforce	the	power	of	the	constructed	knowledge	category	of	
youth	that,	by	remaining	fuzzy	and	‘empty’,	constitutes	a	‘driving	metaphor’	for	development	
action.	 By	 studying	 the	 ‘messy	 actualities’	 that	 characterize	 development	 practices	 around	
youth	in	agribusiness	in	Uganda,	demonstrate	that	the	messiness	and	diversity	of	narratives	
and	 practices	 in	 development	 do	 not	 neatly	 fit	 a	 coherent	 Foucauldian	 understanding	 of	
development	 unless	 practices	 and	 relations	 are	 studied	 in	 their	 interactive	 and	 processual	
nature	–	“the	complex	conjunctures	where	multiple	powers	coincide”.	“Empowerment	is	still,	
in	short,	a	relationship	of	power”	(Murray	Li,	2007,	p.	275)	–	yet	a	relationship	that	emerges	
within	and	between	groups	of	development	practitioners	and	recipients.		
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7.1	INTRODUCTION:	THE	PUZZLE	AND	RESEARCH	QUESTION		
The	 focus	 and	 strategies	 of	 development	 in	 Africa	 has	 changed	 over	 time,	 from	 structural	
adjustment,	to	market	liberalisation,	to	health,	environment	or	gender	issues.		The	identified	
bottlenecks	 for	 development	drove	policies,	 budgets	 and	programmes	–	 creating	 trends	 in	
development	 policy	 making.	 Recently,	 development	 concern	 has	 turned	 its	 attention	 to	
demographic	 growth	and	 youth	unemployment	 challenges.	 The	average	age	of	 the	African	
population	 is	 half	 as	 much	 that	 of	 the	 population	 in	 the	 European	 Union,	 so	 the	 social	
category	of	youth	includes	a	growing	share	of	the	population	across	the	continent.		
This	category,	however,	 is	mostly	defined	as	an	age	range	–	which	differs	per	development	
agency	 or	 government	 (Sommers,	 2015).	 Given	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 population	 in	 this	 age	
range,	across	the	continent	or	even	just	within	one	country,	the	social	category	of	‘youth’	has	
little	 explanatory	 power	 of	 who	 the	 youths	 actually	 are.	Moreover,	 as	 target	 of	 increased	
development	attention,	specific	knowledge	would	be	required	to	tackle	their	capacities	and	
constraints.	However,	recent	programmes	for	youth	are	homogeneously	targeting	this	social	
category	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 engaging	 them	 in	 agribusiness.	 In	 fact,	 despite	 rapid	 economic	
growth	 of	 African	 countries,	 the	 labour	 market	 is	 not	 yet	 able	 to	 absorb	 the	 growing	
population,	and	the	majority	of	young	Africans	is	already	engaged	in	agriculture.		
It	is,	therefore,	unclear	what	the	rationale	is	for	engaging	youth	in	agribusiness.	There	is	little	
evidence	that	 it	would	be	the	majority	of	youths’	aspiration,	nor	 the	most	effective	way	of	
tackling	 youth	 unemployment.	 This	 puzzle	 around	 the	 social	 category	 of	 youth,	 in	
combination	with	youths’	engagement	 in	agribusiness,	 triggered	the	question	of	 the	thesis:	
how	has	the	recent	trend	in	development	been	constructed	and	what	has	its	impact	so	far	has	
been?	
The	focus	of	the	research	has	been	that	of	understanding	the	adoption	and	implementation	
of	new	trend	in	development;	therefore,	I	have	focused	on	a	major	recipient	of	ODA:	Uganda.	
The	 political	 economic	 history	 of	 the	 country	 has	 shown	 an	 emblematic	 relation	 with	 the	
‘development	industry’	over	the	past	decades.	With	a	very	young	population,	Uganda	has	a	
representative	demographic	composition	in	comparison	to	other	sub-Saharan	countries.		
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This	chapter	is	structured	as	follows.	First	(sections	7.2	and	7.3),	I	will	summarise	the	results	
of	 the	two-fold	research	question:	1)	how	through	narratives	and	practices	the	category	of	
youths	has	driven	the	recent	trend	around	agribusiness;	and	2)	what	the	impact	has	been	so	
far.	I	will	also	problematize	the	focus	on	the	‘gap	between	policies	and	practices’,	which	has	
occupied	many	scholars	in	development	studies.	In	section	7.4,	I	confront	my	results	with	the	
existing	academic	literature,	showing	how	my	study	contributes	to	a	better	understanding	of	
the	recent	development	trend.	In	this	section,	I	also	outline	the	potential	implications	of	my	
study	for	other	countries.	Before	concluding,	 I	discuss	(section	7.5)	the	shortcomings	of	my	
research	 and	 recommendations	 for	 future	 research.	 In	 the	 final	 section	 (section	 7.6),	 I	
elaborate	some	policy	recommendations,	focusing	on	the	most	practice-oriented	results	that	
can	 be	 useful	 for	 development	 practitioners.	 I	 conclude	 (sub-section	 7.6.3)	 with	 a	 short	
reflection	on	the	implications	of	my	research	for	conflict	studies.	
	
7.2	YOUTH	IN	AGRIBUSINESS	
In	this	section,	I	outline	the	ways	in	which	the	category	of	youth	has	driven	the	development	
trend	 around	 agribusiness	 in	 Uganda.	 An	 analysis	 of	 how	 the	 development	 discourse	 was	
constructed	also	illuminates	the	rationales	of	this	trend.	I	draw	from	the	empirical	chapters	
(4,	5	and	6)	and	confront	the	results	with	the	literature	in	critical	development	studies.		
The	 analysis	 of	 development	 practitioners’	 narratives	 in	 chapter	 4	 showed	 that	 youths	 are	
defined	 as	 an	 age	 range	 representing	 both	 a	 threat	 and	 hope	 for	 development.	 While	
international	 development	 organisations	 are	 more	 concerned	 about	 the	 ‘youth	 bulge’,	
Ugandan	 agencies	 are	 more	 concerned	 about	 youth	 unemployment	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	
stability	 of	 the	 country.	 In	 both	 cases,	 youths	 are	 identified	 both	 as	 the	 ‘development	
problem’	as	the	target	of	development	strategies.	The	social	category	of	youth	is	invested	of	
the	responsibility	of	being	‘drivers	of	change’	–	provided	they	change	their	mindset	towards	
commercial	 agribusiness.	 I	 have	 recorded,	 across	 all	 17	 development	 organisations	
approached,	a	polarisation	of	perspectives	on	youths:	narratives	ranged	from	a	description	of	
youths	as	a	‘ticking	time	bomb’	to	the	optimistic	portrayal	of	youths	as	the	hope	and	future	
of	 Uganda.	 The	 development	 narrative	 on	 the	 social	 category	 of	 youth	 recall	 the	 instable	
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development	 discourse	 on	 economic	 development	 in	 the	 continent.	 Jerven	 (2015,	 p.	 123)	
argues	 that	“narratives	on	African	economic	development	can	switch	 from	one	extreme	to	
the	 other	 so	 swiftly.	 Of	 course,	 the	 truth	 lies	 somewhere	 between	 the	 ‘miracles’	 and	
‘tragedies’.	 We	 went	 from	 a	 rhetoric	 of	 ‘Bottom	 Billion’	 to	 ‘Africa	 Rising’	 within	 half	 a	
decade.”	Development	cooperation,	is	contingent	to	its	socio-historical	context.		The	analysis	
of	how	the	development	discourse	around	youth	in	agribusiness	evolved	sheds	 light	on	the	
politics	driving	one	strategy	rather	than	another.		
Despite	 the	 awareness	 of	 the	 great	 socio-cultural	 and	 economic	 disparity	 across	 Ugandan	
regions,	the	development	narrative	strikingly	lacks	a	problematization	of	the	social	category	
of	‘youth’.	In	fact,	development	actors	explained	that	their	programmes	had	a	regional	focus.	
However,	 they	 themselves	 lamented	 not	 having	 empirical	 evidence	 on	 what	 youths’	
capacities	 and	 constraints	 were,	 across	 the	 country.	 In	 chapter	 5	 (‘Youthnography’),	 as	
emerging	 from	my	 interviews	with	youths	 themselves,	 I	 identified	13	heterogeneity	 factors	
clustered	 in	 three	 main	 dimensions	 socio-cultural,	 territorial	 and	 value-chain	 embedding.	
These	 dimensions	 had	 a	 strong	 influence	 in	 shaping	 both	 youths’	 identity	 and	 their	
experience	 in	 agribusiness.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 identity	 and	 agribusiness	 practices	 of	 youths	
across	the	country	were	extremely	diverse.	
In	 chapter	 6,	 I	 compared	 the	narratives	 and	practices	 of	 the	 two	 groups	of	 social	 actors	 –	
development	 practitioners	 and	 youths.	 Youths’	 heterogeneity	 was	 not	 reflected	 in	 the	
narratives	I	had	collected	in	development	agencies	in	Kampala,	anticipating	a	discrepancy	of	
perspectives	 and	 practices	 also	 in	 the	 implementation	 phase	 of	 the	 programmes.	 A	
discrepancy	emerged	 from	 the	 confrontation	of	perceptions	 and	aspirations	of	 youths	 and	
development	 practitioners	 on	 who	 the	 youths	 in	 Uganda	 are	 and	 what	 their	 role	 in	
agribusiness	should	become.		
The	vagueness	of	definitions	of	youths	by	development	agencies	do	not	reflect	the	complex	
heterogeneity	 of	 identities	 and	 agribusiness	 experiences	 I	 recorded.	 The	 social	 category	 of	
youths,	 thus,	emerges	as	an	ambiguous	concept	 that	means	everything	and	nothing	at	 the	
same	time.	Ugandan	and	international	organisations	have	defined	on	this	social	category	as	
an	age	 range.	But	an	age	bracket	does	not	have	 the	explanatory	power	 to	account	 for	 the	
heterogeneity	I	encountered	on	the	ground.	What	is	the	rationale	of	using	such	category	as	
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main	focus	of	multi-million	development	programmes?	Mosse	(2004,	p.	663)	suggested	the	
use,	 in	 development	 policy	 making,	 of	 fuzzy	 concepts	 as	 ‘mobilizing	 metaphors’	 for	
development:		
Policy	 discourse	 generates	 mobilizing	 metaphors	 (‘participation’,	 ‘partnership’,	
‘governance’,	 ‘social	 capital’)	 whose	 vagueness,	 ambiguity	 and	 lack	 of	 conceptual	
precision	is	required	to	conceal	ideological	differences,	to	allow	compromise	and	the	
enrolment	 of	 different	 interests,	 to	 build	 coalitions,	 to	 distribute	 agency	 and	 to	
multiply	criteria	of	success	within	project.		
As	a	mobilizing	metaphor,	‘youth’	has	in	fact	had	the	power	of	driving	a	trend	in	development	
with	the	most	disparate	approaches	and	theories	of	change.		
I	 have	 asked	 development	 practitioners	 about	 their	 organisations’	 views	 on	 youths’	
engagement	in	agribusiness,	and	from	the	interviews	emerged	a	variegated	range	of	theories	
of	change.	The	variety	of	conceptualisations	of	development	problem,	vision	and	strategy	for	
change	show	the	heterogeneity	characterising	this	trend	in	development	in	Uganda.	In	fact,	
this	 trend	 is	not	a	unilateral,	homogeneous	process.	Such	heterogeneity	 is	also	reflected	 in	
the	variety	of	different	development	approaches	of	the	development	programmes	aiming	to	
engage	youths	in	agribusiness.		
According	 to	Mosse	 (2004,	p.	648,	 italics	original),	 the	 formulation	of	development	policies	
and	programmes	is	driven	by	a	political	agenda:		
The	 first	 proposition	 is	 that	 policy	 (development	 models,	 strategies	 and	 project	
designs)	 primarily	 functions	 to	 mobilize	 and	 maintain	 political	 support,	 that	 is	 to	
legitimize	rather	than	to	orientate	practice.	Anybody	who	has	been	involved	in	project	
formulation	knows	that	this	is	work	which	is	technically	expressed	(as	project	designs)	
but	politically	shaped	(by	the	interests	and	priorities	of	agencies).	Project	design	is	the	
art,	 firstly	of	making	a	convincing	argument	and	developing	a	causal	model	(relating	
inputs,	outputs	and	 impacts)	oriented	upwards	 to	 justify	 the	allocation	of	 resources	
by	 validating	 higher	 policy	 goals;	 and	 secondly	 of	 bringing	 together	 diverse,	 even	
incompatible,	 interests	 —	 of	 national	 governments,	 implementing	 agencies,	
collaborating	NGOs,	research	institutions,	or	donor	advisers	of	different	hues.		
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Such	political	dimension	of	development	programmes	for	youth	 in	agribusiness	emerged	 in	
the	 analysis	 of	 how	 programmes	 changed	 over	 time	 (chapter	 6).	 From	 the	 observation	 of	
how	 development	 programmes	 are	 negotiated	 among	 different	 stakeholders,	 different	
agendas	and	incentives	emerge	as	determinant	factors	changing	the	course	of	development	
programmes.	Tensions	between	agendas	and	incentives	showed	how	tensions	emerged	also	
within	 the	 group	 development	 actors	 at	 the	 top.	 This	 adds	 to	 the	 body	 of	 literature	 in	
development	studies	that	focused	on	discrepancies	between	development	actors	at	the	top	
and	 bottom.	 Furthermore,	 in	 the	 following	 section,	 I	 report	 the	 discrepancy	 within	 the	
development	practices	at	the	bottom.		
	
7.3	SOCIAL	IMPACT	OF	THE	PROGRAMMES,	SO	FAR	
The	 variety	 of	 theories	 of	 change	 of	 development	 organisations	 translated	 in	 a	 variety	 of	
programmes	 that	 were	 implemented	 on	 the	 ground.	 In	 chapter	 6,	 I	 analysed	 what	 their	
impact	 has	 been,	 from	 the	 perspectives	 of	 youths.	 Considering	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	
development	approaches	and	the	heterogeneity	of	youths	across	the	country,	the	outcomes	
and	 impact	 of	 the	 programmes	were	 also	 heterogeneous.	 There	were	 two	main	 variables	
influencing	the	diversity	of	outcomes:	the	regional	variety	and	the	development	approaches	
(public	 vs	 private-sector	 driven).	 Within	 these	 two	 variables,	 the	 heterogeneity	 factors	
described	 in	 chapter	5	played	an	 important	 role	 in	diversifying	 the	 impact	of	programmes.	
For	 instance,	 the	 same	 programme	 in	 the	 same	 location	 would	 have	 different	 impact	 on	
males	or	females	(gender	being	one	of	the	heterogeneity	factors).	In	most	cases,	while	young	
males	 could	 dispose	 of	 the	 economic	 improvement	 obtained	 through	 agribusiness,	 female	
counterparts	were	 not	 allowed	 (by	 their	 husbands)	 to	 retain	 their	 income	 for	 themselves.	
Another	example,	 regarding	 the	 factors	of	ethnicity	and	embeddedness	 in	 the	value	chain:	
programmes	addressing	the	dairy	sector	in	the	south-west	region	had	a	stronger	impact	on	
youth	from	the	bahima	ethnic	group,	which	historically	and	culturally	have	a	tradition	in	this	
value	chain.		
Besides	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	 outcomes	 (described	 in	 chapter	 5)	 there	were	 three	 general	
outcomes,	homogeneously	distributed	across	the	country.		
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First,	the	absence	of	political	or	civic	engagement	amongst	youths.	Men	and	women	I	spoke	
to	did	not	 identify	 themselves	as	 ‘youth’,	despite	being	 targeted	by	programmes	as	 youth.	
Despite	 the	 mobilization	 of	 ministries,	 politicians,	 international	 organisations,	 media	 and	
budgets	 for	 the	 Ugandan	 ‘youths’,	 I	 recorded	 scarce	 awareness	 of	 their	 potential	 as	 a	
majoritarian	share	of	the	population.	‘Youth’	was,	to	young	farmers	in	programmes	targeting	
them,	 not	 a	 political	 category:	 belonging	 to	 the	 category	 of	 youth,	 culturally,	 is	 associated	
with	not	having	obtained	 the	 status	of	adults.	Only	adulthood	 is	a	 social	 status	 that	allows	
access	to	political	and	social	decision-making.	Youths	felt,	across	the	country,	insulted	when	
(mistakenly)	 approached	 as	 youth,	 while	 having	 obtained	 the	 social	 status	 of	 adults	 (for	
example	 through	circumcision,	 for	males).	 Youth	was,	 to	 them,	a	 condition	 to	exit	 through	
attainment	of	socio-economic	status.		
Second,	 agribusiness	was	 considered	a	 springboard	 to	obtain	 the	 socio-economic	 status	 to	
access	 adulthood.	 Agriculture	 is	 still	 the	major	 sector	 employing	 the	 Ugandan	 population,	
and	 commercial	 agriculture	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 better	 income	 generating	 activity	 than	
subsistence	 agriculture.	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 youth	 experience	 agribusiness	 very	 diversely	
across	 the	country,	amongst	my	 interviewees	agribusiness	was	generally	 considered	as	 the	
most	accessible	way	to	work	up	the	ladder	of	socio-economic	status.	In	this	way,	agribusiness	
could	 be	 considered	 a	 ‘rite	 of	 passage’	 for	 youths	 to	 access	 adulthood.	 In	 this	 way,	 their	
requests	 and	 expectations	 from	 development	 programmes	 were	 mostly	 related	 to	 the	
improvement	 of	 their	 economic	 status.	 The	 most	 common	 requests	 regarded	 irrigation	
systems,	 tractors	 and	 quality	 inputs	 (seeds	 and	 chemicals).	 These	 requests	 reveal	 their	
pragmatic	views	on	the	programmes	as	benchmarks	for	obtaining	the	socio-economic	status	
for	adulthood.		
Third,	 I	observed	a	gap	between	development	policies	and	programmes	 implemented.	This	
gap	was	at	 two	 levels:	on	 the	one	hand,	 there	was	a	gap	between	practitioners’	narratives	
and	 practices.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 there	 was	 a	 gap	 between	 the	 intended	 and	 actual	
outcomes	as	perceived	by	 youths.	 In	 the	 following	 sub-section	 (7.3.1),	 I	will	 delve	 into	 the	
problematization	of	these	two	gaps.		
	
	 281	
7.3.1	MIND	THE	GAP		
In	chapter	6,	I	focussed	on	the	practices	of	both	groups	of	development	actors	to	explore	the	
synergies	and	discrepancies	between	and	within	the	narratives	of	the	two	groups.	I	examined	
the	 ways	 in	 which	 development	 programmes	 unfolded	 in	 the	 implementation	 phase.	 	 I	
analysed	the	perceptions,	impact	and	outcomes	of	different	development	approaches.	From	
this	analysis,	it	emerged	that	while	development	practitioners	were	concerned	about	access	
to	 land,	capital	and	markets,	youths’	constraints	 in	agribusiness	were	heavily	 influenced	by	
other	 heterogeneity	 factors,	 such	 as	 family	 background,	 gender	 and	 location.	 Besides	 the	
heterogeneity	factors,	which	in	their	three	dimensions	played	a	crucial	role	in	influencing	the	
implementation	of	programmes,	the	outcomes	of	the	programmes	differed	according	to	the	
approach	used	(public	vs	private	sector	driven).		
As	for	the	public-sector	approach,	there	was	a	substantial	discrepancy	between	the	political	
agenda	 of	 development	 practitioners	 and	 youths	 understanding	 of	 the	 programme.	 In	 the	
central	and	south-western	region,	youths	reported	their	disappointment	with	corruption:	the	
start-up	capital	was	intended	by	practitioners	as	‘political	money’	in	times	of	election.	In	the	
majority	 of	 cases	 YLP	 officers	 had	 trouble	 retrieving	 the	 loan,	 because	 the	 start-up	 capital	
was	often	perceived	as	a	political	handout	(to	buy	votes).	There	was	a	great	discrepancy	 in	
the	ways	in	which	the	programme	was	politicised,	more	in	central	and	south-western	regions	
than	 in	 the	 north.	 The	 most	 successful	 YLP	 groups	 were	 in	 the	 north	 and	 intended	 the	
programme	 as	 a	 way	 to	 strengthen	 the	 distressed	 social	 relations	 after	 the	 war,	 while	
building	a	self-help	saving	scheme	in	the	meantime.		
As	for	the	private-sector	driven	approach,	there	was	a	discrepancy	between	the	embedding	
of	 youths	 in	 the	 value	 chain	 and	 the	 interests	 of	 companies	 setting	 up	 the	 out-growing	
schemes.	In	fact,	oftentimes	the	companies	required	the	youths	to	work	in	value	chains	that	
were	not	the	main	focus	of	their	household	or	agribusiness.	The	most	successful	outcomes	
were	in	the	environments	where	the	private	sector	companies	were	investing	in	value	chains	
grounded	socio-culturally	in	the	local	environment	(e.g.	dairy	sector	in	the	south-west).	The	
majority	of	youths	working	as	contract-farmers	were	satisfied	with	the	improved	income,	but	
they	 were	 in	 a	 position	 of	 dependency	 rather	 than	 of	 entrepreneurship	 (contrary	 to	 the	
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proposed	 theory	 of	 change).	 In	 fact,	 the	 company	 constituted	 both	 the	 input	 and	 output	
market	for	their	produce.	
Moreover,	only	a	few	development	agencies	adapted	their	development	strategies	to	fit	(or	
exploit)	 the	 heterogeneous	 agribusiness	 and	 socio-cultural	 environments	 in	 which	 youths	
were	embedded.	Here	the	Foucauldian	approach	was	useful	to	gain	a	deeper	understanding	
of	the	gaps	both	between	and	within	development	practitioners	and	beneficiaries.	Within	a	
Foucauldian	 approach,	 development	 is	 understood	 as	 a	 dialectic	 process	 where	 agency	
within	 the	 top	 and	 bottom	 are	 as	 explanatory	 as	 the	 power	 relation	 between	 the	 two.	 I	
argued	 that	 it	 is	 the	 very	 dynamics	 at	 the	 top,	 which	 I	 analysed	 in	 terms	 of	 negotiation	
practices,	 that	 shape	 the	 relations	with	 and	within	 the	 bottom.	 As	 the	 trend	 on	 youths	 in	
agribusiness	 grew	 to	 a	 multi-million	 ‘industry’	 the	 negotiations	 among	 development	
practitioners’	 collided	 with	 the	 necessity	 to	 be	 adaptive	 to	 the	 heterogeneous	 reality	 of	
youths	on	the	ground.			
	
7.4	ETHNOGRAPHY	OF	DEVELOPMENT	AND	FOUCAULT		
I	 was	 able	 to	 bring	 to	 light	 the	 heterogeneity	 in	 development,	 and	 its	 ‘messy	 actualities’	
(Murray	 Li,	 2007,	 p.	 282),	 thanks	 to	 the	 ethnographic	 research	 methods	 I	 adopted.	 In	
particular,	an	anthropological	approach	to	the	study	of	development	as	discourse	accurately	
applied	 the	 Foucauldian	 approach	 to	 the	 study	 of	 power	 and	 discourse.	 While	 Foucault	
invited	us	 to	 study	power	 relations	and	discourse	as	a	process	 that	 circulates	and	 is	 in	 the	
hands	of	all	social	actors,	many	scholars	in	development	have	used	a	Foucauldian	approach	
without	exiting	the	dualistic	paradigm	of	domination	(see	chapter	2).	With	this	study,	I	show	
that	 through	 ethnographic	 research	 methods	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 overcome	 such	 dualistic	
approach	and	explore	the	power	mechanisms	within	development.	 In	fact,	my	study	shows	
that	the	development	trend	around	youth	in	agribusiness	materializes	in	a	complex	context	
of	relations,	with	negotiations	of	different	interests	and	agendas	and	adaptation	to	different	
contexts.	The	dynamics	highlighted	in	my	research	stress	that	the	enactment	of	a	trend	is	far	
more	 complex	 than	 bilateral	 relation	 between	 development	 practitioners	 (‘top’)	 and	
‘beneficiaries’	(‘bottom’).			
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Rather	than	focusing	on	how	a	policy	was	enacted,	enforced	from	the	top	to	the	bottom,	 I	
studied	how	the	trend	around	youth	emerged,	through	the	narratives	and	practices	all	social	
actors	 involved.	 This	 study	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 Foucauldian	 understanding	 of	 power	 as	 a	
circulating	rather	than	bilateral	process,	in	the	hands	of	all	social	actors.		
The	study	of	narratives,	in	particular,	is	crucial	‘to	explore	how	subjectivities	were	produced’	
(Murray	 Li,	 2007,	 p.	 282).	 The	 social	 category	 of	 youth,	 which	 until	 recently	 was	 only	
considered	a	brief	liminal	phase,	became	the	object	of	much	development	attention.	‘Youth’	
was	constructed	in	different	ways	by	the	narratives	of	the	development	actors	I	interviewed,	
contributing	to	the	emergence	of	a	social	category.	 In	the	following	sub-sections	 I	spell	out	
the	ways	 in	which	 such	 subjectivities	 (youths,	 7.4.1)	were	 produced	 and	 the	 development	
discourse	 (agribusiness,	 7.4.2)	 in	 which	 they	 were	 incorporated.	 The	 production	 of	 such	
subjectivities	 and	 development	 discourse	 can	 be	 considered	 the	 ‘unintended	 effects’	
(Ferguson,	2014)	of	this	development	trend.	
	
7.4.1	YOUTH	
As	discussed	above,	development	practitioners	and	youths	had	different	understandings	of	
what	this	social	category	means	in	Uganda.	In	particular,	‘youth’	loses	explanatory	power	in	
light	of	 the	vague	definitions	by	development	organisations	 (as	discordant	age	 ranges)	and	
the	heterogeneity	of	youths	across	the	country.	Yet,	in	the	course	of	the	years	(2015-2018)	I	
spent	studying	this	development	trend	in	Uganda,	it	turned	into	a	multi-million	development	
industry.	 Interestingly,	 the	 trend	 grew	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 major	 ‘development	
problems’	 identified	 in	 the	 theories	 of	 change	 of	 the	 organisations	 were	 structural	 rather	
than	youth-specific:	demographic	bulge,	youth	unemployment	and	stability,	and	agricultural	
modernisation.		
Moreover,	 from	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 programmes	 emerged	 that	
approaching	 such	 a	 broad	 and	 heterogeneous	 segment	 of	 the	 population	 was	 often	
misleading.	The	programmes	that	had	the	most	successful	impact	for	youths’	engagement	in	
agribusiness	 were	 those	 that	 adapted	 to	 their	 specificities.	 Youths	 themselves	 had	 mixed	
opinions	on	the	same	programme	because	of	the	heterogeneity	factors	characterising	their	
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experience	of	agribusiness.	 In	fact,	the	heterogeneity	factors	were	often	more	determinant	
for	youths’	success	in	agribusiness	than	the	actual	impact	of	the	programmes.	Therefore,	the	
social	category	of	youth	stood	out	as	a	 fuzzy	concept	 in	development	narratives.	Yet	 it	 still	
functioned	as	a	‘mobilizing	metaphor’	(Mosse,	2004,	p.	663).		
In	 light	 of	 the	 Foucauldian	 theoretical	 approach	 I	 sketched	 in	 chapter	 1,	 as	 a	 ‘mobilizing	
metaphor’,	 ‘youth’	 can	 be	 described	 as	 a	 dispositief	 of	 power	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 a	
development	 discourse.	 ‘Youth’	 for	 development	 practitioners	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 knowledge	
inscribed	 in	 the	 power	 system	 of	 development	 programmes	 and	 relations.	 ‘Youth’	 for	 the	
youths	is	a	heterogeneous	and	concrete	experience,	a	phase	in	life	to	be	escaped	to	access	
adulthood	through	economic	status.	As	a	category	of	development	knowledge,	constructed	
through	narratives	at	different	levels,	‘youth’	justifies	the	(re)inforcement	of	power	relations	
tangled	 in	 the	 development	 industry.	 In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	 not	 the	 actual	 individual	 youths	
(with	 their	 particularities	 and	 heterogeneity)	 to	 be	 at	 the	 core	 of	 development	 focus:	 the	
theories	of	change	of	practitioners	were	concerned	with	general	rather	than	actual	youths,	
with	 the	 ‘mobilizing	 metaphor’	 of	 youth,	 the	 conceptual	 category.	 In	 the	 study	 of	 micro-
physics	of	power	 in	 ‘Discipline	and	Punish’,	Foucault	 reflects	on	the	construction	of	power-
knowledge	relations	that	go	beyond	the	actual	subject	of	knowledge	and	domination	(in	his	
case,	 the	 body	 of	 the	 punished,	 in	my	 case	 the	 youths).	 Foucault’s	 analysis	 (Foucault	M.	 ,	
1975,	p.	27-28)	is	revealing:		
These	‘power-knowledge	relations'	are	to	be	analysed,	therefore,	not	on	the	basis	of	
a	subject	of	knowledge	who	is	or	is	not	free	in	relation	to	the	power	system,	but,	on	
the	contrary,	the	subject	who	knows,	the	objects	to	be	known	and	the	modalities	of	
knowledge	must	be	regarded	as	so	many	effects	of	these	fundamental	implications	of	
power-knowledge	and	their	historical	transformations.	In	short,	it	is	not	the	activity	of	
the	subject	of	knowledge	that	produces	a	corpus	of	knowledge,	useful	or	resistant	to	
power,	 but	 power-knowledge,	 the	 processes	 and	 struggles	 that	 traverse	 it	 and	 of	
which	it	is	made	up,	that	determines	the	forms	and	possible	domains	of	knowledge.		
In	 the	case	of	 the	construction	of	a	development	discourse	around	youth,	 the	 focus	of	 the	
analysis	 is	not	whether	youths	are	‘useful	or	resistant	to	the	power’	relations	in	which	they	
are	 built-in.	 Rather,	 youths	 as	 a	 social	 category	 have	 entered	 the	 domains	 of	 knowledge-
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power.	 With	 this	 new	 trend	 in	 development,	 a	 share	 of	 the	 Ugandan	 population	 –	 a	
majoritarian	 one	 –	 has	 entered	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 ‘social	 gardening’	 (Scott	 J.	 ,	 1998)	 and	
development	politics	(Ferguson,	2014).		
Of	 particular	 relevance,	 this	 social	 category	 also	 constitutes	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 voting	
population.	The	political	relevance	of	this	social	group	is	evident	for	governmental	agencies	
that	are	subject	to	the	strong	power	of	Museveni,	who	came	to	power	in	1986	when	78%	of	
the	current	Ugandan	population	was	yet	to	be	born.	In	fact,	the	regime	of	Museveni	has	been	
considered	an	example	of	‘personal	rule’	in	post-colonial	Africa	(Carbone,	2015,	p.	42).	Since	
the	past	election	were	rigged,	it	would	seem	that	youths’	political	opinion	(which	increasingly	
supports	the	opposition)	is	not	actually	taken	into	account.	However,	the	democratic	guise	of	
the	 regime	 needs	 to	 contain	 the	 increasing	 dissatisfaction	 and	 tensions,	which	 in	 the	 past	
year	have	generated	violent	demonstrations	and	social	tensions.	It	can	be	argued	that	there	
is	a	political	interest	in	showing	that	the	issue	of	the	‘youth	bulge’	and	youth	unemployment	
has	 been	 addressed	 with	 development	 programmes,	 considering	 that	 youth	 constitute	 a	
wide	 share	 of	 the	 electorate.	 In	 particular,	 the	 public	 sector	 programme	 (Youth	 Livelihood	
Programme)	was	politically	manipulated	 in	several	regions	where	 it	was	 implemented,	with	
the	scope	of	winning	votes	–	as	reported	by	my	informants.	
	
7.4.2	AGRIBUSINESS	
The	 development	 discourse	 around	 youth	 clearly	 proposes	 agribusiness	 as	 solution	 for	
unemployment.	 In	 development	 narratives,	 this	was	 described	 as	 a	win-win	 solution,	 as	 it	
would	 tackle	 unemployment	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 contribute	 to	 the	 modernisation	 of	
agriculture	 and	 economic	 growth.	 In	 fact,	 the	 majority	 of	 youths	 in	 Uganda	 is	 already	
engaged	in	agriculture,	although	mostly	subsistence	agriculture.	There	is	also	little	evidence	
that	 agribusiness	would	 indeed	 be	 the	 best	 solution	 for	 youths’	 employment	 and	 there	 is	
little	 evidence	 youth	 prefer	 this	 career	 path.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 among	 the	 youths	 I	
interviewed,	only	a	minority	saw	agribusiness	as	voluntary	career	aspiration.		
Yet,	 agribusiness	 emerged	 in	 the	 recent	 trend	 in	 development,	 as	 promising	 strategy	 –	 in	
which	 the	 majority	 of	 youths	 could	 be	 employed.	 The	 youths	 themselves	 adopted	 this	
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narrative	 and	 envisioned	 agribusiness	 as	 a	 strategy	 to	 gain	 economic	 status	 and	 thereby	
adulthood.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 discourse	 on	 agribusiness	 and	 the	 identity	 of	 youths	 as	
agripreneurs	 was	 adopted	 by	 all	 actors	 in	 development	 rather	 than	 being	 imposed.	
Agribusiness	 became,	 for	 youths	 in	 Uganda	 (and	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 continent),	 what	 Scott	
(1998,	p.	83)	refers	as	the	“authoritative	tune	to	which	most	population	must	dance”.		
However,	 in	 my	 study,	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 besides	 few	 pockets	 of	 success	 (in	 terms	 of	
economic	 improvement	 through	 agribusiness)	 the	 outcomes	 of	 programmes	 targeting	
youths’	 engagement	 in	 agribusiness	were	 variegated	and	 limited.	 In	particular,	 it	was	 clear	
that	 besides	 few	 motivated	 entrepreneurs	 (who	 often	 had	 not	 even	 benefitted	 from	
development	 schemes),	 the	majority	was	going	 to	be	employed	as	 contract-farmers	 rather	
than	agripreneurs.	The	very	neoliberal	model	of	agribusiness	which	centralises	power	in	the	
hands	of	few	agripreneurs,	would	be	able	to	absorb	a	limited	number	of	youths	–	leaving	the	
majority	 to	 labour	 or	 at	 all	 excluded.	 Within	 the	 discourse	 stressing	 the	 responsibility	 of	
youths	to	adopt	an	agripreneurial	mindset,	those	who	served	as	contract	farmers	or	simply	
continued	as	subsistence	farmers	failed	in	the	project.	Ferguson	(2014,	p.	19)	considered	the	
aspect	of	failure	in	development	in	the	light	of	the	Foucauldian	study	of	the	genealogy	of	the	
prison:			
The	 prison,	 Foucault	 shows,	 was	 created	 as	 a	 “correctional”	 institution.	 It	 was	
intended	to	imprint	on	the	inmates	the	qualities	of	good	citizenship…[but]	prisons	do	
not	in	fact	“reform	criminals;	that,	on	the	contrary,	they	make	nearly	impossible	that	
return	 to	 “normality”	 that	 they	 have	 always	 claimed	 to	 produce	 (…).	While	 such	 a	
result	 must	 be	 conceived	 as	 a	 “failure”	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 planners’	
intentions,	the	result	has	quite	a	different	character	when	apprehended	as	part	of	a	
different	 “strategy”.	 (…)	 the	prison	did	end	up	 serving	as	part	of	 a	 system	of	 social	
control.	 (…)	 The	 point	 to	 be	 taken	 from	 the	 above	 argument	 is	 only	 that	 planned	
interventions	 may	 produce	 unintended	 outcomes	 that	 end	 up,	 all	 the	 same,	
incorporated	 into	 anonymous	 constellations	 of	 control	 –	 authorless	 “strategies”,	 in	
Foucault’s	sense	–	that	turn	out	in	the	end	to	have	a	kind	of	political	intelligibility.		
Within	 the	 context	 of	 failure	 of	 development	 cooperation,	 Ferguson	 focuses	 on	 the	
‘unintended	outcomes’	rather	than	on	the	actual	effectiveness	of	the	programmes:	whether	
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development	 works	 or	 does	 not,	 is	 only	 relevant	 to	 some	 extent.	Within	 the	 Foucauldian	
paradigm,	 Ferguson	 considers	 the	effect	of	development	 “strategies”	of	 social	control.	 The	
prison	may	fail	to	reform	criminals,	but	it	instils	a	peculiar	concept	of	illegality	in	the	minds	of	
others;	 again,	 while	 prisons	 fail	 to	 eliminate	 crime,	 they	 produce	 delinquents	 as	
“pathologized	 subjects”.	 In	 the	 realm	 of	 development	 studies,	 Ferguson	 transposes	 the	
unintended	effects	of	 failures	of	development	programmes	as	de-politicization	of	 issues	of	
poverty	and	pathologization	of	development	beneficiaries.	 In	 the	case	of	 the	 trend	around	
youth	 in	 agribusiness	 in	 Uganda,	 the	 imposition	 of	 ‘agribusiness’	 in	 the	 development	
discourse	 is	 a	 normative	 strategy	 that	 as	 a	 consequence	 pathologizes	 unsuccessful	
agripreneurs	and	subsistence	farmers.		
	
7.4.3	HETEROGENEITY	AND	GAPS		
A	 recurrent	 theme	 in	 my	 study	 was	 ‘heterogeneity’	 –	 of	 the	 theories	 of	 change,	 of	 the	
programmes,	of	the	outcomes	and	of	the	youths.	Such	heterogeneity	emerged	from	the	data	
and	 invited	 me	 to	 problematize	 my	 approach	 to	 development.	 While	 scholars	 in	 critical	
development	 studies	 (Scott	 J.	 ,	 1998;	 Escobar,	 2012;	 Ferguson,	 2014;	 Murray	 Li,	 2007)	
examined	 development	 as	 a	 negotiated,	 resisted	 or	 oppressing	 relation	 between	 the	
development	apparatus	and	its	beneficiaries,	the	messiness	of	the	reality	I	examined	on	the	
ground	invited	to	look	beyond	this	binary	contraposition.	Development	programmes	changed	
over	 time	 for	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons:	 regional	 disparities	 jeopardized	 or	 required	 changes	 in	
approaches;	 there	 were	 negotiations	 and/or	 conflicting	 incentives	 among	 stakeholders	
implementing	the	programmes;	programs	were	forced	to	adapt	to	the	heterogeneous	reality	
of	youths	across	 the	country;	 there	were	 tensions	between	youths	and	 local	authorities	or	
development	 practitioners,	 as	 well	 as	 tensions	 among	 the	 youths	 for	 the	management	 of	
group	decisions.		
The	 observation	 of	 the	 processes	 of	 implementation	 of	 the	 programmes	 highlighted	 the	
complex	 reality	 of	 development:	 far	 messier	 than	 a	 unilateral	 enactment	 of	 policies	 into	
practices.	 Power	 relations	 articulated	 within	 besides	 between	 groups	 of	 development	
practitioners	 and	 youths.	 This	 result	 reinforces	 the	 argument	 of	 Foucault	 that	 “power	
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circulates”	 (1976,	 p.	 29)	 and	 is	 thus	 to	 be	 analysed	 beyond	 the	 dualistic	 model	 of	
domination/resistance	between	a	top	and	bottom.		
Moreover,	through	my	analysis,	 it	becomes	clear	that	however	‘good’	development	policies	
are,	 it	 is	a	range	of	different	practices,	engaging	a	variety	of	actors,	that	will	determine	the	
success	of	these	policies.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	hard	to	evaluate	the	success	of	programmes	
because	of	their	transient	nature	and	the	disparate	definitions	of	success	within	the	various	
agencies.	In	line	with	Mosse	(2004,	p.	663),	“policy	models	are	poor	guides	to	understanding	
the	 practices,	 events	 and	 effects	 of	 development	 actors,	 which	 are	 shaped	 by	 the	
relationships	and	interests	and	cultures	of	specific	organizational	settings”.		
Overcoming	 the	 contraposition	 between	 ‘top’	 and	 ‘bottom’,	 problematizes	 the	 classic	
development	question	of	the	gap	between	policies	and	practices.	In	fact,	I	have	argued	that	
programmes	change,	adapt	or	even	fail	because	of	relations	on	the	ground,	power	relations	
and	 conflicting	 incentives.	 In	my	 research,	 I	 have	 identified	 tensions	 at	 all	 levels,	within	 as	
much	 as	 between	 groups	 of	 social	 actors,	 abstract	 policies	 and	 actual	 implementation	
practices	and	outcomes.	Consequently	 to	 these	 tensions,	 gaps	emerged	at	different	 levels:	
between	the	narratives	of	youths	on	their	 identity,	which	was	substantially	different	across	
the	country	and	between	genders;	between	governmental	and	international	agencies	on	the	
best	approach	to	tackle	agribusiness;	between	the	policies	and	the	practices	through	which	
they	 were	 implemented;	 between	 narratives	 of	 development	 practitioners	 on	 how	 they	
intended	the	programmes	and	how	they	were	perceived	by	youths.	Therefore,	it	is	necessary	
to	re-frame	the	focus	of	analysis	and	investigate	tensions	in	development	beyond	the	classic	
question	of	‘development	policies	and	practices’.	The	gaps	emerging	from	my	analysis	show	
that	development	is	more	than	the	enactment	of	policies	into	practices.	In	this	way,	I	add	to	
the	conclusion	of	Mosse	(2004)	that	(good)	development	policy	is	unimplementable:	not	only	
because	 of	 the	 internal	 incentives	 of	 development	 agencies,	 but	 because	 the	 reality	 of	
development	 enactment	 is	 more	 heterogeneous	 and	 messy	 than	 the	 dual	 paradigm	 of	
policies	and	practices.		
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7.5	DISCUSSION	
This	 study	 meant	 to	 investigate	 a	 trend	 in	 development	 as	 a	 discursive	 process,	 using	 a	
Foucauldian	approach.	The	ethnographic	approach	allowed	me	to	study	power	as	something	
that	 circulates	 rather	 than	 being	 imposed,	 through	 the	 examination	 of	 narratives	 and	
practices	of	social	actors	in	development.	As	Mosse	(2004,	p.	663)	argues,	with	reference	to	
Scott:	 “The	 ‘public	 transcripts’	 of	 development	 are	 sustained	 by	 the	 powerful	 and	 the	
subordinate,	both	of	whose	interests	lead	them	to	‘tactically	conspire	to	misrepresent’	(Scott,	
1990:	2).	In	development,	we	cannot	speak	of	policy	controlling	or	disciplining,	being	resisted	
or	 subverted.”	With	 this	 in	mind,	my	 research	 suggests	 the	 need	 to	 remove	 development	
from	 the	 dualistic	 logic	 of	 domination	 and	 resistance,	 top	 and	 bottom.	 Capitalizing	 on	 an	
ethnographic	approach	is	one	way	to	do	this:			
An	 ethnography	 of	 policy	 in	 the	 making	 focuses	 on	 both	 policy	 practice	 and	
performance	 and	 brings	 out	 the	 actual	 behavioural,	 unofficial,	 and	 unintended	
aspects	of	policy-making.	More	ethnographic	and	anthropological	work	could	permit	
us	 to	deepen	our	understanding	of	 the	performative	and	 imaginative	dimensions	of	
policy-making.	 Actual	 observation	 in	 the	 flow	 of	 events	 could	 help	 to	 understand	
policy	better	 as	 an	ongoing	process	of	 representation	 to	mobilise	 support.	 It	would	
reveal	that	this	takes	place	through	a	variety	of	social	and	material	practices,	means,	
and	events.	(Rap,	2006,	p.	1319)	
In	 fact,	 ‘the	observation	 in	 the	 flow	of	 events’	 inherent	 to	 ethnography	allows	us	 to	 study	
development	as	a	process	–	its	construction	through	narratives	and	practices.	Perhaps	even	
more	 importantly,	 this	 methodological	 approach	 –	 which	 pivots	 on	 inductive	 research	 –	
accounts	for	‘unintended	effects’	of	development.		
As	with	any	study,	however,	 there	are	 limitations	 in	my	analysis.	 First,	 I	have	not	collected	
empirical	data	on	the	applicability	of	my	results	in	other	African	countries.	As	I	have	argued	in	
chapter	 3,	 there	 is	 little	 reason	 to	 believe	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 recent	 trend	 in	
development	 around	 youth	 in	 agribusiness	 has	 followed	 substantially	 different	 paths	 in	
regards	to	narratives	and	practices	in	other	countries.	Therefore,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	
that	 many	 of	 the	 trends	 I	 discussed	 in	 this	 dissertation	 are	 applicable	 in	 other	 contexts.	
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Additionally,	 empirical	 research	 in	 other	 country	 contexts,	 however,	 would	 need	 to	 verify	
this.	Second,	by	carrying	out	multi-sited	research,	 I	did	not	have	the	opportunity	of	delving	
into	 in-depth	ethnographic	analysis	of	one	location	or	group	of	social	actors.	This	 limitation	
prevented	me	from	collecting	exhaustive	data	on	the	identity	and	agribusiness	experience	of	
youths.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 allowed	 for	 gathering	 an	 overview	 of	 youths’	 heterogeneous	
narratives	and	practises	across	 the	country.	Third,	being	a	white	 lady	and	not	speaking	 the	
local	languages,	I	incurred	the	risk	of	misunderstanding	or	being	misunderstood.		I	have	taken	
several	 steps	 to	 limit	 such	misunderstandings,	 but	 these	 are	 to	 some	 degree	 inevitable	 in	
research	 of	 this	 type.	 Four,	 the	 ethnographic	 nature	 of	 my	 research,	 together	 with	 time	
constraints,	only	allowed	the	sampling	of	a	 limited	number	of	youths.	To	help	 limit	 internal	
validity	concerns,	 in	both	the	sampling	of	youth	and	development	agencies,	 I	tried	to	be	as	
representative	as	possible	and	ultimately	interviewed	over	130	persons	for	this	research.	In	
addition,	 whenever	 possible,	 I	 validated	 the	 narratives	 of	 development	 practitioners	 by	
confronting	them	with	their	agencies’	policy	briefs.		
	
7.6	POLICY	ADVICE170	
Since	 the	 topic	of	 this	 study	was	directly	 relevant	 to	development	 stakeholders,	during	my	
fieldwork	 I	 was	 often	 asked	 to	 report	 back	my	 results.	 For	 development	 practitioners	 the	
main	 question	 is	 often	 ‘what	works	 and	what	 doesn’t’	 –	 not	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 efficiency	 of	
programmes,	 but	 also	 in	 terms	 of	 strategy	 for	 future	 approaches.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 will	
therefore	 focus	 on	 two	main	 practice-oriented	 results	 of	my	 research.	 First,	 the	 feasibility	
and	assumptions	underlying	 the	 theories	of	 change	of	development	organisations;	 second,	
how	 to	 take	 youths’	 heterogeneity	 into	 account	 when	 addressing	 their	 engagement	 in	
agribusiness,	by	considering	their	diverse	identity	and	constraints.	
																																																						
170	The	policy	advise	presented	in	this	section	is	based	on	a	working	paper	(Turolla,	Swedlund,	
Schut,	Muchunguzi,	&	Jassogne,	2018)	that	was	distributed	to	the	majority	of	the	
development	practitioners	I	worked	with,	during	the	third	field	trip	to	Uganda	in	2018.	With	
this	working	paper,	I	was	able	to	give	feedback	to	organisations	that	requested	to	be	
informed	on	the	outcomes	of	my	study.	Moreover,	I	was	able	to	validate	the	results	of	my	
study	by	presenting	them	to	my	informants.	Dr.	Haley	Swedlund	and	IITA	staff	members	
collaborated	in	the	elaboration	of	this	text.		
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I	will	conclude	this	section	with	a	broader	consideration	on	the	implications	of	my	study	for	
conflict	prevention,	given	that	youth	studies	often	link	the	youth	bulge	to	unemployment.	
	
7.6.1	FEASIBILITY	AND	ASSUMPTIONS	OF	THEORIES	OF	CHANGE	
In	general,	the	trend	around	youth	engagement	in	agribusiness	relies	on	the	assumption	that	
engaging	 youths	 in	 agribusiness	 will	 result	 in	 a	 decrease	 in	 youth	 unemployment	 and	 a	
general	 economic	 growth	 and	 agricultural	 productivity.	 Narrowing	 down	 to	 the	 specific	
development	 approaches,	 I	 have	 shown	 how	 the	 main	 goals	 and	 outcomes	 of	 two	
approaches	at	the	extremes	of	the	spectrum	are	often	incongruous.	The	main	public	sector	
programme	(YLP)	supporting	youths	in	agribusiness	was	set	out	to	foster	youth	employment	
in	 agribusiness,	 but	 through	 its	 approach	 it	 ends	 up	 stimulating	 informal	 entrepreneurship	
along	 the	 agri-food	 value	 chains.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 private	 sector	 approach	 aims	 at	
stimulating	 agripreneurship,	 but	 through	 the	 popular	 contract	 farming	 schemes	 it	 ends	 up	
fostering	 a	 paid-labour	 type	 of	 employment.	 Neither	 of	 the	 two	 outcomes	 are	 to	 be	
considered	 failures,	 but	 rather	 unforeseen	 results	 of	 the	 ‘pathway	 to	 change’	 they	 had	
chosen.	 However,	 it	 is	 important	 for	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 programmes,	 to	 understand	
whether	there	is	a	logical	correlation	between	the	three	steps	of	the	theory	of	change.		
A	deeper	understanding	of	the	organisations’	or	programmes’	theories	of	change	allows	us	to	
set	feasible	and	consequent	objectives.	Defining	the	programme’s	success	and	vision	upfront	
should	also	define	the	pathway	to	change.	For	example,	if	the	aim	is	youths’	employment,	it	
will	be	necessary	to	develop	the	specific	agri-skills	necessary	for	fulfilling	their	duties	 in	the	
out-grower	scheme	–	while	if	the	aim	is	entrepreneurship	and	spill-over	of	enterprises,	it	will	
be	necessary	to	train	them	in	agri-skills	for	the	ownership	of	the	agribusiness	enterprise.	 	
Moreover,	I	have	seen	how	programmes’	definitions	of	success	were	also	a	guiding	principle	
for	 the	 choice	 of	 a	 development	 approach	 over	 another.	 Different	 development	 agencies	
have	different	definitions	of	success,	including:	repayment	of	the	loans,	employment	and/or	
training	 of	 youths,	 boosting	 of	 agribusiness	 production,	 spill-over	 effect.	 For	 instance,	 the	
majority	of	bilateral	development	programmes	for	youths	were	eventually	held	accountable	
for	 the	 number	 of	 youths	 trained	 or	 employed	 in	 an	 agribusiness	 firm.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	
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incentives	 to	 achieve	 such	 organisations’	 targets	 were	 much	 stronger	 for	 development	
practitioners	 implementing	 programmes	 than	 their	 theory	 of	 change.	Moreover,	 it	 can	 be	
concluded	 that	 success	 is	 relative	 and	 depends	 on	 theories	 of	 change,	 assumptions,	 and	
incentives	and	targets.	Depending	on	their	own	definitions	of	success,	their	programmes	can	
be	set	up	and	evaluated	differently.	Therefore,	 it	can	be	concluded	that	 the	success	of	 the	
development	 programmes	 depends,	 among	 others,	 on	 three	 main	 factors:	 1)	 on	 the	
feasibility	of	the	underlying	theory	of	change;	2)	on	the	definition	of	success;	3)	on	the	extent	
to	which	youths’	heterogeneity	and	specificities	are	accounted	for.	In	the	following	section	I	
will	explore	the	latter	factor	impacting	programmes	efficiency.		
	
7.6.2	HOW	TO	ACCOUNT	FOR	YOUTH	HETEROGENEITY	
As	 I	 have	 shown	 in	 chapter	 5,	 youths	 are	 a	 heterogeneous	 social	 group.	 Capacities,	
constraints	and	aspirations	of	youths	 in	agribusiness	vary	significantly	and	require	different	
types	of	 support	depending	on	 three	dimensions:	 territorial,	 socio-cultural	 and	value	 chain	
embedding).	 Such	 heterogeneity	 results	 in diverse	 agribusiness	 cultures.	 Uganda	 is	 an	
extremely	diverse	country,	both	in	terms	of	ecosystem	and	socio-cultural	environments	as	in	
terms	 of	 regional	 disparities	 of	 development	 (markets,	 infrastructures,	 education	 etc.).	
Youths	agribusiness	enterprises	incubated	in	development	schemes	kick-off	better	where	the	
programme	 are	 embedded	 in	 local	 networks	 and	 value	 chains.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	
address	 youth	 engagement	 in	 agribusiness	 within	 their	 specific	 context.	 Considering	 the	
heterogeneity	 of	 socio-cultural	 and	 economic	 backgrounds	 of	 youths	 should	 encourage	 a	
tailor-made	 programme	 design,	 accounting	 for	 at	 least	 three	 factors:	 a)	 the	 age-	 specific	
aspirations	 and	 abilities;	 b)	 their	 gender	 based-capacities	 and	 constraints;	 c)	 their	 local,	
culture-bond	values	and	norms	around	agriculture.	 	
Besides	 these	 factors	 of	 diversity,	 gender	 is	 probably	 the	most	 crosscutting	 indication	 that	
youth	means	different	things,	and	that	youths’	ability	to	engage	in	agribusiness	is	not	equally	
distributed.	Women	in	agribusiness	have	a	harder	time	then	male	counterparts.	In	particular,	
they	face	discrimination	in	two	main	ways:	first,	accessibility	to	assets	such	as	land	–	which	is	
almost	 exclusively	 inherited	 by	 men;	 and,	 second	 household	 relations,	 which	 don’t	 allow	
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them	to	earn	and	retain	an	income	(especially	if	higher	than	their	husbands’).	Development	
programmes	 accounting	 for	 gender	 disparities	with	 quotas	 of	 female	 participants	 are	 thus	
not	enough.	Household	approaches	are	more	successful	in	empowering	female	participation	
in	agribusiness	as	they	tackle	the	cultural	environment	generating	discrimination.	Considering	
the	 youth-specific	 challenges	 for	 agribusiness	 (mainly	 access	 to	 finance	 and	 land),	 it	 is	
important	to	engage	the	whole	household	when	involving	youths	 in	development	schemes:	
in	 this	 way,	 they	 have	 more	 chances	 of	 counting	 on	 family	 support	 for	 starting	 up	 an	
agribusiness	 enterprise.	 This	 is	 particularly	 important	 for	women,	where	 the	 family	 and/or	
spouse’s	support	is	crucial.	 	
	
7.6.3	THE	CONTROL	OF	SOCIAL	CONFLICT	AROUND	THE	‘YOUTH	BULGE’	
From	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 theories	 of	 change,	 emerged	 a	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	
development	 problem	 that	 relates	 youth	 unemployment	 to	 issues	 of	 social	 security	 and	
political	 stability.	 This	 concern	 was	 particularly	 strong	 among	 public	 sector	 development	
practitioners.	 In	 their	 narratives,	 the	 ‘youth	 bulge’	was	 described	 as	 a	 destabilizing	 factor,	
assuming	 unemployed	 youths	 would	 either	 steal	 or	 join	 social	 protests	 organised	 by	 the	
opposition.	There	was	a	clear	gender	bias	 in	 these	postulations,	whereby	 the	actual	 threat	
was	constituted	by	males.	Sommers	(2015)	confirms	that	also	the	concerns	 in	 international	
development	 cooperation	 are	 particularly	 focusing	 on	 young	 males.	 Moreover,	 Sommers	
(ibid)	 also	 problematizes	 the	 link	 between	 youth	 unemployment	 and	 conflict,	 arguing	 that	
there	is	no	direct	correlation.		
My	 study	 shows	 that	 development	 practitioners	 had	 little	 evidence	 on	 the	 actual	 issues,	
capacities	 and	 constraints	 of	 youths	 at	 the	 time	 they	 targeted	 them	 with	 development	
programmes.	Moreover,	as	shown	by	Sommers	(2015),	there	is	little	scientific	evidence	that	
confirms	 a	 causal	 correlation	 between	 youth	 unemployment	 and	 conflict	 (in	 Uganda	 and	
elsewhere).	Even	assuming	a	connection	between	youth	unemployment	and	 instability	and	
insecurity,	I	question	the	effectiveness	of	development	programmes	for	youth	in	agribusiness	
as	counter-measures.	As	argued	above	(section	7.4.2),	there	is	little	evidence	that	shows	that	
the	engagement	of	youths	 in	agribusiness	will	 reduce	youths	unemployment,	 let	alone	halt	
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social	 insecurity	and	conflict.	 It	 is	hard	 to	 imagine	an	effective	approach	 to	 secure	 security	
and	political	stability,	without	a	clear	understanding	of	who	the	youths	are,	what	their	issues	
are	 and	 what	 would	 trigger	 youth-led	 instability	 and	 insecurity.	 The	 studied	 development	
trend	 was	 more	 efficient	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 social	 category	 of	 youth	 and	 a	
development	discourse	for	their	engagement	in	agribusiness,	then	in	securing	the	stability	of	
the	country	from	the	‘ticking	time	bomb’171		of	the	‘youth	bulge’.		
In	fact,	as	argued	in	chapter	5	(section	5.4.2),	 in	2017	and	2018	social	unrest	took	over	the	
streets	of	the	capital,	Kampala.	Under	the	lead	of	Bobi	Wine,	a	singer	turned	politician,	now	
MP	of	the	opposition,	youths	called	for	political	change.	Bobi	Wine	has	often	argued	that	the	
current	president	should	give	way	 to	a	new	generation	of	 leaders.	His	 songs	voiced	youths	
discontent	and	called	for	political	action	of	youths	(the	majority	of	the	Ugandan	population)	
across	 the	 country.	 Yet,	 as	 I	 have	 shown	 in	 my	 study,	 one	 of	 the	 ‘unintended	 outcomes’	
(Ferguson,	2014)	of	the	recent	trend	for	youths	in	agribusiness	was	that	of	creating	a	social	
category	of	‘youth’	perceived	by	the	youths	themselves	as	a-political.	Absorbing	youths	in	the	
development	discourse	of	 agribusiness	had	 the	effect	of	 framing	 their	 success	 (in	 entering	
adulthood)	in	agripreneurial	terms.		
Rather	 than	 addressing	 the	 (potential)	 sources	 of	 social	 conflict	 related	 to	 the	
disproportionate	 demographic	 dividend	 and	 unemployment,	 this	 development	 trend	 has	
(partially)	 achieved	 the	 ‘unintended	 outcomes’	 of	 social	 control	 through	 the	 political	
manipulation	 of	 development	 policies	 addressing	 youth	 unemployment	 (see	 sections	 7.4.2	
and	7.4.3).	Nevertheless,	recently,	(urban)	youths	have	started	to	respond	to	Bobi	Wine’s	call	
for	political	action:	“When	the	going	gets	tough,	the	tough	must	get	going,	especially	when	
our	leaders	have	become	misleaders	and	mentors	have	become	tormentors,	when	freedom	
of	expression	becomes	a	target	of	suppression	opposition	becomes	our	position.”	
	
***	
																																																						
171	Ugandan	Monitor,	article	from	7/04/2012,	accessed	on	29/10/2018:		
http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/688342-1381200-ara4ho/index.html	
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Empowerment	is	still,	in	short,	a	relationship	of	power.	
	(Murray	Li,	2007,	p.	275)	
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APPENDIX		
	
LIST	OF	INTERVIEWS	WITH	DEVELOPMENT	PRACTITIONERS		
#	Interview	 Place	 Date	 Gender	 Organisation	
ws750034	 Kampala	 July	2016	 male	 Embassy	NL	
ws750040	 Kampala	 17.01.2017	 male	+	female	 AfDB	
ws750043	 Kampala	 19.01.2017	 male	 young	farmers	
coalition	of	
Uganda	
ws750044	 Kampala	 19.01.2017	 male	+	male	 AKORION	
ws750045	 Kampala	 19.01.2017	 male	 USAID	CPM	
ws750046	 +	
ws750047	
Kampala	 20.01.2017	 male	 Ministry	of	
Gender,	Labour	
and	Social	
Development	
ws750048	 Kampala	 20.01.2017	 male	 FAO	
ws750049	 Kampala	 23.01.2017	 female	 ICCO	
ws750050	 Gayaza	 23.01.2017	 male	 CURAD	
ws750051	 Kampala	 25.01.2017	 male	 Makerere	
ws750052	 Kampala	 25.01.2017	 male	 ZOA	
ws750053	 Entebbe	 27.01.2017	 female	 Ministry	of	
Agriculture	
Animal	Industry	
and	Fisheries	
ws750054	 Kampala	 2.02.2017	 male	 USAID	YLA	
ws750055	 Kampala	 2.02.2017	 male	 YOFCHAN	
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ws750056	 Entebbe	 6.02.2017	 male	+	male	 Ministry	of	
Agriculture	
Animal	Industry	
and	Fisheries	
ws750061	 Kampala	 13.02.2017	 male	 Ministry	of	
Gender,	Labour	
and	Social	
Development	
ws750063	 Mbale	 16.02.2017	 male	 Ministry	of	
Gender,	Labour	
and	Social	
Development	
voice001	 Kampala	 21.0.2017	 male	 Agriprofocus	
ws750064	 Kampala	 7.03.2017	 male	 BRAC	
ws750066	 Kampala	 9.03.2017	 female	 Goal	-	DYNAMIC	
ws750070	 Kampala	 13.03.2017	 male	 AVSI	
voice007	 Gulu	 5.04.2017	 male	 Gulu	District	
Authority	
ws750113	 Kampala	 10.04.2017	 male	 Ministry	of	
Gender,	Labour	
and	Social	
Development	
TABLE	20.	LIST	OF	INTERVIEWS	WITH	DEVELOPMENT	PRACTITIONERS	
	
LIST	OF	INTERVIEWS	WITH	YOUTHS		
#	Interview	 Place	 Sub-
Region	
Date	 Name	 Gender	 Group	
ws750058	 Gulu	 North	 7.02.2017	 Group	discussion:	
Annette,	Irene,	
male	+	
female	
private	
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Leah,	Didas,	
Marcos	
ws750085	 Koch	
Goma	
North	 29.03.2017	 Denis	 male	 private	
ws750086	 Parabongo	 North	 30.03.2017	 Robert	+	
Clementine	
male	+	
female	
private	
ws750087	 Parabongo	 North	 30.03.2017	 Carlos	+	Scovia	 male	+	
female	
private	
ws750088	 Parabongo	 North	 30.03.2017	 Molly	+	Irene	 female	+	
female	
private	
ws750089	 Parabongo	 North	 30.03.2017	 Michael	+	Harriet	 male	+	
female	
private	
ws750091	+	92	 Atiak	 North	 3.04.2017	 Patrick	 male	 control	
ws750093	 Atiak	 North	 3.04.2017	 focus	group	
discussion	
males	 control	
ws750094	 Atiak	 North	 3.04.2017	 Matooke	 male	 control	
ws750095	 Atiak	 North	 3.04.2017	 Charles	Nyako	 male	 control	
ws750096	 Atiak	 North	 3.04.2017	 Lasco	Odoch	 male	 control	
ws750097	 Atiak	 North	 3.04.2017	 Charles	Onaka	 male	 control	
ws750098	 Atiak	 North	 3.04.2017	 Geoffrey	Akena	 male	 control	
ws750099	 Atiak	 North	 3.04.2017	 Geoffrey	
Komakech	
male	 control	
ws750100	 Odek	 North	 4.04.2017	 focus	group	
discussion	
males	 public	
ws750101	 Odek	 North	 4.04.2017	 Patrick	Okello	 male	 public	
ws750102	+	103	
+	voice005	
Odek	 North	 4.04.2017	 Pasca	Akello	 female		 public	
voice006	 Odek	 North	 4.04.2017	 Lucy	 female		 public	
voice007	 Gulu	 North	 5.04.2017	 anonymous	 male	 public	
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ws750105	 Atiak	 North	 6.04.2017	 Pierina	+	Lucilina	 female	+	
female	
control	
ws750106	 Parabongo	 North	 7.04.2017	 Clementina	+	
focus	group	
discussion	
male	+	
female	
private	
ws750108	 Odek	 North	 8.04.2017	 theatre	drama	
play	
male	+	
female	
public	
ws750109	 Odek	 North	 8.04.2017	 Patrick	 male	 public	
ws750110	 Odek	 North	 8.04.2017	 Geoffrey	 male	 public	
ws750111	 Odek	 North	 8.04.2017	 Nancy	 female		 public	
ws750112	 Odek	 North	 8.04.2017	 Kenneth	Banya	 male	 public	
ws750065	 Kampala	 Kampala	 8.03.2017	 anonymous	 female	 control	
ws750067	+	68	 Kampala	 Central	 9.03.2017	 Cathy	 female	 control	
ws750069	 Kampala	 Central	 10.03.2017	 Joyce	Atuhaire	 female	 control	
ws750071	 Kampala	 Central	 15.03.2017	 Joyce	 female	 control	
uber	driver	 Kampala	 Central	 15.03.2017	 uber	driver	 male	 control	
ws750072	 +	
Sjaak	part2	
Gayaza	 Central	 16.03.2017	 anonymous	 male	 private	
ws750073	 +	
christinexclusive	
Gayaza	 Central	 16.03.2017	 anonymous	 female	 private	
ws750074	+	75	 Gayaza	 Central	 16.03.2017	 anonymous	 female	 private	
ws750076	+	77	 Gayaza	 Central	 17.03.2017	 anonymous	 female	 private	
ws750078	 Gayaza	 Central	 17.03.2017	 anonymous	 male	 private	
ws750079	 Gayaza	 Central	 22.03.2017	 anonymous	 female	 private	
ws750080	 Gayaza	 Central	 22.03.2017	 Walter	 male	 private	
ws750081	 Gayaza	 Central	 22.03.2017	 Harriet	 female	 private	
ws750082	 Gayaza	 Central	 22.03.2017	 anonymous	 female	 private	
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ws750114	 Kampala	 Central	 4.05.2017	 Focus	group	
discussion:	Dorah,	
David,	Abbey	
male	+	
female	
public	
ws750115	 Kampala	 Central	 4.05.2017	 Dorah,	Henry	 male	+	
female	
public	
ws750116	 Kampala	 Central	 5.05.2017	 Gaster	 male	 control	
ws750117	 Kampala	 Central	 5.05.2017	 Alex	 male	 control	
sheema	 piggery	
YLP	
Sheema	 Western	 23.05.2017	 Zeriba	 male	 public	
ws750118	 Sheema	 Western	 24.05.2017	 Ashiraf	 male	 control	
ws750119	 Sheema	 Western	 24.05.2017	 Abby	 female	 private	
ws750120	 Sheema	 Western	 24.05.2017	 Rachel	 female	 private	
ws750121	 Sheema	 Western	 24.05.2017	 Nixon,	Crescent	 male	+	male	 private	
ws750122	 Sheema	 Western	 24.05.2017	 Allan	 male	 control	
ws750123	 Sheema	 Western	 25.05.2017	 Ambrose	+	David	 male	+	male	 NA	
ws750124	 Sheema	 Western	 25.05.2017	 Joas	+	Davis	+	
Pius	
male	+	male	 control	
ws750125	 Sheema	 Western	 25.05.2017	 Sura	 male	 control	
ws750126	 Sheema	 Western	 26.05.2017	 Alson	 male	 control	
ws750127	 Sheema	 Western	 26.05.2017	 Mofi	 male	 private	
ws750128	 Sheema	 Western	 27.05.2017	 Julius	 male	 public	
ws750129	 Sheema	 Western	 27.05.2017	 Joy	 female	 control	
ws750130	 Sheema	 Western	 29.05.2017	 Auntie	Janet	 female	 control	
ws750131	songs	 Sheema	 Western	 29.05.2017	 mamma	Rose	 female	 control	
ws750132	+	133	 Sheema	 Western	 30.05.2017	 Jeremiah	 male	 control	
ws750134	+	135	 Kiruhura	 Western	 30.05.2017	 Peter	+	Alice	+	
Isaac	
male	+	
female	
private	
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ws750136	+	137	
songs	
Sheema	 Western	 30.05.2017	 mamma	Rose	+	
auntie	
female	+	
female	
control	
ws750138	 Bushenyi	 Western	 31.05.2017	 Emmanuel	 male	 private	
ws750139	 Ntungamo	 Western	 31.05.2017	 Elinathan	 male	 private	
ws750140	 Kiruhura	 Western	 1.06.2017	 Edward	 male	 private	
ws750141	 Kiruhura	 Western	 1.06.2017	 Simon	 male	 private	
ws750142	 Kiruhura	 Western	 1.06.2017	 Amanya	 male	 private	
ws750143	 Kiruhura	 Western	 1.06.2017	 Stephen	 male	 private	
ws750144	 Kiruhura	 Western	 2.06.2017	 Margaret	(old)	 female	 control	
ws750062	 Kamu	 Eastern	 16.02.2017	 Charles	+	family	+	
Gerald	
male	+	
female	
control	
ws750146	 Mbale	 Eastern	 12.06.2017	 Baker	Mwanta	 male	 public	
ws750147	 Mbale	 Eastern	 13.06.2017	 Masala	Fred	 male	 control	
ws750148	 Mbale	 Eastern	 13.06.2017	 Amidu	+	Amir	 male	+	male	 control	
ws750149	 Mbale	 Eastern	 14.06.2017	 group	discussion	 male	+	male	 public	
ws750150	 Mbale	 Eastern	 14.06.2017	 Wachi	 male	 public	
ws750151	 Mbale	 Eastern	 14.06.2017	 Yussuf	 male	 public	
ws750152	 Mbale	 Eastern	 14.06.2017	 Hassan	 male	 public	
ws750153	 Mbale	 Eastern	 14.06.2017	 Adjala	+	Lucia	 female	+	
female	
control	
ws750154	 Mbale	 Eastern	 14.06.2017	 Eriasa	 male	 public	
ws750155	 Mbale	 Eastern	 14.06.2017	 anonymous	 male	 public	
ws750156	 Mbale	 Eastern	 15.06.2017	 Pius	 male	 private	
ws750157	 Mbale	 Eastern	 15.06.2017	 Wilber	 male	 private	
ws750158	 Mbale	 Eastern	 15.06.2017	 Richard	 male	 private	
ws750159	 Mbale	 Eastern	 21.06.2017	 Lydia	 female	 private	
ws750160	 Mbale	 Eastern	 21.06.2017	 Cathy	 female	 private	
ws750161	 Mbale	 Eastern	 22.06.2017	 group	discussion	 male	+	
female	
private	
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ws750162	 Mbale	 Eastern	 22.06.2017	 Fred	 male	 private	
ws750163	 Mbale	 Eastern	 22.06.2017	 Lorna	 female	 private	
ws750164	 Mbale	 Eastern	 22.06.2017	 Ivan	 male	 private	
ws750165	+	166	 Mbale	 Eastern	 22.06.2017	 Reverend	
(anonymous)	
male	 private	
ws750167	 Mbale	 Eastern	 23.06.2017	 Moses	 male	 control	
ws750168	 +	
voice	008	
Mbale	 Eastern	 23.06.2017	 Gerald	&	Kiria	 male	+	male	 control	
voice009	 +	
voice010	
Mbale	 Eastern	 23.06.2017	 Garita	 female	 control	
voice011	 Mbale	 Eastern	 23.06.2017	 Robina	 female	 control	
TABLE	21.	LIST	OF	INTERVIEWS	WITH	YOUTHS	
	
	
APPENDIX	TO	CHAPTER	4	
SECTION	4.9	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	DEVELOPMENT	PROBLEM	
INTERNATIONAL	
	 Food	
security	
Demography	 Unemployment	 Stability	 Other	
1. Food	and	
Agriculture	
Organization			
	 	 	 x	 	
2. African	
Development	
Bank	
x	 x	 	 	 	
3. Embassy	of	the	
Kingdom	of	the	
Netherlands	
	 x	 	 	 	
4. USAID		 x	 x	 x	 	 	
5. AgriProFocus		 	 	 x	 	 	
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6. AVSI		 	 x	 x	 	 	
7. ICCO		 	 x	 	 	 	
8. ZOA		 	 	 x	 	 	
9. MasterCard	
Foundation	–	
DYNAMIC	
project	
	 x	 	 	 	
10. Triodos	Bank	–	
BRAC	
programme	
	 x	 	 	 	
	 2/10	=	
20%	
7/10	=	70%	 4/10	=	40%	 1/10	=	10	 0%	
TABLE	22.	DATA	-	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	DEVELOPMENT	PROBLEM	(INTERNATIONAL)	
	
NATIONAL	
	 Food	
security	
Demography	 Unemployment	 Stability	 Other	
1. AKORION		 	 	 x	 	 	
2. Young	
Farmers	
Coalition	of	
Uganda		
	 	 x	 	 	
3. Young	
Farmers	
Champions	
Network		
x	 	 x	 x	 	
4. CURAD		 	 	 x	 	 	
5. Makerere	
University	
Kampala		
x	 	 x	 x	 	
6. Ugandan	
Ministry	of	
Agriculture,	
Animal	
Industries	
and	Fisheries	
x	 	 x	 x	 x	
7. Ugandan	
Ministry	of	
Gender,	
	 x	 x	 	 	
	 304	
Labor	and	
Social	
Developmen
t	
RESULTS	 3/7	=	
42,8%	
1/7	=	14,3%	 7/7	=	100%	 3/7	=	
42,8%	
1/7	=	
14,3%	
TABLE	23.	DATA	-	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	DEVELOPMENT	PROBLEM	(NATIONAL)	
ALL	DEVELOPMENT	ORGANIZATIONS	(17)	
Food	security	 Demography	 Unemployment	 Stability	 Other	
5/17	=	29,4%	 8/17	=	47%	 11/17	=	64,7%	 4/17=	23,5%	 1/17	=	5,9%	
TABLE	24.	DATA	-	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	DEVELOPMENT	PROBLEM	(ALL)	
4.9B	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	PATHWAY	TO	CHANGE		
INTERNATIONAL	
	 Funding	 Capacity	
building	
Organizing		 Mindset	
change	
Market	
linkages	
Ag.	
inputs	
1. Food	and	
Agriculture	
Organization			
	 x	 	 	 	 	
2. African	
Development	
Bank	
	 x	 	 x	 	 	
3. Embassy	of	the	
Kingdom	of	the	
Netherlands	
	 	 x	 x	 x	 x	
4. USAID		 	 	 x	 x	 x	 x	
5. AgriProFocus		 	 x	 x	 x	 x	 	
6. AVSI		 	 	 	 x	 x	 	
7. ICCO		 	 x	 	 x	 	 x	
8. ZOA		 	 x	 	 	 	 	
9. MasterCard	
Foundation	–	
DYNAMIC	
project	
	 x	 	 x	 x	 	
10. Triodos	Bank	–	
BRAC	
	 x	 	 	 x	 x	
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programme	
RESULTS	 0%	 7/10	=	
70%	
3/10	=	
30%	
7/10	=	
70%	
6/10	=	
60%	
4/10	=	
40%	
TABLE	25.	DATA	-	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	PATHWAY	TO	CHANGE	(INTERNATIONAL)	
TARGETING	–	INTERNATIONAL		
	 Targeting	BLANKET	 Targeting	SELECTED	
1. Food	and	Agriculture	
Organization			
	 x	
2. African	Development	
Bank	
	 x	
3. Embassy	of	the	
Kingdom	of	the	
Netherlands	
	 x	
4. USAID		 	 x	
5. AgriProFocus		 	 x	
6. AVSI		 	 x	
7. ICCO		 	 x	
8. ZOA		 	 x	
9. MasterCard	
Foundation	–	
DYNAMIC	project	
	 x	
10. Triodos	Bank	–	BRAC	
programme	
	 x	
RESULTS	 0%	 10/10	=	100%	
TABLE	26.	DATA	-	TARGETING	(INTERNATIONAL)	
NATIONAL		
	 Funding	 Capacity	
building	
Organizing		 Mindset	
change	
Market	
linkages	
Ag.	
inputs	
1. AKORION		 	 x	 	 x	 x	 x	
2. Young	
Farmers	
Coalition	of	
Uganda		
	 x	 x	 x	 x	 	
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3. Young	
Farmers	
Champions	
Network		
	 x	 x	 x	 x	 x	
4. CURAD		 	 x	 	 x	 x	 x	
5. Makerere	
University	
Kampala		
	 x	 x	 x	 	 	
6. Ugandan	
Ministry	of	
Agriculture,	
Animal	
Industries	
and	Fisheries	
x	 x	 x	 x	 	 x	
7. Ugandan	
Ministry	of	
Gender,	
Labor	and	
Social	
Developmen
t	
x	 x	 x	 x	 	 	
RESULTS	 2/7=	
28.6%	
7/7=	
100%	
5/7=	
71.4%	
7/7=	
100%	
4/7=	57%	 4/7	=	
57%	
TABLE	27.	DATA	-	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	PATHWAY	TO	CHANGE	(NATIONAL)	
TARGETING	–	NATIONAL	
	 Targeting	ALL	 Targeting	SELECTED	
1. AKORION		 	 x	
2. Young	Farmers	
Coalition	of	Uganda		
	 x	
3. Young	Farmers	
Champions	Network		
x	 	
4. CURAD		 	 x	
5. Makerere	University	
Kampala		
x	 	
6. Ugandan	Ministry	of	
Agriculture,	Animal	
Industries	and	
Fisheries	
x	 	
7. Ugandan	Ministry	of	
Gender,	Labor	and	
Social	Development	
x	 	
	 307	
RESULTS	 4/7	=	57%	 3/7	=	43%	
TABLE	28.	DATA	-	TARGETING	(NATIONAL)	
CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	PATHWAY	TO	CHANGE	–	ALL		
Funding	 Capacity	
building	
Organizing		 Mindset	
change	
Market	
linkages	
Ag.	inputs	
2/17	=	11.8%	 14/17	=	
82.3%	
8/17	=	47.1%	 14/17	=	
82.3%	
10/17	=	
58.8%	
8/17	=	47.1%	
TABLE	29.	DATA	-	CONCEPTUALIZATION	OF	PATHWAY	TO	CHANGE	(ALL)	
TARGETING	–	ALL	
Targeting	ALL	 Targeting	SELECTED	
4/17	=	23.5%	 13/17	=76.5%	
TABLE	30.	DATA	-	TARGETING	(ALL)	
4.9C	CLUSTERING	OF	DEVELOPMENT	ORGANIZATIONS	BY	APPROACHES	
Private	sector	 Type	
AKORION	 National	
BRAC	 International	
DYNAMIC	 International	
AVSI	 International	
USAID	 International	
Embassy	of	the	Netherlands	 International	
6/17	development	organizations	=	35,3%	 1/6	 national	 -	 5/6	 international	 =	 16,7%	 -	
83,3%	
TABLE	31.	CLUSTERING	OF	DEVELOPMENT	ORGANIZATIONS	BY	APPROACHES	(PRIVATE	SECTOR)	
Public	sector	 Type	
MUK	 National	
MAAIF	 National	
MGLSD	 National	
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AfDB	 International	
FAO	 International	
5/17	development	organizations	=	29,2%	 3/5	national	-		2/5	international	=	60%	-	40%	
TABLE	32.	CLUSTERING	OF	DEVELOPMENT	ORGANIZATIONS	BY	APPROACHES	(PUBLIC)	
Other	 Type	
YOFCU	 National	
YOFCHAN	 National	
CURAD	 National	
ICCO	 International	
ZOA	 International	
AgriProFocus	 International	
6/17	development	organizations	=	35.3/	 3/6	national,	3/6	international	=	50%	-	50%		
TABLE	33.	CLUSTERING	OF	DEVELOPMENT	ORGANIZATIONS	BY	APPROACHES	(OTHER)	
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